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I INSCRIBE THIS VOLUME TO THE MEMORY OF

THE LATE

Sir Henry Marion Durand,

K.C.S.I.

A MAN WHO COMBINED A RARE GREATNESS OF SOUL
AND A PERFECT GENIUS FOR AFFAIRS
WITH SIMPLICITY OF MANNERS, DIRECTNESS OF PURPOSE
AND A DETESTATION OF ALL THAT IS MEAN AND FOUL
AS WISE IN COUNSEL
AS HE WAS PROMPT AND DECIDED IN ACTION,
HE MET ALL THE STORMS OF LIFE WITH FORTITUDE,
RENDERING EVER, ALIKE BY HIS ACTION AND HIS EXAMPLE,
UNSURPASSED SERVICES TO HIS COUNTRY.

AFTER A SERVICE FULL OF HONOUR, EXTENDING OVER
FORTY-TWO YEARS,
HE DIED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY.
"HE LEFT A REPUTATION WITHOUT SPOT—THE BEST
INHERITANCE HE COULD BEQUEATH TO HIS CHILDREN."

LIST OF MAPS.

Map of the Southern Marátha Country . . . to face page 20
Map to illustrate the Central Indian campaign of Sir Hugh Rose . . . . . to face page 330
Map to illustrate the final campaign in Oudh . . to face page 296
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LIST OF ERRATA.

VOLUME I.

page 405, line 24, *for* Sultanpur *read* Ghazipur.

VOLUME II.

page 515, lines 14 from top and 6 from foot, *for* Gosling *read* Gottfinge.

VOLUME III.

page 118, line 4 from top, *for* Madras *read* Bengal.

PREFACE.

The present volume concludes the history of the great Indian uprising of 1857.

The question whether that uprising was simply a military mutiny or a revolt of which that military mutiny constituted the prominent feature, was debated keenly at the time, and is to this day as warmly contested. In the concluding chapter of this volume I have endeavoured to throw some light on the dispute, by the simple process of tracing effect to its cause. There is not a line in that chapter which will not bear the most searching analysis. The conclusion I have arrived at is that the uprising of 1857 was not primarily caused by the greased cartridges; that it was neither conceived nor designed by the sepoys. The mutiny was in reality the offspring of the discontent roused by the high-handed measures inaugurated, or at least largely developed, by Lord Dalhousie, and brought to a climax by

the annexation of Oudh. The greased cartridge was the opportune instrument skilfully used by a band of conspirators, for the most part men of Oudh, for the purpose of rousing to action the sepoys, already made disaffected by consecutive breaches of contract and of faith.

Of these acts, of the attempt, as I have termed it, to disregard the silent growth of ages and to force Western ideas upon an Eastern people, and in the course of that attempt to trample upon prejudices and to disregard obligations, the mutiny was the too certain consequence. It is remarkable that the decisive points of this great uprising were at two places, famous in Indian history, in both of which we had, by force or by the moral power engendered by the possession of force, displaced the former rulers. These places were Dehli and Lakhnao. At the one we were the besiegers, in the other we were besieged. Dehli and Lakhnao constituted, so to speak, the wings of the rebel army. Had the centre, represented by Gwalior, gone with the wings, it had fared badly with us. But, for the reasons I have specially referred to in the concluding chapter, the centre remained sound long enough to enable us to concentrate the bulk of our forces on the two decisive points of the rebel line.

It was after Dehli had fallen and a severe blow had been dealt at Lakhnao, that we had to deal with the centre—a centre formidable indeed,

which the loyalty of Sindia had deprived of much of its power and prestige. It is with the contest with that centre, carried on by Colonel Durand, Sir Hugh Rose, Sir Robert Napier, Generals Stuart, Roberts, Michel, and Whitlock, Brigadiers Smith, Honner, Parke, Somerset, Colonel Holmes, Becher, and many others, that the military portion of this volume mainly deals; and I venture to affirm that no part of this history is more remarkable for the display of capability and daring by the generals, of courage and endurance by the men. It is a page of history which every Englishman will read with pride and satisfaction—with pride because the deeds it records were heroic—with satisfaction because many of the actors survive, ready, when they are called upon, to repeat their triumphs in other fields.

But important and full of interest as are the military records of this volume, the political action it relates is certainly not less so. There was not a moment of more consequence to India than that in which Lord Elphinstone had to decide whether he would content himself with saving his own presidency, or, risking everything, would send every available man to the decisive points in the endeavour to save India. Not for a second did that illustrious man hesitate. It has been to me a task of no ordinary pleasure to demonstrate how the daring and generous con-

is difficult to distinguish them. Napoleon, reciting this difficulty, announced to his army after one of his great campaigns that it would be sufficient for a soldier to declare that he had belonged to the army which had fought in that campaign for the world to recognise him as a brave man. That assurance is certainly not less applicable to the soldiers whose gallant deeds are recorded in this volume, and on whom the campaigns of Málwa, of central India, of the southern Maráthá country, and again of Málwa and Rájpútáná, have fixed the stamp of heroes.

Attached to this volume will be found a few amplifications and corrections of details given in the second volume. The services of the artillery during the street-fighting at Delhi; the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Wilkin, 7th Hussars, at Lakhnao, and of Captain Middleton, 29th foot, during the pursuit of Kúnwar Singh; and the additional support of my statement regarding the part taken by Brigadier Napier in the plan for the attack on Lakhnao, come under the former category. Under the latter will be found the measures taken by Major, now General, Orfeur Cavenagh, to provide for the equipment of the army before the arrival in Calcutta of Sir Colin Campbell; an accurate version of the manner in which Adrian Hope met his death before Jhánsí; a corrected account of the storming of the Mess-house at Lakhnao, rendering justice to Captain

Hopkins, 53rd foot; and an extract from a letter from General Cavenagh regarding the cause of the panic in Calcutta on the 2nd of March 1858. I desire also to add that in my account in the second volume of the defence of Lakhnao, after the first relief of that place by Havelock and Outram, I have not given sufficient prominence to the services of Major, now Major-General, Crommelin of the Engineers.

The last appendix gives the story of Tántia Topi's career as related by Tántia Topi himself.

I cannot conclude without expressing the deep obligations under which I lie to the many gentlemen who have placed their journals and letters, all written at the time, at my disposal. The value of the information I have thus been able to obtain is not to be expressed in words. But, especially do I desire to acknowledge the benefit I have received from the services of the gifted friend who read this volume in proof-sheets, and whose frank and judicious criticisms have greatly contributed to the clearness and accuracy of the military narrative.

G. B. MALLESON

27, West Cromwell Road,
31st July, 1880.

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HISTORY

OF THE

INDIAN MUTINY OF 1857.

BOOK XIII.

CHAPTER I.

THE western, or Bombay, Presidency of India comprises a long, narrow strip of country of varying breadth and irregular outline. Including the province of Sindh, the administration of which is subordinate to it, it occupies the western coast of the peninsula from the mouths of the Indus to the northernmost point of Goa, and from the south of that territory to the borders of Maisúr. It is thus bounded on the west by Balúchistan and the Arabian Sea; on the south by Maisúr; on the east by the Madras Presidency, Haidarábád, Barár, the central provinces, the states forming the central Indian agency, and Rajpútáná; on the north by Bhawalpúr, the Panjáb, and Balúchistán. The area of the British portions of the Presidency is one hundred and thirty-four thousand one hundred and thirty-five square miles, supporting fourteen millions of inhabitants; but

in subordinate political relations to it, there are, or rather there were in 1857, native states comprising seventy-one thousand three hundred and twenty square miles with six millions of inhabitants. The principal of these were Barodah, Káthwár, Kachh, Kambhayat, Mahikánta, Rewakánta, Kohlapúr, Sáwantwári, and Khairpúr.

In 1857 Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay. A man of culture and ability, Lord Elphinstone had enjoyed more experience of India than generally falls to the lot of governors unconnected with the civil or military services. He had been Governor of Madras from 1837 to 1842; and although the records of the Madras Presidency throughout his incumbency had marked no stirring events within its borders, yet the first Afghán war, with its early success and its later collapse, had excited the minds of the natives throughout the country, and had called for the exercise of tact and judgment on the part of the rulers. These qualities Lord Elphinstone was eminently qualified to display, and he had displayed them. He was called, however, to deal principally with administrative details. The manner in which he performed these duties gained for him the confidence of the natives. His measures for improving the resources of the country, and for establishing means of communication in all directions, are spoken of to this day.

Lord Elphinstone revisited India at the time of the first Sikh war, 1845-6, and marched in company with the 14th Light Dragoons, then commanded by the late Colonel William Have-

lock, who had been his military secretary, from Bombay, through central India, to the head-quarters of the British army before Láhor. On the transfer of Káshmir to Gúláb Síngh, a proceeding following the treaty of 1846 with the Sikhs, Lord Elphinstone formed one of the party which first visited that famous valley. After a residence in it of nearly three months, he set out for Ladák by the Husora valley, and endeavoured to proceed thence up the Gilghit valley—in those days an utterly unknown country. Forced, perhaps fortunately, by the objections of the authorities, to renounce this expedition, Lord Elphinstone crossed the Hurpo pass to Rondu on the Indus, being the first Englishman by whom that journey had been attempted.

Book XIII. Chapter I. 1857. Mt.

It will be seen, then, that when in 1853 Lord Elphinstone was called to the post of Governor of Bombay, he brought to that office experience such as few men, not trained in the Indian services, could command. His knowledge of men, his courtesy, his genial bearing, gave effect to that experience. Up to the outbreak of the mutiny in 1857 his conduct as Governor of Bombay was invariably marked by temper, judgment, and discretion. Calm and dignified in manner, courteous to his colleagues and to all with whom he was brought in contact, he evinced, on all occasions likely to test his action, the possession of a directing mind, of a will not to be shaken, a resolution that went direct to its aim. The crisis of 1857 was just one of those occurrences which Lord Elphinstone

His qualifications for his post.

Well fitted to encounter the crisis of the mutiny.

Book XIII. Chapter I. 1857. May.

was constitutionally fitted to cope with. He at once realised its difficulty and its danger, and rose equal to encounter the one and to neutralise the other. In the words of a contemporary writer, generally unfavourable to him, he displayed "the courage of the soldier who knows his enemy."*

Lord Elphinstone's action on hearing of the outbreak at Mirath.

The truth of this judgement was proved by the action taken by Lord Elphinstone when the news reached him of the outbreak of the 10th of May at Mirath. Lord Elphinstone was at Bombay when he heard of that event. It happened that General Ashburnham, commanding the expeditionary corps on its way to China, was staying with him. So greatly did the importance of the intelligence impress the Governor, so certain did he feel that the Mirath revolt would spread, and that it should be met at once by bringing large reinforcements of European troops without delay into the country, that he urged General Ashburnham to proceed immediately to Calcutta, and to offer his services, and the services of the China expeditionary force, to the Governor-General.

His request to General Ashburnham.

It was a fortunate circumstance that the war with Persia had just been brought to a successful conclusion. Fortunate, likewise, that the disaffection had not spread to the native army of Bombay. Lord Elphinstone thus felt himself equal to the most decisive measures. He at once authorised the Commissioner of Sindh, Mr

* *The Friend of India.*

necessary stores, and despatched them, under the command of Captain Griffith Jenkins of the Indian navy, to the Mauritius and the Cape, with letters to the Governors of those settlements, dwelling upon the importance of the crisis, and begging them to despatch to India any troops they could spare.

I may here state that the result of these applications was such as might have been anticipated from the characters of the men to whom they were addressed. The Governor of the Mauritius, Sir James Higginson, embarked on board the *Pottinger* the head-quarters and as many men of the 33rd as that steamer could carry. Not contented with that, he took an early opportunity to charter and despatch another transport to convey the remainder of that regiment, a battery of artillery, and as much money as could be spared from the treasury of the island.

Nor was the Governor of the Cape, Sir George Grey, animated by sentiments less patriotic. It fortunately happened that an unusually large force of British regiments was, at the moment, concentrated at Cape Town. Sir George despatched, without delay, as many of them as he could spare. The 89th and 95th he sent to Bombay; the 6th, the 1st battalion 13th, the 2nd battalion 60th, the 73rd, 80th, and 31st to Calcutta. In subsequent vessels he despatched horses in as large a quantity as he could conveniently procure.

The despatch of Lord Elphinstone to Sir George Grey had painted the urgency of India's

Frere, to transfer the 1st Bombay Fusiliers from Karáchi to the Panjáb. He arranged that the 64th and 78th regiments, then on their way from Persia, should proceed forthwith, without landing at Bombay, to Calcutta. The more speedily to carry out this object, he caused vessels to be equipped and prepared for the reception of these regiments, so that on the arrival in the Bombay harbour of the transports which were conveying them from Bushír they might be transhipped without loss of time. This measure was duly and effectively carried out. The men moved from the one transport into the other, and reached Calcutta in time materially to influence the campaign. But Lord Elphinstone did more. He despatched on the instant to Calcutta a company of Madras artillery which happened to be on the spot, taking the duty of the Bombay artillery, then absent in Persia. He at the same time sent instructions to the officer commanding at Dísá to hold the 83rd Regiment and the troop of horse artillery at that station in readiness to march on Ájmír, on the sole condition that, in the opinion of the local authorities, the departure of the only European troops in the vicinity of Ahmadábád and Gújrát might be hazarded without the absolute certainty of an outbreak. And, still penetrated by the necessity to concentrate on the scene of the mutiny as many European troops as could be collected, Lord Elphinstone chartered, on his own responsibility, two steamers belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the *Pottinger* and the *Madras*, provided them with all

needs in terms so glowing that that able governor considered himself justified to stretch his powers. He did not hesitate to direct the commanders of the transports conveying the China expeditionary army so far to divert from their course as to call at Singapor for orders. The result of this patriotic action was most happy. The intelligence which met these transports at Singapor induced their commanders, in every case, to bear up for Calcutta.

To return to Bombay. So important did it appear to Lord Elphinstone, that reinforcements should promptly be sent from England by the overland route—a route till then untrodden by British troops—that, telegraphic communication being open with Calcutta, he suggested to the Governor-General the propriety of sending to England a special steamer, which he had ready, with despatches, impressing upon the Home Government the urgency of the need. There can be no doubt that the suggestion was a wise one. A fast lightly-laden steamer, travelling at her highest speed, would have anticipated the ordinary mail steamer by three or four days at the least. This, too, at a time when the most important events depended on prompt and decisive action. But Lord Canning did not view matters in the same light. He refused to interfere with the ordinary mail service. The steamer, therefore, was not sent.

Lord Elphinstone suggests sending a special steamer to England.

but Lord Canning refuses.

Before I pass from the record of the precautionary measures taken in the early days of the revolt, to describe the actual occurrences in the

Effect of the precautionary measures above described.

1857. May.

various parts of the Bombay Presidency, I wish to advert for a moment to one material result which followed them. Those measures undoubtedly saved Bombay from serious outbreak. They did more. They secured an important base of operations against central India and Rajpútáná, and they preserved the line of communication between those provinces and the provinces beyond them and the seaboard. It is difficult to overestimate the importance thus gained, solely by the exercise of timely foresight.

Lord Elphinstone meets a breach of law at Baroch.

A rather serious breach of the law at Baroch in the month of May, originating in a dispute between the Párśís and the Muhammadans, might have led to important consequences but for the firmness with which it was met, in the first instance, by the officer commanding on the spot, and, in the next, by the Governor. The spirit of Lord Elphinstone's action may be judged from the fact that, to prevent the spread of the riot, he despatched two hundred men of the 86th to Súrat—a movement of troops which left only three hundred European troops of all arms in Bombay itself.

He designs a policy of offensive defence.

The riot at Baroch was, for a time, the only indication of ill-feeling manifested in the western Presidency, and it was entirely unconnected with the great revolt then raging in the north-west. Lord Elphinstone, whilst carefully repressing it, did not abate a single effort to carry out the policy which he was convinced was the only sound policy—the policy of offensive defence. Almost from the very first he had designed to form, at a

convenient point within the Presidency, a column to secure and hold the great line of road between Bombay and Agra. Not only would the line thus secured form a base for ulterior operations, but a great moral advantage would be gained by its tenure. In the crisis which then afflicted India, it was not to be thought of that any portion of the empire would stand still. The attitude of folded arms was an attitude to invite danger. To check the approach of evil, the surest mode was to go forth and meet it. A column marching towards the north-west would encounter the elements which, having brewed there disturbance, were eager to spread it, and encountering, would annihilate them. The presence of such a column, marching confidently to the front, would, moreover, go far to check, perhaps even to suppress, any disloyal feelings which might have been engendered in the minds of the native princes whose states bordered on this line of communication. For these reasons, then, at a very early period of the crisis, Lord Elphinstone proposed in Council, and ordered the formation of a column, under the command of Major-General Woodburn, to open out communications with central India and the North-West Provinces.

The column formed in consequence, under the command of Major-General Woodburn, was but small in numbers. It consisted only of five troops of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, Captain Woolcombe's horse-battery of artillery, and a pontoon train. It set out from Poona on the 8th of June, under

orders to march with all speed to Mán, with the view to save that place while there was yet time, and to prevent the spread of the insurrection in Málwa, and along the northern frontier of the Bombay Presidency.*

The state of affairs at Mán and at Indúr was such as to demand the most prompt action on the part of General Woodburn. It was just possible that, making forced marches, he might approach so near to Indúr as to baffle the plans of the discontented. The dread that he might do so for a long time paralysed their action.† Circumstances, however, occurred which baffled the hopes expressed by Lord Elphinstone, when, acting on his own unaided judgment, he pressed upon the military authorities the necessity for General Woodburn to advance.

Aurangábád. The city of Aurangábád—once the capital of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, and, at a later period, the favourite residence of the Emperor Aurangzéb—occupies a prominent and important position in the north-western corner of the dominions of the Nizám. The corner of which it was the capital, juts like a promontory into British territory. To the east and north-east it touches western Berár and the central provinces; to the south, the west, and the north-west, the northern portions of the Bombay Presidency. Beyond the northernmost part of that Presidency, and within easy distance of Aurangábád, lies Málwa.

* Lord Elphinstone's letter to General Woodburn.
† *Vide* vol. i. page 212.

Disaffection was known to reign in Málwa, and it was of the highest consequence that that disaffection should not spread southward to Bombay. But at Aurangábád, the capital of the small promontory I have described, almost touching Málwa on one side and running into Bombay on the other three sides, were quartered the 1st and 3rd Cavalry, the 2nd Infantry, and a battery of artillery, of the Haidarábád Contingent. These regiments, commanded by British officers, were composed chiefly of Muhammadans, and one of them—the 1st Cavalry—had, in the early part of June, displayed symptoms of disaffection.

Disaffection of the Chapter I.

1857. June.

Garrison of Aurangábád.

Aurangábád is distant from Púna a hundred and thirty-eight miles, from Ahmadnaggar, about midway between the two, sixty-eight miles. In the ordinary course of events, General Woodburn, armed with positive instructions to push on with all speed to Máu, would not have entered the dominions of the Nizám. It happened, however, that the disaffection I have spoken of as prevailing at Aurangábád proceeded on the 13th of June to more open demonstrations, and in consequence General Woodburn received, not from Lord Elphinstone, instructions to deviate from the line urged upon him by that nobleman, and to march upon Aurangábád.

Disaffection of the garrison.

In explanation of the open demonstrations at Aurangábád, I may state that a rumour had reached that place that the cavalry regiment stationed there would be required to join General Woodburn's column and march with him on Dehlí. The rumour was founded upon truth, for

Reasons of the disaffection.

it had been intended that the regiment in question should join General Woodburn's force. But to the minds of soldiers who were not British subjects, who lived under the rule of the descendant of a viceroy appointed by the Moghol, the idea of fighting against the King of Dehlí was peculiarly distasteful.* They showed their dislike on the moment. On the 13th of June the men of the 1st Cavalry openly expressed their dissatisfaction, and—it was stated at the time—swore to murder their officers if pressure to march against Dehlí were put upon them. Fortunately, the commanding officer, Captain Abbott, was a sensible man. He summoned the native officers to his quarters, and discussed the question with them. The native officers declared that, for their own part, they were ready to obey any lawful order, but they admitted that their men would not fight against the mutineers. Captain Abbott then, after communicating with the Resident, resolved to adopt a conciliatory course. He gave the men assurances that they would not be required to march on Dehlí. In this way order was restored. So little confidence, however, in the stability of the compromise was felt on both sides, that the officers proceeded to barricade themselves in their mess-house, whilst the mutinous cavalry boasted over their moral victory in every quarter of the city.

Matters were in this state when, on the morn-

* The splendid manner in which the Haidarábád cavalry atoned for this momentary disaffection will be found recorded in subsequent pages.

ing of the 23rd of June, General Woodburn's column entered Aurangábád, marched at once to the ground occupied by the mutineers, and ordered the men to give up their arms. With the exception of one troop of the 1st Cavalry, all obeyed. The general gave the men of that troop six minutes to consider the course they would pursue. When the time elapsed, the men, instead of submitting, put on a bold front and attempted to ride away. In this attempt most of them succeeded. The next morning some three or four, convicted of attempts at assassination, were hanged, and order was restored.

Woodburn enters Aurangábád and disarms the mutineers.

General Woodburn was under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Somerset. In the opinion of Lord Elphinstone, the danger at Aurangábád had not been so pressing as to necessitate the deviation of the field force from the direct road to Máu. He thought that in the presence of two dangers, that which would result from the mutiny coming down to Bombay from central India and Málwa was greater even than the disaffection of a portion of the troops of the Nizám. Forced, however, to accept General Woodburn's action at Aurangábád, he lost not a moment in urging him to press on towards Máu. "I am persuaded," he wrote to that officer on the 22nd of June, "that the local officers greatly exaggerate the danger of a rising in our own provinces. I have no fear of anything of the sort; and if it should happen, I trust that we should be able to put it down speedily. But I feel confident that it will not happen—at all events,

Lord Elphinstone urges Woodburn to press on to Máu.

for the present. If you allow the insurrection to come down to our borders without attempting to check it, we shall almost deserve our fate; but if by a rapid advance you are able to secure Mhow" (Máu), "you will also, in all probability, save Mehidpúr, Ságar, Hoshangábád," &c. Lord Elphinstone followed up these noble words, displaying the true conception he had formed of the situation, by a letter addressed, the same day, to Sir Henry Somerset: "I am very much obliged to you," he wrote, "for the perusal of General Woodburn's letter. I conclude that since it was written he has received his orders to continue his march to Mhow" (Máu) "with all possible expedition."

But General Woodburn did not move forward. In reply to the letter I have just quoted, he wrote, on the 25th, to Lord Elphinstone, urging the various reasons which, he thought, would necessitate a long stay at Aurangábád. These reasons might, in the presence of the greater danger at Máu, be justly termed trivial. They consisted in the possibility of a fresh outbreak after his departure, and in the necessity of trying some sixty-four prisoners by court-martial.

Lord Elphinstone answered the objections to advance urged by the general, in a very decided manner. "I wish you to remember," he wrote to him on the 27th of June, "that it was for the object of relieving Máu, and not for the purpose of chastising a mutinous regiment at Aurangábád, that the field force was formed. The latter is an incidental duty, which it was hoped would not

interfere with the main object. I am perfectly aware that, in these times, circumstances may occur to divert your force from its original destination, but I do not think they have yet occurred." He then proceeded in a few forcible words to urge the folly of wasting unnecessary time upon trials,* and the necessity of disarming regiments which might show disaffection, instead of delaying a movement of the first importance from a fear that a revolt might take place after the departure of the British troops.

This letter, I have said, was despatched to General Woodburn on the 27th of June. On the morning of the 28th Lord Elphinstone received a despatch from Calcutta, instructing him to send to Calcutta by sea the wing of the 12th Lancers then stationed at Púna. This diminution of his available European strength, already extremely small, following immediately upon the departure from the Presidency of General Woodburn's force, and accompanied by reports received from many district officers to the effect that rebellion was only watching its opportunity, so affected Lord Elphinstone, that for the moment he felt inclined to authorise General Woodburn to halt at Aurangabád. Indeed, on the spur of the moment he wrote that officer a letter, expressive of his deep regret and disappointment at having to request him to give up a measure which he believed to be of great importance. But the night dissipated his anxiety. In the morning

*"To allow twenty days prisoners is out of the question in these times."

he had resolved to dare all, to risk all, for the supreme advantage of saving central India. On the 29th, then, he wrote again to General Woodburn, cancelling that portion of his previous letter which had given him authority to defer the projected movement.

But, before this letter could reach General Woodburn that officer had become incapacitated for command by ill-health. The Government promptly replaced him by Colonel C. S. Stuart, of the Bombay Army, then commanding the 3rd Regiment Native Infantry. Pending the arrival of that officer, the command of the field force devolved upon Major Follett, 25th Regiment Native Infantry.

Major Follett had a grand opportunity before him. He had only to move forward. Unfortunately, he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief a letter in which he dwelt upon the impossibility of leaving Aurangábád in the then condition of the Nizám's regiments. Moré unfortunately still, Major Follett's representations were strongly supported by the head of the army.

Lord Elphinstone's reasons and instincts still told him that the further delay thus proposed was the delay of red tape—the natural consequence of the absence of a clear mind and a firm will. But he was in a very difficult position. He was not a soldier. And although he would unhesitatingly have disregarded the scruples of Major Follett, unsupported by higher authority, he could not treat with contempt the weighty support given to those scruples by the officer who was

Commander-in-Chief of the armies serving in India. Unwillingly, then, and solely in deference to the strong opinion expressed by Sir Henry Somerset, Lord Elphinstone consented to the delay.

A few days proved how true had been his judgment. On the 7th of July, Major Follett convicted himself and the chief who supported him of a hasty and premature decision. On the 7th of July that officer wrote to Lord Elphinstone,* declared that it was perfectly feasible to leave Aurangábád, and announced his intention to march for Máu on the 10th, leaving a troop of cavalry and two guns for the protection of the Aurangábád cantonment.

Major Follett is converted to Lord Elphinstone's views.

Lord Elphinstone promptly requested Sir Henry Somerset to confirm this change of feeling by cancelling his previous orders. This was, in effect, carried out.

The force, led by Colonel C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, who joined it on the 8th, quitted Aurangábád on the 12th, too late to prevent the mutinies at Máu and Indúr, but not too late, under the guidance of Colonel Durand, who joined it at Asírgarh, to restore British authority in central India. To the further movements of this column I shall return in a subsequent chapter. Its march beyond the Bombay fron-

Colonel Stuart to command the force, and sent on to Asírgarh.

* It is probable that Major Follett's change of opinion was due to the receipt of a despatch from Colonel Durand addressed to Mr. Plowden, and sent through the officer commanding at Aurangábád. This letter contained convincing proofs of the necessity of promptly advancing.

tier was due solely to Lord Elphinstone.* Had he been unfettered, and had its first commander been a man after his own heart, it would have taken place in time to prevent much evil in central India.

But the despatch of Colonel Stuart's column to central India was not the only aid proffered by the Bombay Presidency for the suppression of the mutiny. I have already alluded to the splendid self-abnegation by which the province of Sind was denuded for the benefit of the Punjáb. Again, the western Presidency was prompt to comply with the indent made upon it by Colonel G. St. P. Lawrence.

* "I quite agree with you," wrote Lord Elphinstone to Colonel Durand, the 27th of July, "in regretting the delay which took place in the advance of the force. You cannot have written more strongly than I have upon the subject, but there was a strong counter-prejudice on the part of the officers on the spot, everyone of whom declared that the departure of the column from Aurangábád would be the signal of a general rising. I from the first recommended that the mutinous troops should be disarmed and dismounted. But this was considered inexpedient. It was represented that it was not so much the troops but the whole population was against us.' Mr. ——, the Deputy Commissioner in North Berár, who is reckoned a very good officer, said that there were, I am afraid to say how many, armed Musulmans in his district, who would rise the moment the column was ordered to move. Colonel —— who commands the Madras cavalry regiment at ——, said it was utterly impossible to send half his regiment over to Aurangábád, as the people in that neighbourhood would attack the station." It is immensely to the credit of Lord Elphinstone that, in spite of these and many similar reports from district officers, and of the opposition referred to in the text, he should have persevered in urging the forward movement. He was, in fact, one of the few men in high position in India who realised how the mutiny should be met.

the Governor-General's agent in Rajpútáná.* The greater part of the garrison of Dísá, consisting of a troop of horse artillery, one regiment and one squadron of native light cavalry, a detachment (four hundred men) of the 83rd, and a detachment of the 12th Native Infantry, was formed into a movable column, and placed at the disposal of George Lawrence, just then nominated Brigadier-General in Rajpútáná. Lord Elphinstone was prompt to confirm this arrangement—an arrangement which gave General Lawrence a power, exercised with remarkable ability and judgment, to maintain order in a country ruled over by the great Rajpút chiefs.† Further, on the 23rd of July, four companies of the 86th Regiment were sent from Malligám to join Colonel Stuart's column on its way to Máu. Marching direct by the Bombay road, they did not join till after that column had arrived at Máu.

Book XIII. Chapter I. 1857. July. Lord Elphinstone places a column at the disposal of General Lawrence.

Whilst Lord Elphinstone was thus actively employing a policy of aggressive offence alike to keep the evil from his own borders and to crush it in the provinces beyond them, the spirit which had worked so much mischief in the north-west suddenly raised its head on his very hearth. The first symptoms of mutiny in the Bombay Presidency broke out shortly after the march of the columns whose movements I have just recorded.

First symptoms of mutiny in Bombay Presidency.

The southern Maráthá country comprises the territory between Satárah and the Madras Presidency to the north and south, and between the

The southern Maráthá country.

* Vol. i. page 249. † *Vide* pages 245 to 260, vol. i.

Nizám's dominions and the western ghats to the east and west. It has an area of fourteen thousand square miles and a population of about three millions, for the most part of pure Maráthá blood. Within this country are the two collectorates, Belgáon and Dhárwár, the native state Kolhapúr, and numerous small semi-independent states, each with an annual revenue rising up to, but in no case exceeding, fifty thousand pounds. In 1857 the principal of these were Sángli, Míraj, Sávanúr, Kurándwár, Jamkhandi, Nargúnd, and Múdhol.

Of this important country the Collector and Magistrate of Belgáon, Mr. George Berkeley Seton-Karr, had political charge. Mr. Seton-Karr possessed remarkable natural abilities, and these had been developed by an education which had continued up to the date of which I am writing. He was a firm advocate for the rights of native princes, for continuing to them the power to adopt, for interfering as little as possible with their customs which, however little understood by Europeans, were harmless in themselves, and which were hallowed by the practice of ages. He was one of those men who, whilst possessed of a firm and decided character, yet preferred to try to their fullest extent the arts of persuasion before having recourse to intimidation or violence.

The internal condition of the southern Maráthá country when Mr. Seton-Karr assumed charge of it in May 1856, just twelve months prior to the revolt, was one of brooding discontent. The

Cambay
Barodah
Dabhai
Broach
Narbada
Khandesh
Daman
Trimbak
Malligaon
Chandur
Akola
Jalnah
Jaffrabad
Aurangabad
Ahmadnagar
Bombay
Salsette I.
Kolabah I.
Rajapur
Jinjirah
Sevandurg
Sitara
Phaltan
Sholapur
Akalkot
Pandarpur
Tolapur
BIJAPUR
Kolhapur
Sangamtahur
Ratnagiri
Vingorla
GOA
Sawantwari
Dharwar
Hubli
Sivadashagarh
Ankolah
THE
MARATHA COUN
English Miles

annexation by the Government of India of Berar and of Sindh had been in the one case followed, in the other preceded, by an Act known as Act XI. of 1852, under the operation of which the Inam Commission was empowered to call upon all landed proprietors to produce the title-deeds of their estates. A new tribunal had, under this Act, been invested with arbitrary jurisdiction over this vast mass of property. The holders of estates, careless and improvident, unacquainted with law, and accustomed to consider that thirty years' possession conferred an irrefragable title, had failed in many instances to preserve the most valid muniments of their estates. In some cases, indeed, no muniments had ever existed. Chiefs who, in the anarchy which prevailed in India subsequent to the death of Aurangzíb, had won their estates by the sword, had not been careful to fence them in with a paper barrier—in that age utterly valueless—but they had transmitted to their descendants the arms and the retainers who had constituted their right to possession, and with whose aid they had learned to consider mere titles superfluous, as without it they were contemptible. In other cases, men who had acquired land in the general scramble which preceded the downfall of the Peshwá's Government, had transmitted their acquisitions to their children, fortified by no better titles than entries in the village account-books. To both these classes the Inám Commission had been a commission simply of confiscation. In the southern Maráthá country the titles of thirty-five thousand

estates, large and small, had been called for by the new tribunal. In twenty-one thousand cases that tribunal had pronounced sentences of confiscation. Thousands of other landowners, still unevicted, looked on in dismay, tremblingly awaiting the sentence which was to add their wail of distress and resentment to that of their impoverished neighbours.* Can it be wondered at, then, that Mr. Seton-Karr, when he assumed charge under these circumstances in May 1866, found the native landowners of the southern Maráthá country in a state of moody discontent, which was prevented from bursting into open disaffection only by a sense of its utter hopelessness?

* In writing thus of the feelings of the actual landowners, I am far from desiring to say a single word against the inquiries instituted by the Inám Commission. I wish to record only the discontent of the men who actually possessed the land when the inquiry was ordered. I admit not only that the Government was perfectly justified in ordering that inquiry, but that it was demanded by thousands who had been violently and, in some cases, fraudulently dispossessed of their hereditary acres during the period antecedent to the fall of the Péshwá. The Inám Commission rendered substantial justice to these men. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that forty years had elapsed since the dominions of the Péshwá had been brought under British sway, and that during those years, and, in many cases, during many antecedent years, the landowners who felt aggrieved by the action of the Inám Commission, had enjoyed and transmitted to their children the estates which their fathers had gained. The long possession gave them in their eyes a better right than any which could be urged by the descendants of the men who had been dispossessed. No wonder, then, from their point of view, the Inám Commission was an instrument of tyranny.

Book XII. Chapter I.

1857. May.

But another cause increased, even intensified, the discontent, and, by its connection with the religious feelings of all classes, added greatly to the danger of the situation. Of all the rights devolving upon a Hindú landowner, the right to adopt is at once the most cherished and the most sacred. It is an observance enjoined upon him by his religion. Should he fail to beget a child, he is bound to provide for himself an heir by adoption. On the child so adopted he bestows all the care and the affection ordinarily lavished on the offspring of love. Taught by his religion to believe that his own happiness in the other world depends upon the transmission to the adopted son of the inheritance of his fathers, he is ever careful to instil into his mind that he actually is of the family, and will be, after his death, the representative of its traditions and its honours. The idea that he might die heirless is to the Hindú landowner an ever-present canker-worm. It is sufficient to make him moody, despairing, miserable. The prohibition to find for himself such an heir might even make him reckless.

The right of adoption.

But the Anglo-Indian Government had, in many instances, pronounced such a prohibition. The policy of absorption adopted by Lord Dalhousie had shown no respect for the principle of adoption. Under its action large states had been absorbed, and the power to adopt had been denied to lesser landowners. This refusal had been extended to the landowners of the southern Maráthá country—amongst others, to the important chief of Nargúnd. The prohibition produced conster-

The policy of Lord Dalhousie

nation. The effeminate training of the Hindú upper classes often rendered it absolutely necessary to employ the rite of adoption to prevent the extinction of a family. The custom had been followed by time. The prohibition of it by a paramount power, alien in race and faith, could be attributed only to greed for the land. When, then, the prohibition was extended, and the landowners saw family after family disappear, a great fear fell upon them. They felt, one and all, that their turn would come; that their names, too, would perish; that none would succeed to commemorate their deeds and the deeds of their ancestors, and to appease their *manes* by yearly celebrations. In the common despair old feuds were laid aside, hereditary enmity was forgotten. A common dread produced a common sympathy, and the indignation or alarm of each was supported and increased by the sense that it was shared by all. For the moment, indeed, no one thought to combine against the British Government. But though tranquillity prevailed, it was not the tranquillity which is based upon contentment. The landowners were tranquil simply because successful revolt seemed impossible. The British authority seemed too firmly fixed to be easily shaken. But, were it to be shaken, it was always possible, considering the intense and widespread discontent of the landowners, that their hopeless apathy might become the audacity of despair.

Such was the state of the southern Marátha country when, in May 1856, Mr. Seton-Karr as-

named charge of it. But a few weeks elapsed before his experienced mind had mastered the causes of the discontent which he found everywhere prevailing. It was difficult, even for a man who condemned the policy of the Government and who sympathised with the native landowners, to allay it. He found, in fact, that in almost every instance the landowners had been grievously wronged. The influential chief of Nargund had been denied the rights of adoption in terms which—owing to the faultiness of the translation of the original English—added insult to injury. Other landowners of ancient lineage, and possessing weight in the country, were found by Mr. Seton-Karr estranged from their loyalty by the causes to which I have adverted—the Inám Commission and the withholding of the right of adoption—and plunged in moody mistrust of the Government. It was not in the power of Mr. Seton-Karr to carry out the only act which would have restored confidence—to moderate the action of the Inám Commission and to restore the right of adoption. Nor, conciliatory and sympathising as he was, was he more able to reconcile the native chiefs and landowners to the new order which had to them all the effects of a revolution. But all that an earnest and high-minded man could do he did. He visited every landowner. Their individual characters he carefully studied. To their complaints he listened with patience. He met them generally with such explanations of the policy of the Government as might remove misapprehension as to its general

intention; whilst, in cases of individual hardship—which he was powerless to remedy—he endeavoured to soothe the sense of hardness and injustice by kindly expressions of sympathy. In this way he won their confidence. He made the landowners feel that in the highest official in the province they had a real friend. More it was impossible for him to effect. Regard for the individual in no way obliterated resentment at the action of the Government. A sense of deep injury still continued to rankle in each breast.

Such was the state of affairs when, on the 21st of May 1857, the news of the mutiny at Mirath and Dihlí reached Belgáon. The effect of this news, and of the worse tidings which continued to follow, upon the peoples of the southern Marátha country was electric. The Muhammadans were at once aroused to an intense pitch of excitement. The Hindús, on the other hand, were far more reticent, and for some time concealed their inner feelings by an impassive exterior. British authority seemed so firmly rooted in the country that they hesitated to believe that it could be suddenly destroyed.

Mr. Seton-Karr was fully alive to the dangers of the crisis. The force at Belgáon consisted of one regiment of native infantry, the 29th, a weak battery of European artillery, and the depot of the 64th Foot, composed of about thirty men fit for duty, guarding upwards of four hundred women and children belonging to that regiment. Exclusive of the artillery, not more than one hundred Europeans fit to carry arms could be

stationed in the place; whilst between Belgáon and Púna and Sholapúr there were more than two thousand native, and only one hundred and twenty European soldiers. The defences of Belgáon consisted of a fort nearly a mile in circumference, the ramparts of which, unrepaired for years, presented breaches in several places. In a military point of view the place was, in fact, untenable, but it had nevertheless to be regarded as the sole refuge for the European non-combatants, consisting of some five hundred including children. Belgáon was the head-quarters of the southern division of the army, and Major-General Lester had arrived there on the 11th of May to assume that command. Mr. Seton-Karr at once placed himself in communication with that officer, and, under his direction, such improvements as in so brief a time were practicable, were made to the defences.

During the week or two following, the unusual exaltation of the Muhammadans alone gave evidence of the effect produced by the bad news from the north-west. But in the early part of June Mr. Seton-Karr discovered that an emissary from that part of India had arrived some days before, and that he had been in daily communication with the Muhammadan leaders. Prompt to act in the presence of real danger, as he was slow to use violence when the end could be accomplished by peaceable means, Mr. Seton-Karr caused this intruder to be arrested and confined. He did not act one minute too soon. The sepoys, many of them natives of Oudh, had for some days pre-

vious displayed an unaccustomed insolence. It had become hourly more and more evident that they sympathised with the action of their brethren in the north, and that they would grasp at an opportunity to follow their example. In the proportion in which their insolence increased did the peril of Mr. Seton-Karr's position increase. It was still further augmented by the action of Náná Sáhib at Kánhpúr towards the end of June. To understand this it is requisite only to remember that Náná Sáhib claimed to be, and in the eyes of his countrymen actually was, the adopted heir of the last of the Péshwás; and that some of the most important estates in the southern Maráthá country—the estates of Sángli, of Jam-Khandi, of Míraj, and of Kúrandwar—were held by branches of the great Patwardhan family, the most illustrious of the dependants of the Péshwá. The fact that Náná Sáhib was married to the first cousin of the chief of Sángli; that his most active lieutenant was that chief's uncle; and that the chief himself, on the verge of his majority, had evinced a taste for low and intriguing associates, did not certainly lessen the danger of the position.

There were other chiefs whose discontent was hardly less formidable. Prominent amongst these were the Désái of Nipáni, a small fortress built on the model of Bharatpúr, about forty miles from Belgáon—a chieftain who had lost a large portion of his estates under the operation of the Inám Commission, who was known to be disaffected, and whose disaffection would cut off

communications with Bombay; the Désái of Jámboti—a chieftain whose family, settled for many generations amongst the forests which stretch onwards from the Gháts, had come to be regarded as the natural lords of the wild population of the jungles, and who, in his own person, had been reduced to penury by the action of the same arbitrary tribunal. The temper of this chieftain had been soured by his misfortunes. He had little to lose, everything to gain, by rebellion. It was in his power to draw after him a large portion of the jungle population, and by their means to sever the communications of the British with the sea. Not less dangerous was the adopted son of the late Désái of Kittúr. The retainers of this family, twenty-four years previously, had crowned a rash insurrection by a gallant defence of their fort, in the siege of which a political agent of that day had fallen. The last representative of the race was then living as a pensioner upon the bounty of his father-in-law, commanding in his fallen state the sympathies of the whole Lingayat population. He, too, had nothing to lose, everything to hope, from rebellion. His father-in-law, the Désái of Wantmúri, though a cautious and prudent man, did not possess the strength of character to resist extraordinary pressure placed upon him by his co-religionists. Add to these the chief of Nargúnd, connected with some of the most powerful families in the southern Maráthá country, and known to be thoroughly disaffected; add, moreover, that the population, naturally turbulent and

warlike, had retained the arms which had all but gained empire for the Marathás; and the reader may gather some idea of the position which, difficult in May, became dangerous in the early part of June, and threatening as every day witnessed a closer approach to the advent of July.

For long Mr. Seton-Karr met the increasing danger from the resources suggested to him by his long experience, and by his thorough acquaintance with native character. But as time went on, each post bringing with it intelligence of further outbreaks in the provinces of the north-west, that gentleman deemed it at last his duty to bring the situation of the provinces under the eyes of the Government of Bombay. He did this on the 20th of June. Cognisant, however, of the great difficulties which Lord Elphinstone had to encounter, of the unselfish foresight which had induced that heroic man to denude his own presidency that he might crush rebellion upon its borders, Mr. Seton-Karr did not ask for aid, material or other. He merely asked that his own powers might be extended. He asked, in fact, that the entire responsibility of meeting and encountering the crisis might be cast on him alone. It was a noble request; especially noble at that crisis; especially noble considering the resources at his disposal—a native regiment in a state of veiled rebellion, a weak battery of artillery, about one hundred Europeans—to meet the rebellion which might occur at any moment. The request was complied with.

Free now to act, Mr. Seton-Karr developed his plan. The use of force was out of the question. The only possible policy was conciliation. In carrying this out Mr. Seton-Karr enjoyed advantages which would have been denied to many men. During the year immediately preceding the mutiny he had carefully cultivated friendly relations with the chiefs. Over the minds of many he had acquired an extraordinary ascendancy. This ascendancy he now tested—and in the most cases with the happiest results. Valuable information was placed at his disposal; the safe communication of the disaffected was prevented; a vigilant watch upon their movements was secured. In this way, and by a show of confidence towards all, by impressing upon each chief the idea that his neighbour was loyal, and by the expression of a confidence, really felt, that the scare would soon pass away, leaving the British complete master of the situation, Mr. Seton-Karr succeeded in staving off the fatal day and in averting the dreaded explosion.

Difficulties, however, continued to increase. On the 31st of July the 27th Native Infantry mutinied at Kolhapúr, plundered the treasury, and after murdering such officers as fell in their way, set off for the Ghâts. Kolhapúr is sixty-five miles from Belgáon. Communications between the 27th Regiment and the 29th at the latter place had been frequent. At Dhárwár, forty-two miles from Belgáon in a direction opposite to that of Kolhapur, the 28th Regiment had been for some time on the very verge of revolt

Mr. Seton-Karr was thus occupying a position between one station where the garrison had just mutinied, and another the garrison of which was on the verge of mutiny—the troops at the central point being also infected. It happened, however, that the native officer of the 29th—the regiment stationed at Belgáon—who was the secret leader of the disaffected, one Thákur Singh, was known to Mr. Seton-Karr. That gentleman at once, and before the news of the mutiny at Kolhapúr was generally known at Belgáon, entered into communication regarding this native officer with General Lester. To arrest him might have precipitated a calamity. It was more easy to devise a pretext to remove him honourably from the station. Such a pretext was soon found. Two companies of the 29th, that of Thákur Singh being one of them, were ordered on command to Badámi, a small town some ninety miles distant near the south-western frontier of the Nizám's dominions. The two companies set out on the morning of the 29th, still ignorant of the mutiny at Kolhapúr. When the tidings of that mutiny reached the sepoys left behind at Belgáon they were too disconcerted by the absence of their leader to act on the moment. The opportune seizure and the condign punishment of an emissary from Jámkhandi who had come to incite them to an immediate outbreak, awed them into still longer inaction.

The danger, however, was by no means removed. Concurrently with the events I have just related, Mr. Seton-Karr discovered a plot of

the Muhammadan population of Belgáon. He soon found that this conspiracy had its ramifications at Kolhapúr, at Haidarábád, and at Púna, and that its outbreak was to be signalled by the seizure of Belgáon itself. The arrest of one of the chief conspirators at Púna seemed likely to precipitate the outbreak. Mr. Seton-Karr, therefore, no sooner received information of this event, than he secured the local leaders at Belgáon, all of whom he had carefully watched. The evidence regarding some of these proved defective, and they were discharged. But the principal conspirator was convicted on the clearest evidence, and he was blown from a gun in company with the emissary from Jámkhandí just spoken of.

Three days before this execution—the 10th of August—a small detachment of European troops arrived to reassure the authorities at Belgáon. Another detachment went on to produce a similar good effect in Dhárwár. General Lester at once proceeded to repress the rising mutinous spirit of the 20th Native Infantry. Five men of that regiment were tried, one of them was condemned to death, the remainder were transported for life. Taking advantage of the good effect produced by these proceedings, Mr. Seton-Karr began the work of disarming the district, including the towns of Belgáon and Shahpúr. On the 24th of August a further reinforcement arrived in the shape of a detachment of the 86th Foot. Their presence, combined with other precautionary measures taken by Mr. Seton-Karr, caused the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram to pass off

without disturbance—and, for a time, the Europeans in the southern Maratha country felt that they could breathe freely.

Mr. Seton-Karr had thus succeeded, by a combination of firmness and tact, the result of good judgment directing intimate acquaintance with the native character, in guiding the territories committed to his charge through the most dangerous crisis of the mutiny. Considering the previous discontent of the chiefs and landowners, the fact that he was supported by no force, that he had only his own energies upon which to rely, this result will ever be quoted as a marvellous instance of skilful management of men. It is not too much to say that a single false step would have produced the most fatal consequences. Not only would it have involved the southern Maratha country in revolt, but it would have kindled a flame which would have spread throughout the dominions of the Nizám. Had Mr. Seton-Karr diverged, but for one day, from the line of vigilant forbearance which he had laid down as his policy; had he hurried the ill-disposed into open insurrection by any unguarded word of suspicion or slight; or had he encouraged their designs by supineness, a great calamity would have been inevitable. Unhappily, subsequent events proved only too truly the truth of this assertion. When in an evil moment, to be related hereafter, the charge of political affairs was removed from the hands of Mr. Seton-Karr to those of an officer distasteful, from his previous connection with the Inám Commission, to the chiefs and landowners,

one month did not elapse before the rebellion, controlled by good management, began its course with murder. All honour, then, to the wise and far-seeing officer who kept it within bounds when its outburst would have been far more dangerous.*

Before returning to Bombay, I must ask the reader to accompany me for a brief period to Kolhapúr. The state of this name, ruled over by the descendants of Sivaji, had up to the year 1842

* The Government of Bombay was not insensible to Mr. Seton-Karr's great merits. On the 14th of September 1857, he was informed that "the Right Honourable the Governor in Council considers that in a conjunction of great anxiety and danger you have displayed a calmness, an energy, and a foresight which entitle you to the thanks and commendations of Government." Again, "the judicious arrangements made by you have amply secured the future tranquillity of the southern Maráthá country." These and other commendations were repeated and confirmed by Lord Elphinstone in letters under his own hand, in which he alludes to "the marked ability and success" with which Mr. Seton-Karr had performed his duties. In his published minute on distinguished services rendered during the mutiny, Lord Elphinstone placed Mr. Seton-Karr's name third on the list of those who had deserved well of their country. The honour was the more marked, because, as Lord Canning observed, every recommendation from Lord Elphinstone carried double weight from the fact that out of the many who had rendered important services in western India, he selected only a few names for mention. Yet, strange as it may appear, when so many were decorated, Mr. Seton-Karr received neither honours nor reward. He returned to England towards the end of 1860, his proud nature suffering from the unmerited slight which had been cast upon him. In less than two years he died, conscious that he had performed a great service which his country had failed to recognise.

suffered from continuous disorder and misrule. To such an extent had the evil proceeded that in the year I have mentioned the British Government was forced to interfere and to nominate a minister to introduce order and good government. The efforts made in that direction by this enlightened man, a Brahman named Dáji Khrishna Pandit, to deprive the corrupt party in the state of their illicit gains, provoked a rebellion. This rebellion having been suppressed, the British Government assumed the direct administration of the state during the minority of the Rájá. Within this period, which did not expire till 1862, the forts of every description were dismantled, and the system of hereditary garrison was abolished; the native military force was disbanded, and a local corps, officered by three English officers, was substituted for it. These measures, especially those for the disarmament of their forts and the disbandment of their native force, though in view of the many previous rebellions absolutely necessary, had been regarded with great disfavour by the higher orders in Kolhapúr, and had tended not a little to the unpopularity of the paramount power.

Such was the state of affairs in the province when the mutiny broke out at Miráth. Hopes and wishes similar to those which I have described as actuating the Muhammadan population of the Belgáon district, at once took possession of the minds of their neighbours in Kolhapúr. To a people accustomed to revolt, living on the memories of plunder and corruption, and hating good government, the occasion seemed singularly

favourable. The town of Kolhapúr is distant only sixty-five miles from Belgáon. It was garrisoned by one native regiment, the 27th, and by the local corps raised on the disbandment of the native force. There were no European troops nearer than Belgáon, and it was impossible to spare any from that place. Satárah was eighty-one miles to the north, and Púna, whence European aid was alone possible, seventy-one miles further. The political superintendent of Kolhapúr was Colonel Maughan. Major Rolland commanded the 27th Native Infantry, Captain Schneider the local corps.

Garrison of Kolhapúr.

I have already stated* that communications between the 27th Native Infantry at Kolhapúr, the 29th at Belgáon, and the 28th at Dhárwár, had been frequent during the months of June and July. Supported, as they were, secretly, by discontented chiefs, almost openly by the disaffected Muhammadan populations, these three regiments had the game in their own hands. Concerted and simultaneous action was only necessary to their success. Happily on this, as on so many occasions at this eventful period, the conspirators failed in this essential particular. It would seem that they reckoned without the telegraph. Instead of deciding to rise on a settled date, they arranged that the example should be set by Kolhapúr, and followed at once by Belgáon and Dhárwár. The 27th Native Infantry accordingly rose on the 31st of July at Kolhapúr. But for the telegraph the

* Page 31.

regiment at Belgáon would have received by express intelligence of the movement, and have followed the example. But the telegraph forestalled their express. And Mr. Seton-Karr, using his priority of news with judgment, averted, as we have seen, the calamity from that place.

But the mutiny at Kolhapúr was a reality. During the night of the 31st of July the 27th rose in arms and detailed parties to attack their officers' bungalows. The native adjutant, a Jew, and a Hindú havildár ran to give warning only just in time to permit the ladies to escape from their houses before the sepoys came up and poured volleys into them. Some of the officers nobly endeavoured to bring back the rebels to their duty, but their efforts were vain. The treasury and the bazaar were plundered, and riot reigned supreme. Three officers who had escaped into the country were shot and thrown into the river. The remainder took refuge in the Residency, about a mile from the cantonment, but near the lines of the Kolhapúr local regiment, which happily remained loyal.*

The news of this disaster reached Bombay by telegraph. Lord Elphinstone acted with promptitude and decision. It happened that Colonel G. Le Grand Jacob, a man of the old heroic type, ready in council, prompt and decisive in action, had but just returned to Bombay from a command in the Persian campaign. He was about to start for Púna under the orders of the Commander-in-

* *Western India before and during the Mutinies*, by Major-General Sir George Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., C.B.

Chief, when the telegram from Kolhapúr was placed in the hands of the Governor. Lord Elphinstone at once sent for Jacob. He told him all that had occurred at Kolhapúr; that he would receive orders from the Commander-in-Chief to take command of the troops in that quarter. He added that he was well aware that there were no troops to be depended upon, except perhaps the local regiments; but that he would receive special powers, and was to do the best he could.*

Colonel Jacob set out at once, saw the Commander-in-Chief at Púna, pushed on, then, to Satárah, and found there a troop of horse artillery and dragoons. The rainy season was at its height, the track between Satárah and Kolhapúr was composed of the black soil in which, during the monsoon, horses not unfrequently sank up to their girths, and wheels to their axles; there were several rivers and streams unbridged and unfordable. Still, time was everything. Colonel Jacob then pushed on two guns with double allowance of men and horses, and riding forward himself with a few men of the Southern Marátha Horse, a loyal and capable regiment, reached

Jacob sets out.

* The final orders to Colonel Jacob were not issued till the following day, as Lord Elphinstone wished, before their issue, to receive a reply to a telegram he had sent to Kolhapúr. As no reply came, the orders were at once issued. 'They were,' writes Sir G. Le G. Jacob, 'brief and satisfactory. "I am aware," said Lord Elphinstone, "that in a crisis like this, a person on the spot ought to be the best judge of any action that might be at once necessary; to wait for orders may allow events to become too strong to master. I have confidence in your judgment; do your best to meet the present emergency, and rely on my full support."'—*Western India*, by Sir G. Le G. Jacob.

Kolhapúr on the 14th of August, just before midnight.

How, meanwhile, had matters been progressing in Kolhapúr? There, according to all probabilities, there would have been little to check the victorious progress of the rebels! Thanks to their delays and to the prompt action of Colonel Maughan, it had happened otherwise. The sepoys, greedy of plunder, went first to pillage the treasury and sack the station. Then, and then only, did they make their way to the town, fully expecting to find its gates open. But Colonel Maughan had closed those gates. The sepoys, not caring to attempt to force them, took up a rather formidable position outside, close to the gates, in a small outwork where the Rájá's horses and menagerie were kept. Here they maintained their position all night, repulsing Colonel Maughan in an attempt made by him to dislodge them.

It would seem that from this time the greater part of the regiment returned to its allegiance. This movement was probably hastened by the knowledge, brought to the sepoys by some of their still recalcitrant comrades, that the passes to the coast had been occupied by Europeans landed on the coast by the splendid exertions of the Indian Navy. This is certain, that the recalcitrant sepoys were checked in this way; that the greater number betook themselves to the jungles; whilst the minority, about forty in number, returning to Kolhapúr, reoccupied the outwork close to the town. But the garrison of the town had in the

meantime been reinforced. Lieutenant Kerr, of the Southern Maráthá Horse, had marched a detachment of that regiment from Satárah—a distance of eighty-one miles—without a halt. The rebels were at once attacked, on the 10th of August, in their outwork; some of their own comrades joining in the attack. They made a desperate defence—but a secret entrance to the outwork having been pointed out to Lieutenant Kerr, that gallant officer dashed in, followed by horsemen whom he had caused to dismount, and fought his way to the interior of the building. At the same time, Lieutenant Innes, with a party of the 27th, took the rebels in the rear. These two attacks decided the affair; but so desperate had been the defence, that of the forty rebels three only escaped wounds or death.*

When, then, Colonel Le G. Jacob reached Kolhapúr, he found that the mutiny had been quelled. Some forty of the most rebellious men of the 27th Native Infantry had been killed in fair fight; a larger number was in the jungles; but still the great bulk of the regiment was doing its duty, and there was no evidence against any man of it.

Three days after his arrival, Colonel Jacob was reinforced by the two horse-artillery guns he had sent on from Satárah, and about a hundred men of the 2nd Europeans from the coast—the same who had so opportunely occupied the passes. With so small a force at his disposal, he felt it

* Jacob's *Western India*. Victoria Cross for his conduct Lieutenant Kerr received the on this occasion.

would be impossible to act against the insurgents unless he should decide, before acting, to disarm the regiment whose conduct had been so suspicious. On the one hand was the danger of his being attacked before his force should gather further strength, or of the mutineers marching away with their arms; on the other, the chance of the men who were still loyal, those of the local corps especially, yielding to the temptation to join their countrymen. It was a balance of risks and probabilities. Many men would have preferred to wait. But Jacob was, as I have said, a man of the old heroic type, and, feeling the importance of striking the first blow, he determined to disarm the men of the 27th Native Infantry.

He disarmed them on the morning of the 18th of August. Under his orders were twenty-five European gunners, with two guns and two howitzers; ninety men of the 2nd Europeans; one hundred and eighty men of the Southern Maratha Horse; and three hundred and fifty men of the local corps. These were drawn up in a manner to command any movement tending to resistance on the part of the rebels.

But they made no resistance. They piled their arms in silence. The investigation which followed brought to light many hidden springs of the movement. It had been intended, it was discovered, to delay the mutiny till the 10th of August; but the action of the Jew native adjutant on the 31st of July, in sending away his family, aroused suspicion, and prompted a sudden and ill-matured rising. This premature movement

joined the plot. Acting hurriedly and without concert with their brethren at Belgáon and Dhárwár, the mutineers acted without plan or settled purpose. It required, then, only energy to baffle them, and that energy was conspicuous in the conduct of all the European officers concerned, in the conduct alike of Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, of Maughan, of Kerr, of Innes, in defence and attack, and of Colonel Jacob in striking the decisive blow. Book XIII. Chapter 3. A.D. 1857. August.

I ask the reader to return with me now to Bombay. Until the approach of the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram there had been no apprehensions of an outbreak in that city. The Superintendent of Police, Mr. Forjett, a gentleman who, born and bred in India, knew the natives thoroughly, had deemed it sufficient, when the news of the massacre of Kánhpúr reached Bombay, to obtain permission to incorporate into the police a body of fifty mounted Europeans. He reasoned justly that as the Muhammadan population of the city exceeded a hundred and fifty thousand, it would be folly to trust implicitly to the fidelity of the native police. Bombay. The police force there.

It may be fitting to describe here the officers to whom was entrusted the direction of the civil and military forces, upon whose conduct depended the safety of the important town of Bombay at this critical juncture.

The commander of the military forces was Brigadier-General Shortt of the Bombay army. General Shortt was an officer of capacity and intelligence. He thoroughly understood the native General Shortt.

soldier. He was quick to decide on an emergency and prompt to carry his decision into execution. In a word, he was an officer thoroughly to be depended upon in danger, a tower of strength to the Government in the crisis which was then impending.

The Superintendent of Police, Mr. C. Forjett, was* one of the most remarkable men brought to the front by the events of 1857. I have already stated that he was born and bred in India. When the mutiny broke out, he was in the very prime of manhood. He was so thoroughly acquainted with all the dialects of all the languages of western and southern India, that it was easy for him to pass himself off as a native upon the most astute of natives. Mr. Forjett gave an extraordinary proof of this talent immediately prior to his nomination to the office of Superintendent of Police. He had gained so great a reputation for ability, tact, and judgment in the performance of his duties in the southern Maráthá country, that in 1855 Lord Elphinstone sent for him to offer him the chief superintendence of police in Bombay. Mr. Forjett came to the presidency, saw Lord Elphinstone, and received the offer. He at once expressed his willingness to accept it, but requested that Lord Elphinstone would defer the nomination for a fortnight, so as to give him time to find out for himself the true character of the men he had been sum-

* I am happy to add that the imperfect tense is used only historically. Mr. Forjett still lives in the vigour of healthy life.

Book XIII. Chapter. 1857. August.

pioned to command. The request was at once granted. Mr. Forjett then disguised himself as a native and went to places haunted by the police, passing himself off as the son of a subadar in search of a girl whom he loved. He so completely deceived the natives that men of the highest caste invited him to eat with them. He found out the character, the secret longings, of the natives, who, in a few days, would be his instruments. Nor did he neglect the European police. His experience with them was remarkable. He tried them all, and not a single man amongst them refused the bribe he offered. At the end of the fortnight he presented himself to Lord Elphinstone, and took up the office. I leave the reader to imagine the consternation of his native subordinates when they learned whom it was whom they had now to serve.

Mr. Forjett's experiment on the police.

He assumes the office.

But quickness, cleverness at disguise, readiness of resource, represented but a small part of Mr. Forjett's qualities. Small in person, endowed, according to all appearance, with no great strength, he united the cool courage of a practised warrior to remarkable powers of endurance. The courage was not merely the physical courage which despises danger; it was that, and much more. It was a courage set into action by a brain cool and clear—so cool and so clear that there never was a crisis which could blind it, never a danger which it was unable to parry. I venture to describe it as the highest form of intellectual courage.

His other remarkable qualities;

his intellectual courage;

I have spoken of his powers of endurance. These were often tested in the southern Maráthá

his powers of endurance;

country prior to 1855. If to ride a hundred miles a day, on dismounting to partake of a rude meal of the natural products of the country, and then to lie on the ground, with a bundle of grass for a pillow, in the morning to wash in the stream or in the water drawn from the well, and pursue a similar journey in a similar manner, if this be a test of endurance, then Mr. Forjett may claim to be a passed master in the art. If, to the qualities I have recorded, I add an upright mind, a lofty sense of honour, a devotion to duty, I present to the reader an accurate portrait of the Superintendent of Police of Bombay.

During the two years which had elapsed between his assumption of that office and the outbreak of the mutiny, Mr. Forjett had gained the complete confidence and esteem of Lord Elphinstone. Those who knew that high-minded noble are aware that he never bestowed his trust until he had assured himself by experience that the recipient was fully worthy of it.

There being thus two men so capable and in all respects so well qualified at the head of the departments regulating order, it would seem that the repressal of disturbance in Bombay would be easy. But there were two causes which militated against such a conclusion. The first was the great disparity between the numbers of European and native troops. Whilst there were three native regiments, the 10th and 11th Native Infantry and the Marine Battalion, of the former there were but four hundred men. The other cause affected the concert between the heads of the two departments.

General Shortt believed in the loyalty of his sepoys, but mistrusted the native police. Mr. Forjett was confident that he could do what he would with the police, but mistrusted the sepoys. To use his own words, Mr. Forjett regarded the sepoys as "the only source of danger."

The festival of the Muharram was a festival of a character the most dangerous of all. It was a religious festival, lasting many days, the excitement of which increased with each day. Lord Elphinstone had confided to General Shortt the arrangements for preventing disturbance during the whole of the time it lasted. Granted one premiss—that the sepoys were absolutely loyal—those arrangements were perfect. Mr. Forjett, when informed of them, declined, without pledging himself to the contrary, to admit this premiss, and he informed Lord Elphinstone of his doubts. Lord Elphinstone replied that he was sorry he had not known of his objections before, but that it was now too late to alter them. I may here state that the arrangements made by General Shortt involved the division into very small bodies of the European force under the orders of Mr. Forjett. The reply made by that gentleman to Lord Elphinstone's remark, just referred to, is eminently characteristic. He intimated that he should, at all events, be obliged to disobey the orders of Government with respect to the police arrangements, because it was necessary for him to have them in hand in the event of a sepoy outbreak. "It is a very risky thing," replied Lord Elphinstone, "to disobey orders,

but I am sure you will do nothing rash." Mr. Forjett construed this tacit permission in the sense in which it was doubtless intended.*

Five days of the festival passed without disorder. The next night would see its conclusion. On the eve of that night an incident, accidental in its cause, almost produced an outbreak. A Christian drummer belonging to the 10th Regiment Native Infantry, whilst in a state of intoxication, insulted the carriers of a Hindú god which was being carried in procession by some townspeople, and knocked over the god. Two policemen, who witnessed the outrage, took the drummer into custody. It happened that the sepoys of the native regiments were possessed by an inner conviction that their loyalty was doubted by Forjett, and they replied to the feeling they thus imputed to him with one of hatred to himself and his subordinates. When, then, the men of the 10th heard that one of their comrades, albeit a Christian, caught in the act of offering an insult to a Hindú god, had been taken into custody by the police, some twenty of them turned out, broke into the lock-up, rescued the drummer, assaulted the policemen, and marched them off as prisoners to their lines. The European constable of the section at once proceeded with four native policemen to the lines, and demanded the liberation of their

* "Happy was it for Bombay, happy for western India, and happy probably for India itself," wrote Mr. Forjett, reviewing at a later period these events, "that one so noble and clear-headed as Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay during the period of the mutiny."

comrades. The demand was not only refused, but the new-comers were assaulted by the sepoys, and, after a conflict, in which two of the assailants were left for dead, and others were wounded, they were forced to retire. The excitement in the sepoy lines, increasing every moment, received a further impetus from this retirement, and the sepoys began to turn out in such numbers that a messenger was sent at full speed to Mr. Forjett, with the information that the native regiments had broken out.

This was the one danger which Mr. Forjett had all along dreaded, and against which he had taken every precaution possible under the circumstances, already noted, of his limited sphere of action. He had, that is to say, disobeyed orders, and massed his European policemen. On receiving the news that the sepoys had broken out, Mr. Forjett ordered the European police to follow him as soon as possible, and galloped down to their lines at so great a speed as to outstrip all his attendants. He found the sepoys in a state of tumult, endeavouring to force their way out of the lines, their European officers, with drawn swords, keeping them back. The sight of Mr. Forjett inflamed the sepoys still more. They called out loudly that this was the man who had wished them all to be killed, while the European officers, seeing how the presence of Mr. Forjett excited their men, begged him in earnest language to go away. The fate of Bombay at that moment hung upon the conduct, at this critical conjuncture, of Mr. Forjett.

Book XII. Chapter I. 1857. September.

Such are Asiatics, that had that gentleman obeyed the calls of the officers, the sepoys would have burst the bonds of discipline and dashed forward to pursue him. He was there, alone, seated on his horse, calmly daring them. His knowledge of natives made him feel that so long as he should remain there, facing and defying them, they would not move; but that a retrograde movement on his part would be the signal for a real outbreak. In reply, then, to the shouts of the officers and men of the native regiments, Mr. Forjett called out to the former, "If your men are bent on mischief, the sooner it is over the better," and remained facing them. Two minutes later his assistant, Mr. Edington, galloped up, followed very shortly by fifty-five European policemen—the men he had kept massed in case of a disturbance. Then Mr. Forjett acted. Forming up and halting his men, he called out, "Throw open the gates; I am ready for the sepoys." Again was displayed that complete acquaintance with the Asiatic character which was one of the secrets of Mr. Forjett's power. The excitement of the sepoys subsided as if by magic, and they fell back within their lines. Never had a nobler deed been more nobly done!

The tide now turned. The evil-disposed amongst the sepoys—and that many were evil-disposed subsequent revelations fully proved—were completely cowed. Nevertheless, Mr. Forjett relaxed not one of his exertions. The Mohammedan was not yet a thing of the past, and it was

clear that an accident might yet kindle the mine. One night still remained, and Mr. Forjett, far from relaxing his precautions, bent himself to increase them. He so posted his police that the smallest movement upon the part of the sepoys would at once become known to the main body of his Europeans, forty-eight in number, located at a decisive point. His precautions were not only successful, they were the cause of success. To borrow the language, subsequently revealed, of the baffled conspirators, "it was the vigilance maintained that prevented the outbreak." The vigilance was the vigilance of the police personally directed by Mr. Forjett.*

* Mr. Forjett's great services were not left unacknowledged. On the 19th of June 1858, Lord Elphinstone thus recorded his sense of their value:—"The Right Honourable the Governor in Council cannot too highly praise the devoted zeal of this excellent public servant, upon whom such grave responsibilities were imposed during last year." Referring to Mr. Forjett's "very valuable services" in the detection of the plot in Bombay in 1857, the same high authority thus wrote: "His duties demanded great courage, great acuteness, and great judgment, all of which qualities were conspicuously displayed by Mr. Forjett at that trying period."

All classes combined to testify to the great services rendered on this occasion by Mr. Forjett. Couched in varying phraseology, every letter received from the members of the European community indicates that, in the opinion of the several writers, it was the vigilance of Mr. Forjett which saved Bombay.

I may add here that, for his services in the mutiny, the European and Native communities in Bombay presented Mr. Forjett with addresses, and, with the sanction of the Government, with testimonials and purses to the value of three thousand eight hundred and fifty pounds. It was still more gratifying to him that, after he had left the service and

Book XIII. Chapter I. 1857. October.

I have already stated that, thanks to the precautions taken and to Mr. Forjett's energetic action, the festival of the Muharram had passed off quietly. The discontented men amongst the sepoys still, however, cherished the hope that another opportunity more favourable to the execution of their projects would soon arise. The Hindú festival of the Diwáli, occurring towards the end of October, seemed to them to offer such an opportunity. During this festival the Hindús of the upper and wealthier classes are accustomed to collect all their wealth in one room of their dwelling, and assembling, to worship it. The discontented sepoys resolved, in many a secret council, to break out during the Diwáli, to pillage Bombay, killing all who should oppose them, and then to march out of the island. Had this plan been carried out, it is nearly certain that the contagion would have spread all over the presidency, and have even reached Madras.

The sepoys hatch a new conspiracy.

But again had the mutineers to reckon with Mr. Forjett. That gentleman was informed by

quitted India, the native cotton merchants sent him a handsome address and a purse of one thousand five hundred pounds, "in token of strong gratitude for one whose almost despotic powers and zealous energy had so quelled the explosive forces of native society, that they seem to have become permanently subdued. In addition, and likewise after he left India, the shareholders of a company, mainly composed of natives, presented Mr. Forjett with shares, which they subsequently sold on his account, for thirteen thousand five hundred and eighty pounds.

a detective that suspicious meetings were being held by disaffected sepoys at the house of one Ganga Parshád. Attempts to introduce a confidential agent of the police into those meetings having been baffled by the precautions of the sepoys, Mr. Forjett had Ganga Parshád conveyed to the police-office during the night, and obtained from him a complete revelation. Fertile in disguises, Mr. Forjett subsequently became an eye-witness—by means of holes made in the wall which separated the chamber where the conspirators assembled from the ante-room—of the proceedings of the sepoys, a listener to their conversation. More than that, aware of the feeling prevailing amongst the officers regarding himself, he induced Major Barrow, the officer commanding the Marine battalion, to accompany him, on four different occasions, to the meetings.* The information there obtained was duly reported to General Shortt by Major Barrow, and to Lord Elphinstone, through his private secretary, by Mr. Forjett. Courts-martial were in due course convened. The proceedings resulted in sentences of death being passed and executed on two, of transportation for life on six, native soldiers of

Book XIII. Chapter I.

1857 October.

which is discovered by Mr. Forjett,

and revealed by him to Major Barrow,

by which means the conspiracy is nipped in the bud.

* "Major Barrow's astonishment when he saw some of his own men in Ganga Parshad's house was remarkable. He exclaimed, 'My God, my own men! Is it possible!' And his memorable words to me at the court-martial were: 'It is well I was present and saw and heard them myself, but for which I should have been here, not as a witness for the prosecution, but as one for the defence; *such was my confidence in these men.*'"—Forjett's *Our Real Danger in India.*

Book XIII. Chapter I.

1857. December.

Necessitation of events at Bombay.

various ranks. But the projected mutiny was nipped in the bud.

With the story of the measures taken for the safety of Bombay closes the general sketch of events in the western Presidency up to the close of 1857. We have seen how, displaying at once a rare foresight and a remarkable self-reliance, Lord Elphinstone had denuded his own Presidency of European troops in order to crush the mutiny beyond its borders. No man in high position recognised more truly, and acted more conscientiously, on the maxim that the art of war consists in concentrating the greatest number of troops on the decisive point of the action. Now, the decisive point of the action in the early days of the revolt of 1857 was not in Bombay. To Lord Elphinstone it was clear that Dehlí could only be reached from Bengal, and that it was just possible he might save central India and Rajpútáná. Whilst, then, he sent every available European soldier to Calcutta, he formed, from the small remnant which was left, a number in reality not sufficient for his own needs—one column which should march on Máu, another which should restore order in Rajpútáná. Feeling that amidst the many dangers which threatened him the most fatal was that which would come from without, he sent to meet and to crush it before it should penetrate within. His defence of Bombay was an aggressive defence. It was a policy requiring rare courage, immense confidence in his own judgment, and great resolution. In carrying it out he exposed himself to the danger, only one

Lord Elphinstone's true thought, promptitude, and decision.

His plan of aggressive defence.

degree less, of a rising within the Presidency. How nearly that was occurring I have shown in these pages. The southern Maráthá country was saved, in 1857, partly by the prudence and the judgment displayed by Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr, aided by the energy of General Lester, partly by the bungling and want of concert of the conspirators. How Bombay was saved I have just told. The reader will have seen that the danger was real, the peril imminent, that but for the unlimited confidence placed by Lord Elphinstone in Mr. Forjett—a man of his own selection—it might have culminated in disaster. That he dared that risk to avert a greater danger is one of the many proofs of Lord Elphinstone's capacity. Sufficient credit has never been given to him for his noble, his far-seeing, his self-denying policy. In the presence of the massacres of Kánhpúr and of Jhánsi, of the defence of Lakhnao, and of the siege of Dehlí, the attitude of Lord Elphinstone, less sensational though not less heroic, has been overlooked. Had there been an uprising attended with slaughter in Bombay, the story of its repression and the deeds of valour attending that repression would have circulated throughout the land. Instead of that, we see only calm judgment and self-reliance meeting one danger and defying another, carefully selecting the most experienced instruments, and by their aid preventing a calamity so threatening that, if it had been met by men less tried and less worthy of confidence, it must have culminated in disaster. It is an attitude which gains from being contemplated.

Book VIII. Chapter I. 1857. Description.

Mr. Seton-Karr.

General Lester.

Mr. Forjett.

The attitude of Lord Elphinstone has never yet received its due meed of praise.

Book XIII. Chapter I. 1857. December.

which impresses the student of history, in an ever-increasing degree, with admiration of the noble character of the man whose calm trust in himself made possible the success of the policy he alone inaugurated.

BOOK XIII.

CHAPTER II.

Asírgarh. ASÍRGARH is a very famous fort, lying two hundred and ninety miles to the north-east of Bombay, one hundred and fifty miles from Maligám, and ninety-nine miles to the south-east of Máu. It is built on an isolated hill, detached from the Sátpúra range dividing the valley of the Tápti from that of the Narbadá. It has a history which has sent its name through the length and breadth of India. Alike in the times of the Hindú, of the Muhammadan, and of the British overlordship, it has been considered a place worth fighting for. After many changes of masters, it surrendered, on the 9th of April 1819, after a vigorous resistance, to a British force commanded by Brigadier-General Doveton, and it has, ever since, remained in the occupation of a British garrison.

Garrison of Asírgarh. In 1857 that garrison consisted of a wing of the 6th Regiment Gwáliár Contingent, lent by the Bengal Presidency to replace the 19th Bombay

Book XIII. Chapter II. 1857. June.

Native Infantry ordered on service to Persia, but which never embarked for that country. The commanding officer of the garrison was Colonel Le Mesurier, and the Fort Adjutant was Lieutenant John Gordon of the 19th Bombay Native Infantry.

Situation of the fort.

The hill on the summit of which Asírgarh is perched rises abruptly to about five hundred feet above the jungle. Below it is a town of no real importance, inhabited by villagers mainly engaged in tending their flocks.

The men of the contingent evince symptoms of mutiny.

The men who formed the garrison of Asírgarh belonged to a contingent which speedily asserted its right to a prominent place amongst the mutineers. The events at Nímach and at Gwáliár speedily convinced the European residents at Asírgarh that their guardians were not to be trusted. Even before this discovery had been made, the fort adjutant, distrusting their demeanour, had enlisted some ninety men from the villagers of the town, and had charged them with the task of watching the behaviour of the sepoys. These men were known as Gordon's Volunteers.

Bad news reaches the Europeans,

On the 19th of June the Europeans of the garrison heard of the mutinies at Nímach and Nasirábád. From that day almost every post brought them distressful tidings. Every precaution was taken by Lieutenant Gordon. To relieve the fort, by fair means, of a portion of its real enemies, one company of the regiment was

who send one company to Búrhánpur;

detached to Búrhánpúr, twelve miles distant. The anxieties of the ladies of the garrison

were lessened about the same time by the intelligence, verified by a personal visit made by Lieutenant Gordon, that Captain Keatinge,* the political agent for that part of the country, had fortified a position fourteen miles distant from Ásírgarh.

Book VIII. Chapter II.

1857. July.

From this time till the end of July good and bad news succeeded each other with strange rapidity. At times the Europeans were in great danger. The company sent to Búrhánpúr mutinied, marched on Ásírgarh, and was only prevented from entering it by the havildar-major of the regiment, whose loyalty had been appealed to, not in vain, by Lieutenant Gordon.

Where it mutinies.

The following morning the four remaining companies obeyed, not without murmuring, the order given to them to march out and encamp below the fort, their places within being taken by Gordon's Volunteers. The next day a party of Bhíl infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Birch, surprised and disarmed the Búrhánpúr mutineers, and carried their arms into Ásírgarh. A few hours later that place was reinforced by two companies of the 19th Native Infantry under Captain Blair. The disarming of the Gwáliár men outside the fort—a work performed admirably and without bloodshed by Captain Blair and Lieutenant Gordon—completed the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the fortress pending the arrival of Colonel Stuart's column.

The remainder are disarmed.

That column, the earlier movements of which

* Now Colonel Keatinge, V.C.

Book XIII. Chapter IV. 1857. July.

I have recorded in the preceding chapter, quitted Aurangábád for Asírgarh on the 12th of July. Marching rapidly, it reached Búrhánpúr on the 21st and Asírgarh on the 22nd idem. Here it was joined by Colonel Durand, who had reached Asírgarh some days previously.

Arrival of Stuart's column and of Durand.

Summary of Durand's proceedings after leaving Indúr.

In another part of this history* I have shown how Durand, after the catastrophe of Mán, had fallen back on Sihor; how, staying there only one day, he had set out for Hoshangábád on the southern bank of the Narbadá, in the hope of being able to communicate there with General Woodburn; how, hearing at Hoshangábád of the safety of Máu, he heard also of the attempts made to change the direction of Woodburn's force from the line of the Narbadá to Nágpúr; how, not content with simply protesting against such a line of conduct, he had set off for Aurangábád with the intention of enforcing his arguments there, and, if necessary, of pressing on to Bombay; how, on his road, he received the gratifying intelligence that Woodburn's column, now commanded by Stuart, was advancing towards Asírgarh; how he had at once hurried to that place. He had the gratification of meeting that force on the 22nd of July. From the moment of his joining it, he assumed his position as the Governor-General's representative, and became likewise, in everything but in name, the real leader of the column.

He assumes the real direction of the column.

The column pushed on for Máu on the 24th

* Vol. i. pages 242, 243.

Book XII. Chapter II.

1857 July–Aug.

with all practicable expedition. On the 28th it was joined by the 3rd Regiment Cavalry, Haidarábád Contingent, under the command of Captain S. Orr. On the 31st it ascended the Simrol pass, halted on its summit to allow the artillery to close up, and the following morning marched into Máu. The weather for the time of the year, the height of the monsoon, had been exceptionally fine; no rain had fallen to hinder the march of the guns over the sticky black soil. On the night of the 1st of August, however, the weather changed. Heavy rains set in and continued throughout August and September. But Durand was now at Máu, within thirteen and a half miles of the capital whence the mutinous conduct of Holkar's troops had forced him to retire just one month before. He had returned to vindicate British authority, to punish the guilty, to give an example which should not be forgotten.

Is joined by the 3rd Regiment Cavalry, Haidarábád Contingent.

Even before he had marched into Máu, whilst he was yet halted on the top of the Simrol pass, Durand had received a message from the Indúr Darbár. Mahárájá Holkar and his minister sent to inform him that they were still in a state of alarm as to the conduct of their own troops, and to inquire whether aid could not be afforded to them. Durand replied that he was ready, if the Mahárájá wished it, to march with the entire force into Indúr instead of into Máu. Apparently, this was not the end desired by the Darbár, for the messengers at once withdrew their requisition.

Durand arrives at Máu.

He offers to march on Indúr and disarm Holkar's troops.

but Holkar declines.

In deciding to march on Máu instead of Indúr,

Reasons why Durand

Book XVII. Chapter II.

1857. August. Marched on Máu instead of on Indúr.

Durand was mainly influenced by the fact that at the latter place there was no accommodation for European troops. He had with him, indeed, no European infantry,* but four companies of the 86th were marching up by the Bombay road, and would join in a few days. It was desirable also, after the events which had occurred, that the Indúr rabble should see in the British force the white faces of the unvanquished foot soldiers of England. Durand marched then on Máu.

He is joined by four companies 86th.

The four companies of the 86th having joined a few days later, the propriety of marching on Indúr to punish Holkar's guilty troops and the townspeople who had abetted the revolt again became a question for Durand's consideration. It was a very difficult question. That Holkar's troops had attacked the Residency on the 1st of July was a fact admitted by everyone. But Holkar had asserted that this act had been committed without his sanction or authority. Durand himself never believed this; but officers who had occupied the Máu fort in July, notably Captain Hungerford, had been penetrated with the conviction that Holkar was innocent, and, in his letters to Durand, Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, had insisted on the same view. Under these circumstances Durand, duly weighing the difficulties presented by the case, deemed it advisable to defer all action, so far as

Circumstances which induced Durand to defer all proceedings with respect to Holkar.

* The force consisted of five troops 14th Light Dragoons, 3rd Cavalry Haidarábád Contingent, one horse battery of European artillery, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, and a pontoon train.

Holkar was personally concerned, until he should become acquainted with the views of the Governor-General regarding him. He accordingly made a complete reference on the subject to Lord Canning.

Book XIII. Chapter I. 1857. August.

Holkar, on his part, was naturally anxious to delay Durand's action as long as he could. He knew that, in his heart, Durand had condemned him. And, although it was well known that, in the excited state of native feeling throughout the country, he could not depend on the conduct of his own troops, and would have been glad to see them coerced by the British, yet, when he thought of the possible results of such action, he inclined to prefer the uncertainty of his actual condition. Could he, he felt, but stave off the critical moment for a few months, Durand would be relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, and Sir Robert Hamilton, an old and much-regarded friend, would, he felt confident, accept explanations regarding the events of the 1st of July which Durand would utterly contemn.

Probable reasons for Holkar's conduct.

The question of disarming Holkar's revolted troops, whilst the personal case regarding Holkar was still pending, opened out difficulties of another description. The force at the disposal of Durand was small, and, though sufficient to dispose of the revolted troops of Indúr, could these be encountered *en masse*, it was scarcely large enough to attack its several component parts in detail, holding the bulk in check whilst portion after portion should be destroyed. It must always be remembered, writing of this period, that the

Reasons why Durand determines to defer to a later period any movement against Holkar's troops.

revolt had at that time nowhere received a serious check. The force before Dehli was almost as much besieged as besieging. Lakhnao was supposed to be at its last gasp; Havelock had made no impression upon Oudh; Bihar was surging with mutineers. The disaffected in central India might, then, well be excused if, regarding all these points, they were not only hopeful, but confident that resolute resistance on their part would serve the cause which they now regarded as the common cause of their co-religionists throughout India. Under these circumstances, it was to be apprehended that Holkar's troops, the three arms of which, each superior in numbers to the entire British force, were located in separate cantonments, might evince a strong disinclination to be disarmed; and that, morally supported as they were by a large party in the city of Indúr, and, as I shall presently show, by a strongly aggressive party in the districts lying between Indúr and Nímach, they might offer a resistance certain to entail great loss on the attacking party, and to cripple its future movements. This will be clear to the reader when, recalling the composition of the force at the disposal of Durand,* extremely weak in infantry, he calls to mind that a rainy season of unusual force was at its height, that the roads could be traversed by guns only with the greatest difficulty, that the bridges in many places had been carried away, and that any military opera-

* *Vide* page 62, note.

tion against the several cantonments occupied by Holkar's troops would have to be carried out on a swampy plain, on which, at that season of the year, it would be impossible for the three arms to work together.

But there were other reasons which impressed Durand with the necessity of dealing in the first instance with those rebels in the districts, of whose aggressive tendencies I have just spoken.

Mandisúr. Mandisúr is a large and important town on a tributary of the river Chambal, about one hundred and twenty miles from Indúr. In the month of July this place had been occupied by some of Sindia's revolted troops, and these had been joined, and were being constantly further strengthened, by Afghán, Mekráni, and Mewáti levies. In August the insurrection at Mandisúr threatened not only to embrace all western Málwá, but Nímach as well. Impressed with a confidence in themselves, justified only by the prolonged immunity which had been allowed them, the rebels at this place began, in the month of August, to display an aggressive temper far more dangerous than the sullen disaffection of the compromised troops of Holkar. The more active and daring of the mutineers of Holkar's army had proceeded to Gwáliár after the insurrection of the 1st of July; the less energetic mass remained, sullen, dangerous, watching events, but to a certain extent paralysed, though not controlled, by the English party in power at Holkar's court. The progress of the Mandisúr insurrection was, however, so rapid that to uphold British supremacy in Raj-

becomes a centre of insurrection.

aggressive in its nature.

Act XIII of Chapter II.

1857. December.

and requiring the most prompt attention.

pútáná and Málwá, and to maintain the line of the Narbadá, it became absolutely necessary to check its growth with the utmost promptitude. In the presence of this new danger, the disarming of Holkar's troops became, in every sense, a matter of secondary importance. An attempt to subdue the lesser evil might have augmented the greater, whilst a decisive blow struck at the greater could not fail to be fatal to the lesser.

The rains an impediment to prompt action.

Action in any shape was impossible so long as the heavy rains continued. But when, in the beginning of October, the monsoon passed away, and the country began to dry up, the Mandisúr rebels began to give proof of the possession of the aggressive nature with which I have credited them.

Composition of the Mandisúr insurgents.

The leader of the Mandisúr insurgents was Firoz Sháh, a Sháhzáda or prince connected with the imperial family of Dehlí. It was estimated in September that some fifteen thousand men with sixteen or eighteen guns, had rallied round his standard, and this estimate was subsequently found to have been below the actual number. To meet these, Durand, after deducting the sick and wounded, and a sufficient number of men to guard Máu, could not bring into the field more than one thousand five hundred men* and nine guns.

Durand's effective force.

Under these circumstances it was perhaps for-

* Thus composed: Artillery, one hundred and seventy; Dragoons, two hundred; 86th, two hundred and thirty; 25th Bombay Native Infantry, three hundred and fifty; 3rd Nizám's Cavalry, three hundred and fifty.

1857. (October.

Durand learns that central India is about to rise in revolt.

timate that the aggressive movement was made by the rebels. Durand expected it. Towards the very end of September he had intercepted letters from Haidarábád, from Núgpúr, from Surát, from Újjén, from Gwáliár, and from Mandisúr, all telling the same tale. The tale was to the effect that, after the conclusion of the Dasahra festival,* a general rising would take place in Málwá, and that influential personages were coming from Núgpúr and Haidarábád for the purpose of giving life and strength to the insurrection. The close of the Dasahra corresponded with the setting in of the dry season. The result corresponded with the information Durand had thus obtained. Early in October the Sháhzáda's troops, who had previously occupied Dhár and Amjhéra, advanced to the Bombay road and threatened to interrupt Durand's communications with Bombay, to command the line of the Narbadá along the Bombay frontier, and to attack Nímach. They sent also a pressing invitation to Holkar's troops to join them.

The rebels attempt to cut off Durand from Bombay.

Everything depended upon the rapidity with which Durand would be able to strike a blow at this enemy. Failing it, it was quite possible that Náná Sáhib, who at that time was hovering in the vicinity of Kálpi, might transfer the whole of his troops to central India, and that the Maráthá war-

The vital importance of rapid action.

* A festival of ten days' duration, nine of which are spent in worship and religious ceremonies. The tenth day is the birthday of Gangá (the Ganges). Whoever bathes in the Ganges on that day is purified from ten sorts of sins. The festival occurs in September or October, the date varying with each year.

Book XIII. Chapter II.

1857. October.

cry might raise the whole of the country formerly acknowledging the supremacy of the Peshwa. Seeing the necessity, Durand struck. On the 12th of October he detached one body of Haidarábád cavalry to defend Mandlésar, threatened by the rebels, and another to the village of Gújrí to intercept them on their way. On the 14th he sent three companies of the 25th Native Infantry and some dragoons to support this last-named party, and on the 19th, with all the men who could be spared from forming the garrison of Máu, he marched for Dhár.

Durand strikes at Dhár.

Ánand Ráo Púár, a lad of thirteen years, had succeeded to the chiefship of Dhár on the death of his brother, cut off by cholera on the 23rd of May 1857.* His minister, Rámchandar Bápoji, a shrewd and intelligent man, who, from his thorough knowledge of the English and from his large acquaintance with British officers, was supposed to be devoted to British interests, began, almost immediately after his assumption of office, to pursue a line of policy the very reverse of that which had been hoped from him. In direct opposition to the policy pursued by the Government of India ever since the settlement of Málwá, to prevent the employment of mercenary troops in native states, this man began to enlist large numbers of Arabs, Afgháns, and Mekránis. As soon as the news of the Indúr rising of the

History of Dhár immediately previous to the events of 1857.

Disloyalty of Rámchandar Bápoji.

* The formal recognition by the British Government only reached the young chief on the 28th of September, but he was acknowledged and treated as Rája from the date stated.

1857. October.

1st of July reached Dhár, a party of these mercenaries, four hundred in number, joined with the mercenaries of the rájá of Amjhéra, and plundered the stations of Bhopáor and Sirdárpúr, burning the hospitals over the heads of the sick and wounded. Returning to Dhár with their plunder, they were met and honourably received by Bhim Ráo Bhonslá, the young rájá's uncle, and three of the guns which they had captured were placed in the rájá's palace. On the 31st of August they were in possession of the fort of Dhár, with or without the consent of the Darbár was not certainly known. But on the 15th of October Captain Hutchinson, the political agent, reported that there was strong reason to believe that the rájá's mother and uncle and the members of the Darbár were the instigators of the rebellion of the Dhár troops, that the conduct of the Darbár was suspicious, that its agent had purposely deceived him regarding the negotiations entered into by its members with the mutinous mercenaries and the number of men they had enlisted, and that it had received with attention and civility emissaries from Mandisúr, the centre of the Muhammadan rising. It was this intelligence which decided Durand to dismiss the Dhár agent in attendance on him, with a message to the Darbár that its members would be held strictly responsible for all that had happened or that might happen,* and to despatch all his available troops to attack Dhár.

He enlists mercenaries, whom, after their plunder of British stations, he receives with honour.

Captain Hutchinson reports the complicity of the Rájá's family, and of the Darbár.

Durand dismisses the Darbár's agent with a warning.

* Durand repeated this son during the siege of the warning to the Rájá in per- fort.

Book XIII. Chapter II.

1857. October. The British force arrives before Dhár.

On the 22nd of October the British force arrived before Dhár. The Arab and Mekrání levies who garrisoned that fort gave a signal instance of the confidence engendered by the long compulsory inaction of the British by quitting the protection of their lines of defence and coming to attack them in the open. Planting three brass guns on a hill south of the fort, they extended from that point along its eastern face in skirmishing order, and advanced boldly against the British.

The action.

But their confidence soon vanished. The 25th Bombay Native Infantry, a splendid regiment, often to be mentioned, and always with honour, in these pages, led by their most capable commandant, Major Robertson, charged the three guns, captured them, and turned the guns on the rebels. Almost simultaneously, the four companies of the 86th and the sappers, flanked by Woollcombe's (Bombay) and Hungerford's (Bengal) batteries, advanced against the centre, whilst the cavalry threatened both flanks, the dragoons, under Captain Gall, the left, the Nizám's cavalry, under Major Orr, the right. Baffled in their advance by the action of the 25th, and the play of the British guns on their centre, the enemy made a rapid movement to their left, and attempted to turn the British right. The dragoons, led by Gall, and the Nizám's cavalry, led by Orr and Macdonald, Deputy Quartermaster-General of the force, charged them so vigorously that they retired into the fort, leaving forty bodies of their companions on the field. On the British side

The 25th Native Infantry.

The British troops.

Gall and Orr and Macdonald.

The rebels are beaten.

three dragoons and one native trooper were wounded, a jemadar and native trooper were killed.

Book XIII. Chapter VI.

1857. October.

The fort was now invested, but the British force had to wait for the siege guns, expected on the 24th. They arrived on the evening of that day; the next morning they were placed in position.

Dhár is invested.

The fort of Dhár is entirely detached from the town of the same name. Its southern angle rests on the suburbs, the road running between. It is situated on an eminence of thirty feet above the surrounding plain, and is built of red granite, in an oblong shape, conforming itself to the hill on which it stands. The walls are about thirty feet in height, and have at intervals fourteen circular and two square towers.

Description of the fort of Dhár.

On the 25th a sandbag battery, two thousand yards south of the fort, armed with one 8-inch howitzer and one 8-inch mortar, began to shell the fort. Under cover of this fire the infantry pushed on to a low ridge, about two hundred and fifty yards from the southern angle of the fort, forming a natural parallel, and took possession of it. On this the breaching battery was at once constructed. Simultaneously, strong cavalry and infantry pickets were thrown out on the north and east faces of the fort, whilst the west face was covered by an extensive tank or lake which could not be forded. Durand was in hopes that the rebels, seeing themselves thus surrounded, would spontaneously surrender. But although, during the six days the siege lasted, they made many

Investment of Dhár.

Book XIII. Chapter II.

1857. October.

The rebels ask for terms.

efforts to obtain aid from outside, acting and writing in the name of the Darbár, under whose orders they professed to be defending the fort, they waited until, on the night of the 29th, the breach had been made so large that its practicability was only a question of a day or two, ere they sent a white flag to inquire the terms which would be granted. "An unconditional surrender," was the reply, upon which the firing continued.

The reply.

The breach practicable and

At sunset on the 31st the breach was reported practicable, and that night a storming party was detailed to assault the place. Never was a task easier. The breach was easily ascended. Almost immediately afterwards firing was heard on the plain. Whilst dragoons and irregulars were despatched in that direction, the storming party entered the fort. It was empty.*

The fort evacuated.

In fact the rebels, foreseeing the assault, had quitted the fort by the main gate between 9 and 11 o'clock, and escaped in the direction of the north-west. The firing heard on the plain at the moment the breach was entered was only a skirmish with the rear-guard of the retreating enemy and an outlying picket of the 3rd Nizam's cavalry.† The main body had passed by them and the dragoons† wholly unobserved, and were well away before the alarm could be of any avail.

Escape of the rebels.

* Sindhia and Dhar. *Calcutta Review.* Lowe's *Central India.* Private papers.

† It had, unfortunately happened that the European pickets, which had been there for some days and which knew the ground well, had been changed that very day. The trooper, sent by the jemadar of the native picket, fell with his horse on the way, and was disabled.—Lowe.

Book XII. Chapter I.

1857. November.

pursuit, though it could scarcely avail much, was attempted. It resulted, however, only in the capture of a few wretched stragglers.

Durand useless.

Durand ordered the fort of Dhár to be demolished, the state to be attached, pending the final orders of Government, and charges to be prepared against the leaders and instigators of the rebellion.* The force then continued its march through western Málwá towards Mandisúr, in pursuit of the rebels. These latter, however, had by no means renounced their aggressive tendencies. On the 8th of November they attacked the cantonment of Mahidpúr, garrisoned by a native contingent of the three arms, officered by English officers. Major Timmins, who commanded the contingent, imprudently permitted the rebels, without offering opposition, to take up a strong position close round his guns and infantry. The men of the contingent, on their side, displayed mingled cowardice and treachery, the majority eventually going over to the rebels. Half a troop of the cavalry behaved, however, extremely well, and, after making a gallant but ineffective charge, in which their leader, Captain Mills, was shot dead, and their native officer severely wounded, escorted the remainder of their European officers to Durand's camp, where they arrived on the 9th.

Durand demolishes the fort and marches towards Mandisúr.

The rebels attack Mahidpúr,

and plunder the station.

* Ultimately, owing to circumstances upon which it is unnecessary for me to enter here, they all escaped punishment. To the young Rájá himself, merciful consideration was shown, and he was restored to his title and position.

Book XIII. Chapter II.

1857. November.

The line of the Narbadá held.

Two other affairs, which occurred during the pursuit of the rebels to Mandisúr deserve here to be recorded. The first was the capture and destruction of the fort of Amjhéra by a small party of Haidarábád cavalry and infantry under Lieutenant Hutchinson. There was, indeed, no opposition, but the fact of the occupation was satisfactory, as it proved that Durand's rapid action had saved the line of the Narbadá, and had maintained that barrier between the blazing north and the smouldering south.

The other action was one in which Major Orr and the Haidarábád Contingent was prominently engaged.

Reinforcements sent by the Haidarábád Contingent.

I have already stated* how one regiment of the Haidarábád Contingent had joined Brigadier Stuart's force on its march from Aurangábád. The remaining cavalry of the contingent and a large force of its infantry and artillery, had, about the same time, been formed at Edlábád, one of the chief outlets of the Dekhán, on the high road to central India. Here they remained until the monsoon had ceased and the roads had begun to dry up. They then marched with all speed into Málwá, and coércing on their way the refractory zamindárs of Píplíah and Rágugarh, reached Durand's force before Dhár.

Major Orr pursues the Mahidpúr plunderers.

Upon the news reaching camp of the successful action of the rebels at Mahidpúr, Major Orr, with a small force, consisting of three hundred and thirty-seven sabres drawn from the 1st,

* *Vide* page 61.

3rd, and 4th regiments Nizám's cavalry, was sent to follow on their track. The second morning after he had left camp, Orr, having marched some sixty miles, arrived before Mahidpúr. There he learned that the rebels had left the place the same morning, carrying with them all the guns, stores, and ammunition upon which they could lay hand. Orr stopped to water and feed his horses, and whilst thus halting had the gratification to receive Mrs. Timmins, the wife of the commandant already mentioned, who had been unable to effect her escape* with her husband. Having despatched that lady under a sufficient escort to rejoin her husband, Orr followed the rebels, and after a pursuit of twelve miles came up with their rear-guard, about four hundred and fifty men with two guns, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at the village of Ráwal. They were prepared to receive him. They had taken up a very formidable position, especially calculated to resist cavalry, their right resting on the village, and their front covered by a muddy nullah or rivulet. Occupying this position they hoped effectually to cover the retreat of their main body, conveying their stores, their ammunition, and the spoils of Mahidpúr. But they had not counted on the gallant spirit of their enemy. Orr and his officers, Abbott, Johnstone, Clark, Murray, and Samwell, led their men forward, crossed the nullah, charged the guns, and then fought

Book XVII. Chapter II. 1857. November.

He catches them up.

Their strong position.

Orr gallantly and successfully attacks it.

* This lady had been concealed by a faithful tailor, who frustrated all the efforts of the rebels to discover her hiding-place.

Book XIII. Chapter II.

1857. November.

hand to hand with the enemy. The contest was desperate and continued till the sun went down. Then the rebels gave way, and all their guns, eight in number, and stores, fell into the hands of the victors. The nature of the engagement may be gathered from the fact that the British lost nearly one hundred men killed and wounded. Amongst the latter was Lieutenant Samwell, shot through the abdomen. The rebels lost one hundred and seventy-five killed, and some seventy taken prisoners.

Satisfaction of the 14th Dragoons at the success.

When the despatch containing the account of this affair reached Durand, he handed it over to Major Gall to read to the 14th Dragoons and 86th Foot. By these men it was heard with more than satisfaction, for it dissipated any doubt which might have been caused by the escape of the garrison of Dhár.

Durand reaches the Chambal.

Durand now pushed on as fast as the baggage-carts and the roads would permit him, and on the 19th of November reached Hernia on the banks of the river Chambal. The crossing of this river, unopposed as it was, presented no inconsiderable difficulties. Its banks are rugged and almost perpendicular, its stream is deep and rapid, and its bed is broken by enormous boulders of basalt. The baggage of the force was carried almost entirely on carts drawn by bullocks, a few camels only having been obtainable, and to convey these carts and the artillery guns across a river presenting the difficulties I have described would, under no circumstances, have been an easy task. That the rebels, hitherto

Description of the river.

Book XVI. Chapter II.

1857. November.

The rebels foolishly leave it undefended.

so aggressive, should have neglected the opportunity thus offered to them adds another to the many proofs in which this history abounds, that brave as they were in fight, they understood little of the art of war. As it was, nearly two days were spent in effecting the passage, nor was this possible until the sappers had cut a road down the bank for the artillery and carts, and another up the opposite bank.*

Durand approaches Mandisúr.

The column halted the afternoon of the 20th on the east bank of the Chambal, and marching early the following morning, encamped four miles south of Mandisúr, in a position covered to the front by some rising ground, flanked on the left by a little village and gardens, beyond which again were several large topes, some cultivated ground, and another village surrounded by gardens and trees. On the right of the British position were hills and villages, and between these and the rising ground in front already

* "I never saw a more animated and beautiful picture in my life than when our brigade crossed this river. The steep, verdant, shrubby banks, covered with our varied forces, elephants, camels, horses, and bullocks; the deep flowing clear river, reaching on and on to the far east, to the soft deep-blue tufted horizon; the babble and yelling of men, the lowing of the cattle, the grunting screams of the camels, and the trumpeting of the wary, heavily-laden elephant; the rattle of our artillery down the bank, through the river, and up the opposite side; the splashing and plunging of our cavalry through the stream—neighing and eager for the green encamping ground before them; and everybody so busy and jovial, streaming up from the deep water to their respective grounds; and all this in the face, almost, of an enemy, formed a *tableau vivant* never to be forgotten." — Lowe's *Campaign in Central India.*

Book XIII Chapter II

1857 November. Aggressive humour of the rebels.

referred to was an extensive plateau, covered here and there with acres of uncut grain. Beyond it, again, the city of Mandisúr.* A reconnaissance having indicated that all was quiet in front, the camp was pitched, and the men went to their breakfasts.

But the rebels were again in an aggressive humour. Rumours had been industriously spread in their ranks that the British force had been repulsed from Dhár and, in sheer desperation, was now meditating an attack on Mandisúr. The leaders knew better, but they used all their efforts to give currency to the story. Consequently, about mid-day on the 22nd, the rebels, confident that they had before them only a dispirited and beaten column, sallied forth from Mandisúr, and, marching gaily, took possession of the village surrounded by trees and gardens beyond the extreme left of the British line, and making that village their extreme right, occupied, with two considerable masses, the plateau connecting it with Mandisúr.

They threaten the British force,

which turns out to receive them,

The men in the British camp were at their breakfasts when the news of the rebel movement reached them. Instantly they fell in, and the line formed; the dragoons on the extreme right, the Nizám's horse on the extreme left, Hungerford's and Woollcombe's batteries forming the right-centre, the bullock battery of the Haidarábád the left centre, the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry the centre, and the Haidarábád

* Lowe.

infantry with the Madras Sappers on the left of the Haidarábád guns, opposite the village occupied by the rebels. The British guns at once opened fire; and Woollcombe's guns, pointed by Lieutenant Strutt, to be again mentioned in these pages, firing very true,* the rebels wavered. An advance of the Haidarábád troops converted their wavering into flight. The cavalry then pursued and cut up a number of them. The remainder escaped into the city.

Book XII. Chapter IV. 1857. November. and beats them.

The next day, the 22nd, Durand crossed to the right bank of the Mandisúr river and encamped to the west of the town within two thousand yards of the suburbs. His object was to gain a position whence he could threaten Mandisúr with one hand, and the rebel force, which had occupied Nímach,† and which, he had learned from spies, was now hastening to the aid of their comrades, on the other. A cavalry reconnaissance showed the Nímach rebels to be in considerable force in the village of Gorariá on the high road to that place. Durand encamps between the Mandisúr and Nímach rebels.

In that direction, then, Durand moved on the 24th. After a march of three miles, he espied the rebels about a mile distant, their right rest-

* "Lieutenant Strutt's shooting was very true. All the while this firing was going on at the village, a fine fellow, dressed in white, with a green flag, coolly walked out from the cover, and sauntered leisurely along the whole line of our guns, while round shot and shell were whizzing about him in awful proximity. He occasionally stooped down but never attempted to run; he then quietly retraced his steps, when a shot from Lieutenant Strutt struck him just before he regained the village."—Lowe's *Central India*.

† Vol. ii. pages 571, 572.

Book XIII. Chapter II. 1857. November.

ing on the village, their centre on a long hill, and their left, well covered by fields of uncut grain, with broken ground and nullahs in their front, full of water and mud.

Provoke the latter at Gorariá.

The British guns, opening out on the rebels, soon overcame the fire of their five field-pieces, and forced their line to fall back. They clung, however, with great pertinacity to the village of Gorariá, and on this, retiring from the centre and left, they fell back very slowly. Whilst the British were endeavouring to drive them from this position, a strong party sallied from Mandisúr and attacked the rear. They were driven back after a very sharp contest by the Nizám's horse and the dragoons. In front, however, the British could make no impression on the village. The brigadier detailed the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry to carry it with the bayonet, but the fire from it was so fierce that he countermanded the order, preferring to reduce it with his guns. When night fell the rebels still occupied Gorariá. The British loss had been considerable, amounting to upwards of sixty officers and men killed and wounded.

Desperate conflict.

Gorariá is finally carried.

At 10 o'clock next morning the 18-pounders and the 24-pounder howitzer were brought to within two hundred and fifty yards of the village, and the firing recommenced. The place was shelled till it became a mere wreck; everything that could be burned in it was consumed. Still the rebels held out. At last, about mid-day, some two hundred and twenty came out and surrendered. Those that remained were Rohillas, and

they stuck to the last brick in the place. About 4 o'clock firing ceased, and the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry stormed it.

Book XIII. Chapter IV. 1857. November. The gallantry of the Rohillas allows the Sháhzádah to escape.

The stern defence of the Rohillas did service to their cause. Whilst the British force was dealing with them the Sháhzádah and his two thousand Afgháns and Mekránis evacuated Mandisor and retreated on Nángarh. The cavalry, worn out by four days of unremitting exertion, was unable to pursue them.

Pursuit, however, was scarcely necessary. The blow struck at Gorariá was a blow from which there was no rallying. The Afgháns and Mekránis, as panic-stricken as they had been bold, fled through the country, avoiding towns and villages, and endeavouring to seek refuge in the jungles. One party of them, more daring than their fellows, suddenly appeared at Partábgarh. The loyal chief of that state, summoning his Thákurs, attacked them, killed eighty of them, and drove the rest into flight. The others seemed, above all, anxious to place the Chambal between themselves and their conqueror.

The blow struck at Gorariá is decisive.

The objects which Durand had in his mind when he set out from Máu on the 14th of October had now been accomplished. With a force extremely weak in infantry, he had crushed the rebellion on the plateau of Málwá, thus saving the line of the Narbadá, and cutting off the disaffected troops of Holkar from the supports on which they had rested. The campaign, brief as it was, had proved decisive, and had vindicated to the letter the prescience of Durand when, re-

The objects the campaign achieved.

Book XIII. Chapter II. 1857. December.

sisting every temptation to act otherwise, he resolved to allow Holkar's troops to rest in quiet until he should have disposed of the Dhár rebels and the mutineers of Mandisúr and Nímach.

Durand marches on Indúr.

He was now at liberty to turn his arms against Holkar's troops. This he did. Returning by Mahidpúr and Újjén, he reached the vicinity of Indúr on the 14th of December, fully prepared to encounter the troops of the Mahárájá should they offer opposition to his entrance into the city. But the spirit which had prompted the treacherous attack of the 1st of July quailed before the sight of a British force returning from victory over traitors. The Indúr troops, held in check during Durand's campaign by the Máu garrison, had been utterly disheartened by the defeat of their sympathisers at Mandisúr, and were as humble as some few weeks previously they had been boastful and defiant.

Disarms Holkar's regular cavalry.

Near the ground on which Durand encamped on the 14th of December he met and disarmed Holkar's regular cavalry, and placed the men under the care of the Sikh cavalry of the late Bhopál Contingent. He sent likewise to Holkar's chief minister a letter, in which he insisted that the remainder of the troops should be promptly disarmed. Should this demand not be complied with immediately, he expressed his firm resolution to disarm them himself.

Durand engages Holkar to disarm the infantry.

The reply came that afternoon. The agent who brought it expressed the intention of the Darbár to disarm the infantry at once, and the

request that whilst the operation was being carried into effect Durand would halt at a point one mile from the cavalry lines. Durand complied, and Holkar's infantry, one thousand six hundred in number, were quietly disarmed that same evening.

Book XIII. Chapter II. 1857. December.

After the disarming had been completed, Durand, accompanied by a large body of the officers of the Máu column, called upon the Maharájá in his palace in the city of Indúr. It was the first time since the month of June that Durand had seen Holkar. Regarding him in his own mind as an accessory to the attack made upon the Residency on the 1st of July, Durand had sent a report of all the circumstances of the case to Lord Canning, and pending a reply, had declined to renew personal relations with a prince who might possibly be adjudged by the English authority in India to be a rebel. But when, after the Málwá campaign, Holkar had acquiesced in the disarming of his cavalry and infantry, and his minister had promised that a suitable punishment should be meted out to the guilty, Durand, on the eve of being relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, felt that the circumstances were not such as to warrant the omission of the ordinary courtesy required to be displayed on such an occasion. Holkar himself was anxious for the visit, and that it should be conducted with a ceremony and an ostentatious display of friendly intercourse such as would produce an impression on his people. Durand acceded. The visit went off well. Holkar was in good spirits, expressed him-

Durand visits Holkar.

prompted by reasons of courtesy.

Interview between Durand and Holkar.

Book XIII. Chapter II. 1857. December.

self delighted at the disarming of his troops, and a hope that the act would be regarded by the British Government as a proof of his loyalty. Durand quietly, but firmly, impressed upon him that something further was yet required—the punishment of the guilty, whether soldiers or citizens—and stated his confident belief that the British Government and the British people would expect that this remaining duty would be properly carried out. Holkar gave an assurance that a Commission, which he had previously appointed, would make full inquiries into the matter. The interview then terminated. The next day Durand was relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton.

Durand's character crowned his career.

He had completed a noble task. His personal character had been the mainstay of British authority in central India. Had Durand not been there, the result had not been accomplished. This little sentence conveys to the reader more clearly than a multitude of words the vast value of his services. He was the representative of political power and, virtually, the general; the brain and the hand, in a most important part of India. He foresaw everything, and he provided for everything. He foresaw even—his own despatches and memoirs written at the time show it most clearly—all that was to happen in the few months that were to follow: how the pacification of the North-West Provinces would increase the pressure west of the Jamná; the action of Náná Sáhib and his nephews; the incursion of Tántia Topi. He saw equally clearly the line that should be, and that was, followed. "If affairs at Indúr

His great sagacity;

his foresight.

are successfully arranged," he wrote on the 12th of December, "I shall lose no time in marching the bulk of the Máu column to Sihor with the view of concentrating Sir H. Rose's command, and enabling him to relieve Ságar, clear Bandalkhand, and advance on Jhánsi and Gwáliár." In these lines Durand foreshadowed the course which he would himself have pursued, and which Sir Hugh Rose did pursue. But it is his actual achievements which call for special commendation. In spite of his earnest entreaties, in spite of the pressure exercised by Lord Elphinstone, Woodburn had in June chosen to waste most precious moments at Aurangábád. Had that general not delayed at that Capua, it is more than probable that the insurrection of the 1st of July would never have been attempted at Indúr. But mark the conduct of Durand after that misfortune had happened. He hastens to meet Woodburn's column, now commanded by another officer; he meets it, quickens its movements, and brings it to Máu. He finds western Málwá in a state of aggressive insurrection, and the only line which had remained a barrier between the Central Provinces and Bombay—the line of the Narbadá—sorely threatened. Of all the political officers in central India he alone understands the enormous importance of that line. He finds Mr. Plowden from Nágpúr, Major Erskine from the Ságar and Narbadá territories, urging measures which would have lost it. Though pressed by many considerations to disarm Holkar's troops, he, receiving from no quarter a word of encou-

The value of his great achievements.

In spite of the incapacity and wrong-headedness of others.

Book VIII. Chapter II.

1857. December.

ragement or support, risks everything to save that important line. Then what do we see? With a weak column of five hundred Europeans of all arms and eight hundred natives,* he sets out from Máu, and in five weeks takes a strong fort, fights several cavalry combats, gains three actions in the open field, takes more than forty guns, crushes the Mandisúr insurrection, saves the line of the Narbadá, and, marching back to Indúr, causes the disarming of the disaffected troops of Holkar. In four months he more than counteracts the evil effected by an army of conspirators.

He wins back in four months all that had been lost.

His greatness not appreciated by his contemporaries.

It was, I repeat, a noble work, nobly performed, and, like many noble works, left unrewarded. No man has been more calumniated than its author. No one more bravely fought the battle of life in face of calumny. I may add that of no man that ever lived will the career bear more acute and critical examination. Should the life of Henry Marion Durand be written with the fearlessness the occasion demands, his countrymen will realise alike the worth of the man who, at a most critical period, secured a line the loss of which would have produced incalculable evils. They will learn, too, something of the nature of the smaller beings who aided in the attempt to calumniate, to insult, and to depreciate him. They will learn that it is not always the truly great who occupy the most conspicuous position in the eyes of their contemporaries!

Who were also rivals, though far below him.

* Reinforced at Dhár by the Haidarábád troops.

Many officers distinguished themselves in this campaign. One of these, who for his daring, his gallantry, and his brain power was specially noticed by Colonel Durand, requires mention here. "Much of the success in quelling this insurrection," wrote Durand to Lord Canning at the end of November 1857, "is due to the judicious daring, the thorough gallantry with which, whenever opportunity offered, Major Gall, his officers and men, sought close conflict with the enemy—a bold one, who often fought most desperately. I feel it a duty to Major Gall and H.M.'s 14th Light Dragoons, men and officers, thus especially to beg your Lordship's influence in favour of officers and men, who have merited, by conspicuous valour, everything that Her Majesty's Government may be pleased to confer. They deserve most highly." Durand also noticed with marked commendation the splendid services of Major Orr, Captain Abbott, and the officers and men of the Haidarábád Contingent and of the 25th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry. This regiment boasted a commanding officer, Major, afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel, Robertson, than whom no one rendered better service to the State. Captain Woollcombe, Lieutenants Strutt and Christie, of the Bombay Artillery, the last-named of whom was shot through the heart, also greatly distinguished themselves. But there were many others in the same category. The list is too long.

Some of the men who served under him.

BOOK XIII.

CHAPTER III.

The Ságar and Narbadá territories.

THE territories known as the Ságar and Narbadá territories formed an extensive tract, bounded on the north by the British districts of Bandá, Allahábád, and Mirzapúr; on the south by Nágpúr and the dominions of the Nizám; on the west by Gwáliár and Bhopál. Within these boundaries is comprehended the state of Rewá, whose Rája recognised the overlordship of the British. The other native feudatories, the feudatories of Kóti, Maihír, Uchéra, and Soháwal, held their lands under grants from the East India Company. Within the limits of those lands, however, they exercised a ruling authority, subject to the interference, when necessary, of the paramount power. The larger portion of the Ságar and Narbadá territories were directly British. This portion comprised the districts of Ságar, Jabalpúr, Hoshangábád, Sióni, Damoh, Narsingpúr, Baitúl, Jhánsi, Chandairi, Nagód, and Mandlah.

1843.

Sketch of the later history of those territories.

When, in 1843, the Gwáliár Darbár commenced those hostilities against the British which culminated in the battle of Maháráj púr, the chiefs and people of the Ságar and Narbadá territories, then ruled by Mr. Fraser, C.B., as Agent to the Governor-General, broke out into open rebellion. This rebellion was due partly to the great dislike felt by the people to the civil courts, and more particularly to the mode in which they were administered, and partly to the propaganda of the Gwáliár Darbár. When, however, the pride of that Darbár had been lowered by the battle of Maháráj púr, peace was restored to the Ságar and Narbadá territories. Lord Ellenborough, who, throughout his Indian career, always displayed a marked detestation of proved abuses, inaugurated the newly-gained peace by making a clean sweep of the British officials serving in the territories, and by sending one of the ablest officers in the Indian services, the late Colonel Sleeman, to administer them on a new basis. Colonel Sleeman succeeded in pacifying the chiefs and in contenting the people. When, after a rule of two or three years, he was promoted to be Resident at Lakhnao, he handed over the territories to his successor, Mr. Bushby, in perfect order. Mr. Bushby's administration of five or six years was characterised by ability and good judgment; but when, at the close of that period, he was promoted to the Residency of Haidarábád, the Ságar and Narbadá territories were joined to the North-West Provinces, then ruled by Mr. Colvin, Major

Acts XIII. Chapter III. 1855.

Erskine* receiving the appointment of Commissioner of Jabalpúr and becoming Mr. Colvin's representative in the territories. Subordinate to Major Erskine, were, amongst others, Captain Skene, Commissioner of Jhánsi, and Captain Ternan, Deputy Commissioner of Narsangpúr.

They fall under the rule of the Sudder Board of Revenue.

With their transfer to the North-West Provinces, the Ságar and Narbadá territories came under the Sudder Board of Revenue. In accordance with its traditions, that venerable Board at once proposed changes in the administration so startling that, if carried out, they would inevitably have caused a violent rebellion. Before finally deciding in favour of the proposed changes, Mr. Colvin had the good sense to ask the opinion of the officer who had served longest in the territories, a man of remarkable sense and strength of character, Captain A. H. Ternan. Captain Ternan replied by pointing out the inapplicability of the rules of the Sudder Board of Revenue to the needs of the province, and the certain consequences which would follow any attempt to enforce them. Mr. Colvin, struck by Captain Ternan's representations, withdrew nearly the whole of the proposed changes. It is a pity that he did not withdraw the whole, for the few that he allowed, relating chiefly to the subdivision of properties, roused a very bad feeling, and led to many agrarian outrages.

Which produces revolutionary changes.

On Captain Ternan's representation many of these are modified.

Such was the state of the territories in 1857. The temper of the people, kindled by the cause I

Sufficient remains to show the temper of the people.

* Afterwards Earl of Kellie.

have mentioned, had not wholly subsided into its normal condition of contentment. The outbreak in the North-West Provinces came inopportunely to inflame it still more.

Book VIII. Chapter III.

1857. January.

Captain Ternan at Narsingpúr.

The small station of Narsingpúr on the Narbadá, sixty miles to the west of Ságar, was garrisoned at the outbreak of the mutiny by four companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry, under the command of Captain Woolley, an excellent officer. The Deputy Commissioner of the district, Captain Ternan, to whose calm and cool judgment I have already referred, had his headquarters also at Narsingpúr. The district of which this town was the capital was largely inhabited by petty chiefs, who had gone into rebellion in 1843, and who had never submitted willingly to British jurisdiction. So early as December 1856 there were not wanting indications that some great event was looming before the eyes of these men, but no European could venture an opinion as to the form that event would take. It happened, however, that one evening in January 1857, Captain Ternan was sitting outside his tent, smoking a cigar, when the Kótwál* of the village came running to him, bearing in his hand some small chapatties or cakes of unleavened bread. On reaching Ternan, the Kótwál, out of breath and panting, stated that the cakes were the remnant of a large quantity he had received that morning, with instructions to leave them with the watchman of every village, to be

His first experience of the chapatties in circulation.

* A Kótwál is generally a chief officer of police.

Book XIII. Chapter III.

1857. January.

kept till called for; that he had so distributed them in the neighbouring villages, and that those which he held in his hand constituted the surplus. "What," he asked Ternan, "was he to do with them?"

Ternan divines the mystery.

Ternan, naturally shrewd, and that natural shrewdness sharpened by the experience of the rebellion of 1842–43, at once divined the truth. In those small unleavened cakes he saw the fiery cross sent through the land to unsettle the minds of the great mass of the people; that, distributed broadcast as the Kótwál had distributed them in his district, they would indicate a sudden danger that might come at any moment upon the people, threatening their caste and undermining their religion. He at once embodied these ideas in a report, which he transmitted forthwith to his official superior, Major Erskine.

And reports his views to Major Erskine.

Major Erskine.

Major Erskine was an officer who had written a book of "Forms and Tables for the Use of the Bengal Native Infantry." That book was a reflex of his mind. His mind was a mind "of forms and tables." His mental vision commanded the line of strict and formal routine. Out of that line he saw nothing, he was incapable of seeing anything. When, therefore, he received Ternan's report and read the conclusions drawn by that officer regarding the unleavened cakes, he ridiculed them; he considered the idea far-fetched, absurd, impossible. He wrote back to Ternan to that effect, adding that it was simply a case of "a dyer's vat having gone wrong," and that the owner of the vat was

Utterly declines Ternan's view.

propitiating the gods by the distribution of cakes!

Book XIII. Chapter II.

1857. January.

Subsequent events made it abundantly evident that Erskine was wrong and Ternan was right. Distributed broadly over the North-West Provinces and in Oudh, in the earlier months of 1857, these cakes were the harbingers of the coming storm. It is certain now that they originated in the brain of the Oudh conspirators, of the men made conspirators by the annexation of their country, and they were sent to every village for the very object divined by Ternan—the object of unsettling men's minds, of preparing them for the unforeseen, of making them impressionable, easy to receive the ideas the conspirators wished to promulgate.

Ternan's prescience is justified by events.

I may record here a decision of the Government promulgated in the same district a year or two prior to 1857, and of the remarkable consequence it produced after the mutiny had broken out, as illustrative of the influence which an able and conscientious English officer can almost always bring to bear upon native chiefs. One of the most influential chieftains in the territories under Captain Ternan's supervision was the rájá of Dilhérí, the feudal lord of all the Gónd clans. This chief had ever been loyal. For his fidelity and good conduct in the trying times of 1842–43, the Government had presented him with a gold medal. Like many of the Gónd tribe, he had been somewhat too profuse in his expenditure, and had incurred debts. But by exercising a strict economy he had paid off those debts.

The rájá of Dilhérí

Book XIII. Chapter III. 1855.

Such was his condition in 1855, shortly after the Ságar and Narbadá territories had been brought under the government of the North-West Provinces. It had been a principle of that government, since the time when it was administered by Mr. Thomason, to discourage large landowners. One morning in that year Captain Ternan received instructions, emanating from Ágra, desiring him to inform the rájá of Dilhéri that, inasmuch as he was unfit to hold the title of rájá, and had proved himself incapable of managing his estates, he was deprived of both; that his title of rájá was abolished, and that his property would be distributed among his tenants, he receiving a percentage from the rents! When this decision was most unwillingly announced to the rájá by Captain Ternan, the old man drew his medal from the belt in which it was habitually carried, and requested the English officer to return it to those who had bestowed it, as they were now about to disgrace him before his clan and before the whole district. With great difficulty Ternan pacified him. It was generally expected that he would break out into rebellion. He might well have done so, for every member of the clan felt insulted in his person. Ternan, fearing an outbreak, pressed on the Government the mistake they had committed, and urged them to rectify it. But the Government would not listen. The order was carried out. Ternan did all in his power to save the family from ruin; but even he could do little.

Falls under the displeasure of the Board of Revenue,

and is deprived of his title and estates.

He feels the insult bitterly;

but despite Ternan's remonstrances, the decision is persisted in.

Before the mutiny broke out in May 1857, the

old man had died; his son, too, had died. The next heir took the title—for, however the Government might order, the representative of the family was always rájá to the people. Then came the mutiny of May 1857. The Narsingpúr district felt its shock. Muhammadans from across the border invaded the district and pillaged the villages. The outlook became every day more gloomy. "Save yourselves while yet there is time," said the loyal officials to Ternan. But Ternan stayed. One morning, however, early in June, his house was surrounded by a considerable body of armed men, with lighted matchlocks. Ternan saw at a glance that they all belonged to the Dilhéri clan. He at once summoned the chief and asked him what had brought him and his clansmen in such numbers and in so warlike a garb. The chief replied that he would answer if he and the other chiefs were allowed a private audience with their interlocutor. Ternan admitted them into his drawing-room. The chief replied: "You behaved kindly to us and fought our battle when the title and estate were confiscated, and you were abused for so doing. Now we hear disturbances are rife, and we come to offer you our services. We will stick by you as you stuck by us. What do you wish us to do?" Ternan thanked them, accepted their offer, assured them they should be no losers by their conduct, and promised to do his utmost to see justice done them. The members of the clan remained loyal throughout the trying events of 1857–58, resisted the urgent solicitations made to them to join the

rebels, and, what was of equal importance, they induced other clans to join them in rendering most valuable service to the British cause.

I turn now to the part of the territories the chief centres in which were more purely military stations.

There were three military stations in the Ságar and Narbadá territories—the stations of Ságar, Jabalpúr, and Hoshangábád. Ságar was garrisoned by the 31st and 47th Bengal Native Infantry, the 3rd Regiment Irregular Cavalry, and sixty-eight European gunners; Jabalpúr by the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, and Hoshangábád by the 28th Madras Native Infantry. The commandant of the Ságar district force was Brigadier Sage, who had his head-quarters at Ságar.

Neither the news of the mutiny at Mírath nor the tidings of the nearer and more horrible events at Jhánsi,* affected, according to all appearance, the demeanour of the native troops at Ságar. Indeed, so conspicuous was their good conduct, that, early in June, Brigadier Sage, not trusting them, yet unwilling openly to display an opposite feeling, did not hesitate to send a detachment, consisting of five hundred infantry, one hundred and twenty-five cavalry, and two 9-pounders, against a rája who had rebelled, promising them a reward of six thousand rupees for the capture of the said rája, dead or alive. A few days later, however, the brigadier had reason to feel that the policy of concealing distrust was not likely to answer

* Vol i. page 190.

Book XIII. Chapter VI. 1857. June.

better in Ságar than in the places where it had been already tried and had failed. The station of Ságar was laid out in a manner which rendered it difficult for a commander with only sixty-eight European soldiers at his disposal, to exercise a general supervision over the whole. At one end of it were the fort, the magazine, and the battering train. At the other end, distant from it three miles and a quarter, was a commanding position known as the artillery hill. Both these points could not be retained. The artillery hill, though in many respects important as a position, wanted water and storing-room for provisions. There was no question, then, in the brigadier's mind, as to the position which should be abandoned. Yet he laboured under this great difficulty, that the sepoys possessed the fort and the treasury, and they took care to let it be surmised that they would yield neither the one nor the other. In a word, the station was at their mercy.

The position at Ságar.

Affairs were in this position when, on the 13th of June, Brigadier Sage received an application for assistance in guns from Lallatpúr, a station in the Jhánsi district, garrisoned by three hundred men of the 6th Infantry, Gwáliár Contingent. The brigadier promptly despatched two 9-pounders, escorted by one company of the 31st Native Infantry, one of the 42nd, and seventy-five troopers of the 3rd Irregulars. The detachment never reached Lallatpúr. The very evening before it left Ságar, the three companies of the Gwáliár regiment at that station had broken out into mutiny, had plundered the treasury, and had

Mutiny at Lallatpúr.

driven the European officers* to flee for protection to the rájá of Bánpúr, who, under the pretence of being a friend, had been for some days in the vicinity of Lallatpúr, exciting the sepoys to mutiny.

For a moment I follow the action of this rájá. Finding that the rebel sepoys had taken possession of the Lallatpúr treasury, and were marching off with its contents, he attacked them, and was repulsed. Thus baffled, he sent off his European guests to the fort of Tehrí, there to be confined, and then marched in haste to meet the detachment coming from Ságar, with the view of inducing the sepoys composing it to join him.

Major Gaussen, commanding that detachment, had reached Málthoni, thirty-seven miles from Ságar, when he heard of the mutiny at Lallatpúr and of the movement of the Bánpúr rájá. He at once halted and wrote for reinforcements. Sage replied promptly by sending four hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry. The night previous to the day on which those men were ordered to set out, great commotion reigned in Ságar, and it seemed as though mutiny might break out at any moment. The danger passed, however. Brigadier Sage, though urged by many of those about him to put an end to the terrible suspense by striking a blow with the few Euro-

* Captain Sale, commanding; Lieutenant Irwin, second in command, his wife and two children; Dr. O'Brien, and Lieutenant Gordon, Deputy Commissioner of Chandairi. They were made over to the rájá of Sháhgarh, by whom they were kindly treated. Ultimately they were all released.

peans under his orders, remained impassive. He had resolved to act only when the sepoys should commit themselves unmistakably to revolt. Book VIII. Chapter III. 1857. June.

The detachment marched the following morning, the 19th of June, and joined Major Gaussen on the 23rd. Gaussen then marched with his whole force against the fort of Bálábát, held by the rebels, stormed it,* and took sixteen of the garrison prisoners. The sepoy storming promised these men their lives, and two days later, on the return of the detachment to Málthoní, they insisted on their release. Major Gaussen being powerless to refuse the demand, they released the prisoners, and made them over to the Bánpúr rájá. No sooner had this act been accomplished than that rájá entered the British camp, and openly offered the sepoys a monthly pay of twelve rupees if they would leave their officers and go over to him with their arms and ammunition! The sepoys complied, dismissed their officers, and joined the rájá. His men revolt.

The information brought by the returning officers to Ságar decided Sage to act promptly. He saw that if he were to wait till the rebel rájá should march on Ságar, he and his sixty-eight men would be surrounded and lost. According he at once, and in the most judicious manner, began his operations. He first moved the contents of the treasury to the fort; to the same place he next conveyed the contents of the Sage prepares for a decisive movement.

* In blowing open the gate, Ensign Spens of the 31st was accidentally killed. Lieutenant Willoughby of the artillery was wounded.

Book XIII. Chapter III. 1857. June.

expense magazine and the artillery magazine; and last of all, he removed thither the women, children, and baggage of the European artillery. As soon as this had been accomplished, he took a guard of Europeans and relieved the sepoy guard at the fort gate. He then marched into it the ladies and children. Thus, by a few decisive strokes, the one following the other with rapidity, Sage gained a place of refuge, secured the contents of the magazine, and saved the treasure.

His reasons with the native officers.

The second day after, the morning of the 30th of June, whilst the ordinary grand guard-mounting was progressing, Sage marched the Europeans and sixty cavalry, who remained loyal, into the fort. He then sent for all the native officers, and frankly telling them the reason of his action, added that they had suffered acts of mutiny to take place without opposing them, and had forfeited their character; that there was yet one method open to them of regaining it, and that was to have the leading mutineers seized and delivered up to justice. The native officers of the three regiments, apparently very much affected, promised everything. The next morning, however, the 3rd Irregulars and the 42nd Native Infantry broke into open mutiny and plundered the bazars and the bungalows of the officers. The 31st held aloof, professing loyalty; and on the 7th of July, one of their men having killed a trooper who had fired at him, a desperate fight ensued between the two native infantry regiments. The 31st being unable to make much impression on the 42nd, who had two guns, sent

The 3rd Irregulars and the 42nd Native Infantry break out into mutiny: the 31st Native Infantry remains staunch.

into the fort imploring assistance. Sage sent them the sixty loyal troopers. A good deal of fighting then ensued, but, in the midst of it, forty of the 31st deserted to the 42nd. Still the bulk of the loyal regiment persevered, and, when evening fell, sent again to the fort to implore assistance in guns. Sage replied that it was too late to send them that night, but in the morning he would bring them victory. Information to this effect reaching the two belligerent parties fixed the 31st in their loyal resolves, whilst it so dispirited their opponents that during the night they fled, pursued for some miles by the loyal sepoys and troopers, who captured one of the guns. When the victors returned, it was ascertained that whilst the entire 31st, the forty above alluded to excepted, had remained loyal, fifty of the 42nd had followed their example, and the sixty loyal troopers had been joined by at least an equal number of the same temper from out-stations.

Book VIII. Chapter III.

1857. July.

Battle between the loyal and the disloyal sepoys.

Final victory of the loyal natives.

The brigadier now devoted himself to strengthening the mud fort. He had supplies and medical stores for six months, and a sufficiency of guns and ammunition. The able-bodied men of the Christian community were gradually drilled, and as they numbered about sixty, Sage soon had at his disposal a force of one hundred and twenty-three fighting men. The number was not at all too large, for the duties were heavy; there were one hundred and ninety women and children to be guarded, and occasionally parties of Bandíla rebels, into whose hands the surrounding country had fallen, made known their pre-

Life in the Sāgar fort.

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Book XIII. Chapter III.

1857. August.

The districts overrun by the rebels.

sence by a sudden volley. They fired, however, only to disappear in the jungles on the first appearance of pursuit.

The districts—in close vicinity to each other—of Jabalpúr, of Ságar, of Chandairi, of Jhánsi, and of Jaláun, continued, from this time until the arrival of the relieving force under Sir Hugh Rose, to be over-run by rebels, sepoy and other. These harried the country, captured forts, plundered villages, for a long time with impunity. Before I narrate the manner in which they were ultimately dealt with, it will, I think, be advisable to clear the ground by recording the events passing at the other stations in this part of India.

Jabalpúr.

Of Lallatpúr I have spoken. Jabalpúr, one hundred and eleven miles south-east from Ságar, has next to be noticed. This station was, in 1857, garrisoned by the 52nd Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Jamieson. It was the head-quarters likewise of Major Erskine, the chief political officer in the Ságar and Narbadá territories. For a few weeks after the news of the mutiny at Mírath had reached Jabalpúr the men of the 52nd showed no sign of disaffection, but it soon became clear that they, too, were only watching their opportunity. On the 16th of June one of the men attempted to murder the adjutant; and though the man in question was subsequently released on the ground of insanity, the conduct of his comrades a little later proved that there had been method in his madness. They assumed the usual airs of authority, treated their officers with patronising familiarity,

Dubious conduct of the 52nd Native Infantry.

and declared that they would only mutiny if a European regiment were sent to disarm them. One consequence of this conduct was that all the ladies and children were promptly despatched to Séoni and Narsingpúr.

For a time they do good work in the district.

The news that a native brigade was advancing on Jabalpúr from Kámpti would appear to have produced a good effect on the men of the 52nd, for in the interval between the period I have referred to and the arrival of the brigade, 2nd of August, they were usefully employed by Major Erskine in repressing disturbances in the district. The Kámpti movable column—for it was no more —consisted of the 4th Madras Light Cavalry under Captain Tottenham, the 33rd Madras Native Infantry under Colonel Millar commanding the column, a battery of Field Artillery under Captain Jones, and one company Rifles, Nágpúr Irregular Force, under Lieutenant Pereira. This column marched into Jabalpúr on the 2nd of August. After a halt there of a few days, the larger portion of it was sent into the neighbouring districts to restore order. During its absence an old rájá of the Gónd dynasty, Shankar Sháh, his son, and some adherents of his house were convicted, on the clearest evidence, of plotting the destruction of the English at Jabalpúr, and the plunder of the station. On the 18th of September the father and son were blown away from guns, the adherents being reserved for the following day. But little doubt was entertained that the criminal rájá and his criminal son had made many efforts to seduce the men of the 52nd from their alle-

The Kámpti column arrives.

Rájá Shankar Sháh and his son mutiny and are punished.

Book XIII. Chapter III. 1857. September.

giance. To allay, then, the excitement which, it was apprehended, their execution might create in the minds of the rank and file, Colonel Jamieson and other officers of the regiment proceeded almost immediately to the lines, and explained to the men that the rájá and his son had merely paid the penalty for proved misconduct. They judged, from the manner of the men, that they had removed all apprehensions from their minds. At 9 o'clock that night, however, the entire 52nd regiment marched quietly out of the station, without noise or alarm, and proceeded some twenty miles without a halt to the Tahsildári of Patan. At that place was stationed a company of their own regiment commanded by Lieutenant MacGregor. MacGregor, who naturally had had no intimation of the proceedings of the regiment, was surprised, and at once placed in confinement under sentries. The sepoys then sent in to their colonel a letter, most respectfully worded, in which they announced their intention of marching to Dehlí, and offered to release MacGregor in exchange for ten sepoys left behind in Jabalpúr. This offer not having been complied with, the rebels kept their prisoner till they were attacked, and then shot him.*

But long before the commission of this atrocity information of the high-handed action of the 52nd

* MacGregor's body was found by the officers of the Madras column with one ball through the neck, both arms broken, and his body perforated with thirty or forty bayonet wounds. Major Erskine had previously offered eight thousand rupees for his release.

1857. September.

Native Infantry, and orders to return to Jabalpúr, had been conveyed to the Madras column in the district. That column, consisting of four hundred men of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, the rifle company of the 1st Madras Native Infantry, one troop of the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, and four guns, manned by European gunners, happened to be at Damoh, sixty-five miles to the north-west of Jabalpúr. It started at once, on the 21st of September. On the night of the 25th it encamped at Sangrámpúr, about twenty-five miles from its destination. Between this place and Jabalpúr, close to a village called Katanji, flows a navigable river, the Hiran, the passage across which, it was thought possible, might be disputed by the 52nd. To secure the means of crossing it, a party, consisting of the grenadier company 33rd Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Watson, and a few troopers of the 4th, under Major Jenkins, left the camp at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 26th. At daybreak, as they were nearing Katanji, Jenkins and Watson, who were riding in front of their column, were suddenly fired at, and almost immediately surrounded. How they escaped it is difficult to imagine. But, notwithstanding all the efforts made by the sepoys, they fought their way through them and reached their men. These were not numerous enough to take the aggressive. Jenkins, therefore, drew them up on a hill difficult to escalade, and there awaited the arrival of the main column.

A Madras column marches against the 52nd Native Infantry.

An advanced party meets them.

fights its way through them,

and waits for the main body.

To this column, on the point of starting about

Book XIII. Chapter III.

1857. September.

6 o'clock in the morning, information arrived, in an exaggerated form, of the events at Katanji. The two European officers were reported killed, and the rebels were said to be pressing on in force. Eager to avenge their officers and relieve their comrades, the gallant native soldiers of the coast army hurried forward. On reaching the mouth of the gorge leading to Katanji, they found the 52nd had taken up a very strong position, both flanks covered by thick jungle. Without hesitating, they opened fire from the guns, and then attacked the rebels with the bayonet and drove them before them. On reaching Katanji, they were joined by Jenkins and Watson. The pursuit was continued beyond that place. In Katanji the body of MacGregor, murdered that morning, was found. The rebels suffered severely. A hundred and twenty-five dead were actually counted on the field, and it is certain that many more were wounded. On the side of the victors one man was killed and fifty were wounded. The column then returned to Jabalpúr.

Which totally defeats the rebels.

This was not by any means the only skirmish which took place in the Ságar and Narbadá territories during the autumn of 1857. In my story of the transactions at Ságar, I have alluded to the conduct of the Bánpúr rájá. This rebel chief, still hoping to gain greatly by the downfall of the British, had, after a great deal of promiscuous plundering, taken up a position at Niráoli, about nine miles from Ságar, and had strongly intrenched it. Against this position a force was sent from the Ságar fort on

A force is sent from Ságar against the Bánpúr rájá.

the 15th of September, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dalyell, 42nd Native Infantry. The expedition was not successful; for though the rebels suffered severely from the fire of the British guns, Colonel Dalyell was killed and the loss of the attacking party in killed and wounded was very severe. The intrenchment was not stormed.

Book XIII. Chapter II. 1857. September. It is repulsed with the loss of its leader, Colonel Dalyell.

This affair did not increase the chances of the restoration of order. The remnant of the 52nd native infantry, numbering some five hundred and thirty men, continued, after its defeat at Katanji, to ravage the country. Joining the adherents of rebel rájás, these men took advantage of the withdrawal of the Madras column from Damoh to plunder that place and to release the prisoners. They then took possession of a strong fort, about thirty miles from Ságar, called Garhákót, and from this they constantly sallied forth to plunder and destroy. In fact, as the year drew to a close, in spite of the fall of Dehlí, the daring of the rebels increased, whilst the handful of British, shut up in the stations at long distances from each other, and powerless to interfere effectually, could do little more than hold their own. Several skirmishes, indeed, occurred, but with no decisive result. In one of these, early in November, near Jabalpúr, the Madras troops defeated the enemy, but their commander, Captain Tottenham, was killed. In others, the defeat of the rebels merely signified a disappearance from one jungle to appear immediately in another.

This country is still ravaged by the rebels.

Book XIII. Chapter III.

1857. November.

Military operations in the Narsingpúr district.

In the preceding pages of this chapter I have alluded to the conduct of Captain Ternan in the Narsingpúr district. I must devote a few lines to the military operations in that quarter. The garrison of Narsingpúr consisted of four companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry under Captain Woolley. These sepoys, unlike the bulk of their brethren in Bengal, continued throughout the period of 1857–58 loyal and true. In November 1857, led by Woolley and accompanied by Ternan, they restored order in the disturbed parts of the district, co-operating for that purpose with a detachment sent from Ságar under Captain Roberts of the 31st Bengal N.I. and Captain Mayne of the 3rd irregular cavalry. Its action was most successful. The districts north of the Narbadá were cleared of rebels; and in a hand-to-hand encounter with the largest body of them, the rebel leader, Ganjan Singh, a landowner of considerable consequence, was slain, and nearly all his followers were destroyed. Ternan, who had his horse shot under him in this encounter, then urged a rapid march upon Singpúr, a place held by a noted rebel called Dalganjan. His advice was followed, and Dalganjan was taken and hanged. The following month another fatal blow was dealt to the insurgents near Chírápúr. When Woolley reached this place it was found evacuated. Ternan, however, pushing on with a small party in search of the rebels, succeeded in surprising them, and capturing their tents, one 4-pounder gun, and many native weapons. This enterprising officer

Woolley.

Ternan.

Roberts.

Mayne.

Energy displayed by Ternan at Chírápúr.

followed up the blow in January 1858 by completely defeating the invading rebels from Rátgarh and Bhopál at Maddanpúr. By this vigorous stroke the Narsingpúr district was finally cleared of all rebels of consequence.

1857. September and at Maddanpúr.

Before describing the measures ultimately taken to reassert British authority throughout this part of India, it is necessary that I should take the reader for a moment to Nagód.

Nagód.

Nagód is a military station, in the Úchéra district, distant forty-eight miles from Réwah, one hundred and eighty from Allahábád, and forty-three miles from Ságar. The garrison in 1857 consisted of the 50th Bengal N.I., commanded by Major Hampton. Up to the month of September this regiment had displayed no mutinous symptoms, and the men were regarded by their officers as staunch and loyal. It happened, however, that at the time that the 52nd native infantry decamped from Jabalpúr in the manner already described, a rumour reached Nagód that Kúnwar Singh was marching on that place. The men of the 50th were accordingly ordered to prepare to march against that warrior. They appeared delighted at the order, made all the necessary preparations with alacrity, and marched. The regiment had not, however, reached the second milestone from Nagód when a voice from the ranks gave the order to halt. The regiment halted. Some of the men then told the officers that their services were no longer required, and that they had better go. Opposition was useless. A few faithful men escorted the

The 50th Native Infantry,

appear staunch and loyal,

but they mutiny,

officers and their families to Mirzapúr, whilst the remainder, returning to Nagód, plundered and burned the place, and then inaugurated in the district a career similar to that of their brethren of the 52nd.

Réwah, I have already stated, is a small native state, ruled by a quasi-independent rájá, recognising the suzerainty of the British, bound to them by treaties, and having a British resident at his court. In 1857 the resident political agent was Lieutenant Willoughby Osborne, an officer of the Madras army, possessing great strength of will, a courage that never faltered, and resolute to do his duty to the utmost. Left unfettered, Willoughby Osborne almost always did the right thing; but, like many other men conscious of their powers, he writhed under the sway of self-appreciative mediocrity. Happily, at Réwah, he was unfettered.

The town of Réwah lies little more than midway between Allahábád and Ságar, being one hundred and thirty-one miles south-west of the former, and one hundred and eighty-two miles north-east of the latter. It is built on the banks of a small river, the Bíhar, a tributary of the Tons. Around it runs a high and thick rampart, still nearly entire, flanked by towers, many of which have fallen into decay. Within this outer defence a similar rampart immediately environs the town; and still further inward a third surrounds the residence of the rájá. It is a decaying place, and the population in 1857 scarcely exceeded six thousand.

Book XII. Chapter II.

1857. June.

The residence of a rájá whose ancestors had been proud of their independence, surrounded by districts in which mutiny was rampant, lying many miles from the route of the British armies between Calcutta and the north-west, Réwah, in June and July of 1857, seemed utterly lost. Not, however, to Willoughby Osborne. The first point to which that able officer directed his efforts was to win the rájá. His character had, indeed, already gained the respect and admiration of the prince, but in such times as were then upon them it became necessary that the princes of India, especially the small rájás, should feel that they had everything to lose, nothing to gain, by the success of the mutineers. Osborne succeeded in instilling that feeling into the mind of the rájá. On the 8th of June he was able to announce that the rájá of Réwah had placed his troops at the disposal of the Government of India; that the offer had been accepted; and that eight hundred of those troops, with two guns, had been sent to Ammapatan—a place commanding the roads to Jabalpúr, Nagód, and Ságar—ready to oppose insurgents from any of those stations, and to intercept communications with the rebellious villages on the Jamná. He despatched, about the same time, eleven hundred of the rájá's troops and five guns to the Kattra pass, about midway to Mirzápúr, and whence a rapid advance could be made on that important commercial city, on Banáras, or on Chunár, as might be deemed advisable. A week later he obtained the rájá's sanction to send seven hun-

Glance at the political situation at Réwah.

Tact and judgment displayed by Willoughby Osborne.

He gains the rájá.

and sends troops to guard the districts.

dred troops to Bandá, and he induced him to issue a proclamation promising rewards to any of his soldiers who should distinguish themselves by their gallantry and loyalty.

The measures taken by Willoughby Osborne had a very marked influence on affairs in Bandalkhand. There, as in the adjacent territories, the smaller chieftains, mostly men of impoverished fortunes, thought the opportunity too favourable to be lost. They, too, rose in revolt. But Osborne was incessantly on the watch. By the skilful disposition of the rája's troops, and by the display of an energy which never tired, he baffled all the earlier efforts of the rebels. By the exercise of similar qualities he kept open the important line of road between Mirzápúr and Jabalpúr, a necessary part of the available postal route between Calcutta and Bombay. In a few weeks he was able to take an active offensive against the insurgents. He defeated them at Kanchanpúr and Zorah, then advancing on their stronghold—Maihir—he stormed that city on the 29th of December, pushed on to Jakháni, captured that place, thus opening thirty-six miles of road in the direction of Jabalpúr. At a date considerably later he, in the most gallant manner, captured the important fort of Bijérájúgarh. Owing solely to the indefatigable exertions of this gallant Englishman, the rebel cause not only found no footing in Bandalkhand, but it lost way in the adjacent territories.

Págpúr, till 1853 the capital of the Bhonslá dynasty, and since that period the chief town in

the Central Provinces and the head-quarters of the Chief Commissioner, is a large straggling city, about seven miles in circumference, having in 1857 a population somewhat exceeding a hundred thousand. Close to the city, on its western side, is a hilly ridge running north and south, known as the Sítábaldi, possessing two summits, one at each extremity, the northern being the higher, the southern the larger, but both commanding the city. Outside of but near the city were the arsenal—containing guns, arms, ammunition, and military stores of every description—and the treasury of the province, containing a large amount of cash. To protect these and the city, the Commissioner, Mr. George Plowden, had, of European troops, one company of Madras artillery, whose head-quarters were at Kámptí, eleven miles distant. The local native troops at his disposal were thus stationed: at Kámptí or in Nágpúr itself, the head-quarters of the 1st Infantry, the 1st Cavalry, and the artillery of the Nágpúr irregular force; at Chánda, eighty-five miles south of Nágpur, were the 2nd Infantry, and a detachment of the 1st, of the same force; at Bhandára, forty miles to the east, was another detachment of the 1st Regiment; the head-quarters and greater part of the 3rd Regiment were at Raipúr, one hundred and thirty-seven miles still further in the same direction; the remainder of that regiment w[illegible] Biláspúr. These, I have said, were [illegible] Kámptí was likewise the head-quart[illegible] gade of the Madras army. The troops stationed there in 1857 were the 4th Madras Light Cavalry,

Desc[illegible] of its position.

Mr. Geo[illegible] Plowden.

The local troops.

the 17th, 26th, 32nd, and 33rd Native Infantry, and the European artillery already alluded to. Brigadier H. Prior commanded the Nágpúr subsidiary force.

Very soon after the events of May 1857 at Mírath became known to the troops located in the Central Provinces, symptoms of disloyalty began to be manifested by the troops, especially by the cavalry portion, of the local force. In the position he occupied, ruling a large city, dependent for physical aid upon a few European gunners and five native regiments, Mr. Plowden could not afford even the symptoms of mutiny to pass unnoticed. Still less could he afford it when all the circumstances of the intended rising, to the extent even of the signal which was to set it in action,* were revealed to him. Mr. Plowden resolved to act, and to act promptly. He arranged with Colonel Cumberlege, who entirely trusted the men of his own regiment—the 4th Light Cavalry—that the troopers of the local regiment should be disarmed on the 17th of June. Colonel Cumberlege performed the task with skill and tact, and without bloodshed. Mr. Plowden followed up this blow by strengthening the two peaks on the Sítábaldi hill, that they might serve as a refuge for the residents of Nágpúr in the event of a mutiny. The residency

* ...y was to have ... the 13th of ... signal to have been ... ascent of three fire-balloons from the city. One of the ringleaders, caught in the act of seducing the men of the 1st local infantry, gave the first intimation of the plot.

was at the same time converted into a barrack, in which the civil and military officers should congregate during the night.

Book VII. Chapter I. 1857 June.

These precautions were effective. Notwithstanding serious alarms, no outbreak actually occurred. The Madras soldiers not only remained faithful, but when a column of them was despatched to Jabalpúr,* the departing men were replaced by others of the same army not less loyal and true. The position at Nágpúr was the more difficult in that the province of which it was the capital was isolated. No part of it was used as a high road for troops. No Europeans could be spared for it from their more pressing duties of crushing the revolt in Oudh and in the North-West Provinces. Its safety was in the hands of the Commissioner. For it he was responsible. It was his duty, with most inadequate means, to assure it. Fortunately, Mr. George Plowden, who represented the Government at Nágpúr, was a gentleman of lofty courage and imperturbable nerve. Without appliances, he acted as though he possessed them. Left without external resources, he regulated his conduct as though they were abundantly at his command. And he succeeded. Eventually, when the first fever-heat of mutiny had subsided, he restored their arms to the local troops. There is no truer test of a man than this capacity to meet dangers and difficulties when he is unarmed, to look them calmly in the face, to remain cool

Loyalty of the soldiers of the Madras army.

Isolated position of Nágpúr

Great credit due to Mr. George Plowden.

* *Vide* page 108.

and imperturbable in their presence. If to do this thoroughly, to cause disaffection to quail before the glance—if this be a proof of greatness, then most assuredly Mr. George Plowden deserves to be classed amongst the great men brought to the front by the mutiny.

BOOK XIII.

CHAPTER IV.

It will clear the ground if, before I record the action of the British generals which restored order throughout central India, I deal with the events in a part of the country already slightly touched upon in the first chapter of this book, and upon the issue of which depended, to a very considerable extent, whether the rebellion would or would not extend throughout the length and breadth of southern and western India. I refer to the dominions of the Nizám.

Those dominions—called after the capital Haidarábád, the abode of Haidar—occupy a portion of India south of the Vindhya range, and enclose about ninety-five thousand three hundred and thirty-seven square miles. Measuring from their extreme point in the north-east, they extend four hundred and seventy-five miles to the south-west, and in their widest part they produce almost a similar result. On the north-

Haidarábád.

Extent and boundaries of the Nizám's dominions.

Book XIII. Chapter IV. 1857. May.

east they are bounded by the central provinces, of which Nágpúr is the capital; on the south-west by portions of the Madras Presidency; on the west by the Bombay Presidency; and on the north-west by a portion of the same presidency, by the dominions of Sindia, and by the Súgar and Narbadá territories. A consideration of this proximity to so many inflammable points will convince the reader how dangerous would have proved a Haidarábád in arms; how essential it was that tranquillity should be maintained within her borders.

The Nizám.

When the year 1857 dawned, the Nizám was Nasir-úd-dáolah. This prince died, however, on the 18th of May, and was succeeded by his son Afzúl-úd-dáolah. The minister, Sálar Jang, nephew of his predecessor, Súráj-úl-Múlk, had held the highest office in the state since the year 1853. He was a man of great ability, great intelligence, devoted to the interests of his country and his master. It was his pride to prove that the natives of India can be governed by natives, not only with justice, but with a regard to their habits and modes of thought, such as, he considered, was impossible under alien rule. But, holding these opinions, he was, nevertheless, a sincere admirer of the British character, and sensible of the absolute necessity of an overlordship, which, while interfering as little as possible with the internal affairs of a native state, should take from each the power to draw the sword against a neighbour. The British Resident at the Court of the Nizám in the early part of 1857

Sálar Jang.

was Mr. Bushby. This able officer, however, died in February of that year. He was succeeded by Major Cuthbert Davidson, an officer of the Madras army, who had at a previous period held the office temporarily, and who had then shown that he possessed all the qualifications necessary for discharging its duties in quiet times. Major Davidson took charge of the office of Resident on the 16th of April. In a very short time an opportunity offered for him to show the stuff he was made of. I have already stated that on the 18th of May the Nizám, Nasir-úd-dáolah, died. His son, Afzúl-úd-dáolah, was installed after the necessary ceremonies. But to the disaffected in Haidarábád the death of one ruler and the succession of another seemed to offer a mine of promise. The late Nizám had trusted Sálar Jang. It was quite possible that his successor might refuse his confidence to that powerful minister. At all events an attempt might be made to discover the actual lay of the situation. Accordingly, when the men of the city of Haidarábád rose on the morning of the 12th of June, they found the walls of the city covered with placards, signed or purporting to be signed by orthodox máulvis, calling upon the faithful to enrol themselves and murder the Europeans. Major Davidson was not the last to receive the intelligence. He acted promptly and with vigour. He requested the general to parade his entire force in full marching order, with forty rounds of ammunition per man. This parade impressed the disaffected immensely. On the morning of the 15th a

Book VII. Chapter IV.

1857. May–June.

Major Cuthbert Davidson.

Tumult on the accession of the new Nizám.

is suppressed by Major Davidson.

second parade, not less imposing, was ordered. At this the resident was present, and addressed the troops.* By that time it had become known that the influence of Sálar Jang was not less weighty with the new, than it had been with the late ruler. That loyal minister, on learning that a large mob had assembled near the mosque known as the Mekka mosque, and had hoisted there a green flag, sent down a corps of Arab mercenaries upon whom he could rely to disperse them. Subsequently he arrested the principal leaders of the movement, and for the moment the plague was stayed.

Only, however, for the moment. The information which poured daily from the outer world into the city, often in an exaggerated form, made every day a deeper impression upon the minds of the more bigoted of the population. They argued that whilst their co-religionists had risen for the faith in the north-west, it was not becoming in them to sit idle in the south. They recalled to the minds of listeners, likewise impressionable and fanatic, that little more than half a century had elapsed since Dehlí, the capital of the Muhammadan world of India, had fallen into the hands of the infidel; that a supreme effort had now recovered it, and that if that effort were supported by the entire Muhammadan community

* The garrison at or near Haidarábád consisted of a battalion of artillery, the 7th Madras Light Cavalry; the 3rd Madras Europeans; the 1st, 22nd, 24th, 34th, 41st, 42nd, and 49th Native Infantry. The force was commanded by Brigadier, now Sir William, Hill.

Book III. Chapter IV. 1857. July.

of Hindustán, the recovery would be made complete, the gain would become permanent. These were no idle words. They sank deep into the minds of the people of Haidarábád—a people that had never known European rule, and that had never welcomed its approach to their borders. In a few weeks they produced corresponding acts.

Mutiny at Haidarábád.

A little before 5 o'clock on the evening of the 17th of July, five hundred of the Rohilla troops in the service of the Nizám, supported by some four thousand of the mob of Haidarábád, rose in insurrection and marched on the residency, demanding the release of thirteen mutineers and deserters, who, caught red-handed in revolt, had been made over by Major Davidson to Sálar Jáng. That minister, who was not very well served by his agents, only heard of the outbreak just on the eve of its occurrence. He at once sent a special messenger to warn the resident. Major Davidson, however, in anticipation of some such movement, had improvised defences all round the residency, had mounted guns on the newly-erected bastions, and had warned his military secretary, Major Briggs, to arrange the troops at his disposal in the manner best calculated to meet a sudden attack. Seven minutes then sufficed to send every man in the residency to his post. The insurgents came on, in the manner of undisciplined fanatics, drunk with excitement, without order, and without leading, properly so called. A fire of grape from the ramparts sent them reeling back. They came on again, only similarly to be received, and

Sálar Jang warns the Resident.

Major Davidson's previous preparations.

Book XIII. Chapter IV.

1857. July.

Repulse and defeat of the rebels.

similarly to retire. Staggered by this reception, they were beginning to recover from their intoxication, when a charge of the Nizám's troops decided them to flee in confusion. Many of them then took refuge in a two-storied house, at the end of a narrow street. In this place it was resolved to allow them to stay till the morning. They did not, however, avail themselves of the permission. Mining under the floor, they escaped during the night. In their attack on the residency, several of the rebels were killed; in their flight from the Nizám's troops more were taken prisoners. Amongst the latter were the two ringleaders, Torábáz Khán and Maulvi Alla-úddín. The former, attempting to escape, was shot dead; the latter was tried, convicted, and transported to the Andamán islands.

and capture of their leaders.

Good effect produced at Haidarábád.

The manner in which this wanton attack terminated produced a very salutary effect on the minds of the Haidarábád population. It showed them very clearly that their own rulers, men of their own faith, sided with the British. It needed but one word from Sálar Jang to rouse the entire country. Not only was that word not spoken, but the fanatical Muhammadans were made clearly to understand that, in the event of their rising, they would have to deal, not with the British only, but with their own Government as well.

The situation still critical.

Still the situation grew daily more critical. The city of Haidarábád had ever been filled with military adventurers. The custom of importing Arabs from beyond the sea, and of forming of

1857. July.

them regiments of peculiar trust, had long prevailed. But in addition to the Arab, there used to come from every part of India those adventurous spirits to whom the sober administration of the British gave no avocation. From Rohilkhand, from the Panjáb, from Sindh, from Dehlí, and from the border-land beyond the Indus, men of this stamp had never been wanting. To them were added, in the autumn of 1857, adventurers more dangerous still. The mutinied and disbanded sepoys who had been unable to reach Dehlí, or whose offers had been rejected by Sindia, poured in shoals into Haidarábád. Combining with the other classes I have mentioned, and who gave them a cordial welcome, they helped to swell the ranks of the disaffected, and to impart to them a discipline in which the others were lacking.

by reason of the numerous adventurers

crowding into the city

The presence of these men added not a little to the difficulties of Sálar Jang and the Nizám. Every rumour which reached the city of misfortunes befalling the British arms roused feelings which might at any moment prelude an outbreak. If we think of all that was happening in those provinces—of the massacre of Kánhpúr, of the long siege of Dehlí, of the leaguer of Lakhnáo, of Havelock's three retirements, of the events at Ágra, at Indúr, at Jhánsi, at Bandá—we shall cease to be surprised that this was so. It must be remembered, too, that every skirmish was magnified into a battle, every repulse into a catastrophe, that victories gained by the British were studiously concealed. When we think of the

The effect of rumours

Book XIII. Chapter IV.

1857.

news of these disasters coming upon an inflammable people, hating the English, armed to the teeth, and chafing under their forced inaction, we may well wonder that peace was, on any terms, preserved.

Upon an inflammable people.

Loyalty of the Nizám.

But peace was preserved—mainly owing to the excellent understanding between the Government of the Nizám and the British resident. Whilst the former used all those arts which a powerful native government has so well at command, to check the fanatical ardour of the disaffected, the resident, acting in concert with the Nizám, applied for a larger force of European troops to overawe the same class. In consequence of these representations Davidson received later in the year a reinforcement of a regiment of cavalry, a regiment of infantry, and some artillery.

Reinforcements arrive.

Davidson suggests the employment of the troops of the Haidarábád contingent in central India.

Whilst thus securing his base, Major Davidson was not unmindful of another means for employing the trained soldiers of the Nizám—the soldiers of the Haidarábád contingent, led by English officers—in a manner which might transfer the sympathies of the great bulk of the people, from whose ranks those soldiers were drawn, to the British cause. Acting in concurrence, then, with the Nizám and Sálar Jang, and with the full approval of the Government of India, he formed towards the beginning of 1858 a brigade from the regiments of the contingent, and sent it to act in central India. This brigade was composed of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiments of cavalry, of the 3rd and 5th regiments of infantry,

and of three field-batteries of artillery. The splendid deeds of these troops will be recorded in their proper place. But I will not wait to record that the other purpose which had suggested this action to Major Davidson was entirely accomplished. The successes obtained by these soldiers elated the relations they had left behind them, and these came, in a very brief period, to regard as their own the cause for which their kinsmen were fighting. From that time forward all anxiety ceased in Haidarábád itself. In some parts of the districts the disturbances which arose were eagerly quelled, and with one exception, no chieftain of rank showed the smallest inclination to question the wisdom of the policy adopted by the Nizám and his minister.

Successful result of Davidson's policy.

That exception was the rájá of Shorápúr.* Shorápúr is a small territory situated in the south-west angle of the Nizám's dominions. The Hindú chief who had ruled it, had, fifteen years prior to 1857, fallen into pecuniary difficulties so great that he found himself unable to fulfil his obligations to his suzerain, the Nizám. Certain arrangements, unnecessary here to detail, followed, which ended, after the death of the rájá, in the administration of the country falling for a time into the hands of the British. This arrangement lasted till 1853, when the country

Shorápúr.

Its condition antecedent to the mutiny.

* For a most interesting account of the rájá of Shorápúr and the causes which led him to revolt, I refer the reader to the *Story of My Life*, by the late Colonel Meadows Taylor, one of the most charming of autobiographies.

was handed over to the native ruler in a very flourishing condition. The young rájá, however, soon dissipated his resources; he became so embarrassed as to be utterly reckless. He was in this state of mind when the events of 1857 occurred. With the record of the disasters attending the British came whispers of the advantages which must accrue to him from a successful rebellion. The rájá had not the strength of mind to resist the temptation. Intoxicated by the promises made him, he called together the men of his own clan, and began to levy Rohilla and Arab mercenaries.

Full intelligence of the doings of the rájá was quickly conveyed to Major Davidson. Well aware that to prevent an outbreak even by an extravagant display of force was far wiser and far cheaper than to allow it to come to a head, Davidson at once took decisive measures. Acting in concert with Lord Elphinstone, who displayed on this occasion, as on every other, a far-sighted policy and a rare unselfishness, he called up from the Bombay Presidency a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, consisting of a detachment of European troops, the Maráthá Horse, the 15th Bombay Native Infantry, and a battery of artillery. This force he located at a point equidistant between the Shorápúr and the southern Maráthá country. At the same time he arranged that a force from the Madras Presidency, under Major Hughes, should watch the eastern frontier of Shorápúr, whilst he detached four hundred men and two guns of the Haidarábád contingent,

commanded by Captain Wyndham, to occupy Linsúgúr, ready to act in concert with either of the other forces, as necessity might require.

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Before these preparations had been completed Cuthbert Davidson, hoping to save the rájá from his own folly, despatched to his court, early in January 1858, one of his own most trusted assistants, Captain Rose Campbell. Campbell, however, only wasted his efforts. The rájá had given himself to the fanatical party. Not only did he continue deaf to all entreaties, but he was, it is believed, prepared to connive at the murder of his guest. This, at least, is certain, that Captain Campbell received an intimation from the rájá's own relatives and servants that his life was in imminent danger.

Detaches Rose Campbell to save him,

but fruitlessly.

It would have been fruitless to temporise further. Captain Campbell proceeded to Linsúgúr and ordered Wyndham to march on Shorápúr. Wyndham started at once and reached Shorápúr on the 7th of February. As he approached, the rájá, as is customary in such cases, sent his own servants to indicate a proper encamping-ground. The servants led Wyndham to the place selected —a narrow valley, surrounded by lofty hills and rocks. But Wyndham, though but a captain, was too old a soldier to fall into the trap. He moved on to an open plain, where he was comparatively safe from danger of surprise.

Wyndham moves on Shorápúr;

sees through, and avoids a snare laid for him by the rájá.

That night Wyndham was attacked by a force composed of the clansmen of the rájá, of Arabs and Rohillas, estimated at from five thousand to seven thousand strong. The attack continued all

The rájá's troops attack Wyndham.

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night, but its result was never doubtful. Wyndham, aided by Rose Campbell and the medical officer, Dr. Williamson, barricaded the position, and with the guns kept up a continuous fire. At 1 o'clock in the morning he was reinforced by one hundred cavalry of the Haidarábád contingent. The rebels then ceased their attack, and occupied the heights near the town.

who reprises him.

Meanwhile, expresses had been sent to Major Hughes and Colonel Malcolm. Major Hughes, with two companies 74th Highlanders and some Madras cavalry, arrived first, early on the morning of the 8th. Joining his troops to those of Wyndham, Hughes at once attacked the rebels. A squadron of the 8th Madras cavalry, commanded by Captain Newberry, led the attack, and charged a body of Rohillas. Unfortunately, Newberry and his subaltern, Lieutenant Stewart, better mounted than their men, dashed into the middle of the rebels before their men could follow them. Newberry was killed and Stewart was severely wounded. The enemy, however, were driven from the heights above the town. The city being very strong, the approaches to it difficult of access, and the walls and bastions crowded with defenders, Hughes thought it advisable to wait for Colonel Malcolm's force, which was expected that night, before attempting anything further.

Hughes arrives to the rescue,

and defeats the rebels,

but retire into the city.

But the rájá did not wait for Malcolm. Dispirited by the failure of his attack on Wyndham, and aware that reinforcements were approaching, he gave up the game as precipitately

The rájá flees in the night to Haidarábád.

as he had entered upon it, and, accompanied by a few horsemen, fled that night towards Haidarábád. Arriving there, with but two followers in his train, he made a fruitless attempt to gain the protection of the Arabs. Found, then, wandering in the bazar, he was apprehended and taken to Sálar Jang, who made him over to the Resident.

Book VI. Chapter I. 1858. February. where he is taken prisoner.

The departure of the rájá led to the immediate evacuation of Shorápúr by the hostile bands. Colonel Malcolm, who arrived on the evening of the 8th, entered the town the following morning and found it almost deserted. Captain Rose Campbell assumed charge of the administration of the country.*

Malcolm enters the town.

So ended the only serious attempt made to disturb the tranquillity of the Dekhán. The preservation of that tranquillity was essential to the maintenance of the British power in India. There can be no question but that the rising of Haidarábád, headed by the Nizám, would have been a blow struck at the heart. The whole of western and southern India would have followed. Central India, the dominions of Holkar, and Rajpútáná could not have escaped; and it is more than probable that the communications between Calcutta and the north-west would have been severed. That this calamity did not occur is due

The tranquillity of the Dekhán assured to a great measure by

* The story of the rájá's end is tragical. He was sentenced to death, but the Governor-General commuted the punishment to four years' imprisonment for life, after which he might be restored to his territory. The very day the rájá received this news he shot himself. Colonel Meadows Taylor thinks accidentally.—Vide *Story of My Life*, vol. ii.

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Lord Elphinstone, Lord Harris, Major Davidson and the officers acting under his orders,

to many causes. The far-sighted policy of Lord Elphinstone did much; the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, contributed all that was possible for a man in his high position to contribute. Major Cuthbert Davidson displayed a skill, a tact, and an energy far above the average; he was well served by his subordinates: Colonel Malcolm, Major Hughes, Captain Wyndham, and their comrades executed with marked ability the tasks entrusted to them. But the efforts of these men, great and valuable as they were, would have been utterly unavailing had the Nizám and his minister not seconded them. For three months the fate of India was in the hands of Afzúl úd dáola and Sálar Jang. Their wise policy proved that they preferred the certain position of a protected state to the doubtful chances of a resuscitation of the Dehlí monarchy under the auspices of revolted sepoys.

but mainly by the Nizám and Sálar Jang.

BOOK XIV.

CHAPTER I.

In a previous chapter of this history* I stated that Colonel Durand had been appointed to act as agent for the Governor-General at Indúr in consequence of the departure of the agent, Sir Robert Hamilton, to Europe on leave. Sir Robert Hamilton, on hearing of the mutiny at Mírath, at once asked permission, though he had been but six weeks in England, to return and join his appointment. The application was granted, and Sir Robert arrived in Calcutta in August 1857.

Sir Robert Hamilton

arrives in Calcutta

Very soon after he had reached Calcutta, Sir Robert Hamilton was called upon by the Government to state the measures which he considered necessary for the restoration of tranquillity in central India. There were very many reasons why it was natural that the Government should be anxious to have his views on this important

* Vol i., book viii., chapter iii.

subject. Sir Robert Hamilton was a very eminent public servant. He had passed the greater part of his career in high official positions in central India. Not only had he traversed every inch of that territory, but he knew the exact distances between village and village throughout it, the lay of the ground, the disposition of the people, the peculiarities which constituted either a bond or a division between the several districts. Sir Robert had trained from his early youth the boy who, in 1857, ruled the possessions of his ancestors as Túkaji Ráo Holkar. The training and the connection—that between a guardian and a ward—had inspired both with similar feelings, feelings of the warmest regard. More than that—each thoroughly believed in the other. Each would have waged the possession he most valued on the question of the loyalty of the other. Sir Robert Hamilton was not less acquainted with all the courtiers of his charge, with their character, their dispositions, the influences they exercised. He knew to a scarcely less degree every man of note in the country.

When, then, the Government of India applied to Sir Robert Hamilton to state the measures which he considered necessary for the restoration of order in central India, they did that which it would have been in the highest degree unwise to omit. Sir Robert Hamilton responded to the call. He drew up a memorandum, which he submitted to the Governor-General. Lord Canning passed it on to Sir Colin Campbell, who was still in Calcutta.

Nature of the plan.

Sir Robert Hamilton's plan was as follows. He proposed that whilst one column, coming from the Bombay Presidency, should make Máu its base of operations, and sweep thence the country between that point and Kálpi on the Jamná, reconquering Jhánsi in its course; another, coming from Madras, should form its base at Jabalpúr, clear the line of communication with Allahábád and Mirzápúr, and cross Bandalkhand to Bandá. Thus Kálpi and Bandá would constitute the points towards which the two columns would separately be directed.

The plan is with one slight modification approved of.

This plan was fully discussed between Sir Robert Hamilton, Sir Colin Campbell, and the Chief of the Staff—General Mansfield—and, in the end, was, with one slight modification in one of its details, adopted.* Sir Robert Hamilton calculated that if no delay were to occur in the formation of the several columns, the points indicated would be reached by the 1st of May 1858.

Sir Robert relieves Durand, and assumes political charge of the country to be traversed by the British forces.

This plan approved, Sir Robert Hamilton proceeded to Indúr, and arrived there on the 16th of December 1857, and not only resumed the appointment of Governor-General's Agent for central India, but took up likewise the political functions in respect of all the chiefs in the Ságar and Narbadá territories, which, till then,

* The modification was immaterial. Sir R. Hamilton had suggested that the two brigades of which the Máu column would be composed should, prior to their advance on Jhánsi, effect a junction at Sipri. Sir Colin Campbell substituted Gúnah for Sipri. Gúnah is nearer to Jhánsi by seventy miles.

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had been exercised by the Commissioner of those territories.

The day that witnessed the return of Sir Robert Hamilton greeted likewise the arrival of the officer who had been nominated by Lord Canning to command the force which, having its base at Máu, was to work up to the southern bank of the Jamná. That officer was Major-General Sir Hugh Rose, K.C.B. Sir Hugh Rose bore, even then, a high character for ability, decision, and firmness. Entering the army in 1820, he had early given proof of those qualities, and when, in 1840, the Government of the Queen decided to detach several British officers to serve in Syria with the view of checking the progress of the rebellious Pasha of Egypt, Lieutenant-Colonel Rose proceeded thither in the capacity of Deputy Adjutant-General. Here he distinguished himself no less by his judgment than by his daring courage. In a hand-to-hand encounter with the Egyptian cavalry, in which he was wounded, Colonel Rose captured with his own hand the leader of the enemy, an exploit which procured for him a sabre of honour from the Sultan and the Order of the Nishán Iftihár set in diamonds. For his conduct in Syria, too, he was decorated with the companionship of the Bath. A little later he was nominated by Lord Palmerston Consul-General of Syria.

Character and antecedents of Sir Hugh Rose.

In Egypt.

When, a few years subsequently, Russia was

* Now Field Marshall Lord Strathnairn, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., &c.

preparing to make her bid for the inheritance of the "sick man," Colonel Rose was nominated secretary to the embassy at Constantinople. Later on, just before the storm broke, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe proceeded to England, and Colonel Rose succeeded him as chargé d'affaires. Holding that office, he not only penetrated the designs of Russia, but detected that the one means by which only England could foil them was to put her foot down, and say, "One step further constitutes war." Impressed with this idea, when Prince Menschikoff endeavoured to impose upon the Sultan terms which would have annihilated the independence of Turkey, and the Sultan, turning to the British chargé d'affaires, implored him to give a material pledge of the support of England by bringing the British fleet into Turkish waters, Colonel Rose took the responsibility upon himself, and ordered the fleet to Besika Bay. The fact that such an order had been sent answered for the moment the purposes of the Sultan. Russia was checked; and, if she renewed her attack, it was because the same firmness and the same clear-sightedness were not apparent in the conduct of the British ministers who approved the admiral for refusing to comply with Colonel Rose's requisition.

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1857.

at Constantinople.

Subsequently Colonel Rose served in the Crimean war. He was recommended for the Cross of the Legion of Honour for his conduct at Alma, was repeatedly mentioned for distinguished conduct in the trenches before Sebastopol, and had

in the Crimea.

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two horses shot under him at Inkerman. I cannot omit to add that Marshal Canrobert, then commanding the French army in the Crimea, recommended General Rose for the Victoria Cross for his gallant conduct on three different occasions, and that the claim was not preferred solely because general officers were expressly excluded from the decoration. For his services in this war General Rose received the Turkish order of the Medjidie, was nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath, and received a step in rank "for distinguished conduct in the field."

Sir Hugh lands in Bombay.

When the mutiny broke out in India, Sir Hugh Rose proceeded at once to that country. He landed in Bombay on the 19th of September, was brought on the general staff of the army from that date, and was shortly appointed to the command of the force acting in Málwa, the operations of which I have recorded in this volume.* He proceeded accordingly to Indúr in company with Sir Robert Hamilton, who had taken the only route then open, that *viâ* Bombay.

General Whitlock is appointed to direct the Madras column.

Simultaneously, almost, with the appointment of Sir Hugh Rose to command one of the columns indicated, Brigadier General Whitlock of the Madras army was nominated to direct the other. The proceedings of this officer will be related in the next chapter. This will be devoted to the operations of the Máu column.

Composition of Sir Hugh Rose's force.

The force, now called the Central India Field

* *Vide* Chapter ii. of the last Book.

Force, of which Sir Hugh Rose took command on the 17th of December, consisted of two brigades—the first being at Máu; the second at Sihor. The brigades were thus formed. The first, under the command of Brigadier C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, was composed of a squadron 14th Light Dragoons, a troop of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, two regiments of cavalry Haidarábád contingent, the 86th Regiment, the 25th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, one regiment infantry Haidarábád contingent, one troop of horse artillery, one light field battery, two field batteries Haidarábád contingent, and some sappers; the second, commanded by Brigadier Stenart, 14th Light Dragoons, of the head-quarters of the 14th Light Dragoons, head-quarters of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, one regiment of cavalry Haidarábád contingent, the 3rd Bombay European Regiment,* the 24th Bombay Native Infantry, one regiment of infantry Haidarábád contingent, a battery of Bombay Horse Artillery, one field battery of artillery Haidarábád contingent, one company Madras sappers, a detachment of Bombay sappers, and a siege-train.

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From the second chapter of the last book the reader will have gathered some idea of the hard work which had already devolved upon this force: he will have seen how they had triumphed over obstacles, had beaten every enemy, had proved incontestably that they were made of the stuff which required only leading to conquer. They

Antecedents of the troops composing the field force.

* Now the 109th Regiment.

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had now once more a leader. Personally, indeed, that leader was a stranger to them, but his reputation had gone before him, and that reputation was of a nature to make the men grudge even the short period of repose which it was necessary to give them.

A short period of repose was necessary to enable Whitlock to move in concert with it.

That repose was necessary for the perfect carrying out of the plan devised by Sir R. Hamilton with Sir Colin Campbell in Calcutta by virtue of which a second force, that to be commanded by Whitlock, should start from Jabalpúr. Until tidings of Whitlock's movements should be received, Sir Hugh was forced to halt at Máu.

The period is not wasted.

The time was not thrown away. The two brigades were organised; the country was pacified; the line of advance was marked out; the men had time to recruit themselves. The country about Máu and Indúr is peculiarly suited to be a resting-place. It abounds with the necessaries of life; there is plenty of water and of fodder; the climate at that season is most enjoyable; the country, hilly and diversified, is pleasant to the eye. The halt there was, but short; it scarcely exceeded three weeks—not too long to satiate the men with their rest, yet long enough to make them glad to be once more on the move.

The force enters upon the campaign.

On the 6th of January Sir Hugh Rose, accompanied by Sir R. Hamilton, started from Máu to join the 2nd brigade at Sihor. On the 8th the siege-train was despatched to join him there. It arrived on the 15th. On the following morning Sir Hugh, reinforced by about eight hundred Bhopál levies contributed by the loyal Bégam of

that principality, started for Ráthgarh, a strong fort held by the rebels. The 1st brigade left Mau on the 10th, and then marched in a line parallel with the 2nd brigade upon Chaudairi, a very famous fortress in the territories of Sindia. I propose first to follow the fortunes of the 2nd brigade.

Ráthgarh.

Ráthgarh, distant only thirty miles from Ságar, is situated on the spur of a long high hill, and commands the country surrounding it. The eastern and southern faces of the fortress are almost perpendicular—the rock being scarped. Round their base runs a deep and rapid river—the Bína—answering the purpose of a wet ditch. The north face is covered by a strong wall, facing a very thick jungle, between which and the wall is a deep ditch twenty feet wide. The western face overlooks the town and the road to Ságar, and its gateway is flanked by several bastions, round and square. Along each face and in the four angles were bastions commanding the only possible approaches. Altogether it was a most formidable position.

Sir Hugh disposes his forces before the place.

Sir Hugh Rose arrived before this place the morning of the 24th of January. He at once, with small loss, drove the enemy from the outside positions they had occupied in the towns and on the banks of the river, and then completely invested the place. Fronting the eastern face he posted the Bhopál troops; facing the northern the 3rd Bombay light cavalry and the cavalry of the Haidarábád contingent. With the remainder of the force he occupied the plain across which runs

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the road to Ságar. He then reconnoitred the ground preparatory to selecting sites for his breaching batteries.

The rebels make an offensive defence.

The enemy had reoccupied the town. Issuing from its walls into the thick jungle already spoken of, they made thence, during the 25th, several raids on the camp-followers and baggage-animals of the force, and at night even attacked the position held by the Bhopál troops. They were, however, repulsed with slight loss.

The rebels fire the jungle and force Sir Hugh to change his point of attack.

Early the following morning Sir Hugh Rose made a move forward. Crossing the Ságar road with the 3rd Europeans, followed by the 18-pounders, howitzers, and mortars, and the guns of the Haidarábád Contingent, he entered the jungle. He had no sooner reached a point well within its thick covering, than the enemy, who had been lurking near, fired the jungle grass on all sides. For a few moments the position was perilous, but Sir Hugh, turning back beyond the range of the flames, sent his sappers to cut a road up the height to the north of the town for the guns. This, and the getting up of the guns, occupied the greater part of the day.

Sir Hugh gains the town.

Meanwhile the remainder of the force had occupied the town, and driven the enemy within the fort.

Sir Hugh's mortar batteries open on the fort.

At 3 o'clock the summit of the hill fronting the northern face of the fort was gained. Sir Hugh at once selected sites for his breaching batteries, and set the sappers to work. By 8 P.M. the mortar battery was ready. Whilst it was being thrown up the 6-pounders of the Haidarábád contingent kept

up a constant fire of shot and shell on the fort, whilst the 3rd Europeans employed their Enfield rifles to keep down the matchlock fire of the enemy. At 11 P.M. the mortar battery opened fire, and continued it all night. The breaching batteries were completed by daybreak.

The breaching batteries open.

These opened fire early on the morning of the 27th, and continued it all that day and the day following. At 10 P.M. on the 28th a large breach had been made, and two men went forward to examine it. They had just returned when a sudden rush of camp-followers and cattle-drivers from the rear gave intimation that something startling had happened. It transpired immediately that a rebel force was advancing to the relief of the place.

The rájá of Bánpúr marches to relieve the place.

It was so indeed. The rájá of Bánpúr, whose doings in the vicinity of Ságar I have already recorded,* was advancing on the rear of the besieging force with a considerable body of revolted sepoys and other levies. He came on with great boldness, his standards flying, and his men singing their national hymns. But if his appearance at this critical juncture was a surprise to Sir Hugh Rose, it was a surprise that did not embarrass him. Instead of ceasing his fire against the fort he redoubled it. As for the rájá of Bánpúr, Sir Hugh detached a small force, consisting of a detachment of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 3rd Bombay cavalry, the horse artillery, and the 5th Haidarábád infantry, to deal with him. It did

* *Vide* page 98.

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but vanishes on the approach of the British troops.

not require extraordinary exertion to effect this object. The confidence of the rájá and his followers vanished as they heard the tramping of the horses of the British and Indian cavalry. They did not wait to be charged, but throwing away their arms and ammunition, made off with such celerity, that, though hotly pursued, a few only were cut up.

Ráthgarh is thereupon evacuated.

The attempt at relief, apparently so formidable, was really a stroke of fortune for Sir Hugh. It had been made, evidently, in concert with the rebels within the fort, and its failure so disheartened them, that they silently evacuated Ráthgarh during the night, escaping by a path the precipitous nature of which would seem to preclude the possibility of its being used by man.* Their flight was not on the whole to be lamented, for Ráthgarh was found to be so strong as to make it tenable by a few resolute defenders against numbers greatly superior.

The rebels were pursued, but without much effect; they had gone too far before the evacuation of the place had been discovered. A little before noon on the 30th Sir Hugh received information that the rájá of Bánpúr, reinforced by

* "The most amazing thing was to see the place from whence they had escaped. To look down the precipitous path made one giddy—and yet down this place, where no possible footing could be seen, they had all gone—men and women—in the dead of night! One or two mangled bodies lay at the bottom, attesting the difficulty of the descent. Nothing but despair could have tempted them to have chosen such a way."—Dr. Lowe's *Central India during the Rebellion of 1857–58*"—a book to which I am much indebted.

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the garrison, had taken up a position near the village of Barodia, about fifteen miles distant. He at once ordered out the horse artillery, two 5½-inch mortars, two guns of the reserve battery, the 3rd Europeans, the majority of the cavalry, and a section of the Madras sappers, and went in pursuit. About 4 o'clock he came upon them posted on the banks of the Bína, and prepared to dispute his passage. Sir Hugh at once attacked, and though the rebels fought well, he forced the passage of the river. The country on the other side was thick and bushy, and the rebels took every advantage of it. From the river to Barodia Sir Hugh had to fight his way step by step. He did not do this without loss. Two officers* were killed and six were wounded. The casualties among the men were likewise severe. In the end, however, the rebels were completely defeated, and though the rebel rájá was not captured, he owed his safety only to his acquaintance with the intricacies of the jungle. The force returned to Ráthgarh about 2 o'clock in the morning. It found there a supply of provisions sent from Ságar escorted by a detachment of the 31st Regiment Native Infantry.

The rebels take up a position near Barodia,

where they are attacked and beaten by Sir Hugh.

The fall of Ráthgarh had effected two most important objects. It had cleared the country south of Ságar of rebels, had reopened the road to Indúr, and had made it possible for the general

Result gained by the fall of Ráthgarh.

* One of these was Captain Neville, R.E. He had joined the force only the day before. Captain Neville had served throughout the Crimean war, in which he had greatly distinguished himself.

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1858. February.

Ságar, since the reader last visited it,

to march to the relief of Ságar, now beleaguered for nearly eight months.

The state of Ságar has been recorded in a preceding chapter. Although during that period the garrison had made occasional sallies, more or less successful, it may be stated generally that the rebels had retained possession of the strongholds all over the district, and that, by means of these, they had possessed likewise the country. The manner in which they had used their usurped power had made the peasantry look earnestly to the time when the law-loving rule of the British should be restored.

Sir Hugh marches on Ságar,

That time had now arrived. Sir Hugh Rose marched from Ráthgarh direct on Ságar. He

and enters it.

entered that place on the morning of the 3rd of February, escorted by the Europeans, officers and others, who had held the fort, and who had gone forth to welcome their deliverers. The

The 31st Native Infantry.

31st Native Infantry was one of the very few regiments of the Bengal army which, retaining its arms, had remained faithful throughout that trying period. The greater honour to the 31st, for its companion infantry regiment had revolted, and it had been tempted on all sides.

The fort of Garhákót.

Some of those companions had now to be dealt with. Twenty-five miles to the east of Ságar stands, on an elevated angle of ground, the strong fort of Garhákót. The eastern face of this fort is washed by the wide river Sonár; the western and northern faces by the nullah Gidári, with precipitous banks; the south possesses a strong gateway flanked by bastions, and a ditch

twenty feet in depth by thirty in width. So strong are the parapets of this fort, that when, in 1818, it was attacked by Brigadier Watson with a force of eleven thousand men, he was unable, in three weeks, to effect a breach in them, and was glad to allow the garrison to evacuate the place with all the honours of war! In February 1858 it was held by the revolted sepoys of the 51st and 52nd Native Infantry, and other rebels, well supplied with ammunition and provisions.

His great strength.

Sir Hugh Rose sent a small force to destroy the fort of Sanoda on the 8th, and on the 9th of February marched towards Garhákót. He arrived within sight of it and encamped at half-past 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 11th. He at once made a reconnaissance, which was not concluded till 8 P.M. Sir Hugh found that the rebels had thrown up earthworks on the road to the south, by which they had expected him to arrive, and that they were occupying a position close to the village of Bassári, near the fort, in some force. Notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, he at once drove them from the positions they held, and occupied Bassári; nor, though during the night the rebels made repeated efforts, could they regain the posts they had lost.

Sir Hugh arrives before it and reconnoitres;

drives the rebels from the village of Bassári.

The next day Sir Hugh commenced his attack. He first caused a breaching battery to be thrown up opposite the western face. A 24-pounder howitzer working all day from this battery soon silenced the enemy's guns. Lieutenant Strutt of the Bombay artillery, already referred to in

Excellent effect of Strutt's fire

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these pages, succeeded in dismounting one of the enemy's guns which had been worked very successfully against the assailants. It was this shot, "one of the many good shots made under fire by Lieutenant Strutt," which, in Sir Hugh's opinion, made the sepoys reflect on the casualties which might befall them. Certainly after that they lost heart. In the night they consulted, and determined to escape if they could. Unfortunately Sir Hugh Rose's force was so small, a great part having been left at Ságar, that he had been unable to place a portion of it in a position which would guard the gateway. By this gateway the sepoys made their way into the country during the night of the 12th. They were, however, pursued early the following morning for twenty-five miles by Captain Hare, with his Haidarábád cavalry, a troop of the 14th Light Dragoons under Lieutenant Reed, and half a troop of horse artillery. Hare came up with them at the Biás river, near the village of Biár. The river not being practicable for guns, he led the cavalry across, fell upon the rebels, and cut up about a hundred of them.

Impels the rebels to evacuate the place;

They are pursued by Hare and cut up.

Garhákót was found full of supplies. Sir Hugh had its western face destroyed, and returned to Ságar on the 17th.

The road to Jhánsi.

Jhánsi, one hundred and twenty-five miles to the north, was the next point to be aimed at. But between Ságar and Jhánsi lay the passes of Máltún and Maddanpúr, the forts of Sorai and of Maráora, the towns of Sháugarh and Báupúr. After overcoming the certain obstacles which

would be offered by these places, Sir Hugh would have, before marching on Jhánsi, to effect a junction with his 1st brigade under Brigadier Stuart.

Before setting out on this expedition, there were other considerations demanding attention. Sir Hugh could scarcely move from Ságar until he should receive certain information that Brigadier Whitlock's column had started from Jabalpúr for that place. Meanwhile he would have time to repair damages and to store supplies. The necessity for this was the more pressing inasmuch as it had been ascertained that the districts through which the force would have to march, still occupied by rebel sepoys or disaffected chiefs, would supply little or nothing in the way of commissariat. The hot season, too, was setting in, and it was certain that not a blade of grass would survive a few weeks of its duration. Sir Hugh foresaw all this, and employed the enforced delay in laying up supplies. He caused to be collected sheep, goats, oxen, grain, flour, and large supplies of tea and soda-water. Much of the grain was sent by the loyal B[illegible]n of Bhopal. The sick and wounded men [illegible] transferred to the Ságar field hospital, to be [illegible] away or to rejoin as opportunity might offer. [illegible] resupplied the siege-train with ammunition, a[illegible] strengthened it by the addition of heavy g[illegible] howitzers, and large mortars from th[illegible] S[illegible] arsenal. He obtained likewise an a[illegible] f[illegible] ly of elephants, and, what w[illegible] g[illegible] nce, he secured summer

Excellent use to which the delay was put.

At length news came that Whitlock had left Jabalpúr. Sir Hugh's preparations were now as complete as they could be made. Accordingly a start was determined upon. On the evening of the 26th of February Sir Hugh detached Major Orr's column of the Haidarábád contingent to march on a route parallel with his own, and at 2 o'clock he set out with the remainder of the troops. The following day he took, after some shelling, the fort of Barodia. Pressing forward, he found himself, on the 3rd of March, in front of the pass of Máltún. This pass, of great natural strength, had been fortified, and was now held in force by a mixed army of sepoys and local levies. A reconnaissance having convinced Sir Hugh of the great loss of life which would inevitably attend a direct attack upon it, he determined then only to feign an attack in front, whilst, with the bulk of his force, he should gain the table-land above the hills by a flank movement through the pass of Madanpúr. With this view, early on the morning of the 4th of March, he detailed a force,* under Major Scudamore, to menace the pass, whilst with the remainder, now strengthened by the junction of the Haidarábád troops, he m[illegible] on Madanpúr.

The pass of Máltún.

Sir Hugh decides to attempt a flank march.

Madanpúr.

The pass leading to this town forms a na[illegible] gorge between two ranges of hills, thickly cov[illegible] with jungle and brushwood, and capable of [illegible] a solid defence. The rebels had no[illegible]

[illegible]isting of the 24th itzer, a d[illegible] [illegible] guns light drag[illegible]

crowned the heights on both sides of the gorge, and planted guns in the gorge itself, but they had sent, to a considerable distance in advance, skirmishers, who, concealed in the jungle, would be able to harass an advancing enemy. The British troops, in making the turning movement contemplated, marched for about six miles along the foot of the hills, which they then began to ascend. Almost immediately the enemy opened fire. The crests seemed alive with their infantry, whilst their guns from the gorge opened a continuous fire. Sir Hugh sent the 3rd Europeans and the Haidarábád infantry to storm the heights, brought his guns to the front, and returned the enemy's fire.

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is attacked by the British.

The British skirmishers drove back the rebel footmen, but as these retired another artillery-fire opened from a commanding position at the further end of the pass. So galling and so heavy was this fire that for a short time the British advance was checked. Sir Hugh even ordered the guns to retire some yards. Before this could be done Sir Hugh's horse was shot under him, and the artillerymen were forced to take refuge behind the guns. Bullets fell like hailstones, and the number of killed and wounded increased every moment.

Determined defence of the rebels.

The halt, however, was only temporary. The guns of the Haidarábád contingent coming up at this conjuncture opened with shell on the enemy's masses to the left of the pass in support of the guns in action. Under cover of this combined shower, the 3rd Europeans and

but it is overcome by a charge of infantry.

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1858, 5 March.

the Haidarábád infantry charged. Asiatics can stand anything but a charge of infantry. They had here a splendid position, and a large force of the three arms to hold it; but the sight of the charging infantry struck awe into them. Far from awaiting, with their superior numbers, the hand-to-hand encounter offered, they fled in disorder and dismay. They were followed through the pass by their enemy, and only halted to take breath when they found themselves within the town of Madanpúr.

Sir Hugh drives them likewise from the town.

That town, however, was to be no secure refuge to them. Sir Hugh Rose brought his howitzers to the front and opened fire upon it. For a few minutes the rebels replied, and then fled to the jungles behind. The cavalry, sent in pursuit, followed them to the walls of the fort of Sorai.

Great results obtained from the victory.

The effect of this victory was very great. It so daunted the rebels that they evacuated, without a blow, the formidable pass of Máltún, the fort of Nárút to the rear of it, the little fort of Sorai, the strong fort of Maráora, the fortified castle of Bánpúr—the residence of the rebel rájá called after it—the almost impregnable fortress of Tál-Bahat on the heights above the lake of that name. They abandoned also the line of the Bína and the Bítwa, with the exception of the fortress of Chandairi, on the left bank of the latter river.

The 1st brigade.

Leaving Sir Hugh Rose to reap the consequences of his victory at Madanpúr, I propose to return for a moment to the 1st brigade, under the command of Brigadier C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army,

which, in pursuance of the instructions of Sir Hugh Rose, had left Máu on the 10th of January, and marched upon Gúnah, meeting on its route no serious opposition. About seventy miles to the east of Gúnah lies the important post of Chandairi. Chandairi is a very famous town. Its splendour in the prosperous times of the Moghol empire had made it notorious. "If you want to see a town whose houses are palaces, visit Chandairi," was a proverb in the time of Ákbar. In the reign of that illustrious prince it was described as a city possessing fourteen thousand houses built of stone, three hundred and eighty-four markets, three hundred and sixty caravansarais, and twelve thousand mosques. Since that period, it is true, the rule of the Maráthás had worked a great change in its prosperity. In later years, too, its manufactures had suffered from competition with Manchester. But its fort still remained—strong, menacing, defiant, with a long history, testifying alike to its prestige and to the valour of its defenders. Situated on the summit of a high hill, defended by a rampart of sandstone, flanked by circular towers, the fort of Chandairi, seen by an approaching enemy, looked worthy of its reputation. To this place, in February 1858, flocked the sepoys beaten in the actions already detailed by Sir Hugh Rose, to join there the men who had sworn to defend it successfully or to perish.

Book XI. Chapter I. 1858. March. Chandairi. Its former splendour. Its later decay. Great strength of its fort.

Against it Brigadier C. S. Stuart marched from Gúnah. On the 5th of March he reached a place, Khúkwásás, six miles from Chandairi. Between

Stuart advances against Chandairi.

Khárkwásás and Chandairi the road lay through a dense jungle. Stuart, therefore, sent the 80th Foot and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry to the front in skirmishing order. After marching three miles, he arrived at a narrow pass between two high hills—a place offering splendid capabilities for defence. To the surprise of Stuart, none was offered. Two miles further, however, the road was found barricaded. The engineers began to clear away the barricades; but they had not worked long before the enemy were seen to climb the hill to the left. On reaching it they opened out a musketry-fire. From this point of vantage they were soon dislodged by a small party of the 86th, and the barricades having been removed, the artillery advanced, covered by the 86th on the right, and the 25th Native Infantry on the left. They had not gone far, however, before a very heavy fire opened upon them from the wall of an enclosure about one mile distant from the fort. The 86th dashed forward to gain this enclosure. One officer of the regiment, Lieutenant Lewis, and the political agent with the force, Captain Keatinge* of the Bombay artillery, outrunning the men, gained first the top of its wall, and jumping down, followed by a few men, drove out the enemy. Stuart pursued his advantage, and did not halt till he had occupied the hills to the west of the fort.

The next few days were spent by Stuart in clearing the neighbouring villages, in reconnoi-

* Now Colonel Keatinge, V.C.

tring, and in planting his guns in a commanding position. On the 13th the breaching-batteries opened fire, and by the evening of the 16th effected a breach which was reported practicable. On the morning of the 17th Stuart sent his stormers, men of the 86th and 25th Native Infantry, to the attack. Their impetuous rush carried all before them. Captain Keatinge, who accompanied the party, and who led it into the breach, was struck down severely wounded. But his fall did not stop the stormers. The rebels hurled themselves over the parapets to avoid the rush they could not withstand, and most of them escaped. A letter which the brigadier had sent the previous day to Captain Abbott commanding a party of cavalry, and requesting him to invest the north side of the fort, reached that officer too late. But the place was taken with all its guns.*

Keatinge again distinguishes himself.

The storm.

Sir Hugh Rose heard of the storming of Chandairi on the 18th. Hearing that the garrison had escaped northwards, he sent a detachment of the Haidarábád contingent to intercept them. This force came up with a few stragglers only, but captured some camels and ponies. On the 19th he marched to Chanchanpúr, one march, fourteen miles, from Jhánsi. After a rest here of about two hours, he despatched the cavalry, horse artillery, and light field-guns of the 2nd brigade to reconnoitre and invest that place.

Sir Hugh marches to Jhánsi.

To the fall of Jhánsi Lord Canning and Lord

Great importance

* The casualties in the capture were twenty-nine, including two officers.

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Elphinstone attached the greatest importance. They regarded that fortress as the stronghold of rebel power in central India, the main strength of the formidable rebel force on the Jamná. It was a place, moreover, in which the slaughter of English men and women had been accompanied by circumstances of peculiar atrocity, and where hatred to the English name had been illustrated by acts of the most wanton barbarity. Nevertheless, anxious as was Lord Canning, anxious as was Sir Colin Campbell himself, that the blow, the most effective of all to the rebel cause in central India, should be struck, they were both so little appreciative of the enormous value of delivering that blow at once, whilst the success of Sir Hugh Rose's brigades was yet fresh in the minds of the rebels, that, on the very eve of the crisis, they both sent orders to defer the attack on Jhánsi, to divert the force elsewhere. From the dangerous consequences of their own orders they were saved by the firmness and decision of Sir Robert Hamilton.

Attached to the fall of Jhánsi.

Causes which prompted Lord Canning and Sir C. Campbell to order the diversion of the force from Jhánsi.

I have already stated that Sir Hugh had sent the cavalry and horse artillery of his 2nd brigade, on the afternoon of the 20th, to reconnoitre and invest Jhánsi. He was about, a few hours later, to follow with his infantry, when an express arrived in camp bearing two despatches. One of these was from the Governor-General to Sir Robert Hamilton, the other from the Commander-in-Chief to Sir Hugh Rose.

Sir Hugh Rose and Sir R. Hamilton receive despatches.

The purport of these two despatches was identical. They represented that the rájá of Chir-

ordering the former to march on Chirkári.

kári, a man who, throughout the trying period of 1857–58, had shown unwavering fidelity to his British overlord, was being besieged in his fort by Tántia Topi and the Gwáliár contingent, and they ordered Hamilton and Rose to march at once to his relief, Whitlock's force not being near enough to do so.

Reasons why the order appeared devoid of sense to Hamilton and Rose.

Chirkári was about eighty miles from the ground on which Sir Hugh's force was encamped, on the direct road to Bandá. Jhánsi was within fourteen miles. To the mind of a soldier the idea would naturally present itself that the surest mode of saving the lesser and more distant place was to attack at once the more important and nearer fortress; that to act on the principle indicated in the despatches would be to act in defiance alike of the rules of war and of common sense. So it appeared to both Hamilton and Rose. But Sir Hugh was a soldier. He had received a positive order. Foolish though he knew that order to be, he was bound to obey it. He would be forced to obey it unless the means could be devised of superseding it by higher and more potential authority.

Sir Robert Hamilton takes upon himself the responsibility of ordering the continuance of the movement on Jhánsi.

Sir Robert Hamilton devised those means. How, I will relate in his own simple words. "Sir Hugh Rose considered the order of the Commander-in-Chief imperative: there was not anything left to my discretion in my letter from the Governor-General; it was clear to me it would be a great political mistake to draw off from Jhánsi, which our cavalry were investing, and our force within fourteen miles; moreover,

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supposing the force moved on Chirkári, it was not possible to march the eighty miles before the rebels had carried the fort, the rájá having no provisions, and having lost the outworks according to my intelligence. I, therefore, took on myself the responsibility of proceeding with our operations against Jhánsi, trusting to that course as the most effective to draw the enemy from Chirkári, and so I wrote to the Governor-General." *

Hamilton's determination gives a decided character to the campaign.

It was a responsibility which only a strong man would take, thus to act in direct opposition to the orders of the two highest officials in the country, but, under the circumstances, it was a responsibility which it was necessary to assume. It gave a decided character to the campaign, and enabled Sir Hugh Rose to carry to a glorious conclusion the task which he had taken in hand at Máu.

Sir Hugh moves on Jhánsi.

Freed by Sir Robert Hamilton from the necessity of pursuing the vicious course indicated by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose set out at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st for Jhánsi. He arrived before that city at 9 o'clock, and halting his troops in the open about a mile and a half from the fort, proceeded with his staff to reconnoitre. He did the work completely, for it had struck 6 P.M. before he returned.

The lay of the ground before Jhánsi.

Between the open ground on which Sir Hugh had halted and the town and fortress of Jhánsi,

* Memorandum submitted by Sir Robert Hamilton to Lord Palmerston, dated the 20th of March 1862.

were the ruined bungalows occupied nine months before by Europeans, the jail, the "Star" fort,* and the sepoy lines. Near the town were several large temples and topes of tamarind trees. On the right of the halting-ground, stretching to the north and east of the city, was a long belt of hills, through which ran the Kálpi and Úrchah roads; to the left were other hills and the Datiah road; due north was the fortress on a high granite rock, overlooking, to the north, the walled-in city.†

Great strength of the fort of Jhánsi.

The great strength of the fort of Jhánsi, natural as well as artificial, and its extent, entitle it to a place among fortresses. It stands on an elevated rock, rising out of a plain, and commands the city and surrounding country. It is built of excellent and most massive masonry. The fort is difficult to breach, because composed of granite; its walls vary in thickness from sixteen to twenty feet. It has extensive and elaborate outworks of the same solid construction, with front and flanking embrasures for artillery-fire, and loop-holes, of which in some places there were five tiers, for musketry. Guns placed on the high towers of the fort commanded the country all around. On one tower, called the "white turret," recently raised in height, waved in proud defiance the standard of the high-spirited ráni.

The fortress is surrounded on all sides by the city of Jhánsi, the west and part of the south face excepted.

* Vol. i. page 185. † Lowe's *Central India*.

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The steepness of the rock protects the west; the fortified city wall springs from the centre of its south face, running south-east, and ends in a high mound or mamelon, which protects by a flanking fire its south face. The mound was fortified by a strong circular bastion for five guns, round part of which was drawn a ditch, twelve feet deep and fifteen broad, of solid masonry.

The city of Jhánsi.

The city of Jhánsi is about four miles and a half in circumference, and is surrounded by a fortified and massive wall, from six to twelve feet thick, and varying in height from eighteen to thirty feet, with numerous flanking bastions armed as batteries, with ordnance, and loop-holes, with a banquette for infantry.*

Garrison of the town and fortress.

The town and fortress were garrisoned by eleven thousand men, composed of rebel sepoys, foreign mercenaries, and local levies, and they were led by a woman who believed her cause to be just, and who, classified according to Channing's definition of greatness, was a heroine, though of the third order.

Result of Sir Hugh's reconnaissance.

In his long reconnaissance of the 21st of March, Sir Hugh Rose had noted all the strong points of the defence, and had examined the lay of the ground. He noted the many difficulties presented to the attack, by the fort perched on a lofty granite rock, with its three lines of works, its

* Sir Hugh Rose's despatch, dated the 30th of April 1858, from which this description is taken almost textually. Sir Hugh adds, further on, "A remarkable feature in the defence was that the enemy had no works or forts outside the city."

flanking fire, its thick and solid walls. He had discovered that it would be necessary to take the city prior to assailing the fortress, a work involving double labour and double danger. In this reconnaissance, however, he had decided on his plan of attack. That night he was joined by the cavalry of the 1st brigade. The next day he completely invested the city and fortress with his cavalry. In this investment the defenders read the determination of the English general to capture not only the place but its garrison.

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Difficulties of supplies.

One of the measures taken by the ráni might, under other circumstances, have caused considerable embarrassment to the besiegers. She had made the country all about bare. Not a blade of grass was to be seen. Thanks, however, to the loyalty of Sindia and of the ráni of Théri, the force was throughout the operations abundantly supplied with grass, firewood, and vegetables.

The siege begins.

The cavalry having invested the city on the 22nd, the siege began on the night of that day. At 9 o'clock a detachment of Madras and Bombay sappers, was sent with two 18-pounders, and a company 24th Bombay Native Infantry, to throw up a battery near the Úrcha road on the east side of the town wall; other parties were detached at the same time to positions which the general had selected. Working hard that night, the next day, and the night and day which followed, four batteries, constituting the right attack, were ready on the evening of the 24th. On the morning of the 25th they opened fire. That day, too, the bulk of the 1st brigade came

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up, and was at once posted south of the fort, constituting there the left attack.

Progress of the siege for seventeen days.

The siege now progressed in real earnest. For seventeen days the fire from the besieging batteries and from the walls of the city and fort was incessant. Shot and shell were poured into the city, and the enemy's guns never ceased to reply.

Labours and resolution of the besiegers.

The labour entailed upon the small force of the besiegers was tremendous. During the period of which I have spoken the men never took off their clothes, nor were the horses unbridled except to water. Nor were the exertions of the besieged less determined. Women and children were seen assisting in repairing the defences of the walls, and in carrying water and food to the troops on duty, whilst the ráni constantly visited the troops and animated them to enthusiasm by her presence and her words.

And the besieged.

For breaching purposes Sir Hugh had been able to employ only two 18-pounders, the remainder of the guns being laid so as to employ the enemy incessantly, and to damage the buildings inside the city. The progress made by these 18-pounders was, owing to the great strength of the walls, extremely slow. But on the 29th the parapets of the mamelon bastion were levelled by the fire from the left attack, and the enemy's guns there rendered useless. The two following days the cannonading continued with great spirit.

At length a breach is effected.

A breach had been effected, but it was barely practicable; the courage of the enemy continued unabated; danger seemed only to increase their resolution. Such was the state of affairs when

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a new danger arose for the besiegers. On the evening of the 31st of March intelligence reached Sir Hugh Rose that an army was advancing from the north for the relief of the fortress!

when an army advances to relieve the place.

This was the army of Tántia Topi. The career of this able Maráthá leader will be told at fuller detail in a subsequent chapter. Suffice it to say that after his victory over Windham and his subsequent defeat by Sir Colin Campbell, Tántia had crossed the Ganges, and subsequently, in obedience to orders from Ráo Sáhib, the nephew of Náná Sáhib, had proceeded to Kálpi. Thence, complying with orders from the same quarter, he had, with a small force of nine hundred sepoys and four guns, moved on Chirkári, and, on the eleventh day, had taken it, capturing twenty-four guns and three lakhs of rupees. Just at this time he received a letter from the ráni of Jhánsi, begging him to come to her help. Again he asked for orders, and again received the full approval of his superior. His force, by this time, had been increased by the junction of five or six regiments of the Gwáliár contingent and the levies of rebel rájás to twenty-two thousand men and twenty-eight guns. Leading it himself, he marched on the English camp before Jhánsi.

Tántia Topi

captures Chirkári

and marches to relieve Jhánsi

The position of Sir Hugh Rose was full of peril. Before him was an unconquered fortress, garrisoned by eleven thousand warriors, full of the ardour of battle; advancing against and close to him, an army of more than twenty thousand men led by a chieftain who hated the English, and

Danger of Sir Hugh Rose's position.

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who had twice revelled in their defeat at Kánhpúr. It was a position which required in a special degree great daring, a resolute will, the power to take responsibility. A single false step, a solitary error in judgment, might have been fatal. But Sir Hugh Rose was equal to the occasion. Rightly believing that to withdraw the troops then investing the fortress, for the purpose of meeting the new enemy, would give the besieged all the moral advantages of victory as well as the material advantages which they would derive from a virtual raising of the siege, the English general resolved still to press the siege with vigour, whilst at the head of all the troops not engaged in actual duty he should march against the new enemy. The extreme daring of this plan will be realised when the reader reflects that Sir Hugh was unable to assemble more than one thousand five hundred men of all arms for this purpose, that of these only five hundred were British, and that the enemy numbered, according to Tántia Topí's own admission, twenty-two thousand men. Sir Hugh's preparations* for the engagement were made on the evening of the 31st. He resolved to attack early the following morning.

He resolves to maintain the siege and to meet the motleying army.

Sir Hugh had drawn his covering force from both brigades, the detachment from the 1st being led by Brigadier C. S. Stuart, that from the 2nd by

* The preparations were witnessed with delight by the defenders of Jhánsi, who thought the English were marching to certain destruction. They shouted all night in a frenzy of joy.

himself in person. The men slept in their clothes ready for immediate action. The precaution was necessary. At 4 o'clock in the morning of the 1st, Tántia Topi advanced towards the British encampment. Half an hour later, the falling back of his pickets warned the English general of his approach. In a few minutes the British guns opened fire, and almost immediately those of the enemy answered. But the fire of a few guns was powerless to check the onward march of an enemy whose line overlapped that of the British on both flanks. Tántia had but to move straight on to reach with his overlapping wings the troops besieging the fortress, who would thus, literally, be placed between two fires. Sir Hugh comprehended the position in an instant, and took measures to meet it. Massing his horse artillery on his left, and attaching to it a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, under Captain Prettijohn, he ordered them to attack the enemy's right, whilst he himself, on the other flank, should direct another squadron against their left. The plan succeeded admirably. The rebels were so surprised and intimidated by this double attack, that their centre, which up to that time had been advancing steadily, first halted, and then, as the men composing it discerned a movement on the part of the British infantry, broke up into disordered masses. The movement of the British infantry is easily accounted for. Sir Hugh Rose, in the moment of charging, had sent orders to his infantry to advance as soon as the cavalry attack should be well pronounced. This order

Book XII. Chapter I. 1858. April. Sir Hugh meets Tántia Topi.

attacks their flanks with cavalry.

whilst the infantry attack their centre.

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The enemy's first line is defeated.

was now obeyed. The infantry sprang to their feet, advanced a few yards, then poured in a volley and charged. The result was magical. The first line of the enemy at once broke, and fled in complete disorder towards the second line, abandoning several of their guns.

Meanwhile, Stuart defeats a detached body of the enemy and

The second line, commanded by Tántia in person, was occupying a position upon rising ground, its front covered by jungle, about two miles in rear of the first line. Tántia beheld in dismay the latter rushing helter skelter towards him, followed by the three arms of the British in hot pursuit; but he had scarcely realised the fact when another vision on his right flank came to add to his anguish. Whilst Sir Hugh Rose had been engaged in the manner I have described, Brigadier C. S. Stuart, with the detachment of the 1st brigade, had moved round the hill into the plain on the right of the enemy, in order to check a large body of them, who were taking advantage of the battle raging in front of the line to move off towards Jhánsi. Stuart attacked, defeated them, and drove them back, hotly following them. So close, indeed, was the pursuit, that they had no time to reform, but fled in confusion, leaving gun after gun in the hands of the victors, and leaving numbers of their own men dead or dying on the field. This was the vision that came to add to the dismay of Tántia Topi.

threatens the second line.

It had the effect of forcing upon him a prompt decision. The day, he saw, was lost, but there was yet time to save the second line and his re-

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maining guns. I have said that the ground upon which he rested was covered to the front by jungle. This jungle was dry and easily kindled. He at once set fire to it, and under cover of the smoke and flames, commenced a retreat across the Bétwah, hoping to place that river between himself and the pursuers. His infantry and horsemen led the retreat, his guns covered it. Right gallantly and skilfully they did it, and he did succeed in crossing the Bétwah with his reserve and guns and some of the fugitives of the first line. But he was not the safer for the passage. The British horse artillery and cavalry had dashed at a gallop through the burning jungle, and they were resolved not to cease the pursuit till they had captured every gun that had opened against them. They carried out their programme to the letter. The pursuit did not cease till every gun had been taken. Fifteen hundred rebels were killed or wounded on this day. The remainder, with Tántia Topi at their head, fled towards Kálpi.*

Tántia Topi [illegible] the jungle.

and flees.

pursued across the Bétwah by the British.

Whilst this battle had been raging, the besieged had redoubled their fire. Mounting the bastions and the wall, they had shouted and yelled, and poured down volleys of musketry, seemingly threatening a sortie. Never, however, did the besiegers' batteries ply with more vigour or with greater effect. The sight from the wall, moreover, did not long continue to inspire.

The besieged first jubilant.

are afterwards discouraged.

* Tántia states that four field-pieces accounted for, or five guns were saved, but these must have been additional to the twenty-eight two hundred sepoys. He adds that he was followed in his flight by only

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Suddenly the yells and the shouts ceased—a sure sign that the garrison had recognised that the hour of deliverance had not arrived for them.

The victorious army, returning from the pursuit, its *morale* strengthened as much as that of the enemy had deteriorated, resumed its former positions the same evening. Sir Hugh Rose determined then to take the promptest advantage of the discouragement which, he was well aware, the defeat of Tántia Topi could not fail to produce in the minds of the garrison. He poured in, then, a heavy fire all that night and the day following. On the 2nd the breach in the city wall having been reported practicable, though only just practicable, Sir Hugh determined to storm the place the following morning. He made his preparations accordingly. His plan was to make a false attack on the west wall with a small detachment under Major Gall, 14th Light Dragoons; as soon as the sound of his guns should be heard, the main storming party was to debouch from cover, and enter the breach, whilst on the right of it attempts should be made to escalade the wall. The right attack, composed of the Madras and Bombay sappers, the 3rd Bombay Europeans, and the infantry of the Háidarábád contingent, was divided into two columns and a reserve. The right column was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell, the left by Captain Robinson—both of the 3rd Europeans—the reserve by Brigadier Stewart, 14th Light Dragoons. This attack was to attempt to gain the town by escalade. The left attack, composed of the Royal Engi-

Sir Hugh Rose opens a heavy fire on the fort all that night

and prepares to storm.

neers, the 86th Foot, and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, was similarly divided. Its left column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Lowth, 86th Regiment, was to storm the breach; the right led by Major Stuart, 86th Regiment, to escalade the rocket-tower and the low curtain immediately to the right of it. The reserve was commanded by Brigadier C. S. Stuart.

At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd of April the storming parties marched to the positions assigned to them, to await there the signal from Major Gall's party. No sooner was it given than the stormers dashed to the front. On the left, Captain Darby, 86th, led the stormers of Colonel Lowth's column up the breach in the most gallant manner, driving the enemy before him. At the same time Major Stuart attacked the rocket-tower, and though met by a strong opposition, forced his way by it into the town. Lowth then collected his men, and detached a portion of them against that section of the rebel forces which were engaged in opposing the right attack. Taking these in flank and rear, this detachment forced them to let go their hold on the defences, thus greatly facilitating the difficult task of the right attack. With the remainder of his troops Lowth prepared to march on the rání's palace.

Storming of Jhánsi.

Success of the left attack.

The right attack, on hearing the signal, had marched silently from their cover in three bodies. No sooner, however, had the troops composing it turned into the road leading towards the gate which was the object of their assault than the

The right attack.

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enemy's bugles sounded, and a very heavy fire opened upon them.* Through this fire the stormers had to march upwards of two hundred yards. Steadily they pushed on, and planted the ladders in three places against the wall. For the moment, however, it was impossible for the stormers to ascend. "The fire of the enemy waxed stronger, and amid the chaos of sounds of volleys of musketry and roaring of cannon, and hissing and bursting of rockets, stink-pots, infernal machines, huge stones, blocks of wood, and trees—all hurled upon their devoted heads—the men wavered for a moment, and sheltered themselves behind stones."†

It momentarily checked.

Notwithstanding this momentary check, the sappers, animated by their officers, kept firm hold of their ladders, and in spite of the superhuman efforts of the enemy, maintained them in their position against the wall. How long this lasted it is difficult to state. Minutes seemed hours, when, happily, Major Boileau, Madras Engineers, who had gone back to report the state of affairs to the brigadier, brought up a reinforcement of a hundred men of the 3rd Europeans. The stormers then rushed to the ladders led by their engineer officers. Some were found too short, others, from weakness, broke down under the men; but Lieutenant Dick, Bombay Engineers, gained, by means of one of them,

The ladders too short, or too weak.

Gallantry of Dick.

* "For a time it appeared like a sheet of fire, out of which burst a storm of bullets, round shot, and rockets, destined for our annihilation."—Lowe's *Central India*.

† Lowe, *ibid.*

the summit of the wall, and fighting against enormous odds, called upon the men to follow him. Lieutenant Meiklejohn of the same noble regiment mounted by another, and then boldly jumped down into the seething mass below. Lieutenant Bonus, also of the Bombay Engineers, reached the wall by a third. The men pressed on from behind; but before they could, in any number, join their officers, Dick had fallen from the wall, dying, pierced with shot and bayonets; Bonus had been hurled down, struck in his face by a log or stone; Fox of the Madras sappers, who had also reached the wall, had been shot in the neck; Meiklejohn had been cut to pieces. But the stormers pushed on, and in streams from some eight ladders, at length gained a footing on the rampart, dealing and receiving death from the enemy, who still continued fiercely to contest every point of the attack.

of Meiklejohn.

of Bonus.

of Fox.

The right attack gains a footing on the ramparts.

It was at this crisis that the stormers of the left attack made the charge upon the flank and rear of the defenders, of which I have spoken. Its effect was marvellous. The defenders relaxed their hold, the opposition ceased, and the stormers of the right attack jumped down and mingled with their comrades.

The left attack renders timely aid.

The defence having thus given way, the stormers made their way through the city to the palace, Lowth leading the way. The palace had been prepared by the rebels for a resistance in the last resort. The conflict, as the stormers forced their way through the streets, was severe. At the palace it was desperate. The houses on

The stormers march on the palace.

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which, after a desperate contest, they gain.

both sides of the street leading to it had been set on fire, and the heat was fearful. When even the courtyard of the palace was reached, it became apparent that the resistance had only begun. Every room was savagely contested. Fruitlessly, however. From chamber to chamber the enemy were driven at the point of the bayonet. At length the palace itself was gained. The opposition, however, had not even then entirely ceased. Two hours later it was discovered that fifty men of the rání's bodyguard still held the stables attached to the building. These men defended themselves to the last before, after a desperate encounter, they were disposed of. But the men who accomplished this task, the 86th and the 3rd Europeans, were compensated for their toil and danger by recapturing a British flag.*

Terrible scene in the stables.

The rebels driven from the town, occupy a strong position outside of it,

This occurrence had but just happened when Sir Hugh, who had been present throughout with the left attack, received information that a body of the rebels, numbering about four hundred, driven from the town, after having vainly tried to force the pickets of one of the cavalry camps, had taken up a position on a hill to the west of the fortress, where they had been surrounded by the cavalry. Sir Hugh instantly sent against the hill the available troops of all arms under Major Gall. This gallant officer sent to storm the hill a

whence they are driven.

* This was a Union Jack of silk, which Lord William Bentinck had given to the grandfather of the rání's husband, with the permission to have it carried before him, as a reward for his fidelity."—Sir H. Rose's despatch.

detachment of the 24th Bombay Native Infantry. The 24th went at the rebels with a will, and killed all but about twenty, who retreated to the summit and there blew themselves up. The 24th lost an officer and several men in this attack. Another body of about one thousand five hundred who had collected in one of the suburbs of the town, declaring they would defend it to the last, were driven out, about the same time, with a loss of three hundred of their number.

Book XI. Chapter I. 1858. April. by the 24th Bombay Native Infantry. another body is similarly treated.

All that night, and throughout the following day, desultory fighting continued, the enemy being either slaughtered or driven under the shelter of the fort guns. Sir Hugh was meanwhile engaged in organising measures for an attack on the fortress. But the ráni saved him further trouble on that score. On the night of the 4th, despairing of a successful defence of the fortress, and hoping that her presence at Kálpi might induce Tántia Topi once more to aid her, that princess evacuated the fortress with all her remaining followers. She rode straight for Kálpi, and arrived there the very evening on which Tántia, who had travelled more leisurely, reached that place. Sir Hugh sent a cavalry force in pursuit of her, but the start had been too great. A few of the fugitives were, however, cut up.

Desultory fighting continues during the night.

The ráni evacuates the fortress and rides for Kálpi.

The fortress of Jhánsi was occupied by Sir Hugh Rose on the morning of the 5th of April. The loss sustained by him during the operations against it, including the action on the Bétwah, amounted to three hundred and forty-three killed and wounded, of whom thirty-six were officers.

Sir Hugh occupies the fortress.

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The enemy's loss was computed at five thousand. One thousand dead bodies were actually burned or buried in Jhánsi itself.

Credit due to Sir Hugh Rose.

The mode by which Jhánsi was captured attests the merits of the noble soldier who planned and carried out the attack. Never was there a more complete combination of daring and skill, of foresight and resolution. The result was worthy of the plan, and of the genius which formed the plan.*

Importance of capturing Kálpi.

Sir Hugh's object now was to march on Kálpi, to drive the rebels from that stronghold on the Jamná whence they had so constantly menaced the communications of the British. Kálpi was the arsenal of the rebels, the head-quarters of the nephew of Náná Sáhib, and was extremely well provided with artillery and warlike stores. It lies on the Jamná, one hundred and two miles to the north-east of Jhánsi, and only forty-six to the south-west of Kánhpúr. The occupation of this place would enable Sir Hugh to touch the left rear of Sir Colin Campbell's army, and, in co-operation with him, to clear the triangle the angles of which were Jhánsi, Kálpi, and Ágra—Gwáliár being nearly midway in the line uniting Jhánsi and Ágra.

* The following extracts from Sir Hugh Rose's despatch attest the great strength of the town and fortress: "It was not till Jhánsi was taken that its great strength was known. There was only one part of the fortress, the south curtain, which was considered practicable for breaching. But, when inside, we saw this was a mistake, there being at some distance in rear of the curtain a massive wall fifteen or twenty feet thick, and immediately in rear of this a deep tank cut out of the live rock."

For seventeen days Sir Hugh's little army had known no repose. The halt at Jhánsi of nearly nineteen days which followed the capture of the place was, however, in no sense devoted to repose. Much had to be done in Jhánsi itself: the arrangements for a fresh campaign had to be organised, provisions had to be laid in, the magazines to be replenished. At length all was ready. Leaving at Jhánsi a small garrison consisting of the head-quarter wing of the 3rd Bombay Europeans, four companies 24th Bombay Native Infantry, left wing 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, one hundred troopers Haidarábád contingent, half a company Bombay sappers, and three guns Bhopál contingent—the whole under the command of Colonel Liddell, 3rd Europeans—Sir Hugh detached, on the night of the 22nd of April, a detachment under Major Gall to watch the rebel garrison of Kotá, reported to be at a place called Máu in the neighbourhood, and set out himself with the 1st brigade at midnight on the 25th, leaving directions for the 2nd brigade to follow two days later. Major Orr had been previously detached with the bulk of the Haidarábád force to prevent the rájás of Bánpúr and Sháhgarh and any other rebels from crossing the Bétwah and doubling back southwards.

Sir Hugh halts at Jhánsi to arrange for a march on Kálpi.

Dispositions made by him with that object.

Leaving for a moment these several officers engaged in carrying out the orders entrusted to them, I propose to return for a moment to the ráni of Jhánsi and Tántia Topi.

These two important personages had arrived, as I have said, at Kálpi the same day. The first

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The rání of Jhánsi at Kálpi.

act of the rání had been to implore the nephew of Náná Sáhib, known as Ráo Sáhib, "to give her an army that she might go and fight." The following morning Ráo Sáhib ordered a parade of all the troops at his disposal. These consisted of some regiments of the Gwáliár contingent, several regiments of the regular native army recruited to nearly full strength, the contingents of various rebel rájás, and the remnant of the Jhánsi garrison. Ráo Sáhib reviewed these troops, addressed them, and then directed Tántia to lead them against the English. Tántia obeyed, and hoping to meet them when possibly all their forces were not reunited, marched to Kúnch, a town forty miles from Kálpi on the Jhánsi road, and there took up a strong position, covered by woods and gardens, with temples at intervals between each of them, surrounded by a strong wall, and there threw up intrenchments.

Her appeal to Ráo Sáhib,

who holds a review,

and orders Tántia Topi to march against the English.

He marches on Kúnch.

Movements of Gall.

Meanwhile the English force was advancing on Kúnch. Major Gall, harassed by the enemy on his march, had reached the town of Pútch; sixteen miles from Kúnch, on the 1st of May. Here he was joined the same day by Sir Hugh Rose and the 1st brigade. Major Orr, on his side, had crossed the Bétwah, attacked the rájás of Bánpúr and Sháhgarh at Kotra, and had taken one of their guns. He had, however, found it impossible to cut them off, and they had succeeded, for the time, in escaping southwards, supplies and carriage being furnished them by the treacherous rája of Jigni. By Sir Hugh's direction, Major Orr then marched on Kúnch.

Sir H. Rose.

Maj. Orr.

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The country between Pútch and Kúnch was studded with little forts, which, up to the time of which I am writing, had been occupied by the enemy. From these they could undoubtedly cause considerable annoyance to small detachments; but, in the presence of the large force now collecting at the former place, they deemed it advisable to abandon them and concentrate at Kúnch.

The rebels concentrate on Kúnch.

Sir Hugh was joined by his 2nd brigade, strengthened by the 71st Highlanders, on the 5th of May. He at once marched on Lohári, ten miles nearer Kúnch, thence to put into action the plan of attack which he had matured. Before this, however, hearing on his arrival at Lohári that the rebels were in possession of the fort of the same name close to it, he detached Major Gall, with a wing of the 3rd Europeans, some artillery and dragoons, to attack it. Gall took the fort, losing two of his officers and some men; but of the garrison not one escaped. Sir Hugh meanwhile had matured his plans.

Sir Hugh sends Gall to capture Lohári.

An Asiatic army, Sir Hugh was well aware, always expects a front attack. He had also noticed that nothing disturbs such an army as a turning movement. Instead, therefore, of sending his troops against a position which the rebels had carefully prepared, Sir Hugh resolved to make a flank march with his whole force on the 6th to a position at once facing the unfortified side of the town of Kúnch, and threatening seriously the enemy's line of retreat from that place to Kálpi.

and makes a flank march to turn the rebels' position.

With this view Sir Hugh broke up from his encamping-ground early on the morning of the 6th, and making a flank march of fourteen miles, brought his force into the position contemplated. His 1st brigade, forming his left, rested its extreme left on the village of Nágupúra; his 2nd brigade, forming the centre, occupied the village of Chomair; Major Orr's Haidarábád force, forming the right, occupied the village of Umri. This position was two miles from Kúnch.

The sun was high in the heavens before the troops had taken up the posts assigned to them. Sir Hugh, who had marched with the 1st brigade, ordered them to eat their dinners, whilst he galloped to inspect the arrangements made in the centre and on the right. In an hour he returned, and ordered Major Gall, with a detachment of cavalry, to reconnoitre the wood, garden, and temples which lay between him and Kúnch, covering that advance by a fire of shot and shell. At the same time he directed the siege-guns to take up a position whence they could play upon the town.

Gall soon returned with a report that the enemy had retreated through the wood to the part of it near the town, having in their rear a body of cavalry; that the siege-guns had had the effect of driving the rebels on the right of the wood into the town, but that some outworks were still occupied by them.

Sir Hugh determined at once to clear the wood and the outworks with his infantry, and then to storm the town. Covering his left wing

with a wing of the 86th, and the whole of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, in skirmishing order, and supporting their flanks with cavalry and horse artillery, he sent them into the wood. Advancing in perfect order, the gallant sepoys of the 25th Native Infantry cleared the wood, temples, and walled gardens in front of them, whilst the 86th, making a circuit to their left, carried all the obstacles in their front, and then, bringing their left shoulders forward, advanced, despite a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, through the north part of the town and took the fort. This operation, performed by the 1st brigade, drove the enemy's right on their centre.

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The 1st brigade drives the rebel right on its centre.

Meanwhile, Brigadier Steuart, commanding the 2nd brigade, having observed a body of rebel infantry strongly posted in cultivated ground threatening the line of attack of his brigade, marched to dislodge them. The rebels contested their position with great valour, and it was not until the 1st brigade, establishing itself in the manner already described, threatened their flank, that they gave way. It had been intended that Brigadier Steuart should then march straight into the town, but, with the view of cutting off the rebels, he moved to the south of it and missed them.

and affords aid to the 2nd brigade.

Major Orr's force had, whilst this was going on, advanced through the wood, round the town, to the plains traversed by the road to Kálpi.

Major Orr moves to cut off the rebels.

Although the operations of which I have given an outline had taken only an hour, and the rebels in that short period had been completely defeated, they managed, nevertheless, to gain with the bulk

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The enemy, nevertheless, gain the Kálpi road in full retreat.

of their forces the Kálpi road in advance of their pursuers, and on both sides of this road they were now endeavouring to restore some sort of order in their masses, so as to check by every means in their power the ardour of the pursuit. When Sir Hugh Rose, then, emerging from the narrow streets of the town, formed up his brigades for a renewed attack, he beheld the enemy retreating in a long irregular line, covered by skirmishers at close distances, the skirmishers supported by groups who acted to them as a sort of bastions.

The heat of the sun forces Sir Hugh to halt his infantry,

The terrific heat of the day, and the power of the sun, which had made itself felt with fatal effect on many of his European soldiers,* forbade him further to risk the soldiers of that arm in a pursuit which could not fail to entail a sacrifice of many valuable lives. He, therefore, halted them, whilst he launched in pursuit the cavalry of both brigades and of Major Orr's force,† and the horse artillery and field guns.

but he launches the cavalry in pursuit.

Masterly retreat of the rebels.

Then was witnessed action on the part of the rebels which impelled admiration from their enemies. The manner in which they conducted their retreat could not be surpassed. There was no hurry, no disorder, no rushing to the rear. All was orderly as on a field-day. Though their line of skirmishers was two miles in length it never wavered in a single point. The men fired, then ran behind the relieving men, and loaded. The relieving men then fired, and ran back in

* Many of the sepoys were also struck down by the sun.
† Except a party left to watch the Jaláon road and the rear.

their turn. They even attempted, when they thought the pursuit was too rash, to take up a position, so as to bring on it an enfilading fire. Their movement was so threatening, that Sir Hugh ordered Prettijohn, 14th Light Dragoons, to charge the enfilading party, an order carried out by that most daring officer with great gallantry and success. Still, however, the rebels maintained the order of their retreat, nor was it until many of them had been killed, and all their guns had been captured, that the survivors were driven in on the main body. Then, for the first time, they lost their nerve; then they crowded into the Kálpi road, a long and helpless column of runaways. But the pursuers were completely tired; they were unable to move faster than at a walk; the cavalry horses were knocked up; and whilst the guns could not approach near enough to fire grape, the cavalry could only pick up an occasional straggler. When, then, a few hundred yards further, broken ground, over which the rebels scattered, supervened, the pursuit came to an end. It had produced great results. The rebels lost nine guns, a quantity of ammunition and stores, and five or six hundred men in killed and wounded. The mutinous 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, which covered the retreat, was almost annihilated. The English loss was three officers and fifty-nine men killed and wounded, in addition to many struck down by the sun.

Gallantry of Prettijohn.

The rebel covering force is at last driven on the main body.

The victors completely exhausted.

Cease the pursuit.

The defeat at Kúnch sowed great mistrust among the rebels. The infantry sepoys taunted the cavalry troopers with having abandoned them,

Bad effect on the rebels of the defeat at Kúnch.

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and the men of all three arms brought the same accusation against Tántia Topi, who had disappeared at Kúnch even more rapidly than he had galloped away on the Bétwah. The Jhánsi horsemen, too, came in for their share of abuse, and when they excused themselves on the plea that they had felt bound to escort their ráni* to a place of safety, they were only vilified the more. To such an extent did the animosities among the several parties who constituted the rebel force proceed, that on the morrow of their reaching Kálpi, the rumour that Sir Hugh was advancing by forced marches against that place, sufficed to induce them to disperse. It is believed that shortly after that rumour arrived there were only eleven sepoys left in the town and fort of Kálpi. This dispersion was, however, soon remedied in a manner to be hereafter described.

Sir Hugh pushes on

The report which had so disquieted the rebels at Kálpi was not baseless. Despite the fact that his ammunition was well-nigh exhausted, Sir Hugh, determined to give the enemy no breathing-time, had pushed on with all practicable speed from Kúnch. On the 15th he established himself at Goláoli, on the Jamná, six miles from Kálpi. Goláoli is not on the direct road between Kúnch and Kálpi, but two reasons had prompted Sir Hugh to march on it in preference to taking the direct route. In the first place, he had heard from the Commander-in-Chief that Colonel G. V. Maxwell had been detached with the 88th Foot,

Sir Hugh establishes himself at Goláoli near Kálpi.

* The ráni fled to Kálpi after the defeat: Tántia Topi to Chirki, near Jaláor, the residence of his parents.

some Sikhs, and the Camel corps, to co-operate with him; and Maxwell having reached the left bank of the Jamná opposite Goláoli, Sir Hugh was able to hold out his hand to him at that place. In the second, by marching on Goláoli, Sir Hugh turned the fortifications which had been thrown up to impede his advance, and threatened Kálpi from an unexpected quarter.

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His reasons for taking that route.

Sir Hugh's march from Kúnch to Goláoli, though unopposed by the enemy, was in all respects most trying. The terrible heat, and the rays of the sun told upon his men with deadly effect, and admissions to the hospitals and deaths increased at an alarming rate. This fact was well known to the rebels, and they did their utmost to reap full advantage from it. An intercepted general order by their general-in-chief, issued about this time, directed that no attack should be made upon the European infidels before 10 o'clock in the day, as fighting in the sun either killed them or sent them to their hospitals. But in spite of the heat Goláoli was reached on the 15th, communications were opened with Maxwell, and Sir Hugh, in accordance with his invariable custom, made prompt arrangements for engaging the enemy.

Trying character of the march to Goláoli.

Who now constituted the enemy? I have related how, in the panic caused by the rumour of Sir Hugh's onward march, only eleven rebel sepoys had been left in the town and fort. A few days later, however, the unexpected arrival of the nawáb of Bandá with two thousand horse, some guns, and many followers,—the remnant

The rebels are reinforced by the nawáb of Bandá.

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of the force defeated by General Whitlock at Baudá, in the manner to be told in the next chapter—and his energetic exertions, backed by those of the ráni of Jhánsi, produced one of those changes from despair to confidence which mark the Indian character.* The sepoys who had left returned, and, exhorted by their leaders to hold to the last Kálpi, their only arsenal, and to win their right to paradise by exterminating the infidel English,† declared their resolution to defend it to the last.

Their confidence returns.

Although as a fortification Kálpi had but little to boast of, its position was unusually strong. It was protected on all sides by ravines, to its front by five lines of defence, and to its rear by the Jamná, from which rises the precipitous rock on which stands the fort.

Strong position of Kálpi.

Between the British camp and Kálpi, indeed, existed a most extraordinary labyrinth of ravines, over which artillery and cavalry could make no progress, but which furnished an interminable cover of the most formidable description for infantry. On the, so to speak, tongues of land formed by the prolongation of the ravines, the rebels had rapidly thrown up intrenchments, and had cut trenches near to these in a manner rendering it impossible that they should be turned. Even if driven out of the intrenchments, it was within the power of the rebels to fall back on eighty-four temples, built, as well as the walls round them, of the most

Nature of the country between the British camp and Kálpi.

* Sir Hugh Rose's despatch, the 24th of May 1858.
† Intercepted letter, *idem*.

solid masonry. These temples constituted a second line of defence; the outwork of ravines a third; the town of Kálpi a fourth; another chain of ravines a fifth; and the fort the last.

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Skirmishes between the two armies.

On the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th, constant skirmishes occurred between the two armies, the enemy being the attacking party. On all these occasions they were repulsed, but the British suffered much from the sun, as well as from the incessant toil, anxiety, and heat. On the 19th a mortar battery, established on the right front of the British position, opened on the town. On the 20th a detachment from Colonel Maxwell's brigade, consisting of two companies of the 88th, one hundred and twenty Sikhs, and the Camel corps, crossed the river, and joined Sir Hugh Rose. On the 21st the batteries from Maxwell's camp opened on the fort and town. On the 22nd Sir Hugh determined to deliver his long-meditated blow.

Maxwell reinforces Sir Hugh.

The British plan of attack.

Sir Hugh had, from the first, determined that whilst Maxwell's batteries should shell Kálpi, he would clear the ravines and the other obstacles and attack the left face of the fort. Resolved to keep his men for this great blow, he had contented himself with simply repulsing the attacks I have mentioned. But when he received information that the rebels were meditating an attack on the 22nd, which should be fatal to one of the contending parties, he, now ready for them, resolved to second their views.

The rebel plan of attack.

The rebels had prepared a plan so skilful, that, if carried out with courage and resolution, it

seemed to offer several chances in its favour. Whilst making, with great demonstrations, a false attack on the British left, they were to steal up the ravines with their main body, and try and overwhelm the right, weakened, they hoped, by detachments sent to support the left.

It must be understood that the British force occupied the ground situated between the river Jamná and the road running from Kálpi to Bandá, that its right rested on the ravines near the river, whilst its left nearly touched that road. In pursuance of their plan, the rebels marched out in masses at 10 o'clock on the 22nd along the Bandá road, and threatened the British left, opening fire simultaneously with their guns on its centre. This attack, headed by the nawáb of Bandá and by Ráo Sáhib, nephew of Náná Sáhib, though intended only as a feint, soon made itself felt, and the British left became heavily engaged. Still Sir Hugh, confident as to the real object of the enemy, did not move a man from his right. He contented himself with replying to their guns with his guns in a style which soon forced the rebels to limber up and fall back. The attack on his left not only continued, but became very real indeed, but still Sir Hugh did not move a man from his right. It was well he did not. Suddenly, as if by magic, the whole line of ravines became a mass of fire; the enemy's left batteries opened, and their infantry, climbing from below, poured in an overwhelming musketry-fire on the right of the British line. The suddenness of the attack, their superior numbers, and

the terrible heat of the day gave the rebels a great advantage. Another point, too, was in their favour. Many of the Enfield rifles had become clogged by constant use in all weathers, and the men, after a few discharges, had found it very difficult to load them. The sun, too, had struck down an unusual number of the Europeans. When, then, the rebels, starting up in great numbers from the ravines, poured in volleys which the British reply to only feebly, when they saw that each discharge from the thin red line became weaker than that preceding it, they began to gain a confidence they had never felt before. They pressed on with loud yells, the British falling back, until they approached the British light field-guns and mortar-battery. Then it was that Brigadier C. S. Stuart, dismounting, placed himself by the guns, and bade the gunners defend them with their lives. The 86th and 25th Native Infantry, in thin extended line, disputed step by step. Still the rebels pressed on, and it seemed as though from their very numbers they must prevail, when Sir Hugh, to whom news of the attack had been conveyed, brought up the Camel corps at their best pace; then, dismounting the men, and leading them forward himself at the double, charged the advancing foe, then within a few yards of the British guns. For a moment the enemy stood, but only for a moment. A shout, a dash forward from the whole line, and they went headlong into the ravines below. Not only was the attack on the right repulsed, but the victory was gained! The attack

The confidence of the rebels increases.

Gallantry of Brigadier C. S. Stuart.

Sir Hugh brings up the Camel corps at the critical moment.

and gains the day.

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on the left collapsed when that on the right failed, and the guns, gaining the rebels' flank, inflicted great loss on them as they fled. Sir Hugh followed them up so closely, that he cut off a number of them from Kálpi. The fire from Maxwell's batteries made those who reached that fort feel that it was no secure place of refuge. They evacuated it accordingly during the night. The rest of their force, pursued by the horse artillery and cavalry, lost their formation and dispersed, losing all their guns and baggage. Even the ráni of Jhánsi, who fled with them, was compelled to sleep under a tree!

The rebels evacuate Kálpi.

Trials to which the English troops were subjected during this campaign.

The position of the troops, their sufferings, the feelings that animated them, are thus graphically described by an eye-witness who, throughout its duration, took part in the campaign, and who subsequently gave to the world an eloquent record of the achievements of his comrades. "This was," writes Dr. Lowe,* "a hard day's work, and a glorious victory won over ten times our numbers under most trying circumstances. The position of Kálpi; the numbers of the enemy, who came on with a resolution and a display of tactics we had never before witnessed; the exhausted, weakened state of the general's force; the awful suffocating hot winds and burning sun, which the men had to endure all day, without time to take food or water, combined to render the achievement one of unsurpassed difficulty. Every soul engaged in this important action

* Lowe's *Central India during the Rebellion of* 1857-58.

suffered more or less. Officers and men fainted away, or dropped down as though struck by lightning in the delirium of a sun-stroke; yet all this was endured without a murmur, and in the cool of the evening we were speculating upon the capture of Kálpi on the morrow."

Their unmurmuring endurance.

Before daybreak the following morning, Sir Hugh marched on that place. His 1st brigade, under Brigadier C. S. Stuart, he sent through the ravines, following the course of the Jamná, whilst he led the 2nd himself,* along the Kálpi road.

Colonel Maxwell's batteries still continued to shell the fort and the villages in front of it. As the two brigades advanced, however, these villages were abandoned by the rebels, and it soon became apparent that no serious resistance was contemplated. When the two brigades, having overcome all obstacles in their path, united near the town, and advanced into it, they were not opposed; the rebels had fled, quitting for ever the arsenal which had served them so long and so well.†

The fort of Kálpi is evacuated.

* Brigadier C. Steuart, C.B., commanding the 2nd brigade, had reported sick after the battle of Kúnch, and the command had devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, 71st Highlanders.

† The following description, given by an eye-witness, proves how the rebels had used the position of Kálpi, and the good stead in which it had stood them. After enumerating the quantities of ammunition, lead, iron, brass, gun-carriages, gun-moulds, &c., found in the fort, Dr. Lowe adds:—"The enemy had erected houses and tents in the fort, had their smiths' shops, their carpenters' shops. Their foundries for casting shot and shell were in perfect order, clean and well con-

Book XIV. Chapter I.

1858. May.

The capture of Kálpi completes Sir Robert Hamilton's plans.

Summary of the campaign.

The capture of Kálpi completed the plan of the campaign for the column having its base at Máu, which Sir Robert Hamilton had submitted to the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief towards the close of the preceding year. In all respects that plan had been carried out. Marching from Máu in November Sir Hugh Rose had, in five months, traversed central India, crossing its numerous rivers, storming strong forts, taking many towns, defeating armies vastly superior in numbers, led by men and by a woman whose hatred to the British name incited them to efforts not to be surpassed in the annals of the mutiny. He and his gallant comrades had accomplished these great deeds during a season the terrible heat of which far surpassed the heat of the corresponding season of previous years, and under a sun which proved scarcely less deadly than the enemy.* Yet moving steadily onwards,

structed; the specimens of brass shell cast by them were faultless. . . . In the arsenal were about sixty thousand pounds of gunpowder, outside it were large heaps of shot and shell ranged after the fashion of our own. . . . It would appear . . . . that the enemy had prepared for a long stand here."—Lowe's *Central India*.

* Dr. Lowe thus describes the condition of officers and men from the effects of the sun, when they entered Kálpi. "Most of the officers and men were sick, and the whole force needed rest. The general himself was very ill; his chief of the staff, Colonel Wetherall, C.B., was in a raving fever; his quartermaster-general, Captain Macdonald, was worn out, and among the list of those going away; the chaplain of the force, the Rev. Mr. Schwabbe, had lost his reason and was apparently sinking fast; and other officers, wounded or exhausted by their long and arduous duties and disease, brought on by these and the terrible sun, had been ordered to England."

regarding difficulties as only obstacles to be overcome, keeping in view the goal at which he aimed, Sir Hugh had marched from victory to victory. It may be said of him that it was his character which created his success. Careless of himself, he conducted every reconnaissance, he planned every action, he was foremost in every attack, he courted danger and exposure. At the same time, no leader ever paid greater attention to the soldiers. To look after their comforts, to see, after a hard-fought action, that the wounded were attended to, and, after a long and tedious march, that provisions were abundant, was with him a sacred duty. It was this which endeared him to the troops; this that made them fight cheerily against numbers, endure the killing rays of the fierce sun. If he demanded all their energies on the battle-field, they saw that their wants were attended to when the battle was over; that he never spared himself; that with all the cares of command upon him, he managed to find time to attend to them. It was that sympathy which evoked the enthusiasm which enabled the soldiers of Sir Hugh Rose to equal the achievements of any warriors of whom history makes record.

Sir Hugh Rose's "character created his success."

The campaign now appeared over. Its every object had been accomplished. Sir Colin Campbell, sharing that opinion, wrote to Sir Robert Hamilton a letter explaining the mode in which the several corps of the Central India Field Force were to be cantoned, and adding, with regard to Whitlock's force, that "it would be otherwise em-

The campaign appears concluded.

ployed as a movable division." The general who had conducted the campaign was about to dissolve the force and to proceed to a cooler climate for the recovery of his health. How all these arrangements were suddenly altered I shall tell in another chapter. Meanwhile it is my duty to record the operations of the other column, which, with Jabalpúr as its base, had been directed to move on Bandá, subduing the rebel rájás on its route.

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BOOK XIV.

CHAPTER II.

On the 16th of November 1857 Brigadier-General Whitlock of the Madras army was appointed to the command of a division for service in the Nágpúr, Ságar, and Narbadá territories. His force was to consist of an artillery brigade composed of two troops of horse artillery and three companies of foot artillery, with two light field-batteries attached, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Miller; of a cavalry brigade composed of the 12th Lancers and the 6th and 7th Madras Light Cavalry, commanded by Colonel A. W. Lawrence; of one brigade of infantry composed of the 3rd Madras Europeans and the 1st and 5th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel Carpenter, M.A.; of a second infantry brigade composed of the 43rd Light Infantry and the 19th and left wing of the 50th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel McDuff, 74th Highlanders. There were also

The composition of General Whitlock's force.

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1858. Jan.–Feb.

details of sappers and miners. The force was to be massed at Jabalpúr, and to march thence towards Bandá.

The force at Jabalpúr is directed.

A small force, previously detached from the Madras Presidency or serving in the central Provinces, was already at Jabalpúr.* This force consisted of six hundred and fifty men of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry under Colonel Miller; one hundred and twenty men 28th Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Standen; one hundred and twenty men of the 1st Núgpúr Rifles†; three hundred men 4th Madras Light Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Cumberlege; three hundred men 6th Madras Light Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Byng; one hundred and fifty men 2nd Nizám's Cavalry under Captain Macintire; a total of eight hundred and ninety infantry and seven hundred and fifty cavalry. This small column had orders to halt at Jabalpúr pending the arrival of General Whitlock and his force.

To halt pending Whitlock's arrival.

General Whitlock reached Kámpti on the 10th of January. He was unable, from various causes, to leave that place till the 23rd of the same month. Setting out on that date, he arrived at Jabalpúr on the 6th of February.‡ Part of his 1st brigade reached on the 6th, the remainder a few days later.

Whitlock reaches Jabalpúr.

On the 17th of February General Whitlock,

* *Vide* page 103 of this volume.

† The Núgpúr local force had been rearmed by Mr. Plowden.

‡ The distance is one hundred and forty-eight miles.

1858. Feb.–March.

leaving a small garrison in Jabalpúr, soon to be increased by the arrival of Brigadier McDuff's brigade to a tolerable strength, set out for Ságar. He moved in the direction of Jakháni with the object of overawing the mutinous landowners in the Réwah district. He reached that place, previously captured by Willoughby Osborne, on the 24th, and was there met by the loyal rájá of Urchah. Halting here one day, he set out on the 26th for Damoh, and arrived there on the 4th of March. It is worthy of remark that during this march of fifteen days General Whitlock, though strongly urged by Major Erskine, the political officer accompanying his force, to drive the rebels from the strong places they occupied, and from which they still continued to harass the districts between Jabalpúr and Damoh, refused to send a single detachment for that purpose from his force. He preferred, he said, to keep it massed in his hand. The result was that, although Whitlock's column secured the ground on which it encamped, scared into submission the villages through which it marched, and even recovered Damoh, it left the population of the districts still occupied by rebels astonished at the regard paid to the latter.

He sets out with part of his force for Ságar.

His movements are characterised by extreme caution.

On the 5th Whitlock rode into Ságar accompanied by some horse artillery and cavalry. Ságar had previously been relieved by Sir Hugh Rose, but on reaching it Whitlock at once sent an express to Damoh for two hundred European and seventy native infantry to come in by forced marches; he also detached a small body of Europeans to

Whitlock reaches Ságar.

escort treasure from Jabalpúr, whilst the remainder of the force he kept halted at Damoh under the command of Brigadier Carpenter. He, however, returned and resumed command on the 12th.

Whitlock is ordered to march on Nágód, and to communicate with Sir Hugh Rose.

On the 17th Whitlock, still halted at Damoh, received the Governor-General's orders to march on Nágód and Pannah by way of Hattah, and to afford aid to the loyal rájás of Bandalkhand, notably to the rájá of Chirkári. Lord Canning's despatch further directed Whitlock to communicate his movement to Sir Hugh Rose so as to enable that officer to work in concert with him.

Whitlock reaches Pannah, and halts for information.

In compliance with this order, Whitlock left Damoh on the 22nd of March, and entering Bandalkhand, arrived at Pannah without molestation on the 29th. Evidently a man of extreme caution, Whitlock halted here to obtain information regarding the position of the enemy and the practicability of the roads. The reader, if he refer to the preceding chapter, will see that this was the precise period when the Government would have diverted Sir Hugh Rose from his attack on Jhánsi in order to succour Chirkári, then besieged by Tántia Topi; and that activity on the part of General Whitlock was specially desirable. But none was displayed. The force remained halted at Pannah till the 2nd of April. Whitlock, having by that time come to a resolution, marched it by Marwá Ghát, a road almost impossible for guns and vehicles. So difficult was the road that on reach-

His extreme caution.

Proceeds by difficult road towards Bandá.

ing Mándalá, at the foot of the pass, Whitlock had to halt for three days to repair damages. Whilst thus halted he received (3rd of April) a despatch from Sir Hugh Rose directing him to move with all expedition upon Jhánsi. The very day on which this despatch reached Whitlock, Rose stormed Jhánsi. Whitlock was unable to leave Mándalá till the 6th of April. He then marched, by way of Chattarpúr, on Bandá, reached Chattarpúr on the 9th, surprised the rebels the following night whilst evacuating the fort of Jhigan, then marched on Mahoba, and thence on Bandá.

Book XIV. Chapter II.

1858. April.

still slowly and cautiously.

and eventually reaches Bandá.

The rebel nawáb of Bandá was playing the part of an independent prince in the district which took its name from the chief town. The nawáb had been well supplied with information regarding Whitlock's movements, and judging him to be a man of a cautious and anxious temperament, determined to attempt to lead him into a trap. No sooner, then, had he been certified of the advance of the English general than he directed the troops he had stationed at Mahoba, and which consisted of eight hundred and fifty men of the mutinied 50th Bengal Native Infantry, two hundred men of the 23rd Native Infantry, the 2nd Regiment Irregular Cavalry Gwáliár contingent, and half a battery of guns, to evacuate that place and take up a position in ambush at Kabrai, whence they should fall upon English troops as they would pass it before dawn. At the same time the nawáb took care that Whitlock should be informed that he would encounter no enemy south of Bandá.

The nawáb of Bandá endeavours to draw Whitlock into a trap.

Had the courage of his troops equalled the cleverness of the nawáb, the plan would have succeeded. Whitlock so far fell into the trap that he believed there were no rebels before him. His troops were actually marching through Kabrai an hour before daybreak when the enemy opened upon them a heavy fire. The surprise was but for a moment. The Horse Artillery, the Lancers, and the Haidarábád Irregulars galloped forward, and soon compelled the rebels to retreat. Unfortunately, in the pursuit which followed, the principal body of the British force took, in the dark, a wrong direction, so that but few of the enemy were cut up. The attempt, however, clearly indicated to Whitlock what was in store for him at Bandá. He pushed on, however, and on the early morning of the 19th found the rebel forces, headed by the nawáb, occupying the plain south of the town, and barring his entrance into it. The nawáb's forces consisted of seven thousand men, of whom rather more than one-third were regular troops. The position he had taken up was strong. The ground was very much intersected by ravines and watercourses, and of these the rebels had taken skilful advantage.

Whitlock had broken up his camp at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 19th. At 5 o'clock his advance guard, commanded by Colonel Apthorp, and consisting of three companies 3rd Madras Europeans, two guns Mein's troop Horse Artillery, some Haidarábád Irregulars under Macintyre, a few of the 12th Lancers, and a detachment 1st Madras Native Infantry, came upon

the enemy. Apthorp was at once directed to turn the right of the rebel position, whilst the main body should threaten it in front. These orders were carried out to the letter. Apthorp's men had, however, no easy task. It was difficult to get at the rebels. One ravine carried, they were found in force in the next. There must have been much in the nature of the ground to screen human life, for though the fight lasted six hours, from 5 o'clock till noon, the casualties on the British side amounted only to thirty-nine, of whom four were officers. Several deeds of heroism were performed. The coolness of Apthorp was the admiration of everyone. Young Colbeck of the 3rd Europeans met a glorious death leading his men to the charge of the first nullah. Captain Macintire of the Haidarábád cavalry—which lost twenty killed and wounded—greatly distinguished himself, as did likewise Brigadier Miller, M.A., Sergeant-Major Alford of the same regiment, and Captain Clifton, 12th Lancers. At length the position was forced, and the nawáb fled, with two thousand followers, to Kálpi, leaving behind him seventeen guns, the town of Bandá, and a palace filled with property of great value. The rebel loss in the battle was variously estimated at from four to six hundred men. General Whitlock established his head-quarters in Bandá, to wait there till the remainder of his force should join him.

Gallantry of Apthorp, Colbeck, Macintire, Miller, Alford, and Clifton.

The nawáb is completely defeated.

The second brigade, under Brigadier McDuff, reached Jabalpúr on the 18th of March, and set out for Súgar on the 24th. In order, however, to prevent the mutineers from heading backwards

Whitlock is joined by McDuff's brigade.

Book XIV. Chapter II.

1858. May.

into the Mirzápúr district, Whitlock sent instructions to this brigade to change its course and to proceed to Nagód. McDuff, therefore, only reached Bandá on the 27th of May. He found Whitlock still halted there.

Whitlock, on being joined by McDuff's brigade, resolved to march to the assistance of Sir Hugh Rose at Kálpi, and had indicated the 29th as the day of departure on that errand. But Sir Hugh Rose, as we have seen, had completely defeated the rebels before Kálpi on the 23rd, and had entered that place on the 24th of May. Information of this reached Whitlock in time to change his plans regarding Kálpi.

In every particular Sir Hugh Rose had cleared the way for Whitlock.

The reader who has followed me through this and the preceding chapter will not have failed to see how, in every particular, the action of Sir Hugh Rose had cleared the way for the action of General Whitlock. It was Sir Hugh who at Garhákót and on the Bétwah, had disposed of the enemies with whom, but for that, Whitlock would have had to deal. The defeat of Tántia Topi on the Bétwah alone made it possible for Whitlock to march on Bandá. Yet—extraordinary perversity of Fortune!—whilst Sir Hugh and his force endured all the hardships of the campaign and did by far the most important part of the fighting, Whitlock and his little army, up to the time of the capture of Bandá, gained all the substantial advantages. The spoils of Bandá, which would not have been gained but for the action of Sir Hugh Rose, were allotted to Whitlock's force alone!

Perversity of fortune.

Book XII. Chapter II.

1858. May.

The same blind goddess, not content with one perverse distribution of her favours, now set about to perpetrate another. Whitlock had but just renounced his intention to march to the assistance of Sir Hugh Rose at Kálpi, when he received orders from Lord Canning to march against the Ráos of Kírwí.

Whitlock is ordered to march on Kírwí.

Kírwí, formerly better known as Tiróhan, is forty-five miles from Bandá and seventy from Allahábád. The two ráos, who lived there—Náráin Ráo and Madho Ráo—were descendants by adoption of the Péshwá Ragonáth Ráo. On the fall of the Péshwá's dynasty in 1818, Amrat Ráo of Tiróhan, a son of the Péshwá Ragonáth, had entered into an agreement with the British, under which a provision of seven lakhs a year was guaranteed to himself and his son. He selected Tiróhan (Kírwí) for his residence, and there an estate (jaghír) of four thousand six hundred and ninety-one rupees was conferred upon him. On the death of Amrat Ráo's son, Banaik Ráo, the pension of seven lakhs per annum ceased. Banaik Ráo left no natural heirs, but in accordance with the obligations imposed upon him by his religion, he had adopted two boys, Náráin Ráo and Madho Ráo. Though these lads succeeded to considerable accumulations of wealth, they regarded as a grievance the cessation of the pension, authorised though that cessation was by treaty, and these feelings were fostered by the courtiers who fattened upon them, especially by their dewán, Rádho Govind, a man of considerable ability and utter want of scruple. It is

Sketch of Kírwí.

The two ráos of Kírwí.

Their adviser, Rádho Govind, stimulates their dissatisfaction.

Book XIV. Chapter II. 1858. May.

scarcely to be wondered at, under these circumstances, that when the earlier occurrences of the mutiny in the vicinity of Bandalkhand seemed to presage the fall of the British and the resuscitation of the dynasty of the Péshwá, these young Maráthá nobles should have thrown themselves heart and soul into the cause of their relative, Náná Sáhib, and have joined him in his revolt against the British.

Causes which prompted the raos still to persist after Bandá had fallen.

Up to the third week of May 1858, the two young ráos had enjoyed blissful visions of a fortunate future. Kírwí was for a long time covered from attack by the nawáb of Bandá, and although Bandá fell on the 19th of April, the two ráos saw Whitlock halting at that place, they knew that Tántia Topi was at large, and they believed that Kálpi was impregnable, and would baffle even Sir Hugh Rose. It is true that they wrote to Sir Robert Hamilton, professing loyalty to the British and offering to surrender. But they did not surrender, and the intelligence which reached them shortly afterwards from Bandá, that Whitlock was about to march to join Sir Hugh, confirmed them in their disinclination to take that step.

On hearing that Whitlock is marching on Kálpi, they ride out and surrender.

But when the ráos heard that Sir Hugh, unaided by Whitlock, had taken Kálpi, and that a second brigade had joined Whitlock, they began to tremble. They trembled still more when they learned that, on the 2nd of June, Whitlock had left Bandá to march on their palace. At once their resolution was taken. Resistance they knew to be impossible. On learning, then, that Whit-

1858. June.

lock had reached Bharatkúp, ten miles from Kírwí, they rodé out and surrendered.

By this act the spoils of Kírwí devolve without Battle on Whitlock's Force.

Whitlock's march on Kirwi had been made possible by the annihilation of the forces of the nawáb of Bandá at Kálpi. That chieftain fled from Bandalkhand, never again, during the war, to reappear within its borders. In him the two ráos lost their only protector, the more important as under his orders had been serving many of their own retainers. Thus it was that once more Fortune had given to Sir Hugh Rose the toil, the exposure, the danger; to General Whitlock the bloodless conquest and the spoils of war!

Enormous amount of treasure found at Kírwí.

For Whitlock, moving from Bandá on the 2nd June,* entered Kírwí without opposition on the 3th, and found there alike proofs of the complicity of the ráos in the rebellion, and enormous treasure. In the palace-yard were more than forty pieces of cannon, of calibres between 18 and 3-pounders; an immense quantity of shot, shell, and powder; two thousand stand of arms with accoutrements complete; muskets and belts belonging to several regiments which had mutinied. The gun-foundries and powder-manufactories had been, up to two days prior to the surrender, working full tides. But in the palace itself was stored the wherewithal to compensate soldiers for many a hard fight and many a broiling sun, but in this case gained without a shot. In its vaults and strong-rooms were specie, jewels, and diamonds of priceless value!

* The very day on which, it will be seen, one of Sir Hugh's columns started to encounter more dangers at Gwáliár.

Book XIV. Chapter II.

1858. June.

The right to the booty subsequently framed before the High Court of Admiralty.

The question of the proprietary right in this booty, declared to be prize-money, was ultimately argued before the High Court of Admiralty. By this court the claim of Sir Hugh Rose's force to share in the prize, which had come into British possession mainly in consequence of his action, was rejected; the claims of the commanders of other co-operating but independent divisions and columns were rejected; the claims of the Commander-in-Chief in India and of his staff, who were hundreds of miles from the spot, and whose action did not influence the capture, and the claims of the officers and men of General Whitlock's force, were admitted to an exclusive right in the prize of Bandá and Kírwí.

Its decision.

After the capture of Kírwí, Whitlock's force was distributed so as to maintain order in the Bandalkhand and Jamná districts. A portion was sent to Kálpí on the requisition of Sir H. Rose; one was left at Kírwí, other portions were sent to Mohába, Jaláon, Bandá, Kirka, Ságar, Damoh, and Hamirpúr. The general's headquarters were fixed at Mahóba. Here we must leave him, to return to Tántia Topi and Sir Hugh Rose.

BOOK XIV.

CHAPTER III.

Movements of Tántia Topi, the ráni of Jhánsi, and Ráo Sáhib after the fall of Kálpi.

It has already been related that Tántia Topi, after his defeat at Kúnch, had fled to Chirki—about four miles from Jaláor—where his parents resided. He remained there during Sir Hugh Rose's march to Kálpi, and the events which led to the capture of that place. Learning that Ráo Sáhib and the ráni of Jhánsi had fled, after their defeat at Galáoli, towards Gopálpúr, forty-six miles south-west of Gwáliár, Tántia girded up his loins and joined them at that place.

Desperate condition of their affairs.

Their affairs seemed desperate. Not only had they lost their hold on central India, on the Ságar and Narbadá territories and on Bandalkhand, but their enemies were closing in on every side; Roberts had already detached from Rajpútáná a brigade under Colonel Smith to co-operate with Sir Hugh Rose; the force under that officer was at Kálpi, about to be distributed n the territories west of the Jamná; Whitlock,

Book XIV. Chapter III. 1858. May.

having conquered Bandá, had Kírwí at his mercy. On three sides, then, on the south, the east, and the west, they were encompassed by foes. Nor towards the north did the prospect look brighter. There lay the capital of Maharájá Sindia, overlooked by a wall-girt and almost inaccessible rock. Sindia was not less their enemy than were the British. In the darkest hour of their fortunes, at a time when hostility seemed to promise him empire, Sindia had remained faithful to his suzerain. It was not to be thought of, nor was it thought possible, that in the mid-day of their triumph he would turn against them.

Surrounded by enemies.

Desperate remedy suggested,

The situation then seemed desperate to the rebel chieftains. But desperate situations suggest desperate remedies; and a remedy which, on first inspection, might well seem desperate, did occur to the fertile brain of one of the confederates. To which one it is not certainly known. But, judging the leading group of conspirators by their antecedents—Ráo Sáhib, the nawáb of Bandá, Tántia Topi, and the ráni of Jhánsi—we may at once dismiss the two first from consideration. They possessed neither the character nor the genius to conceive a plan so vast and so daring. Of the two who remain, we may dismiss Tántia Topi. Not that he was incapable of forming the design, but—we have his memoirs—and in those he takes to himself no credit for the most successful act with which his career is associated. The fourth conspirator possessed the genius, the daring, the despair necessary for the conception of great deeds. She was urged on by hatred, by

probably by the ráni of Jhánsi.

desire of vengeance, by a blood-stained conscience, by a determination to strike hard whilst there was yet a chance. She could recognise the possibilities before her, she could hope even that if the first blow were successful the fortunes of the campaign might be changed; she possessed and exercised unbounded influence over one, at least, of her companions—the Ráo Sáhib. The conjecture, then, almost amounts to certainty that the desperate remedy which the confederates decided to execute at Gopálpúr was suggested and pressed upon her comrades by the daring ráni of Jhánsi.

Book IV. Chapter I. 1858. May.

Her plan.

The plan was this. To march on Gwáliár by forced marches, appeal to the religious and national feeling of Sindia's troops, take possession of his capital, by force if it were necessary, and, gaining over his army, bid defiance to the British from the precipitous rock of the Gwáliár fortress!

The confederates accept it, and march on Gwáliár.

The scheme was no sooner accepted than acted upon. Emissaries proceeded in advance of the column to tamper with and, if possible, to gain over Sindia's troops; the column followed more leisurely, yet with a celerity adapted to the occasion, and reached the Morar cantonment, formerly occupied by the contingent, in close vicinity to Gwáliár, during the night of the 30th of May.

Mahárájá Sindia.

Mahárájá Sindia was informed that night of the arrival of his dangerous visitors. Probably no prince had ever been placed in circumstances of stronger temptation than was Jaiaji Ráo Sindia during 1857–58. The descendant by adoption and the representative of the family of the famous

Mádháji Ráo Sindia, of the Dáolat Ráo Sindia who had fought for the possession of India with the two Wellesleys, he was still the most considerable chief of the Maráthá race; and his word, if spoken for religion and race, would have found a response all over central and western India. For four months he had probably the fate of India in his hands. Had he revolted in June, the siege of Dehlí must have been raised, Ágra and Lakhnáo would have fallen; it is more than probable that the Panjáb would have risen. That, under such circumstances, possessing strong military instincts and chafing under a great ambition, Sindia should have remained loyal, is most weighty testimony to the character of the English overlordship, and to its appreciation by the princes of India. That Sindia was greatly influenced in the course he followed by his shrewd minister, rájá Dinkar Ráo, and by the appeals from the fort of A'gra of the able British representative at his court, Major Charters Macpherson, may be admitted. But neither Sindia nor Dinkar Ráo liked the English personally. Both the one and the other would have preferred an independent Gwáliár. But though they did not like the English personally, they had great respect for the English character. Recollecting the state of north-western and central and western India prior to the rule of Marquess Wellesley, they could feel, under the English overlordship, a sense of security such as their fathers and their fathers' fathers had never possessed. They had, at least, secure possession of their holdings. No one from outside would venture to molest

them as their ancestors had been molested. The question, then, would rise—and it was in answering this that the influence of Major Charters Macpherson came most beneficially into play—"Granting that, by joining the mutineers, we could confine the English to Bengal, would Gwáliár gain by their expulsion? It is doubtful: there would be many competitors for supremacy, and—who knows? The King of Dehlí might, with the aid of the sepoys, become supreme, or the Sikhs of the Panjáb, or Náná Sáhib, or perhaps even Holkar! The risk is too great, for, adhering to the English, we shall be safe in the end."

In some such manner reasoned Sindia and Dinkar Ráo. They argued the question in the light of the interests of Sindia, and in that light, held ever before them by the steady hand of Charters Macpherson, they cast in their lot with the British.

The same reasons do not affect the bulk of the Maráthá people.

But not in this manner reasoned many of the great families of Gwáliár, the bulk of the army and of the people. These men could recognise only what was passing before their eyes. They never attempted even to open the book of the future. They could only see, in 1857, the British power struck down, and an opportunity offering itself to their master such as the great Mádháji would have given half his years to have had a glimpse of. They could not understand Sindia's inaction, his attempts to befriend the British in the hour of their adversity. They sympathised with the men of his contingent when they revolted and

Book XIV. Chapter LII. 1858. May.

murdered their officers. The higher and more influential amongst them assailed Sindia with persuasions and entreaties; and when they found these fail, they began even to talk of dethroning him and setting up another mahárájá in his place.

Who, in consequence, fear their discontent on Sindia.

The fall of Delhi, the British successes in Lakhnao and in north-western and central India, had by no means changed these sentiments. The irritation caused by lost opportunities had produced a state of mind eager to grasp at any chance to mend the situation or to be rid of it.

Sindia hears of Tántia Topi's arrival at Morár.

Such was the state of general feeling in Gwáliár when, on the night of the 30th of May, information was brought to the mahárájá that Tántia Topi, the ráni of Jhánsi, and other chieftains, with a force estimated at seven thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and twelve guns, had reached Morár. No one knew better the general state of feeling about him than the mahárájá. But he never wavered. The conviction of the ultimate triumph of the English was never stronger within him than at this apparently inauspicious moment, and, notwithstanding the ill-concealed hostility of many of his adherents, he determined to seize the offered opportunity and do battle with the rebels.

And resolves to do battle with him.

He marches to meet Tántia.

Accordingly, at daybreak on the 1st of June, he marched out and took up a position about two miles to the eastward of Morár. He had with him six thousand infantry, about one thousand five hundred cavalry, his own bodyguard six hundred strong, and eight guns. These he ranged

in three divisions, his guns in the centre, and waited for the attack. About 7 o'clock in the morning the rebels advanced, covered by mounted skirmishers, with camels carrying guns of small calibre. As they approached, Sindia's eight guns opened on them. But the smoke of the discharge had scarcely disappeared when the rebel skirmishers closed to their flanks, and two thousand horsemen, charging at a gallop, carried the guns. Simultaneously with their charge, Sindia's infantry and cavalry, his bodyguard alone excepted, either joined the rebels or took up a position indicative of their intention not to fight. The rebel cavalry, pushing their advantage, then attacked the bodyguard, with which was Sindia himself. A portion of the guardsmen defended themselves with great gallantry, and did not cease to fight till many of their number had fallen. It becoming more and more apparent that it was useless to continue the unequal contest, Sindia turned and fled, accompanied by a very few of the survivors. He did not draw rein till he reached Ágra.

is completely defeated,

and flees to Ágra.

The first part of the ráni's bold plan had thus succeeded. She and her confederates delayed not a moment to carry it out to its legitimate consequences. They entered Gwáliár, took possession of the fortress, the treasury, the arsenal, and the town, and began at once to form a regular government. Náná Sáhib was proclaimed as Péshwá, and Ráo Sáhib as governor of Gwáliár. Plentiful largesses were distributed to the army, alike to the Gwáliár troops as to those who had come

The rebels enter Gwáliár,

and form a government there,

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and prepare to hold the place and the surrounding territories.

from Kálpi. Rám Ráo Govind, one of Sindia's disgraced courtiers, was appointed prime minister. The royal property was declared confiscated. Four Maráthá chiefs, who had been imprisoned by Sindia for rebellion, were released, clothed with dresses of honour, and sent into the districts to raise troops to oppose the British in any attempts they might make to cross the Chambal. The command of the bulk of the troops, encamped outside the city, was entrusted to the ráni of Jhánsi. Those within the town obeyed the orders of Tántia Topi. Letters were at once despatched to the rebel rájás still in the district, notably to the rájás of Bánpúr and Sháhgarh, to join at Gwáliár.

The story returns to Sir Hugh Rose.

The intelligence of the success of this audacious enterprise reached Kálpi on the 3rd of June. Before I refer to the action taken by Sir Hugh Rose, it is necessary that I should state the exact positions of the various portions of the force with which he had conquered Kálpi on the 24th of May.

His action after the defeat of the rebels at Kálpi.

As soon as, by the occupation of Kálpi on the 24th of May, Sir Hugh Rose had discovered the flight of the rebels, he sent out parties to discover the line they had taken. Information was soon brought to him that whilst a few had crossed the Jamná into the Doáb, whilst a few more had been checked in attempting the same course by Colonel Riddell,* the main body had kept their

* Colonel Riddell, who was moving down the north bank of the Jamná with the 3rd Bengal Europeans, Alexander's horse, and two guns, caught sight of a body of the rebels escaping from Kálpi, a few miles above that place, on the

steps in almost a south-westerly direction to Gopálpúr. To pursue these latter he at once organised a column composed of the 25th Bombay native infantry, the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, and one hundred and fifty Haidarábád cavalry, and despatched it, under the command of Colonel Robertson, on the track of the rebels.

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Robertson pushes on in pursuit of the rebels.

Robertson set out from Kálpi on the 25th of May, the rain falling heavily. This rain, which continued throughout that day and the day following, much impeded his progress. He pushed on, however, as fast as possible, and traversing Mahona and Indúrki, found that the rebels were but little in advance of him. At Iráwan, reached on the 29th, supplies ran short, and as none were procurable in the district, the column had to wait till they could be sent up from Kálpi. On the 2nd of June, Robertson received these and was joined by two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, a wing of the 86th foot, and four 9-pounders. The following day he reached Mohárar, fifty-five miles from Gwáliár. Here he was startled by information of the attack made by the rebels on Gwáliár and of its result.

south bank of the river, on the 25th of May. He instantly sent the 3rd Europeans across, who captured their camp equipage, the enemy not waiting to receive them. Colonel Riddell's force had previously had several skirmishes with detached parties of insurgents. A small party of his troops had proceeded to Kálpi in boats, joining there Sir Hugh Rose. On their way they were threatened by a numerous body of rebels near Bhijalpúr. Lieutenant Sherriff, who commanded the party, had at once landed 150 men, defeated the rebels, and captured four guns.

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Sir Hugh learns that the rebels are moving on Gwáliár, and at once despatches Stuart's brigade in that direction.

An express from Robertson, sent from Irawan, and which reached Kálpi on the 1st of June, gave Sir Hugh the first information that the rebels had taken the road to Gwáliár. Instantly Sir Hugh despatched General Stuart with the remainder of his brigade, consisting of the other wing of the 86th foot, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, four companies of the 25th Bengal native infantry, one squadron 14th light dragoons, No. 4 light field battery, two 18-pounders, one 8-inch howitzer, and some sappers, to join Robertson, and to march on Gwáliár. Stuart reached Attakóna on the 3rd—the day on which Robertson had reached Mohárar—and there he too received the first information of the startling occurrences at Gwáliár.

No one dreamt that the daring of the rebels could be successful.

The order which had sent Stuart to Gwáliár was dictated by a sound military instinct. But no one, not even Sir Hugh Rose, had imagined the height of daring to which the ráni of Jhánsi would carry her audacious plans. The rebels might march on Gwáliár, but no one believed they would carry it by a *coup-de-main*. It seemed more likely that they were marching into a trap, to be kept there till Stuart's force should fall on their rear.

The effect of the success upon Sir Hugh Rose.

How the impossible happened has been told. The information of it reached Sir Hugh on the 4th of June, after he had resigned his command and applied for leave on medical certificate. In a moment he realised the full danger of the situation. Gwáliár had fallen into the hands of the

rebels at the time of year most unfavourable for military operations. Another week, and the monsoon rains would render the black soil untraversable by guns, and would swell the rivers. Under those circumstances, the transport of siege-guns, in the absence of pontoons, which Sir Hugh did not possess, would be most difficult if not impossible. He realised, moreover, the great danger which would inevitably be caused by delay. No one could foresee the extent of evil possible if Gwáliár were not promptly wrested from rebel hands. Grant them delay, and Tántia Topi, with the immense acquisition of political and military strength secured by the possession of Gwáliár, and with all its resources in men, money, and material at his disposal, would be able to form a new army on the ruins of that beaten at Kálpi, and to provoke a Maráthá rising throughout India. It might be possible for him, using the dexterity of which he was a master, to unfurl the Peshwá's banner in the southern Maráthá districts. Those districts were denuded of troops, and a striking success in central India would probably decide their inhabitants to pronounce in favour of the cause for which their fathers had fought and bled.

He realises the enormous issues at stake.

Thus reasoning, Sir Hugh considered, and rightly considered, that the time for ceremony had passed. He at once resumed the command which he had laid down,* and leaving a small garrison

He resumes his command.

* It is said that for this breach of red tape rules Sir Hugh was severely reprimanded by Sir C. Campbell. Undoubtedly strict routine required the previous sanc-

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at Kálpi, set out on the 5th of June with a small force* to overtake Stuart's column.

Head sets out for Gwáliár.

With a view to aid Sir Hugh in his operations against Gwáliár, the Commander-in-Chief placed at his disposal, by telegraph, Colonel Riddell's column previously referred to, and Brigadier Smith's brigade of the Rájpútáná field force. The only other troops of which it was possible for Sir Hugh to avail himself, were those composing the small garrison of Jhánsi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hicks of the artillery; and the Haidarábád contingent, commanded by Major Orr.

The Commander-in-Chief places these columns at Sir Hugh's disposal.

Noble conduct of the Haidarábád contingent.

The Haidarábád contingent, after their hard and splendid service, had received orders to return home. They had already started; many of them, indeed, were far advanced on their road. But the moment the intelligence of the events passing at Gwáliár reached them, they one and all expressed their earnest desire to take part in the operations of their old commander.

Sir Hugh's plan of operations against Gwáliár.

Whilst Sir Hugh Rose himself proceeded by forced marches to join Stuart, he directed Major Orr to move to Paniar, on the road between Sipri and Gwáliár, to cut off the retreat of the rebels to the south; and Brigadier Smith, who was near Chandairi, to march with his brigade direct to Kotah-ki-serai, about five miles to the south-east of Gwáliár. To Colonel Riddell,

tion of the Commander-in-Chief. But there are circumstances which require that strict routine must be laid aside; and this was one of them.

* 1st troop Bombay horse artillery; one squadron 14th light dragoons; one squadron 3rd Bombay light cavalry; Madras sappers and miners.

escorting a large supply of siege-guns, he sent instructions to move with his column by the Ágra and Gwáliár road. He hoped that all the column of operations would be at their posts by the 19th of June.

Sir Hugh overtakes Stuart and reaches Morár;

Setting out, as I have said, on the 6th of June, and making forced marches in spite of a heat which occasionally rose to one hundred and thirty degrees in the shade, Sir Hugh overtook Stuart at Indúrki on the 12th, and still pushing on, reached Bahádurpúr, five miles to the east of the Morár cantonments on the 16th. There he was joined by Brigadier-General Robert Napier, whom we last heard of at the storm of Lakhnao, and who at once assumed command of the 2nd brigade.*

is joined by General Napier;

Sir Hugh had reached Bahádurpúr at 6 o'clock in the morning of the 16th of June. He at once directed Captain Abbott with his Haidarábád cavalry to reconnoitre Morár. On receiving Abbott's report that the rebels were in force in front of it, Sir Hugh galloped forward himself to examine the position. He noticed that the side of the cantonments fronting the British position was occupied by strong bodies of cavalry, flanked to the right by guns, supported by infantry in considerable numbers.

reconnoitres the rebel position.

The position offered strong temptations to a commander who knew the value of time and promptitude in war, and who considered that

Reasons which decided him to attack.

* Only a small portion of the bulk of it having been this brigade was present; left at Kálpi.

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minor difficulties must give way when a chance should present itself of overcoming a great obstacle. The effect produced on Sir Hugh Rose by his examination of the position of the rebels before Morar, I shall tell in his own words.

Told in his own words.

"My force had had a long and fatiguing march, and the sun had been up for some time. Four or five miles' more march in the sun, and a combat afterwards, would be a great trial for the men's strength. On the other hand, Morar looked inviting with several good buildings not yet burnt; they would be good quarters for a portion of the force; if I delayed the attack until the next day, the enemy were sure to burn them. A prompt attack has always more effect on the rebels than a procrastinated one. I, therefore, countermanded the order for encamping and made the following arrangements to attack the enemy." *

The battle of Morar.

He attacked them accordingly. Placing his cavalry and guns on his flanks, and the infantry in the centre, he took ground to the right, the 86th leading the way, with the view of coming upon the road leading to cantonments, and the occupation of which would have turned the left of the rebels. Sindia's agent, however, who had promised to lead the troops to this road, lost his way, and Rose found himself in front of a masked battery in the enemy's centre. This at once opened upon the assailants, and its fire was rapidly

The guide loses his way,

and the army marches on the wrong road;

* Despatch of Sir Hugh Rose dated the 13th of October 1858.

followed by a musketry and artillery fire from both sides of it. Sir Hugh answered with his guns, at the same time pushing forward his infantry to gain the required turning position on the right. This once gained, he formed to the front, and, reinforcing his left, which bore for a moment the whole weight of the enemy, pushed forward. The advance was decisive. The enemy limbered up and gave way on all sides. The gallant Abbott with his Haidarábád men had, meanwhile, galloped across the nullahs, further to the right, and dashing through the cantonments at a more northerly point, endeavoured to cut off the retreat of the rebels. But the broken ground he had had to traverse had enabled these to take their guns across the stone bridge which spans the river at the back of the cantonment on the road to the city. The main body of the enemy, driven through the cantonments, fell back on a dry nullah with high banks, running round a village, which they had also occupied. Here they maintained a desperate hand-to-hand struggle with the British. The 71st Highlanders suffered severely, Lieutenant Neave, whilst leading them, falling mortally wounded; nor was it till the nullah was nearly choked with dead that the village was carried. On this occasion Lieutenant Rose of the 25th Bombay native infantry greatly distinguished himself. The victory was completed by a successful pursuit of the rebels by Captain Thompson, 14th light dragoons, with a wing of his regiment. The wing of the rebel force which he destroyed

but, by a masterly movement, gains a firm position.

The rebels fall back,

and continue the contest in a village,

which is at length carried;

and the victory is completed by a successful pursuit of the rebels.

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had been turned by Abbott's advance already spoken of; Thompson, following them up, caught them in the plains and made a great slaughter of them. The guns were splendidly commanded during the day by Strutt, always to the front, and by Lightfoot.

Result of the battle.

The result, then, had justified Sir Hugh's daring. Not only had he dealt a heavy blow to the rebels, but he had gained a most important strategical point.

Brigadier Smith advances from the south-east.

Sir Hugh Rose's success was speedily followed by an exploit on the part of Brigadier Smith, fruitful in important consequences. That gallant soldier, coming up from the south-east, had to make his way through the difficult and hilly ground on that side of Gwáliár before he could reach Kotah-ki-serai. Picking up on his way the small field-force from Jhánsi, he reached Antri, with his brigade,* on the 14th of June, and was joined there the following day by Major Orr and his Haidarábád men. Under orders from Sir Hugh Rose, Smith marched from Antri early on the morning of the 17th of June, and reached Kotah-ki-serai, five miles to the south-east of Gwáliár, at half-past 7 o'clock that morning.

and reaches Kotah-ki-serai;

Smith had met no opposition in marching into Kotah-ki-serai, but on reaching that place he observed masses of the enemy's horse and foot

discovers the rebels massed between him and Gwáliár.

* The brigade was thus composed: a wing 8th hussars, a wing Bombay lancers, H. M.'s 95th foot, the 10th Bombay native infantry, and a troop of Bombay horse artillery.

occupying the hilly ground between himself and Gwáliár. As these masses showed a strong disposition to attack him, and as, hampered with a large quantity of baggage, Smith did not regard his position as a very secure one, he determined to take the initiative. Reconnoitring the ground in front of him, he found it very difficult, intersected with nullahs and impracticable for cavalry. He discovered, moreover, that the enemy's guns were in position about one thousand five hundred yards from Kotah-ki-serai, and that their line lay under the hills, crossing the road to Gwáliár. Notwithstanding this, Smith determined to attack. First, he sent his horse artillery to the front, and silenced the enemy's guns, which limbered up and retired. This accomplished, Smith sent his infantry across the broken ground, led by Raines of the 95th. Raines led his men, covered by skirmishers, to a point about fifty yards from the enemy's works, when the skirmishers made a rush—the rebels falling back as they did so. Raines then found himself stopped by a deep ditch with four feet of water, and having banks so steep that it was with difficulty the men could cross in single file. The rebels took advantage of the delay thus caused to move off with their guns and to retire up the ravines and across the hills. Raines found them so retiring when, after surmounting the difficulty I have recorded, he gained the abandoned intrenchment. Whilst he was continuing his advance across the broken and hilly ground, Smith moved his cavalry across the river Umrah, close to Kotah-ki-serai. They

Difficult nature of the ground before him;

he nevertheless resolves to attack.

Raines leads the infantry to the front,

and, after overcoming many obstacles,

gains the intrenchments abandoned by the enemy.

Meanwhile Smith moves forward the cavalry.

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had hardly crossed when they came under fire of a battery which till then had escaped notice. At the same time a body of the enemy threatened the baggage at Kotah-ki-serai. Matters now became serious. But Smith sent back detachments to defend the baggage and rear, and pushed forward. The road, before debouching from the hills between his position and Gwáliár, ran for several hundred yards through a defile along which a canal had been excavated. It was while his troops were marching through this defile that the principal fighting took place. Having gained the further end of the defile, where he joined Raines, Smith halted the infantry to guard it, and ordered a cavalry charge. This was most gallantly executed by a squadron of the 8th hussars, led by Colonel Hicks and Captain Heneage. The rebels, horse and foot, gave way before them. The hussars captured two guns, and continuing the pursuit through Sindia's cantonment, had for a moment the rebel camp in their possession.

Serious nature of the action.

Smith is victorious.

and drives the rebels before him.

Amongst the fugitives in the rebel ranks was the resolute woman who, alike in council and on the field, was the soul of the conspirators. Clad in the attire of a man and mounted on horseback, the ráni of Jhánsi might have been seen animating her troops throughout the day. When inch by inch the British troops pressed through the pass, and when reaching its summit Smith ordered the hussars to charge, the ráni of Jhánsi boldly fronted the British horsemen.

Death of the Ráni of Jhánsi.

When her comrades failed her, her horse, in spite of her efforts, carried her along with the others. With them she might have escaped but that her horse, crossing the canal near the cantonment, stumbled and fell. A hussar, close upon her track, ignorant of her sex and her rank, cut her down. She fell to rise no more. That night her devoted followers, determined that the English should not boast that they had captured her even dead, burned the body.

Thus died the ráni of Jhánsi. My opinion of her has been recorded in a preceding page. Whatever her faults in British eyes may have been, her countrymen will ever remember that she was driven by ill-treatment into rebellion, and that she lived and died for her country.*

Smith falls back for the night on the head of the defile.

The charge of the 8th hussars was the last effort of Smith's force. "Upon the return of the squadron, the officers and men were so completely exhausted and prostrated from heat, fatigue, and great exertion, that they could scarcely sit in their saddles, and were, for the moment, incapable of further exertion."† But the enemy, recovering, were again threatening. Smith then determined to content himself with holding the defile, the road, and adjoining hills for the night. He drew back his cavalry accordingly, and brought up his baggage. The enemy held their ground on the heights on the other side of the canal.

* *Vide* pages 158, 204–5 of this volume, and pages 181–82 of volume i.

† Brigadier Smith's report.

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Dangerous nature of his position.

Sir Hugh reinforces him.

The position taken up by Brigadier Smith was still far from satisfactory. It left his left and rear threatened, his baggage within range of the enemy's guns, and his whole force cramped. Sir Hugh, on receiving an account of the action, with characteristic promptitude, despatched Colonel Robertson, with the 25th Bombay native infantry, three troops 14th light dragoons, and four guns, to reinforce him.

The 2nd brigade joins Sir Hugh, who resolves to "finish with the rebels."

The next day Sir Hugh was reinforced and his 2nd brigade brought to its full strength by the arrival of the Kálpi garrison. This arrival left him free to act.

Harassing nature of his march.

He opens communications with Smith.

Leaving Napier in Morar with the troops he could spare,* he marched in the afternoon with the rest of the force to join Smith. The distance was long, the heat terrible, the march harassing in the extreme. No less than a hundred men of the 86th were struck down by the sun.† Nevertheless, Sir Hugh pushed on, and bivouacked for the night on the rocky ground between the river and Smith's position.

* These were—One troop Bombay horse artillery, three troops 14th light dragoons, three troops 3rd Bombay light cavalry, fifty men 1st Haidarábád cavalry, 3rd Haidarábád cavalry, two squadrons Meade's horse, 21st company Royal Engineers, wing 3rd Bombay Europeans, four companies 24th Bombay native infantry, three guns Haidarábád artillery.

† Of these men, Sir Hugh reports that they "were compelled by sun-sickness to fall out, and go into dhoolies. These same men, the next day, mindful of their illness, fell in with their companies, and took part in the assault of Gwáliár." These men, be it remembered, formed part of the unreformed British army, an army never equalled by any other in the world.

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The first thing that struck Sir Hugh on reconnoitring the following morning was the possibility of cutting off the main body of the enemy from Gwáliár by forcing their left; the next, the extremely cramped and dangerous nature of his own position. The rebels, too, showed every indication that they intended an attack, for with the early dawn they began a heavy fire from their guns, whilst masses of their infantry were seen moving to positions from which they could manœuvre with advantage against the British position. On the principle, then, that an attack is the best defence, Sir Hugh resolved to become the assailant.

Resolves to anticipate the rebels' attack and to cut them off from Gwáliár.

The rebels, as we have seen, were occupying the heights separated by the canal from those gained by Brigadier Smith. That they meant to attack was evident. They spent the early hours of the morning in strengthening their right with the view of attacking the weakest point of the British line, the left. Soon an express arrived from Sir Robert Hamilton to say that he had received certain information that an attack was intended that day. There was no time for further consideration. Sir Hugh then directed Brigadier Stuart to move with the 86th regiment, supported by the 25th Bombay native infantry, across the canal, to crown the heights on the other side of it, and to attack the left flank of the rebels. As a diversion in favour of this attack he sent Colonel Raines with the 95th regiment from his right front, across the canal in skirmishing order over the shoulder of

Sir Hugh sends Stuart to turn the left of the rebels,

whilst Raines makes a diversion.

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the hill on which the rebels had intrenched some guns. This movement was supported by the 10th Bombay native infantry. Sir Hugh at the same time ordered up the 3rd troop Bombay horse artillery, supported by a squadron of the 8th hussars, to the entrance of the pass towards Gwáliár. The remainder of the force he disposed in support of the attacking columns and for the defence of the camp from the rear.

Stuart's attack.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lowth led the 86th, in accordance with the orders he received, against the left of the rebels. These fell back rapidly on the battery; while the 86th pressed them so hard that they made no stand even under their guns. The 86th gave them no time to rally, but dashing with a cheer at the parapet, crossed it, and took the guns which defended the ridge, three excellent English 9-pounders. Leaving a party with these guns, they pushed on after the fleeing enemy.

succeeds.

Three guns are captured.

which Raines turns on the enemy.

Almost immediately afterwards Raines, advancing with the 95th, came upon the captured guns. Noticing the enemy's cavalry and infantry in detached parties in the plain below at a distance of about a thousand yards, he turned the guns on them and made excellent practice. Meanwhile the 10th Bombay native infantry, led by Lieutenant Roome, moving up in support of the 95th, and protecting the right of the assailing force, found itself exposed to a fire of musketry and artillery from the heights on the enemy's extreme left. Roome was equal to the occasion.

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Wheeling to the right, he advanced with half his regiment in skirmishing order, the other half in support, cleared the two nearest heights of rebel infantry, and captured two brass field-pieces and three mortars which were in the plain below.

Gwáliár lies at the feet of the British.

The day was now won, the heights were gained: Gwáliár lay, as it were, at the feet of the British. "The sight," writes Sir Hugh, "was interesting. To our right was the handsome palace of the Phúl Bágh with its gardens, and the old city, surmounted by the fort, remarkable for its ancient architecture, with lines of extensive fortifications round the high and precipitous rock of Gwáliár. To our left lay the Lashkar or new city, with its spacious houses half hidden by trees." In the plain between the heights and the city was a great portion of the rebel forces, just driven from the heights, and now, under the influence of panic, endeavouring to seek a refuge in one or other of the walled enclosures or fortified places towards which they were moving.

Sir Hugh resolves to occupy the city at once.

The sight of these men at once suggested to Sir Hugh that it would be possible to complete his work that day. "I felt convinced," he wrote in his despatch, "that I could take Gwáliár before sunset."

Orders a general advance.

He at once, then, ordered a general advance. Covering his extreme right with the 3rd troop Bombay horse artillery and a troop of the 8th hussars, he ordered Colonel Owen, with the 1st Bombay lancers, to descend the heights to the rear, make his way into the road which led

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through the hills to the south, and thence attack the grand parade and the new city. Covering his advance, then, with No. 4 light field-battery, and two troops 14th light dragoons, he moved forward his infantry from the left, the 86th leading from that flank, the 95th forming the right.

The British entry the Lashkar.

This prompt advance completely paralysed the rebels. Their guns, indeed, opened fire, but the main object of their infantry seemed to be to escape. The British infantry were approaching the plain, when Owen's lancers, who had gained the point indicated, charged across the grand parade, and, carried away by their ardour, followed the rebels into the Lashkar. In this charge a gallant officer, Lieutenant Mills, was shot through the heart. Raines followed up this charge with a dash on to the parade-ground with two companies of the 95th, and took two 18-pounders and two small pieces. The British line pushing on, the rebels retreated through the town. Before sunset, as Sir Hugh had divined, the Lashkar or new city was completely in his possession. That night, too, Sir Hugh rested in the regained palace of Sindia.

Smith takes the palace at Phúl Bágh.

Meanwhile Brigadier Smith had taken the garden palace, the Phúl Bágh, killing great numbers of the rebels. He then, in pursuance of orders, followed up the retreating enemy, and continued the pursuit long after dark, inflicting great loss on them, and capturing most of their guns.

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As soon as it was clear the day was won, Sir Hugh sent an express to General Robert Napier, directing him to pursue the rebels as far and as closely as he could. How this order was carried out I shall have to relate presently.

Sir Hugh sends an express to Napier to pursue,

The Lashkar and palace occupied, Sir Hugh, ever careful even of the vanquished, made arrangements for the security of the city. This task he found comparatively easy, for the shopkeeping class has always been on the side of its best paymaster, the British.

and then arranges for the security of the city.

Thus, on the night of the 19th of June, Sir Hugh had, with a loss of eighty-seven men killed and wounded, regained all Gwáliár, the formidable fortress alone excepted. But the exception was a grave one. The rock fortress, completely isolated, having a length of a mile and a half, and a breadth at its broadest part of three hundred yards, its face presenting a perpendicular precipice, might, if well defended, still give some trouble. The guns from its ramparts had maintained, during the operations of the 19th, a continuous, though not very effective, fire on the British troops. The fire recommenced on the morning of the 20th. It was then, early on that morning, that two officers of the Indian army and their Bombay sepoys performed a deed of unsurpassed daring.

The rock fortress defies him.

On the morning of the 20th Lieutenant Rose, 25th Bombay native infantry, was in command with a detachment of his regiment of the kotwáli,

Daring feat of Lieutenants Rose and Waller.

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or police-station, not far from the main gateway of the rock-fort. As the guns from its ramparts continued to fire, Rose proposed to a brother officer, Lieutenant Waller, who commanded a small party of the same regiment near him, that they should attempt to capture the fortress with their joint parties; urging that if the risk was great, the honour would be still greater. Waller cheerfully assented, and the two officers set off with their men and a blacksmith, whom, not unwilling, they had engaged for the service. They crept up to the first gateway unseen. Then the blacksmith, a powerful man, forced it open; and so with the other five gates that opposed their progress. By the time the sixth gate had been forced the alarm was given, and when the assailants reached the archway beyond the last gate, they were met by the fire of a gun which had been brought to bear on them. Dashing onwards, unscathed by the fire, they were speedily engaged in a hand-to-hand contest with the garrison. The fight was desperate, and many men fell on both sides. The gallantry of Rose and Waller and their men carried all before them. Rose especially distinguished himself. Just in the hour of victory, however, as he was inciting his men to make the final charge, which proved successful, a musket was fired at him from behind the wall. The man who had fired the shot, a mutineer from Bareli, then rushed out and cut him across the knee and wrist with a sword. Waller came up, and despatched the rebel; too late, however, to

Who, with a small following,

attempt to storm the fortress,

and succeed.

The success is dimmed by the death of Rose.

save his friend.* But the rock fortress was gained.

I have said that when Sir Hugh saw that success was certain, he sent a despatch to Brigadier-General Robert Napier requesting him to pursue the rebels as far and as closely as he could.

Napier, receiving Sir Hugh's order to pursue,

Napier started on this service at half-past 5 o'clock on the morning of the 20th, with about five hundred and sixty cavalry, of whom sixty were dragoons, and Lightfoot's battery of artillery, and pursuing the rebels rapidly, came up with them, at least four thousand strong, at Jáora-Alipúr, on the 22nd. Napier, reconnoitring, found them strongly posted, their right resting on Alipúr, guns and infantry in the centre, and cavalry on both flanks; but he resolved to attack them.

pursues, and finds the rebels at Jáora-Alipúr.

Finding the ground to his right open, Napier directed Captain Lightfoot to take up a position on the left flank of the enemy, about six hun-

* Sir Hugh Rose, in his despatch, thus alludes to this officer: "But the gallant leader, Lieutenant Rose, who has been twice specially mentioned by me for good and gallant conduct, fell in the fort, mortally wounded, closing his early career by taking the fort of Gwáliár by force of arms."

His brigadier, Brigadier G. S. Stuart, thus referred to him in his brigade orders: "Brigadier Stuart has received with the deepest regret, a report of the death of Lieutenant Rose, 25th Bombay native infantry, who was mortally wounded yesterday, on entering the fort of Gwáliár, on duty with his men. The brigadier feels assured that the whole brigade unite with him in deploring the early death of this gallant officer, whose many sterling qualities none who knew him could fail to appreciate."

Chos. XIV. Chapter III.

1858. June. His guns take their line.

dred yards from them, and to enfilade them. He then ranged his cavalry behind a rising ground, which afforded partial concealment, ready to act as soon as the fire from Lightfoot's guns should be felt.

The fire causes them to waver,

This soon happened. After a few discharges, a rapid thinning and wavering of the rebels' ranks took place. Lightfoot then limbered up and advanced at a gallop, whilst the 14th dragoons, led by Prettijohn, and the Haidarábád cavalry, by Abbott, dashed into their ranks.

and, when charged, break and flee.

The result was decisive. Prettijohn's distinguished valour and Abbott's gallant leading were especially conspicuous. The dash of Lightfoot's horse artillery was superb to look at. "You cannot imagine," writes an eye-witness, a cavalry officer, "the dash of the artillery: it was wonderful. We could scarcely keep up with them." But, in fact, every man behaved like a hero: each vied with his comrade. After a brief resistance the rebels broke and fled, hotly pursued. They lost twenty-five guns, all their ammunition, elephants, tents, carts, and baggage, and had three to four hundred men killed. Never was a rout more complete.*

Close of the campaign.

The capture of Gwáliár and the dispersion of the rebel army closed the campaign which will for ever be associated with the name of Sir Hugh

* Tántia Topi, who was present on this occasion, thus describes the affair: "We reached Jáora Alípúr and remained there during the night. The next morning we were attacked and fought for an hour and a half. We fired five shots and the English army fired four shots, and we then ran off, leaving all our guns."



Rose. In a previous chapter I have alluded to the personal character, strong and firm as iron and yet singularly sympathetic, which had chained success to all the incidents of that most eventful campaign. I may be pardoned if I briefly recapitulate here all that had been accomplished in a period falling somewhat short of six months. On the 6th of January 1858 Sir Hugh Rose had left Indúr; on the 24th he laid siege to Ráthgarh; on the 28th he defeated in the field the rájá of Bánpúr; on the 29th he took Ráthgarh; on the 3rd of February he relieved Ságar; on the 13th he took the strong fort of Garhákót; on the 4th of March he forced the pass of Maddanpúr; on the 17th his 1st brigade stormed the fort of Chandairi; on the 22nd he invested Jhánsi; on the 31st he defeated Tántia Topi on the Bétwah; on the 3rd of April he stormed Jhánsi; on the 6th of May he defeated Tántia Topi and the rání of Jhánsi at Kúnch; on the 23rd he beat the rebels at Gallóli near Kálpi, and occupied that fort the following day. In this chapter I have told how, roused from a bed of sickness by the news of the capture of Gwáliár by the rebels, he pursued them with unremitting vigour, and stayed not his hand till he had recovered all that they had temporarily gained. In every undertaking he was successful, and he was successful because, careless of himself, he thought of the great end he had in view, and spared no means to attain it.

Book XI. Chapter III.

1858 June.

Recapitulation of its results;

real cause of his success.

After the victory at Gwáliár, Sir Hugh Rose proceeded to Bombay to assume command of the

Sir Hugh proceeds to Bombay.

Book XIV. Chapter III.

1858. June.

army of that Presidency.* The force with which he had won so many victories was, to a great extent, broken up. The 95th regiment was ordered to occupy the rock fortress. The 71st Highlanders, the 86th regiment, and the 25th Bombay native infantry, with detachments of cavalry and artillery, remained at Morár. The 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay native infantry, with cavalry and artillery, were sent to Jhánsi. Of these troops the command devolved

* The following farewell general order was issued on this occasion by Sir Hugh Rose:—"The Major-General commanding, being on the point of resigning the command of the Puná division of the Bombay army, bids farewell to the Central India Field Force; and at the same time expresses the pleasure he feels that he commanded them when they gained one more laurel at Gwáliár. The Major-General witnessed with satisfaction how the troops and their gallant comrades in arms—the Rajpútáná brigade under General Smith — stormed height after height, and gun after gun, under the fire of a numerous field and siege artillery, taking finally by assault two 18-pounders at Gwáliár. Not a man in these forces enjoyed his natural health or strength; an Indian sun and months of marching and broken rest had told on the strongest; but the moment they were told to take Gwáliár for their Queen and country they thought of nothing but victory. They gained it, restoring England's true and brave ally to his throne, putting to rout the rebel army, killing many of them, and taking from them in the field, exclusive of those in the fort, fifty-two pieces of artillery, all their stores and ammunition, and capturing the city and fort of Gwáliár, reckoned the strongest in India. The Major-General thanks sincerely Brigadier-General Napier, C.B., Brigadier Stuart, C.B., and Brigadier Smith, commanding brigades in the field, for the very efficient and able assistance which they gave him, and to which he attributes the success of the day. He bids them and their brave soldiers once more a kind farewell. He cannot do so under better auspices than those of the victory of Gwáliár."

upon Brigadier-General Robert Napier. Brigadier Smith's brigade was distributed in three portions, respectively at Gwáliár, at Sipri, and at Gúnah. It seemed as though they were about to enjoy the rest they had so gloriously earned. But appearances were deceitful. Though one bitter enemy, the ráni of Jhánsi, had disappeared, there had escaped another, not less implacable, perhaps even more fertile in resources than that resolute lady. Though beaten at all points, that other adversary had never despaired. Not many weeks elapsed before the cities, the villages, and the jungles of central India once more resounded with the name of Tántia Topi.

Book IV. Chapter II.

1858. June.

and the regiments of the force are distributed.

The prospects of peace are illusive.

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BOOK XIV.

CHAPTER IV.

The southern Marátha country.

In the first chapter of this volume I have brought the record of affairs in the southern Maráthá country up to the spring of 1858. In Belgáon and the neighbouring districts the crisis had passed away. It needed only the continuance of the same firm and conciliatory rule to ensure that it should never return.

Mr. Seton-Karr, applying to be relieved of a portion of his duties.

It happened, however, at this period (March and April 1858) that Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr, exhausted by the double labours which had devolved upon him, applied to the Government of Bombay to be relieved of portion of his overwhelming duties. Mr. Seton-Karr had, unquestionably, reason to believe that the Government, should it accede to his request, would grant him an option in the matter, or, at all events, would relieve him of the less important routine duties appertaining to the administration. But he was mistaken. The Government, in sanctioning Mr.

Seton-Karr's request, desired him to retain in his own hands the civil administration of the territory, and to transfer the charge of the political agency to his assistant, Mr. Charles Manson.

Book XIV. Chapter IV.

1858. Apr.

is directed to transfer the political agency to Mr. Manson.

Than Mr. Manson there was not a more high-minded, a more generous, or a more earnest officer in the Bombay Civil Service. He was devoted to his profession, he gave to it his whole soul and his undivided energies. He was in the prime of life, intelligent, energetic, decided. But—he had been employed on the detested Inám Commission—and he belonged to a school of politics differing in one essential point from that of which Mr. Seton-Karr was a leader. The reader will have already discovered the title of that school. Mr. Seton-Karr was strongly in favour of the maintenance of the native aristocracy, an upholder of the rights and customs held and enjoyed by native land-owners at the time that they came under British rule. He believed that so long as the British respected those rights and customs, it would never be necessary to employ force; that persuasion and management would effect the required end. How he had tried, and tried successfully, that policy, I have already shown. The success had proved to him its efficacy. Mr. Manson belonged to a more modern school. In one of the letters which Mr. Seton-Karr addressed to him before the transfer of the political duties, he is jestingly referred to as "an admirer of Lord Dalhousie." This, at least, is certain, that in a crisis such as that which was then prevailing, he gave his pre-

Character of Mr. Manson.

School of which Mr. Seton-Karr belonged.

School of which Mr. Manson was a partisan.

Book XIV. Chap. IV. 1838. May

ference to measures stronger than those which Mr. Seton-Karr deemed suited to the occasion.

Reasons adduced by the Bombay Government for the change.

Mr. Seton-Karr was greatly disappointed by the decision of the Government, but the reason adduced by that Government was one to which he could take no exception. Lord Elphinstone desired that the whole of the southern Maráthá country should be placed under the control of one officer as commissioner, and, in the circumstances of the time, he deemed it further advisable that that officer should be a soldier. Now Colonel Le Grand Jacob already exercised political authority in one part of the territory. On the 6th of December he had suppressed a mutiny in Kolhápúr, and had, by his firmness and strength of character, impressed the Bombay Government with the conviction that he was peculiarly qualified to wield political power in troublous times. Lord Elphinstone, then, transferred to him in the new arrangement a similar authority in the other part, with Mr. Manson as political agent under him. If, however, the reason for the transfer was sufficient in that it cast no slur upon Mr. Seton-Karr, it did not the less cause considerable misgivings to that gentleman, for, knowing as he did the native chieftains, he felt that a change would create suspicion in their minds, a change more especially which transferred political action from himself to an officer who had been engaged in the Inám Commission, and that if that change were followed by a tension of the tie which bound them to the suzerain power, it might even produce a catastrophe.

Colonel Sir G. Jacob appointed Superintending political agent for the southern territory.

Reasons why Mr. Seton-Karr augured ill of the change.

Book XIV. Chapter I.

1858. May.

Previous to the assumption of the charge of the political duties of the Belgáon districts, Mr. Setoo-Karr had been gradually engaged in disarming the country—a work in which he had been most ably assisted by Colonel George Malcolm, commanding the Southern Maráthá horse, and holding military charge of the southern Maráthá territory. It would be difficult to overestimate the services rendered by this able and gallant officer. His regiment mainly preserved order in that excitable country. In a previous chapter I have referred to his services at Shorápúr. Prior to that event, on the 29th of November 1857, he had led his cavalry, supported by one company 28th native infantry, against the fortified village of Halgalli, which had become the head-quarters of the disaffected. For some days previously these men had been held in check by detachments of the horse, first under Kerr, subsequently reinforced by La Touche, of the same regiment. These officers had, by spirited charges, driven the enemy into the town, and were struggling with them desperately in the streets when Malcolm, with a fresh party, arrived. His men at once dismounted, and, assisted by the sepoys of the 28th native infantry, scrambled over the flat-roofed houses of the village, dashed upon the rebels, and decided the victory. The country, however, was still uneasy. Both above and below the ghâts British authority had met with resistance, but, except that in some cases the guns and the arms had not entirely been delivered up, the danger from such disturbances was considered

Colonel George Malcolm.

Kerr and La Touche attack Halgalli.

Malcolm arrives and the place is stormed.

State of the country generally.

Book XIV. Chapter IV.

1858. May. Nargúnd.

to have passed away when Colonel Jacob took charge. Within a very short time of that event, however, a new peril appeared in another quarter.

Of the chief of Nargúnd I have spoken in the first chapter of this volume.* That this chief was thoroughly disaffected there can be no doubt. Mr. Seton-Karr had even suspected him of treasonable correspondence with the chief of Shoráp'ur.† But up to May 1858 he had been managed. He had even, under the gentle pressure exercised by Mr. Seton-Karr, sent in a correct list of the guns and ammunition he possessed, and very recently, urged by Mr. Manson, had even begun to despatch them to Dhárwár. Those who are aware of the reverence and affection with which a native chief regards his guns, will realise the sacrifice which the rájá made to meet the expressed wishes of the Government.

Matters were thus progressing, the chief doubtless secretly disaffected, yet complying under gentle pressure with the orders of the Bombay Government, when, about the 25th of May, intelligence reached him that Mr. Seton-Karr had been removed from the political charge of his country, and that Mr. Manson had been gazetted his successor.

This intelligence changed all the good dispositions of the chief of Nargúnd. Although he did not personally dislike Mr. Manson, he regarded him as the living representative of the hated system of Inám examination—a system which, as I

* *Vide* pages 23, 25, and 29. † *Vide* page 126.

have said, had worked with most disastrous effects on the chiefs of the southern Maráthá country. At that moment, too, Mr. Manson was specially obnoxious to him, for, only few a weeks previously, whilst still serving under Mr. Seton-Karr, he had arrested and carried off as a prisoner his own dearest friend, the chief of Jamkhandi.* The conviction at once took possession of him that the change was aimed against himself, that he was to be arrested, as his friend had been arrested, and thrown into a dungeon.† In his fear and trepidation, the chief sent a confidential agent to Dhárwár to inquire of the magistrate the meaning of the portentous change.

He fears to be arrested.

But before he could receive an answer, those about him had begun to work on a nature constitutionally timid and nervous. His habitual advisers and companions had not even then despaired of receiving a summons to join the victorious standard of the heir of Péshwá. All seemed yet possible. Tántia Topi was confronting the British in Bandalkhand, Kálpi was yet held, and one good victory might give them all they desired. These men took advantage of the consternation caused in the chief's mind by Mr. Manson's appointment to inspire to resist, to

Influences which work on the chief of Nargúnd.

* Only a short time previously the rájá of Nargúnd had met Mr. Manson at the chief of Jamkhandi's house, visiting him apparently on friendly terms.

† So penetrated was he with this idea, that he despatched that day a letter to his brother at Rámdrúg, in which occurs the passage: "I had rather die than be arrested as Jamkhandi was."

cast defiance in the teeth of the foreigners who had persecuted themselves and their brethren.

These men were not alone in their endeavours. The chief's wife, a lady of great personal attractions, and twenty years younger than he was, had renounced all hopes of a natural heir. She loved power, and the chance of her possessing power after her husband's death rested on the prospect of her becoming the adoptive mother of a reigning boy. And the British Government having refused to the chief the right to adopt, this prospect was possible only in the event of the British rule being supplanted by that of the Maráthá. This favoured counsellor added, then, her entreaties to those of the chief's companions.

The chief of Nargúnd gave way. That day he recalled the guns which had progressed only a few miles on the road to Dhárwár, began to store provisions, and on the 27th of May, possessing only three obsolete rusty cannon and a swivel gun, declared war, with all the formalities used by the Maráthás, against the British Government!

Mr. Manson had taken up his duties as political agent on the 16th of May. From that date till the 26th he had remained with Colonel Jacob at Kohlapúr; transacting business with him. On the 26th he set out for the northern states of the territory, with the view of judging for himself of the state of the country and of using his influence with the chiefs. Four hours after he had set out, Jacob received a telegram from General Lester, commanding at Belgáon, stating that an insurrection had broken out near to Dhárwár, and

that the Nargúnd chief was believed to be supporting it as he had recalled some of his guns on their way to be given up. Jacob at once sent a horseman with this news to Manson, informing him also that he had telegraphed to the general to send, if the report were true, a sufficient force to Nargúnd, and recommending him to return to Kohlapúr.

when Jacob hears of the revolt.

He sends to warn Manson.

Jacob's messenger reached Manson at Kúrandwár. Englishmen in India are so accustomed to authority and to all the incense which waits on authority, that, except in rare cases, they judge men and affairs not as they are, but as to their complacent minds they seem to be. Now Manson had always been on the most friendly terms with the chief of Nargúnd. He had no adequate conception of the depth of bitterness and the dread his connection with the Inám Commission had roused in the mind of that Maráthá noble. It was not possible, then, that he should imagine for a moment that his nomination to the control of political affairs in place of Mr. Seton-Karr would rouse the chief to madness. Still believing, then, in the friendly professions of that chief and in the persuasive powers of his influence over him, he sent back word to Jacob that from Kúrandwár he could reach Nargúnd by a cross road; that he would arrive there in time to prevent, probably, the development of the intended mischief; but that if too late to prevent such development, he was confident of being able to prevent the chief's half-brother, the lord of Rámdrúg, from joining the rebellion. Having de-

Manson, confident in himself,

determines to push on to Nargúnd.

Book XIV. Chapter IV.

1858. May.

spatched this reply, Manson posted horses along the road to Rámdrúg, and sent off by a horseman a letter to Colonel George Malcolm, commanding at Kaládji, requesting him to join at Rámdrúg with a body of his regiment, the Southern Maráthá horse.

and sends to Malcolm for military aid.

Malcolm, meanwhile, has taken the field.

But before this missive reached Malcolm, that able and daring officer had taken the field with two hundred and fifty horsemen to attack the insurgents, who had already plundered the treasury of one of the district stations of Dhárwár. Mr. Manson, then, though he rode hard, reached Rámdrúg to find it unoccupied. He had with him the twelve troopers who had accompanied him from Kohlapúr, and these were as fatigued as he himself was. There he learned from the chief the treason of his half-brother; he read the compromising letters from the latter, urging the Rámdrúg chief to follow his example; and, entreated by that chief not to pursue his journey to Nargúnd, he resolved to join the force in the field under Malcolm.

Manson reaches Rámdrúg,

and resolves to endeavour to join Malcolm.

Tired as he was, Manson set out in a palanquin, escorted by his troopers, that evening. Better had he taken his rest at Rámdrúg and made the journey to Malcolm in one day, for, exhausted by the long day's work, he and his followers stopped about 10 o'clock at a temple near a little village on the way and slept.

He sets out that evening,

and, tired, stops, near a temple, to sleep.

A report of all Manson's movements had been duly carried to the chief of Nárgúnd. When the news reached him of the halt at the temple, he reasoned as a Maráthá will always reason. His

The chief of Nargúnd is made acquainted with Manson's movements,

enemy was in his power; he would slay him.* He conceived that, having declared war against the British, he had a perfect right to destroy the members of that nation wherever he might find them. Accordingly, about midnight, he sallied forth with some hundreds of followers, and approaching the spot, poured in a volley, which killed the sentry, and then sent in his men to finish the work with the sword. Manson, roused from his sleep, fired his revolver at his assailants, but he was immediately overpowered, his head was cut off, and his body thrown in the fire, still burning, which had been kindled by his followers. Having killed as many of these as he could find, the chief returned with Manson's head to Nargúnd, and suspended the bloody trophy over a gateway.†

and has him murdered.

Meanwhile, the insurgents who had plundered the treasury, had marched southwards and joined Bhim Ráo, the chief of Kopaldrúg. There they were attacked by a Madras force from Bellári, under Colonel Hughes, already mentioned for his soldier-like conduct at Shorápúr, and who, in daring and manly qualities, in the capacity to manage men and to direct operations, yielded to none who came to the front in the mutiny. This gallant soldier pushed forward with an energy

One body of the insurgents marches to Kopaldrug,

where they are attacked and beaten by Hughes.

* It was the reasoning of Jael, wife of Hebor the Kenite, whose conduct was infinitely more treacherous.

† Read also Sir George Le Grand Jacob's *Western India before and during the Mutinies*. The account of the suspension of the head over a gateway rests entirely on native testimony. When the place was taken it was found floating in a well.

Book XIV. Chapter IV.

1858. May–June.

surpassing that of the rebels, caught them, as I have said, at Kopaldrúg, and stormed the place, killing Bhim Ráo, the chief of Hémbáji, and many of the defenders.

Malcolm hurries towards Nargúnd.

Malcolm, on his side, had no sooner heard that Nargúnd was in revolt than he felt that a moment's delay would provoke the rising of the entire Maráthá country. With only two hundred and fifty cavalry at his disposal he marched, then, immediately against the place, assisted by the wily Brahman officials, who believed he was marching on destruction.

He is reinforced by infantry and guns.

At the same time he wrote to Belgáon asking for some infantry and some guns. The authorities there sent him two companies of Europeans, one of native infantry, and two guns under Captain Paget. Riding on with these, only five days after the insensate declaration of war, he appeared before Nargúnd. He had scarcely dismounted before news reached him that the rebels were marching to attack him. His heart bounded with joy. "I have them now," he said. Mounting his troopers as quickly as possible, he went to the front. It was true, they were advancing. But when they saw Malcolm and his horsemen they hesitated, then halted, and, in the manner of natives, began to close in on their centre. Then, wavering, they fell back. By this time Malcolm had collected his men. Riding at their head, he charged, overthrew the rebels—who, however, fought well in groups—drove them back, followed them up into the town, and forced the surviving combatants to take refuge in the fort.

The rebels march to attack him.

Malcolm charges and defeats them,

and captures the town.

Book V. Chapter IV.

1858. June.

There remained now only the fort, a very strong one, so strong, that if defended, it would have defied the efforts of the small assailing force. But Malcolm knew the natives well. "Give them a quiet night," he said, "and they will save us the trouble." He was right. On the morning of the 2nd of June the strongest fort in the southern Maráthá country was found deserted.

The rebels evacuate the fort in the night.

The chief, accompanied by six of his principal advisers, attempted, in the guise of a pilgrim, to escape the fate he had provoked. Every possible ruse was had recourse to by the fugitives to baffle the pursuit which, they soon learned, had been instituted after them. The man who had been deputed for that task, Mr. Frank Souter,* possessed qualities which did not permit him to be easily baffled. He met ruse with ruse, and after a hot pursuit, captured the chief on the night of the 3rd.†

The chief attempts to escape in disguise,

but is captured by Frank Souter.

On learning of Mr. Manson's death, Colonel Jacob had taken the promptest measures to control the northern states of the territory. He forced the chief of Miraj, the best fortified town in the country, to give a pledge of his fidelity by

Colonel Jacob controls the country.

* Now Sir Frank Souter, Superintendent of Police in Bombay.

† The chief of Nargúnd was tried at Belgáon on the 11th of June. He pleaded guilty, and in his plea stated that it was the fear of arrest that had caused him to commit the bloody deed. He was executed, in the presence of all the troops and of a large number of natives, on the 12th. It remains only to add that the bodies of the wife of whom I have spoken and the chief's mother were found in the Málparba river on the night of the 3rd. Sir G. Le Grand Jacob states, in the work already referred to, that they drowned themselves, unable to bear up against the disgrace.

Book XIV. Chapter IV.

1858. November.

surrendering his ammunition. Shortly afterwards, the death of General Lester led to the nomination of Colonel Jacob as Brigadier-General in military command in the southern Maráthá country.

Measures taken by him for the pacification.

Under General Jacob's firm rule the country above the ghâts soon subsided into quiescence; but below the mountains, along the Goa frontier, the Sáwant rebels still continued to keep a large number of Madras, Bombay, and Portuguese troops, regular and irregular, in the field. Want of concert, however, naturally resulted from the action of troops serving under commanders independent one of the other. Eventually, in November, the Portuguese Viceroy, at a conference with General Jacob, consented to place the whole of his field detachments under the command of the officer who should unite that of the Bombay troops. Under this agreement Brigadier-General Fitzgerald of the Madras army took command of the united forces, and an organised plan was arranged. This was to hem in the track occupied by the rebels, and to inform them that unless they surrendered by the 20th of November, they would be hunted down without mercy. On that date the band had dwindled to the number of eighty persons. These surrendered to the Portuguese commander on the night of that day, and their ringleaders were subsequently transported to the Portuguese possessions in Taimor.

In concert with the Viceroy of Goa.

are eminently successful.

Thenceforward the peace of the southern Maráthá country was assured.

BOOK XV.

CHAPTER I.

In the preceding volume* I referred to the proclamation issued by Lord Canning regarding the tálúkdárs of Oudh, and of its reception in the victorious camp of Sir Colin Campbell; and I promised to deal with the subject more fully later on. I proceed now to redeem that promise. Oudh.

The Oudh proclamation, despatched by Lord Canning to Sir James Outram in his capacity of Chief Commissioner of Oudh, with a letter bearing date the 3rd of March 1858, directing that it should not be published until Lakhnao had fallen, or at least lay at the mercy of the British commander, was at once a sentence, a warning, and a threat addressed to the inhabitants of the rebellious province. That proclamation announced that Lakhnao, after defying and resisting the power of the British for nine months, now lay Purport of Lord Canning's Oudh proclamation.

* Vol. ii. pages 409, 410.

Book XV. Chapter I.

1858. March.

at the mercy of the conqueror; that in that defiance and resistance the mutinous soldiery who had begun the revolt had been greatly aided by the inhabitants of the city and the province, even by those who owed their prosperity to the British Government; but that the hour of retribution had now arrived. Acting on the principle that before pronouncing sentence on the guilty, it was just and proper to reward the innocent, the proclamation proceeded to name six men—three of whom were rájás, two zamíndárs, and one a tálúkdár—who had remained faithful amid great temptations, and who were not only declared "the sole hereditary proprietors of the lands which they held when Oudh came under British rule," but were promised additional rewards. Rewards and honours in proportionate measure were likewise promised to others in whose favour similar claims should be established to the satisfaction of the Government. But, with these exceptions, the proprietary right in the soil of the province was confiscated to the British Government, which would dispose of that right in such manner as might seem fitting. To the chiefs, tálúkdárs, and landowners, however, who should make immediate submission, surrendering their arms and obeying the orders of the Chief Commissioner, the proclamation promised the safety of their lives and of their honour, provided that their hands were "unstained with English blood murderously shed." For any further indulgence, the proclamation added, and with regard to the condition in which such men might thereafter be

Rewards it promises to the innocent.

Punishment of the remainder.

Conditions of commutation of punishment.

placed, "they must throw themselves upon the justice and mercy of the British Government." The proclamation promised, in conclusion, that to those amongst the classes referred to who should come forward promptly and give the Chief Commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and order, the indulgence would be large, and that the Governor-General would be ready to view liberally the claims which they might thus acquire to the restoration of their former rights. Further, that whilst participation in the murder of Englishmen and Englishwomen would exclude those who had participated in it from all mercy, those, on the other hand, who had protected English lives would be specially entitled to consideration and leniency.

Participation in the murder of Englishmen and English women to exclude from mercy.

In the letter to which I have referred as accompanying the proclamation the Foreign Secretary, Mr. G. F. Edmonstone, was, as I have already stated, careful to lay down that it should not be published until Lakhnao had either been conquered or lay at the mercy of the conqueror. It further prescribed that, when published, the proclamation was to be addressed only to the non-military inhabitants of the province, and in no sense to the mutinous sepoys. It expressed likewise the conviction of Lord Canning that the tone of apparent severity which characterised the proclamation was necessary, inasmuch as the announcement in such a state paper of a liberal and forgiving spirit would be open to misconstruction; and it added that, in reality, the spirit of the proclamation was merciful and even

Mr. Edmonstone's accompanying letter fully explains the mercy that underlay

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lenient, in that it promised exemption, almost general, from the penalties of death and imprisonment to rújás, tálúkdárs, and zamindárs who had conspired and fought against the Government; that even the confiscation of estates was rather a merciful commutation of a severer punishment than a harsh measure of justice. The letter concluded with suggestions to Sir James Outram regarding the manner in which it might be requisite for him to deal with mutineers of varying grades of guilt.

The supposed severity of the terms of the proclamation.

Outram receives the proclamation in a sense different to that intended by Lord Canning,

Sir James Outram received the letter and the proclamation on the 5th of March. Reading the latter by the light of its actual contents, apart from the commentary furnished by the letter, he arrived at a conclusion regarding it the very reverse of that which Lord Canning had endeavoured to impress upon him. Lord Canning, when sending him the proclamation, had said in so many words, by the mouth of his Foreign Secretary, "Do not judge the proclamation simply by itself, as a paper dealing out stern justice to conquered revolters. Rather, looking at the measure of punishment which those revolters have brought upon themselves, see whether the proclamation does not in every case, except the case of atrocious murder, pronounce a mitigation of punishment, capable of still further mitigation." But Outram, disregarding this exhortation, looked at the proclamation without sufficient reference to the circumstances which had made it necessary, and condemned it. In a letter to the Foreign Secretary, dated the 8th of March,

and condemns it.

he declared his belief that there were not a dozen landowners in Oudh who had not, in some way or other, assisted the rebels, and that, therefore, there would be but few exceptions to the sweeping confiscations proposed by the Governor-General; he expressed his conviction that as soon as the proclamation should be made public nearly all the chiefs and tálúkdárs would retire to their domains and prepare for a desperate resistance. He proceeded even to urge extenuating circumstances for those of them who had revolted, by declaring his opinion—which, it must be admitted, was founded on fact—that the landowners had been very unjustly treated in the land-settlement after the annexation; that, apart from this, their sympathy with the rebels had been, in the actual circumstances, only natural; that it was not until the British rule in Oudh had been brought to a virtual end by the mutineers that they had sided against the Government; that they ought to be treated rather as honourable enemies than as rebels; that they would be converted into relentless enemies if their lands were confiscated, maintaining a guerilla war which would "involve the loss of thousands of Europeans by battle, disease, and exposure"; but that if their lands were insured to them they would at once aid in restoring order, and would so co-operate with the paramount power as, before long, to render unnecessary the further presence of the enormous army then occupying Oudh.

Book XV. Chapter I. 1858. March. Embodies his views in a letter.

To this letter Lord Canning replied, on the 10th, in a brief despatch, the nature of which

Lord Canning's first reply

Book XV. Chapter I. 1858 March.

renders still clearer the really merciful intentions of his proclamation. Referring to the promise of safety of life and honour to the tálúkdárs, chiefs, and landholders, unstained with English blood murderously shed, who should surrender at once and obey the orders of the Chief Commissioner, Lord Canning authorised Sir James to amplify it by an addition which, if not very wide in itself, intimated as clearly as possible the merciful intentions of the Governor-General. "To those amongst them," ran this addition, "who shall promptly come forward, and give to the Chief Commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and order, this indulgence will be large, and the Governor-General will be willing to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to a restitution of their former rights."

Renders his merciful intentions still clearer

Three weeks later Lord Canning replied at greater length to Outram's remarks. In Mr. Edmonstone's despatch, dated the 31st of March, Lord Canning admitted that the people of Oudh occupied a different position, with respect to their allegiance to the British Government, to that of the inhabitants of the provinces which had been longer under British rule. But, in the Governor-General's opinion, that difference constituted no valid ground for treating the chiefs and tálúkdárs in the lenient manner suggested by Outram. Arguing in the spirit of the letter of the 3rd of March, he again insisted that, in the presence of a great crime, exemption from death, transportation, and imprisonment were great boons, and that to have offered more lenient terms would

His second and more elaborate letter

Gives ample reasons

have been to treat the rebels—not, as Outram contended, as honourable enemies—but as enemies who had won the day. With respect to Outram's contention that the injustice of the land-settlement after the annexation had impelled the landowners to rebel, Lord Canning simply declined to recognise the hypothesis. Admitting that the policy of introducing into Oudh a system of village settlement in place of the old settlement under tálúkdárs might not have been altogether wise, Lord Canning declined to believe that the conduct of the landowners was in any respect the consequence of that policy. He attributed that conduct rather to the repugnance they had felt to suffer any restraint of the arbitrary powers they had till then exercised; to a diminution of their importance by being brought under equal laws; and to the obligation of disbanding their armed followers and of living a peaceful and orderly life. For these reasons, Lord Canning adhered to his proclamation.

for adhering to the proclamation.

That Sir James Outram did not at once realise the statesman-like nature and the really merciful tendencies of Lord Canning's proclamation may at once be admitted. The end of the two men was really the same; the difference was in the manner by which that end should be attained. Sir James would have carried leniency to a point at which leniency would have missed its aim. Lord Canning, maintaining the right to be severe, was prepared to be as merciful as Outram whenever the exercise of mercy was politically desirable.

Real similarity in the objects at which Lord Canning and Outram alike aimed.

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1858. March.

Lord Ellenborough receives Lord Canning's proclamation

The real character of Lord Canning's statesmanship at this period might have remained long generally unknown but for the action taken with respect to the proclamation by the then President of the Board of Control, the Earl of Ellenborough. That nobleman had but recently taken over the seals of that office from his predecessor, a member of the Whig Cabinet, Mr. Vernon Smith. In due course he received, about the 20th of March, a copy of Lord Canning's proclamation, unaccompanied by any explanatory document. In point of fact, Lord Canning, in transmitting the proclamation, had written to Mr. Vernon Smith, a member of his own party, and who, in his belief, still held the office of President of the Board of Control, a letter in which he stated that the proclamation required an explanatory despatch which he had not had time to prepare. Unfortunately Mr. Vernon Smith neglected to pass on that letter to his successor. He thus allowed Lord Ellenborough to believe that the proclamation stood alone, that it required no interpretation, and was to be judged on its merits as an act of policy.

Without the letter addressed to his predecessor,

explanatory of the famous proclamation.

It is not surprising that, reading the proclamation in this way, Lord Ellenborough arrived at a conclusion not very dissimilar to that with which Sir James Outram, possessing all the advantages of proximity to, and personal communication with, Lord Canning, had been impressed. He condemned it as likely to raise such a ferment in Oudh as would make pacification almost impossible. In accord with Outram, of whose views,

Lord Ellenborough arrives at a conclusion similar to that formed by Outram,

however, he was ignorant, Lord Ellenborough believed that the mode of settling the land tenure when the British took possession of Oudh had been in many ways unjust, and had been the chief cause of the general and national character of the disaffection in that province. He concluded—agreeing in this also with Outram—that the people of Oudh would view with dismay a proclamation which cut them off, as a nation, from the ownership of land so long cherished by them, and would deem it righteous to battle still more energetically than before against a government which could adopt such a course of policy. Lord Ellenborough embodied these views in a despatch to be transmitted to Lord Canning in the name of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, added to them an argument—also an argument of Sir James Outram—to the effect that the people of Oudh ought to be regarded as legitimate enemies than as rebels, and concluded it with these stinging words: "Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the people. You have acted on a different principle. You have reserved a few as deserving of special favour, and you have struck with what they will feel as the severest of punishment the mass of the inhabitants of the country.

and embodies his views in a despatch.

Concluding paragraphs of this despatch.

"We cannot but think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom su-

Book XV. Chapter I. 1858. March.

perior to that which appears in the precedent you have made. We desire, therefore, that you will mitigate in practice the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the landowners of Oudh. We desire to see British authority in India rest upon the willing obedience of a contented people; there cannot be contentment where there is general confiscation.

"Government cannot long be maintained by any force in a country where the whole people is rendered hostile by a sense of wrong; and if it were possible so to maintain it, it would not be a consummation to be desired."

He sends this despatch to Lord Canning, without previously submitting it to the Queen or to his colleagues.

Lord Ellenborough was not content with penning these severe and galling strictures. Without submitting the despatch for the approval of the Queen, without even showing it to his colleagues, he transmitted it direct to Lord Canning. Nor was he content even with that. Three weeks later he allowed it to be presented to the House of Commons!

This action, when known, compels Lord Ellenborough to resign.

So far as Lord Ellenborough was concerned, the three mistakes he committed—the penning of an acrimonious despatch without waiting for an explanation, the transmission of that despatch before it had been submitted to the Queen or had received the approval of his colleagues, the disclosure of its contents to Mr. Bright with a view to its being presented to the House of Commons—were fatal to his tenure of office. The matter having come under the cognisance of the House of Commons, Lord Ellenborough taking

upon himself the sole responsibility of the despatch, resigned his office.

Book VI. Chapter I.

1858. June.

Far different was the effect produced by the receipt of the despatch upon Lord Canning. He received it at Allahábád on the 13th of June. Before its contents became known, rumours circulated that the Government of Lord Derby had written a disagreeable letter to the Governor-General. "I asked him," wrote, at the time, one deeply in his confidence, "if it was true that he had received something disagreeable. He said, almost indifferently, that it was impertinent; but he did not care much; he would answer what they wrote." He then entered into a conversation regarding his Oudh policy. The next day, when the despatch had been read by others, the prevailing feeling regarding it was that it was offensively impertinent, with a look of epigrammatic point in the concluding sentences—those which I have quoted—of which the writer was evidently proud. But above all, there arose a feeling of indignation that a despatch so insulting should have been published for the benefit of the natives, many of them still in revolt, as well as of the Anglo-Indians.

Effect produced by the despatch on Lord Canning.

Indignation it causes in the minds of his entourage.

But Lord Canning had, at this crisis, a support not less grateful than the confidence of the friends about him. The same mail brought him a copy of a resolution of the Court of Directors expressing continued confidence in their Governor-General. Letters were received from Mr. Sidney Herbert, from Lord Granville, from Lord Aberdeen, and from many other leading men, express-

Lord Canning is urged from England not to resign.

ing sympathy and regard. In almost all these Lord Canning was urged not to resign, but to carry on his own policy calmly, and to leave to the Government the odium of recalling him. Lord Canning never thought of resigning. He regarded Lord Ellenborough's despatch as Achilles would have regarded a javelin "hurled by the feeble hand of Priam," and far from allowing it to disturb his equanimity, he sat down coolly and calmly to pen a vindication of his policy.

Curiously enough, ten days after that vindication was drafted and despatched—on the 27th of June—Lord Canning received a long private letter from Lord Derby himself on the subject of the point of difference. In this letter Lord Derby expressed a general confidence in Lord Canning's policy: he attributed Lord Ellenborough's despatch to the conduct of Mr. Vernon Smith in withholding the covering private letter which accompanied the Oudh proclamation, and which gave the only intimation that further explanations would be forwarded. Lord Derby concluded by virtually asking, almost pressing, Lord Canning to stay on, and spoke of the probability of Lord Stanley going to the Board of Control. To one in Lord Canning's position such a letter from the chief of the cabinet of which Lord Ellenborough had been a member was most satisfactory. It might almost be said that his policy was vindicated by his enemies.

Lord Canning's own vindication was dated the 18th of June. It began by alluding in a dignified manner to the fact that the despatch con-

suring himself had been made public in England three weeks before it reached his hands, and that in a few days it would be read in every station in Hindustán. Dwelling then upon the pain which the censure of his conduct by the Court of Directors would cause him, and upon the manner in which the publication of it would increase his difficulties, he declared that no taunts or sarcasms, come from what quarter they might, would turn him from the path which he believed to be that of public duty. Expressing, then, his conviction that a change in the government of India at that time, taking place under circumstances which would indicate a repudiation of the policy pursued towards the Oudh rebels, would seriously retard the pacification of the country, he proceeded to declare his belief that that policy had been from the first merciful without weakness, and indulgent without compromise of the dignity of the Government; that it had made manifest to the people of reconquered districts all over India, including Oudh, that the indulgence to those who should submit, and who should be free from atrocious crime, would be large; and that the Oudh proclamation, thoroughly consistent with that policy, offered the best and earliest prospect of restoring peace to that province on a stable footing.

Book I. Chap. I. 1858. June. Preliminary.

Stating then, in dignified language, that although in a time of unexampled difficulty, danger, and toil, he would not lay down of his own act the high trust which he had the honour to hold, yet that if, after reading the vindication of his Preliminary.

1858. Cap. XV. Chapter I. 1858. June.

policy, the Court of Directors should see fit to withhold their confidence from him, he then preferred his respectful yet urgent request that he might be relieved from the office of Governor-General, Lord Canning proceeded to reply to Lord Ellenborough's strictures, and to assert the grounds upon which his convictions of the soundness of his policy rested.

Reports upon Lord Ellenborough,

With respect to the former, Lord Canning referred to the extraordinary manner in which Lord Ellenborough's despatch had almost justified the people of Oudh, as if they were fighting in a righteous cause—a manner quite legitimate in a member of the legislature, but quite unjustifiable in a minister of the Queen of England, who herself was actually Queen of Oudh also. He declined to discuss the policy which, in 1855–56, had dictated the annexation; it was not his act, nor had he ever been empowered to undo it. But he felt it incumbent upon him to point out the disastrous results which might follow, should the people of Oudh be encouraged, by such reasoning as that contained in the despatch, to continue their resistance. At the actual moment, the chiefs of the various sections of rebels in Oudh were united neither by a common plan nor by a common sympathy, but, he added, if it should become manifest that the British Government shrank from a declaration of its right to possess Oudh, the Bégam, as the representative in the field of the late reigning family, would draw to herself all the sympathies of the country, and all the other factions would merge in hers.

Lord points out the mischief his remarks might have caused in India.

Lord Canning prefaced the defence of his proclamation by stating that he had early in the year proceeded to Allahábád chiefly that he might be able to investigate the state of Oudh; that he soon determined to make a difference, in the measures to be adopted for the pacification of the country, between the mutinied sepoys and the Oudh rebels; that the latter should not be put to death for appearing in arms against the authorities, unless they had committed actual murder; that the general punishment for rebellion in Oudh should be confiscation of estates, a punishment recognised by native states as the fitting consequence of the offence, and one which in no way affected caste nor the honour of the most sensitive Brahman or Rajpút; a punishment which admitted of every gradation according to the severity or lightness of the offence, which would enable the Government to reward friendly tálúkdárs and zamindárs, and which, in point of fact, would, in many cases, constitute a kind of retributive justice—many of tálúkdárs having acquired their estates by spoliation of the village communities; that, as a matter of abstract justice, it would only be right to restore those estates to the village communities; but that as there would be insuperable difficulties to such a course, it would be better to take the forfeited estates of the rebellious talúkdárs as Government property, out of which faithful villages and individuals might be rewarded.

Book XV. Chapter I. 1858. June. Defence of his proclamation.

With this vindication ended practically the crisis caused by Lord Ellenborough's hasty act. Final result on Lord Canning of...

Book XV. Chapter I. 1858. June. The Ellenborough letter.

The result was to seat Lord Canning in the presence of a ministry of an opposite party, more firmly in the saddle, and to give him greater strength to carry out the policy which he believed to be adapted to the circumstances. In another way his hands had been strengthened at this crisis.

The nomination of Sir James Outram to the Supreme Council enabled Lord Canning to place at the head of the Oudh province a man who, imbued with his own views, was certain to carry out his policy with the vigour arising from conviction.

Mr. Robert Montgomery.

The new Chief Commissioner of Oudh was Mr. Robert Montgomery.* Mr. Montgomery was a man who, with a thorough acquaintance with administrative duties, combined great decision of character, a sound judgment, and a rare knowledge of native character. His character and antecedents.

He had been the right hand of Sir John Lawrence in the Panjáb, had been the firm advocate of those resolute measures which made the fall of Dehlí possible, and, in the earlier stages of the mutiny, when Sir John Lawrence was absent from Lahor, had himself directed the measures for disarming the native troops, which, carried out in time, had unquestionably saved the province. In questions of administrative policy, Mr. Montgomery, as I have said, agreed in principle with Lord Canning.

Mr. Montgomery appointed Chief Commissioner.

Such was the man to whom, in the month of May 1858, Lord Canning entrusted the carrying

* Now Sir Robert Montgomery, K.C.S.I., a member of the Council of India.

out of the policy towards Oudh embodied in his famous proclamation. Mr. Montgomery, without ignoring the proclamation, did not put it into rough action. He used it rather as a lever, by the judicious employment of which he could bring about the results at which the Governor-General professedly aimed. The situation was, for the first three months of his tenure of office, in many respects remarkable. The larger number of the relations, adherents, and dependants of the deposed royal family had their dwellings in, or belonged, by family association extending over many years, to the city of Lakhnao. Considering, moreover, the part which that city, and more especially the classes of its inhabitants to which I have referred, had played in the rebellion, it was especially necessary to exercise over it a strict supervision. In the provinces an entirely different feeling prevailed. There the rule of the king of Oudh had planted no seeds of loyalty or devotion. Alien in religion and in race to the great bulk of the people of Oudh, the king and his courtiers had been tolerated, first, because they were there, and, secondly, because they had exercised no strict supervising power, but had been content to be the nominal rulers of the great landowners, permitted to carry on, very much in accordance with their own wishes, their feudal rule. The central power, as exercised by the kings of Oudh, had interfered to put a stop to rapine and oppression only when that rapine and oppression had attained a magnitude so great that to ignore them would have produced a national

Book V. Chapter I.

1858. June.

regarding the proclamation.

The situation in Oudh.

Lakhnao.

The provinces.

Feelings of the people towards the King.

B. C. XXV. Chapter I. 1858. June.

rising. The sentiment felt, then, by the great body of landowners towards the royal family of Oudh was not loyalty; it was not affection; it was not sympathy; it was scarcely contentment. Perhaps the term that best describes it is the term toleration. They had been content to tolerate that family as exercising a kind of nominal suzerainty which permitted them to do just as they liked.

Their feeling regarding British rule.

Towards the British rule, exercised as it had been by the civilians who had immediately preceded Sir Henry Lawrence, they entertained a different feeling. In strong contrast with the selfish sway of the Muhammadan kings of Oudh, the British rule had made itself felt in every corner of the province. The reforms it had introduced, the inquiries which it made, had been so sweeping, that an almost universal feeling had risen amongst the landowners that it was not to be endured. If the king of Oudh had been king Log, the British rule was the rule of king Stork. The landowners of Oudh, then, had hailed the mutiny, not from affection towards the deposed dynasty, but from hatred of its successor. Indifferent as they were to the persons and the race of their Muhammadan kings, they would have gladly ejected the British to restore them.

1857. Hostile.

But they were no central rallying point.

When, then, Lakhnao had fallen, the tálúkdárs and the landowners generally were as far as they had ever been from submission to the British authority. Could the Bégam show a strong front, they might yet combine with her for the restoration of the ancient dynasty in the person

of one of its members. But as there did not appear in the field any force sufficiently strong to rally round, the landowners and other rebel leaders fought each for himself, each hoping that some great benefit would accrue to him out of the general turmoil.

Book XI. Chapter I.

1858. July.

This disunion greatly diminished the difficulties which Montgomery might otherwise have had to encounter had there been unity of purpose or concentration of action among the malcontents. But still the task before him was no light one. He met it with all the skill, the temper, and the judgment which might have been expected from so experienced a ruler of men. He exhausted every means of persuasion at the same time that he brought clearly to the view of the landowners the fixed determination of the British Government. He was thus able to restore in some few districts the lapsed British authority. To reorganise that authority in those deaf to his persuasions, he was content to wait until the forcible measures inaugurated by his military coadjutor, Sir Hope Grant, should produce their natural results.

This fact diminishes Montgomery's difficulties, which are, nevertheless, great.

He meets them;

restores British authority in some districts.

What those measures were I shall relate in the next chapter.

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BOOK XV.

CHAPTER II.

Hope Grant

WHEN I last referred to General Hope Grant,* he was marching to the fort of Jallálábád near Lakhnao. The date was the 16th of May. Leaving his force to enter that place, the general, just then nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath for his services in the field, rode into Lakhnao to consult with Mr. Montgomery, just then appointed Chief Commissioner. Montgomery informed him that the Kánhpúr road was again endangered by Béni Mádho, an influential tálúkdár, who had likewise caused proclamations to be distributed in Lakhnao, warning the inhabitants to quit that city, as it was to be attacked. On receiving this information, Hope Grant, taking with him the 53rd foot instead of the 38th, and substituting Mackinnon's battery for Olpherts's,

* Vol. ii. page 498.

returned to Jallálábád, and started thence in pursuit of Béni Mádho on the 25th of May.

follows up Béni Mádho.

For some time Béni Mádho was invisible. Hope Grant followed him to Jássandá, eight miles from Bani, where he had been reported to be "with a force of eighty-five thousand men"; but the tálúkdár and his men had vanished. On the 4th of June the Sikh rájá of Kappartola joined Sir Hope with nine hundred Sikhs and three brass 6-pounders.

Then, leaving the pursuit, marches against a rebel force at Nawábganj.

Hope Grant posted this reinforcement at the Banni bridge, and leaving the pursuit of Béni Mádho, marched against a body of rebels, less fabulously numerous, but more really formidable—being fifteen thousand strong—who had taken up a strong position at Nawábganj, on the Faizábád road, eighteen miles from Lakhnao. Grant's division was tolérably strong.* Leaving, then, a small force at the other Nawábganj (on the Kánhpúr road), he marched on Chinhat. There he found another column, one thousand two hundred strong, under Colonel Purnell. Leaving his baggage under charge of that officer, he left Chinhat at 11 o'clock on the night of the 12th of June to march against the rebels.

* It consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions Rifle Brigade, the 5th Panjab infantry, five hundred Hodson's horse, under Lieutenant-Colonel Daly; one hundred and fifty Wales's horse, under Prendergast; two hundred and fifty Bruce's horse police, under Hill; the 7th hussars, under Colonel Sir William Russell; two squadrons Queen's Bays; Mackinnon's horse artillery; and Gibbon's and Carleton's batteries. The whole of the cavalry was commanded by Colonel Hagart.

Book XV. Chapter II.

1858. June.

Strong position of the rebels.

These latter had taken up a position exceptionally strong. They occupied a large plateau surrounded on three sides by a stream, crossed by a bridge at a little distance from the town. On the fourth side was jungle.

Grant halts near the rebels,

Hope Grant's force, led by a trustworthy guide, crossed the complicated country between Chinhat and the plateau during the night, and reached the bridge mentioned about half an hour before daybreak. He halted his column to allow his men to rest and get their breakfast, and then marched on the rebels. His plan was to turn their right and interpose between them and the jungle. His men would do the rest.

and surprises them.

At daylight Hope Grant crossed the bridge and fell on the rebels. He took them completely by surprise. Their forces, divided into four parts, each commanded by a separate leader, had no time then either to concentrate or to act with unanimity. Hope Grant had struck at their centre, and this move had greatly contributed to their confusion. Still, they fought very gallantly. "A large body of fine daring zamindári men," wrote Sir Hope in his journal,* "brought two guns into the open and attacked us in rear. I have seen many battles in India, and many brave fellows fighting with a determination to conquer or die, but I never witnessed anything more magnificent than the conduct of these zamindáris." They attacked Hodson's horse, who

Gallantry of the rebels.

* *Incidents of the Sepoy War*, by Sir Hope Grant and Captain Knollys.

could not face them, and by their unsteadiness imperilled the two guns attached to their regiment. Grant at once ordered up the 7th hussars, and directed one of the batteries to open on the zamindáris. The fire from four guns of this battery mowed them down with terrible effect, but did not force them to retire. After they had played upon them some time, the 7th hussars came up, and charging through them twice, forced them to give way. The fact that round the two guns of Hodson's horse there lay, after the combat was over, a hundred and twenty-five rebel corpses, testifies to the valour of these gallant zamindáris. After three hours' fighting, the rebels fell back, leaving on the field six guns and about six hundred dead. The British lost sixty-seven in killed and wounded. In addition, thirty-three men died from sunstroke, and two hundred and fifty were taken into hospital.

who, after a desperate contest, are defeated,

This victory had very important results. The rebels had from all sides been flocking to Nawábganj to swell the formidable column already there. But Hope Grant struck dismay all around. The defeat was so crushing, that the fugitives left the vicinity of Lakhnao, each of the four parties taking a different direction. The concentrating movement was also efficiently stopped.

and dispersed.

Sir Hope left his force at Nawábganj and returned to Lakhnao to consult with Montgomery, whom this victory had allowed for the first time to breathe freely. From Lakhnao he was ordered by Sir Colin Campbell, in the third

Sir Hope is sent to relieve Mán Singh.

Book XV. Chapter II. 1858. July.

week of July, to march to the relief of Mán Sing, a famous rájá,* who, having at one time taken part with the rebels, had listened to the advice of Mr. Montgomery, and returned to his allegiance. For this he had been denounced by his former associates, and at the moment was attacked in his fort by a body of them twenty thousand strong with twenty guns.

Hope Grant starts to carry out the order.

It being of great importance to retain the adherence of so powerful a chieftain, Hope Grant at once despatched the 90th regiment, the 1st Bengal fusiliers, Brasyer's Síkhs, Mackinnon's troop of horse artillery, and four hundred cavalry to Nawábganj to supply the place of the troops he should take on thence, and with these latter† he set out on the 22nd of July.

The position of the rebel parties in Oudh.

Before starting with Sir Hope on this expedition it may be convenient to the reader to realise the exact position at the moment of the several rebel parties in Oudh. Of these, counting as one the forces of the Bégam and her alleged paramour, Mammú Kháu, there were nine of great, besides many of smaller dimensions. These nine disposed at the time of sixty or seventy thousand armed men, with forty or fifty guns. More than half of these were said to have their head-quarters under the command of the Bégam and Mammú Khán at Chaoká ghát, on the Gághrá, not far from Faizábád; but a con-

* Vol. i. page 398.

† The 1st Madras Europeans, the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade, the 1st Panjáb infantry, the 7th hussars, five hundred Hodson's horse, twelve light guns, and a train of heavy guns.

siderable body of them were besieging Mán Singh. The remainder—led by such men as Rámbakkas, Behúmáth Singh, Chandabaksh, Gholáb Singh, Narpat Singh of Rúiya notoriety, Bhopál Singh, and Firoz Sháh—were scattered all over the province, never long at the same place, hoping that a chance blow might give them victory or plunder.

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Hope Grant, urged by letters from Mán Singh to the effect that unless speedily relieved he could not answer for the consequences, pushed on rapidly, so rapidly, indeed, that the rumour of his advance had all, or almost all, the effect of the advance itself. When within a day's journey of Mán Singh's stronghold of Sháhganj he learned that the besieging force had melted away!

The rebels abandon the lesguer of Sháhganj on Sir Hope's approach.

It was perfectly true. On hearing that the English army was advancing by rapid marches the besiegers took fright, and broke up into three divisions. One of these fled towards Gonda, a second to Sultánpúr on the Gúmti; a third to Tándá on the Ghágrá.

and break up into three divisions.

Hope Grant moved then, not the less rapidly, on Faizábád; thence he proceeded to the ghát of Ajúdhiá, and found a considerable body of rebels pushing forth in boats to the opposite side of the river. He opened on these and sank all but one. The crews for the most part escaped. The next day he had an interview with rájá Mán Singh.

Hope Grant moves on to Faizábád.

But he did not rest idle at Faizábád. Sultánpúr having been indicated to him as the next

and sends Horsford to Sultanpúr.

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point of attack, Hope Grant detached thither a column composed of the 1st Madras fusiliers, the 5th Panjáb rifles, a detachment of 7th hussars, three hundred Hodson's horse, and a troop of horse artillery under the command of Brigadier Horsford. Horsford was delayed by heavy rain, but at last, on the 7th of August, he set out, and on the 12th arrived within four miles of the town, separated from it by the river Sái.

Hope Grant learns the strength of the rebels at Sultánpúr,

Horsford having ascertained by means of a reconnaissance that the enemy were in force, that the river was peculiarly favourable for defence, and that his passage would be disputed, reported that state of affairs to Hope Grant. Almost simultaneously with the arrival of that report, Hope Grant received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, informing him that the Sultánpúr rebels numbered fourteen thousand men, that they had fifteen guns, and that it was advisable that he should reinforce Horsford with the Rifle Brigade.

and pushes on to aid Horsford.

Nothing loth, Hope Grant ordered up the 53rd from Dariábád, and taking the rifles with him pressed forward to reinforce Horsford. He reached that officer on the 24th of August, and at once changing the position of the British camp, resolved to cross the following morning. The remainder of that day he employed in making rafts. On these, early on the morning of the 25th, he sent over the 1st Madras fusiliers, and the 5th Panjáb infantry. Then, though with great difficulty and after one or two mishaps, he landed on the opposite bank two 9-pounder guns. This force, commanded by Colonel Gelwey, then

gallantly attacked and carried two villages in his front, at a point where the river forms a bend and where the rebels had a picket. The rifles were sent over in support of this advanced party.

Book XV. Chapter II. 1858. August. After crossing the river, and a series of combats, the rebels abandon Sultánpúr.

It was not till the 27th of August that the main body had completed the passage of the river, and even then the heavy guns, artillery park, hospital, and a wing of the 53rd were left on the further bank. Nor did the British force even then attack. On the evening of the 28th, however, the rebels assailed that force, and after a sharp fight were repulsed. They then fled and abandoned Sultánpúr to the conqueror.

The marches and counter-marches of the rebels.

It is difficult to follow the Oudh rebels in their continuous marches and counter-marches. But few of the old sepoys, the men who had been the backbone of the mutiny, were now among them. Their fluctuating numbers were composed almost entirely of the adherents and vassals of the tálúkdárs and landowners of the province, aided by the scum of the population, the refuse of the jails. Their movements were extremely irregular. One day they appeared to retire into Ámethi, a fort twenty-five miles from Sultánpúr, seven miles in circumference, composed of mud walls and surrounded by a jungle, the residence of Lál Madho Singh, a young chief determined in his hostility to the British; then they were heard of near Mozaffarnaggar, then at Rámpúr Kassia.

Sir Hope Grant determines to postpone further operations.

It became evident to Sir Hope that nothing would drive them to submission but force, and he had full instructions to use it. The season, however, was unhealthy, and, having gained Sul-

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till after the rainy season.

The story returns to Rohilkhand.

tánpúr, he resolved, with the concurrence of Sir Colin Campbell, to postpone further operations till the middle of October.

Whilst the gallant soldiers of Sir Hope Grant's force are waiting, with anxious hearts, for the period of renewed action, it may not be inopportune to take a rapid glance at the events which had been occurring in the meanwhile in other parts of the disturbed province.

In the last volume* I recorded the close of the Rohilkhand campaign and the death of the Moulvi, the daring Ahmad Ulla of Faizábád. But although the campaign was terminated, some time elapsed before the border-lands of Oudh and of Rohilkhand were completely pacified. Many landowners on both sides of the border resented the conduct of the rájá of Powáin, and took up arms to punish, if they could, an act which they regarded as treachery in its basest form. It soon appeared, however, that the rebels could not agree amongst themselves, and they soon began to act independently of each other. One leader, named Nizám Áli Khán, with a considerable following, threatened the station of Philibít. Then there appeared in the field the whilom pseudo-viceroy of the province, the treacherous pensioner Khán Bahádur Khán, with about four thousand followers; the nawáb of Farakhábád with five thousand; and a third under Wiláyat Sháh with three thousand. The authorities, however, were on their guard. They sent a small force, including

Nizám Á'lí Khán.

Khán Bahádur Khán.

Farakhábád nawáb.

Wiláyat Sháh.

* Vol ii. pages 540–44.

the cavalry commanded by the gallant de Kantzow, to protect Powáin, and they stimulated the corpulent rája of that place to keep his levies, two thousand strong, in constant training. This measure saved Powáin; but in other parts of Rohilkhand it was found difficult to put down disorder. Towards the end of August, indeed, Áli Khán Mewáti, acting in concert with the Nizám Áli Khán above alluded to, approached so near Philibít as to menace Núriah, a large village ten miles only from that British military post.

The rebels menace Núriah.

The force at Philibít was commanded by Captain Robert Larkins, 17th Panjáb infantry. It consisted of the 2nd Panjáb cavalry under Captain Sam Browne,* the 17th Panjáb infantry† under Captain Larkins, the 24th Panjáb pioneers‡ under Ensign Chalmers, and a detachment of Kemáon levies under Lieutenant Cunliffe. Both Captain Larkins and the chief civil officer, Mr. Malcolm Low, considered that the occupation of Núriah by the rebels was at all hazards to be prevented. Larkins accordingly detached one hundred men of the 24th pioneers and one hundred 2nd Panjáb cavalry, under Lieutenant Craigie, to hold that village, Mr. Low accompanying the party.

Larkins sends a body of men under Craigie to hold the village.

Craigie—who, as senior officer commanded—reached Núriah on the 28th of August. On the

* Now Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne, V.C., K.C.B.
† Now the 25th native infantry.
‡ Now the 32nd native infantry.

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Craigie encounters the rebels,

and compels them to fall back.

Browne is sent to reinforce Craigie.

Browne reconnoitres,

and resolves to make a detour and attack the rebels.

following morning the rebel chiefs I have named came down with three guns, three hundred infantry, and one hundred cavalry to attack the place. Craigie made excellent dispositions to meet them outside the town, and checked their advance. So well did the rebels fight, however, that when nineteen of their cavalry met in a hand-to-hand encounter a party of the 2nd Panjáb cavalry, under Rassaidár Hakdád Khán, fourteen of the nineteen were killed fighting. This occurred on the left flank. On the right flank Craigie repulsed them in person. They then fell back on Sirpúrah, three miles distant.

Larkins, hearing at Philibít the enemy's fire, thought it advisable to reinforce Craigie. Accordingly he directed one hundred and fifty 2nd Panjáb cavalry, one hundred and seventy-five 17th Panjáb infantry, and one hundred Kamáon levies to proceed at once, under the orders of Captain Sam Browne, to Núriah. Browne set off at once, and reached Núriah at 4 o'clock that evening.

He at once reconnoitred the rebel position. It was on a rising ground or mound, amid the débris of the ruined village of Sirpúrah, separated from Núriah by an inundated tract of country nearly a mile in width, the inundating water varying from one to two feet. From that side Browne saw that it was impossible to attack. It was possible, however, to assail the position from the other side. The energetic magistrate, Mr. Malcolm Low, having procured him guides in the persons of an old woman and a boy, Browne

started at midnight to make the détour necessary for the success of his plan.

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Taking with him two hundred and thirty Panjáb cavalry, one hundred and fifty 17th native infantry, one hundred 24th pioneers, and one hundred Kemáon levies, Browne worked round the enemy's right flank, and by daybreak reached a position on his left rear admirably adapted for his purpose. The fatigue had been great, and Browne halted for a few minutes to refresh men and horses. Whilst so halting the rebels discovered him, and at once made preparations to resist him, bringing three 9-pounders to bear on his advance, and having one on their proper right flank. There was no time for further rest; so Browne at once moved forward.

He gains a position on the left rear of the rebels when he is discovered.

He then advances.

Covering his front with skirmishers, and giving them strict orders not to fire, but to use the bayonet only, Browne pushed his infantry forward through some grass jungle which served to screen their movements. Very soon, however, the enemy's guns began to play on his cavalry on the left, which were marching on the open road. Browne, who was with that cavalry, seeing the effect which one of them, fired with grape at eighty yards, was producing, galloped up to it, accompanied only by an orderly, and at once engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand encounter with the gunners, hoping to prevent them working their piece till the skirmishers should come up. Surrounded by the enemy, who attacked him with great fierceness, Browne attained his object. He did prevent the working

The enemy's guns annoy the cavalry.

Browne charges the gunners.

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of the gun until the skirmishers came up and relieved him. In the fight, however, he was first wounded on the knee; immediately afterwards his left arm was severed at the shoulder. As he received this terrible wound, his horse, struck in the face, reared up and fell back on him. Just then the Wúrdí major of his regiment, followed by two or three others, rushed in, and, though the former was severely wounded, these men kept the rebels at bay, and saved their commanding officer. Immediately afterwards the infantry came up, bayoneted the gunners, and secured the gun which Browne had captured.*

Is severely wounded, but gains his point.

Meanwhile, the infantry push on.

To go back for a moment. Whilst Browne was thus engaging the gunners, the skirmishers had advanced steadily without firing a shot until close to the position, when a body of the enemy's infantry lying in the grass jumped up and fired. On this the skirmishers, firing a volley, dashed

* Few more gallant deeds than this were performed during the war. Mr. Malcolm Law, who was near Browne at the time, considered the daring act of prowess to have been the means of preventing the rebel gunners reloading and firing upon the infantry at the most critical period of the whole action. Sir William Mansfield stated that in his opinion and in that of Sir Colin, the affair was "very brilliant," and as "quite one of the best things we have seen of the sort, the attack by you having been made in a most soldierly manner and *secundum artem*." Captain Browne received the Victoria Cross for his daring. The reputation of this gallant officer as a man of great ability and conduct had already been made, and he has subsequently shown himself as qualified to conduct large operations in the field as he was willing to risk his life in the cause of duty.

on, secured the gun, and, aided by the supports and reserve, carried the position.

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The cavalry on the right, meanwhile, had pushed on and, simultaneously with their comrades on the left, attacked the enemy's flank, and captured one gun. This completed their discomfiture. They broke and fled into the jungle, followed, as far as it was possible to follow them, by the victorious horsemen. Their loss had been heavy, amounting to three hundred men killed, their four guns, their ammunition, and their stores. The two rebel leaders escaped, though one of them, Nizám A'li Khán, had been wounded.

Complete defeat of the rebels.

In eastern Oudh, near Allahábád, there were about this time many bold and daring tálúkdárs, the men who had already caused trouble to Longden at Azamgarh, and who were at this time exerting themselves to the utmost to stimulate opposition to the British. They went so far, indeed, as to threaten with condign punishment any member of their class who should submit to or accept the friendship of the common enemy. On these threats they acted. Bábú Rámparshád Singh, a tálúkdár of Soráon who had displayed British sympathies, was attacked by some of these confederated rebels, who burned his house, sacked the town, and took himself and his family prisoners. On the intelligence of this outrage reaching Allahábád Lord Canning hastily organised a small force, to be designated the Soráon field force, composed of two hundred and sixty of the 32nd foot, eighty of the 54th foot, the 7th

Eastern Oudh.

Soráon is sacked by the rebels.

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A British force is sent under Berkeley to clear the district.

Panjáb infantry, seventy men Brasyer's Sikhs, fifty-two troopers 6th Madras light cavalry, sixty sabres Láhor light horse, detachments of horse and foot artillery, and nine guns and mortars, and placed them under the command of Brigadier Berkeley, C.B., with directions to reassert British authority in that part of the country.

Daháin

Berkeley crossed the Ganges on the 12th of July, and on the 14th came in sight of a body of rebels at Daháin. Daháin was not properly a fort. It was rather a large area of jungle surrounded by a dilapidated earthen wall and ditch, and fenced with a thorny abattis. In the centre of the enclosure was a square brick-house. On Berkeley's approach the rebels retired within the enclosure, allowing the British to occupy the village and the jungle outside without opposition. Berkeley waited for the arrival of his heavy guns, and then opened fire; but the result, owing to the dense nature of the jungle, not being satisfactory, he sent on his infantry to storm. The result was entirely successful. About two hundred and fifty rebels were killed in the ditch alone; as many more, chased through the jungle, were cut down by the cavalry and the horse artillery.

Is captured by Berkeley.

Description of Soráon.

Resting on the 15th, Berkeley proceeded on the 16th to the fort of Tirúl, seven miles north of Soráon. He found this fort in the middle of an impenetrable thorny jungle, through which a few paths were cut in directions only known to the natives of the place; and it had walls, bastions, ditches, escarps, like a miniature fortress,

with a stronghold in the centre, into which the garrison could retire on being closely pressed. There were only three guns on the bastions, but the walls were loop-holed for musketry. So thick was the jungle around, that Berkeley could scarcely gain a view of the fort; he therefore deemed it prudent to employ his mortars and a 24-pounder before sending in his infantry. This plan succeeded. The enemy evacuated the place during the night, leaving behind them their three guns and their gun-ammunition. The fort was then destroyed.

Book V. Chapter II. 1858. July. Under pressure the rebels evacuate it.

By a somewhat similar train of operations, Berkeley captured and destroyed a fort at Bhairpúr. Having thus completed the work entrusted to him, he returned with his field force to Allahábád. After a brief interval, he was again sent out to demolish other forts in Oudh at distances accessible from Allahábád. In this manner he extended his force as far as Partábgarh. Pushing on, then, to Sultánpúr, he touched Hope Grant's force, and they united the line of posts direct from Allahábád to Lakhnao.

Berkeley clears the forts of Oudh as far as Partábgarh and touches Hope Grant's force at Sultánpúr.

The force under Rowcroft, and the *Pearl* brigade acting with it under Captain Sotheby, whom we left at A'mórha at the end of April, had fallen back on Captainganj. In the interval there was occasional sharp fighting. On the 9th of June a detachment of both services, led by Major Cox, the sailors commanded by Lieutenant Turnour, and some twenty marines by Lieutenant Pym, marched on A'mórha, where, it had been ascertained, Muhammad Husén had arrived in

Rowcroft's force and the *Pearl* brigade

Book XV. Chapter II. 1858. June-Aug.

force. Cox divided his detachments into two parts; one led by himself, the other—to which were attached the sailors and marines—by Major J. F. Richardson. Setting out at 2 o'clock in the morning, and arriving at daybreak within a mile of Ámórha, they were suddenly met by a heavy fire from skirmishers thrown out by the rebels. Pym and the marines drove these in: Cox then opened fire with his guns. Then foiling an attempt made to outflank him, he drove the rebels out of the place.

Defeat the rebels at Amorha

and Harriah.

Nine days later a larger detachment of Rowcroft's force again attacked the same rebel leader at the head of four thousand men at Harriah, and inflicted on him a defeat so crushing that he fled from that part of the country. A little later Rowcroft moved with his force to Hír, in the Gorákhpúr district, to guard the frontier until the advance of Sir Hope Grant in force should sweep the districts below him.

Rowcroft then falls back on Hir.

Isolated actions in the more western part of the province produced results not less beneficial. It happened that on the 7th of August a rebel band, the advance of the force of the rebel Firoz Sháh, attacked the station of Mohan, on the river Sái, seventeen miles from Lakhnao on the road to Fathgarh. Mohan was one of the places in which British rule had been re-established, and was at the time the head-quarters of the Deputy Commissioner of the district, Mr. Pat Carnegy, already mentioned in these pages.*

The rebels attack Mohan.

* Vol. ii. page 339.

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At Mr. Carnegy's disposal was a native police battalion. The river Sái, close to Mohan, was traversed by a bridge. On the evening of the 7th of August the rebel band referred to, numbering two hundred infantry and one hundred and fifty cavalry—the advance guard of a larger force—drove in the police pickets, crossed the bridge, and made every preparation to attack the town the following morning.

Evelegh marches against them.

Information of this attack reached Colonel Evelegh, C.B., commanding at Nawábganj, at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. An hour later Evelegh set off with three hundred Sikh cavalry under Godby, two horse-artillery guns, twenty-five gunners mounted, to support the guns, and twelve rank and file of the 20th foot, mounted on limbers, and reached a point three miles from Mohan. Conceiving that were he to continue his direct advance the rebels would acquire information of his approach, Evelegh turned off from that point to the village of Husénganj—a village between Mohan and Rassúlábád, the general headquarters of Firoz Sháh, and the occupation of which would cut the rebels' line of retreat. His foresight was justified; for on coming within a mile of Húsénganj, he perceived the rebels falling back on that place from Mohan. He immediately pursued them with his small force, but finding that his guns could not travel fast enough to overtake them, he pushed forward his cavalry under Godby. The result was satisfactory. Godby laid low forty-five of the rebels and

and defeats them.

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1857. July.

captured their only gun, a brass 3-pounder, together with one elephant and two camels.*

Nearer to Lakhnao, between the Rohilkhand frontier and that city, a gallant deed performed by the Kavanagh whose immortal heroism was recorded in the last volume,† tended greatly to the pacification of the district in which it occurred.

Kavanagh and Dawson capture Sandéla.

Of the district of Malhiábád, twelve miles north-west of the capital, Mr. Kavanagh was Assistant Commissioner. Eighteen miles further to the north-west, lay the town of Sandéla, occupied chiefly by Patháns, possessing many brick-built houses and a small mud fort, and situated in a level plain. The Patháns of this place had displayed a determined hostility to the British, and had lost no opportunity to threaten their posts and to intercept their communications. It occurred to Kavanagh, a daring man, fertile in resources and full of the love of adventure, that it would be possible to put an end to these excesses by the capture of the town. He proposed, therefore, to Captain Dawson, commanding one of the new police levies, to attack Sandéla. Dawson agreed. The place was stormed on the 30th of July, the rebels were driven out, and the town remained in the occupation of the British. Kavanagh displayed great daring on this occasion. Nor was his tact inferior to his courage. By a ready display of that quality, he won over several

* This action had the effect of clearing the rebels from many of the districts of Unáo and Mallaon.

† Vol. ii. page 163.

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zamindárs to the British cause, and even engaged them to maintain a number of matchlockmen at their own expense for its support.

The Oudh banks of the Ganges.

The banks of the Ganges in Oudh, even so far down as Allahábád, required during these three months of July, August, and September, very close watching. They were infested by bands of rebels, some of whom pillaged the villages in Oudh; others, crossing the river, attacked and plundered those in British territory. To remedy this evil, river steamers were employed during the rainy season, when the river was navigable. On one occasion, information having reached the authorities, towards the end of July, that the rebels had collected many boats, ready, whenever a favourable opportunity should offer, to cross into British territory, a force of one hundred and twenty Sikhs and two guns was despatched in a steamer to destroy the boats. They did destroy some twenty boats, but the forts which the rebels occupied were too well armed and too strong to be attacked. The expedition against these was deferred, but on several occasions in August and September small detachments were sent up the river to check the predatory instincts of the rebels, and in most cases this object was accomplished.

Position in Oudh occupied by the rebels.

At the period at which we have arrived, the end of September 1858, the position occupied by the British in Oudh was very peculiar. They held a belt of country right across the centre of the province, from east to west; whilst the districts north and south of that belt were

Book XV. Chapter II. 1858. October.

either held by the rebels or were greatly troubled by them. North of the belt were the Bégam, Mammú Khán, Firoz Sháh, Hardat Singh, and leaders less notorious, with their followers; south of it were Béni Mádhú, Jaumant Singh, Hariehand, and others. Besides these, in the north-eastern corner of the province, near the Nipál frontier, Náná Sáhib and his adherents were believed to rest.

The rebels attack Sandíla.

In October the cessation of the rains made the movement of troops again possible. The rebels were the first to take advantage of the change of season. On the 3rd of October Hariehand with six thousand men and eight guns, crossed the Gúmtí ten miles north of Sandíla. His force, increased by the junction of several zamindárs and their following to twelve thousand men and twelve guns, arrived within three miles of that post on the morning of the 4th. Sandíla was occupied by the Captain Dawson already spoken of with his newly raised police battalions and other infantry levies, one thousand four hundred strong, and five hundred irregular cavalry levies. On the approach of the rebels in such overwhelming force, Dawson placed his infantry in the small mud fort and sent his cavalry to Nalliábád. He kept the rebels at bay till the 6th, when Major Maynard, with a detachment of the 88th foot, two 9-pounder guns, two 2½-inch mortars, two hundred and fifty police cavalry, and six hundred police foot, joined him, taking up the five hundred cavalry on the way. Maynard at once attacked the rebels and drove

are held in check by Dawson.

driven back by Maynard,

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them to Pamá, about four miles distant, where they took up a very strong position. On the evening of the 7th, Brigadier Barker reached Sandíla with a strong column,* attacked the rebels on the morning of the 8th, and, after a desperate battle, completely defeated them. His loss, however, was severe, being eighty-two of all ranks killed and wounded. Major Seymour, Queen's Bays, Major Maynard, whose charger was hacked to death with tulwars when in the thick of the fight, and Lieutenant Green, of the Rifle Brigade, who received thirteen wounds, including the loss of his left arm and the thumb of his right hand, greatly distinguished themselves on this occasion. The rebels lost a large number, especially in the pursuit, which promptly followed on the victory. A few days later, after a hard day's fight, accompanied by many casualties, the fort of Birwah fell into the hands of the victors.

and completely defeated by Barker.

Gallantry of Seymour, of Maynard, of Green.

About the same time, the 5th of October, Brigadier Evelegh defeated the rebels at Miángani, between Lakhnao and Kánhpúr, took two guns, and put about two hundred of them *hors de combat*; and on the 8th Sir Thomas Seaton added to his former laurels by intercepting a large body of the rebels on the frontier near Shahjahánpúr, killing three hundred of them, and taking three guns. The same day an attack

Successes of Evelegh and Seaton.

* Two field batteries, two squadrons Queen's Bays, six hundred and seventy native cavalry sabres, two hundred and fifty 88th foot, one hundred 3rd battalion Rifle Brigade, 900 police battalion.

Book V. Chapter II. 1858. October. Lord Clyde's plan of pacification.

upón Powáin was repulsed by the rájá of that place, though with trifling loss.

These were the small actions which indicated the reopening of the campaign. The comprehensive plan which the Commander-in-Chief, now become Lord Clyde, had drawn up during his stay at Allahábád, came into operation only on the 15th of October. This plan was devised on the principle of acting by columns in all the districts simultaneously, so that, driven out of one district, the rebels might not be able, as they had previously, to take refuge in another. Thus, by Lord Clyde's plan, one column was drawn from Rohilkhand for operations in the north-west of Oudh, clearing Mohamdi, Náorangábád, and similar places of importance, and proceeding then to establish itself at Sitápúr. For operations in the Baiswára country four brigades were detailed. Another column was posted to guard the Doáb; another to guard the Kánhpúr road; whilst other smaller columns starting from Lakhnao, Nawábganj, Daríábád, and Faizábád were ordered to be kept movable.

The plan more in detail.

The reader will at once conceive the general purport of the plan. The brigades detailed for duty in the Baiswára country would occupy the whole of the Faizábád district between the Ganges and the Ghághrá. Pushing then northward they would reconquer the country between the Ghághrá and the Rápti, holding out a hand to Rowcroft's force, on their right, in the Gorákhpúr district. Simultaneously the Rohilkhand force would reconquer Sitápúr and the places in the

Khairábád division. Then, with his right firmly fixed, as a pivot, at Balrámpúr and a point beyond the Rápti, Lord Clyde would wheel his main force round to the right till its left point should touch the Rohilkhand column, when the whole, sweeping onwards, would clear the northernmost parts of the province, and drive the surviving rebels, who should refuse to surrender, into the jungles of the kingdom of Nipál.

Instructions sent to Hope.

On the 23rd of October Lord Clyde despatched instructions in the same spirit to Sir Hope Grant. That officer was directed, in co-operation with Brigadiers Pinickney and Wetherall, to make a circuit, moving up the Gúmti as far as Jagdispúr, then turning sharp to his left and moving southward by Jáis, place himself between Parsidápúr and A'methi, dispersing any rebels on his way. The brigadiers mentioned received at the same time detailed instructions as to their action so as to make it co-operate with Sir Hope's movement and to ensure the success of the general plan.

Wetherall marches on Rámpúr Kussia.

Hope Grant, in obedience to these instructions, started immediately, arranging with Brigadier Wetherall, who was marching up from Sariám to join him on the 4th of November, and attack the fort of Rámpúr Kússia, held by an active partisan named Rám Ghúlám Singh. But Wetherall, reaching the vicinity of Rámpúr Kússia on the morning of the 3rd, resolved, despite of the orders he had received to wait for Sir Hope, to assail the place at once. Fortune greatly favoured him. Rámpúr Kússia was in very deed a stronghold.

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1858. November.

Description of the place.

Its outer fortification, formed of mud ramparts, was three miles in circumference. Within this, surrounded up to the outer works by a dense jungle, was another fort, and within this again a stone building. So much for the interior. But beyond, and surrounding the outer ramparts, there was again a dense jungle in every direction save in that of the north-west; and beyond the ramparts was a formidable abattis. The ditch was deep but narrow, and there were rifle-pits in the part which, in fortification, would correspond to the berm.* It happened, however, that on one side the ditch and ramparts had not, for a very small space, been completed, and it fortunately happened that Wetherall lighted on this particular spot. At any other point he would certainly have been repulsed, but at this he effected an entrance, and carried the place and its twenty-three guns, with a loss of seventy-eight men killed and wounded. The rebels lost about three hundred.

Wetherall lights upon an unguarded point and takes the place.

Hope Grant first heard of Wetherall's success on the afternoon of the 3rd. He at once joined him at Rámpúr Kússia. Thence, in pursuance of instructions, he proceeded to A'methi. This fort likewise was almost covered by jungle. It was garrisoned by four thousand men, one thousand five hundred of them sepoys, and thirty guns. Grant arrived within two miles of its north-eastern face at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 7th of November. A reconnaissance

A'methi surrounded by the British.

* Sir Hope Grant's *Incidents in the Sepoy War.*

promptly made, assured him that the rebels were bent on resistance. On returning from this reconnaissance he found a messenger from Lord Clyde, stating that he was encamped three miles to the east of the fort. The Commander-in-Chief, in effect, having failed to induce the rájá of A'methi to come to terms, had marched from Pertábgarh on the 6th, to bring him to reason. This active measure succeeded. The rájá rode into camp on the morning of the 8th, and tendered his submission, yielding his stronghold.

1858. November. A'methi surrenders to Lord Clyde.

A'methi taken, Grant, carrying out the orders of Lord Clyde, proceeded to Shankarpúr to attack it from the north, whilst Wetherall and Pinckney should invest it on the east and south, and Eveleigh on the west. In performing his part of the combined movement Eveleigh was delayed by the bad roads and the opposition of the rebels. He defeated these on the 8th at Morár Máu, and on the 9th he took the fort of Simri, but these operations so delayed him that he was unable to arrive in time to take up a position to cut off the retreat of the chief of Shankarpúr and his followers.

Shankarpúr is invested on three sides.

This chief was no other than Béni Mádho, and he had with him a following estimated at fifteen thousand men. The Commander-in-Chief, anxious to avoid bloodshed, had offered him very favourable terms if he would surrender. Béni Mádho had returned the proud reply that he would yield his fort as he could not defend it, but that he would not yield himself as he belonged to his king! That night he and his followers evacu-

The fort surrenders,

but Béni Mádho escapes.

Book XV. Chapter II. 1858. Nov.-Dec.

ated the fort by its uninvested face. Not, however, with the freedom from molestation they had hoped for. Fleeing hastily to Dúndia Khéra they were encountered on the way by Eveleigh and defeated, with the loss of three of their guns.

And is encountered and beaten by Eveleigh on his retreat.

Converging marches of Grant.

Shankarpúr was at once occupied by Grant, who then marched on the Ghághrá, which he crossed in face of the rebels, led by the rája of Gonda and Méhndi Húsén, on the 27th of November, pursued the enemy twenty-four miles, and captured four guns. Marching thence towards Rái Baréli, he beat the rebels again at Machlígáon on the 4th of December, taking two guns, reached the fort of Banhassia, whence he extracted five guns, on the 5th, Gonda on the 9th, and Balrámpúr on the 16th. Lord Clyde, meanwhile, having learned the direction taken by Béni Mádho, took Eveleigh's brigade with him, and marched on Dúndia Khéra, and attacked the chief on the 24th of November and completely defeated him, taking all his guns. Béni Mádho, however, escaped.

Lord Clyde,

and the other columns.

The other columns had by this time formed a complete cordon round the circumference of eastern Oudh. They now closed in, and marching from their different points of departure, and on a common centre, traversed the whole territory, demolishing forts and strongholds, and re-establishing the civil power as they advanced.

The column from Baréli

Whilst the east was being thus pacified, the Baréli column, commanded by Colin Troup, employed all its efforts to bring about a similar

result on the western side. Crossing the Rohilkhand frontier in the end of October, Troup advanced on Sitápúr, dispersed the talúkdárs who attempted to oppose him in the vicinity of that place, captured Mithóli on the 8th, and gave a final defeat to the rebels at Méhndi on the 18th of November. Columns, meanwhile, under Gordon, Carmichael, and Horsford, were engaged in clearing the country south of the Ghágrá, and before these the irreconcileable chiefs, men of the stamp of Béni Mádho, and Béni Mádho himself, fell back.

Book V. Chapter I. 1858. Nov.–Dec. takes up his position in the converging line, and sweeps chiefs before it.

Hope Grant, I have said, had reached Balrámpúr on the 16th of December. There he learned that Bálá Ráo, brother of Náná Sáhib, had taken refuge in the fort of Túlsipúr, twelve miles distant, with a number of followers and eight guns, and that he had been joined there by Muhammad Húsén, and his adherents. Grant at once directed Rowcroft to move from his position at Hír, and, reinforcing him with the 53rd, directed him to attack Túlsipúr. Rowcroft obeyed orders, found the enemy drawn up to receive him, beat them after a feeble resistance, but could not pursue them for want of cavalry. Hope Grant, fearing lest the rebels should escape into the Gorákhpúr country, then took up the pursuit himself, and cutting off Bálá Ráo from Gorákhpúr, ascertained that he had retreated with six thousand men and fifteen guns along the margins of the jungle to a place near Kandakót, where there was a half-ruined fort at the confluence of two rivers. Manœuvring with great

Hope Grant reinforces Rowcroft,

and sweeps the rebels into Nipál.

Book XV. Chapter II.

1859. January.

skill, and placing his columns in a position so that escape to any other quarter but Nipál was impossible, Grant moved against them on the 4th of January 1859, and drove them across the border, taking all their guns.

On his side,

Whilst Grant was thus engaged, Lord Clyde, sending Evelegh to the west to join Troup, was engaged in sweeping the country from the points occupied by his troops towards the Nipál frontier. Moving on to Sikrora, with Grant's force forming his right, touching, as we have seen, Rowcroft's force on the extreme right, and which formed, as it were, the pivot, Lord Clyde drove the Bégam and Náná Sáhib before him from Bondi and Baraitch; then advancing on Nanpára, cleared the country between it and the Ghághrá; then marching on Bánki, close to the Nipál frontier, he surprised the camp of the rebels, defeated them with great slaughter, and drove them into Nipál. This action and that of Hope Grant at Túlsipúr, referred to in the preceding paragraph, cleared of Oudh the last remnants of the rebels. Sir William Mansfield wrote that he considered the mutiny crushed out; and Lord Clyde, sharing that opinion, left the province under the military care of Sir Hope Grant, instructing him to keep the frontier of the border of Nipál closely shut up, so as to prevent, if possible, the escape of any rebels into the lower country.

Lord Clyde overlooks the remaining rebels into Nipál.

Considering the mutiny crushed, he makes over command to Hope Grant and leaves.

The spirit of the rebels is not, however, extinguished.

The spirit, however, which had animated the rebel chieftains to sustain against the British a struggle which, during six months at least,

had offered not a single ray of success, was not entirely extinguished. Book XI. Chapter II.

1858.

Sir Hope Grant, taking leave of the Commander-in-Chief, proceeded to join Brigadier Horsford's force on the Rápti. An incident had occurred just before his arrival, which showed the great care required in attempting to ford Indian rivers. Horsford had driven a strong rebel force across that river, and in fording it in pursuit of them, many men of the 7th hussars and the 1st Panjáb cavalry had been swept away by the force of the current and were lost. Amongst these was Major Home of the 7th hussars. After some search his body was drawn out of a deep hole, his hands having a fast grip of two of the rebels, whilst the bodies of two troopers who perished with him were found, each with his hands clutching a rebel sowar! * Danger of fording Indian rivers.

From one side only, from the side of Nipál, was further danger to be apprehended. On this side the frontier had a length of about a hundred miles, and a hundred miles of mixed hill and jungle; and with such a frontier it was always possible that, despite the best dispositions on both sides, the strictest precautions would be evaded. The Nipál frontier.

At this crisis the real ruler of Nipál, the Mahárája Jang Bahádur, behaved with the loyalty that had throughout characterised his dealings with the British. Not only did he inform the armed rebels who had crossed the border that he would afford them no protection, but he allowed British troops Loyalty of Jang Bahádur.

* Grant's *Incidents in the Sepoy War.*

Book XV. Chapter II. 1859.

to cross the border to disarm any considerable body there assembled. Under this permission, Brigadier Horsford, early in the year, entered the Sonar valley, and crossing the Rápti at Sidonia ghát, came upon a body of rebels and captured fourteen guns; and, later on, Colonel Kelly, of the 34th, caused the surrender of six guns, after having chased the rebels with great loss under the hills. Under the pressure thus exercised, a moiety of the fifty thousand who had crossed into Nipál, one by one threw away their arms, and returned to their homes, trusting they would be allowed to settle down unmolested.

Gradual dispersion of the rebels.

A few more hardened

A few, more hardened in crime and therefore more hopeless of mercy, still continued to hold out, and some of these—the regiments which had perpetrated the Kánhpúr massacre, the 1st, the 53rd, and the 56th native infantry, led by Gújádar Singh, a rebel whose hate to the British had not been lessened by the loss of an arm when fighting against them—succeeded in crossing the border, in marching on Sikrora, and filching thence two elephants, and finally, when pursued from that place by Colonel Walker and the Queen's Bays, with two guns, in taking up a position at Bangáon, a small dilapidated fort on the river Naddi, at the entrance of the Ghúnglé jungles. There, at the end of April 1859, Colonel Walker, reinforced by four hundred men of the 53rd, and sixty of the 1st Sikh cavalry, attacked and completely defeated them.

Invade Oudh

Rebels are defeated.

Grant drives the remainder

Notwithstanding that the hot weather had set in, Sir Hope Grant deemed it of pressing impor-

PROVINCES.

Book V. Chapter I. 1859.

time to drive the remainder of the rebels from the jungles. Learning that the last remnant of their disorganised forces was at the Sérwa pass, Grant moved against them in person, dislodged them by a turning movement, and then pursued them across the hills. The pursuit gave ample evidence of the state of exhaustion to which the enemy had been reduced. Without food and without arms and without money—for they lost here their last two guns—they were thenceforth powerless. Pursuit ceased, and Grant contented himself with posting troops at different points along the frontier as a precautionary measure. His only regret now was that Nánú Sáhib and his brother Bálá Ráo had found refuge in Nipál. To the last the former had been defiant and daring as became his assumed position. Bálá Ráo, on the other hand, had expressed penitence and denied participation in the Kánhpúr massacre.

Dispersion of the rebels from the jungles.

State of destitution to which they had been reduced.

At last, then, Oudh was at peace. The province had become British by a right far more solid and defensible than the pretext under which it had been seized in 1856. Then, the country of the ruler who had ever been true to his British overlord, was, in disregard of treaty, seized in the dead of the night, against the wishes alike of the sovereign and the people. Fifteen months experience of British rule, administered by doctrinaires who preferred the enforcement of their own theories to considerations of justice and policy, far from reconciling the people to their new master, had caused them to regret the sovereigns whom the British had expelled because of their mis-

Oudh finally becomes British.

Defects of the first rule.

Book XV. Chapter II. 1859.

government of that very people. They hailed, then, the opportunity, ingeniously fomented by the more influential of their countrymen, which seemed to promise them a relief from regulations which perplexed and from changes which irritated them. They joined in the revolt inaugurated by their brethren the sepoys—the majority of them Oudh men—and fought for independence. How pertinaciously they waged the contest has been told in these pages. No other part of India gave an example of a resistance so determined, so prolonged, as did Oudh. Throughout the struggle, the sense of the injustice perpetrated in 1856 steeled the hearts of its people and strengthened their resolution. If on some occasions they too precipitately fled, it was in the hope of renewing the struggle another day. When, finally, the sweep made over Oudh by Lord Clyde forced the remnant of the fighting class to take refuge in the jungles of Nipál, the survivors preferred starvation to surrender.* The agricultural population, the tálúkdárs, the landowners, the traders, accepted the defeat when, after that long struggle, they felt that it was final. Thenceforward Great Britain possessed Oudh by a title far sounder than that which she had set up in 1856, the title of conquest. She holds

Its consequences.

The title of 1860 better.

* "Further on," wrote Sir Hope Grant, describing his last pursuit, "we discovered two of the rebels in a state of helpless exhaustion, dying from their wounds and from starvation. It was sad to see many of the poor wives of the sepoys, who had accompanied their husbands, deserted and left to die on the bare ground," and more to the same effect.

it now on a basis even stronger, on the basis of the affections of a people whom she has conciliated and of a territorial aristocracy whose rights, whilst defining, and, in some instances, curtailing, she has made inalienable.

Book XV. Chapter [illegible]

1857. December [illegible]

that of 1890 the best of all.

BOOK XV.

CHAPTER III.

The Panjáb.

Before proceeding to recount the other great military measure with which the story of the mutiny fitly closes, it is necessary that I should ask the reader to accompany me to the Panjáb to see how the fall of Dehlí, made possible by the noble self-denial of Sir John Lawrence, affected that border province. From the Panjáb the reader will return through the pacified provinces of the north-west to Ágra, in close vicinity to that Gwáliár but just reconquered by Sir Hugh Rose. In the succeeding book I shall record the most romantic episode in the history—the pursuit, from many starting points and by many independent columns, of the famous Tántia Topi.

Sir John Lawrence's position early in September 1857.

The decision at which Sir John Lawrence had arrived at the end of July 1857, to denude the Panjáb of troops in order to reinforce General Wilson's army before Dehlí, had not been arrived at without most serious and anxious considera-

tion. On the one side he had had before him General Wilson's letter announcing that unless he were reinforced from the Panjáb he would not be able to maintain his position, still less to assault the city; and the inner certainty that if General Wilson were to raise the siege of Dehlí the Panjáb would rise in insurrection. On the other he had the knowledge that the effective force of Europeans at his dispósal, including the sick and convalescent, but not including the force under Nicholson, did not exceed four thousand men, and that these were not more than sufficient to maintain order in the Panjáb, even whilst the general feeling of the Panjábis should remain loyal; most insufficient should a striking reverse of fortune, such as the raising of the siege of Dehlí, turn the Panjábis against him. He had before him, in fact, a choice of two risks—the risk of a general rising in the Panjáb, caused by the effect which would certainly be produced in the minds of the Panjábis by a retreat from Dehlí; and the risk of rebellion induced by the knowledge that the Panjáb had been denuded of British.

Comparison of the two risks, one of which he was obliged to run.

Of the two risks, the second was undoubtedly really the lesser. To a nervous man, to a man fearing responsibility, however, the second risk would present dangers affecting to such a degree his position, that he would certainly shrink from incurring them. A man of that stamp would have argued that his primary duty was to protect the Panjáb, and that he dare not, for the sake of the uncertain chance of conquering Dehlí,

risk the safety of that province. "True," he would have said, "true it is that if the march of Nicholson's column enable Wilson to take Dehlí our situation will be ameliorated. But, Wilson might be repulsed; Wilson himself thinks it is quite a toss-up whether he will succeed or whether he will fail. And if he fail, the situation of the Panjáb without Nicholson's column will be a thousand times worse than if I were to retain it. Everything, then, depends upon a very doubtful 'if'; and, responsible for the Panjáb as I am, I dare not incur the risk." But Sir John was not a nervous man, and he had no fear of responsibility. He saw clearly that the one chance of preventing the further spread of the mutiny was to strike a blow at its heart. That heart palpitated at Dehlí. Every risk, then, which strengthened the blow to be struck at Dehlí was a prelude to safety.

Reasons for his decision in favour of the bolder policy.

How Nicholson's column successfully worked out the great result aimed at has been already recorded in these pages. Dehlí fell. But in the interval Sir John Lawrence had to meet the other risk of which I have spoken. He at once made preparations to face it. Nicholson's departure at the end of July had left in the Panjáb about four thousand European troops, including those sick and convalescent. Of these, three regiments were in the Pasháwar valley, but so reduced by sickness, that for the active work of a campaign they could not muster more than a thousand bayonets; one regiment, the 24th, held Láhor; one, sent from Sindh, held Múltan and Firozpúr; another

The Panjáb when Nicholson left it at the end of July.

furnished detachments to hold Ráwal Pindi, Amritsar, and Jalandhar. Sir John first formed a movable column. For this purpose he drew from the 24th foot two to three hundred men, and joined with them four hundred Panjáb infantry and a few horsemen. The other troops alluded to being required for the purpose of watching, as at Pesháwar, the frontier, and elsewhere, the disarmed native troops, eighteen thousand strong, this column really constituted the only force which could be used in the event of an insurrection provoked by the hopes which the march of Nicholson's column might inspire in the minds of the disaffected.

Book XI. Chapter II. 1857. July–Sept. How Sir John prepared to encounter the possible evil.

The doubts which Sir John Lawrence had entertained regarding a prolonged continuation of the loyalty of the Panjábis were quickly justified. Nicholson had crossed the Satlaj on the 30th of July. Early in September it was discovered that the inhabitants of the lower Hazára country had conspired to revolt. Mostly Muhammadans, the people of that tract and of the adjoining hills had been tempted by the long successful resistance of Dehlí to plot the downfall of their English masters. They had evidently been close observers of the state of affairs, for they had arranged that their continued loyalty should depend on the turn affairs should take at Dehlí. If that royal city should not fall before the 10th of September, on that day they would revolt.

Disaffection in the lower Hazára country.

In this case to be forewarned was sufficient. Lady Lawrence, who was then at Marri, received the first intimation of the intended revolt. She

Their plot is discovered and baffled.

Book XV. Chapter III. 1857. December.

quickly entered into communication with Mr. Edward Thornton, Commissioner of Ráwal Pindi. That gentleman concerted at once with the other officials to baffle the conspirators. In a few hours their leaders were arrested, and the plot was thus nipped in the bud.

Rising in the country between Láhor and Multán.

A few weeks later, a conspiracy of a similar nature actually came to a head in the country between Láhor and Múltán. On the evening of the 14th of December, the very day on which the assault on Dehlí was delivered, a Muhammadan official of the postal department arrived at Láhor from Goghaira, and making his way to Sir John Lawrence, reported "with somewhat of a malicious twinkle of the eye,"* that all the wild tribes inhabiting the jungle country between Láhor and Múltán had risen. Questioned further, he declared that the insurgents numbered one hundred and twenty-five thousand. Though he knew this number to be greatly exaggerated, Sir John, well aware of the wild and reckless character of the tribes to whom the tale referred, felt certain that a rising of a formidable character had taken place, and that it was a case to meet which it was necessary to take prompt and decided action. Within three hours, then, of the receipt of the message, one company of European infantry, two hundred Sikh cavalry, and three guns were on their way to the headquarters of the insurgents. Small though the force was, totally inadequate to deal with any

Sir John meets

* *Panjáb Military Report*, page 16.

large body of rebels, the celerity with which it was despatched compensated for every disadvantage. The very rumour of their advance struck terror into the insurgents. They at once took refuge in the almost impenetrable jungles which formed their normal habitation. Their retreat did not in the least relax Sir John's endeavours to crush them. He sent reinforcement after reinforcement to his small column, and very speedily ensured the submission of the disaffected tribes.

Book V. Chapter III. 1857-8. and suppresses it.

This was the last attempt made by any portion of the population of the Panjáb to rise in revolt. The fall of Dehlí occurred about the same time to convince even the most disaffected that the star of England was still in the ascendant. The occurrences that followed seemed to add daily confirmation to this opinion. The relief of Lakhnao, the capture of that place, followed by the reconquest of Rohilkhand, and accompanied, almost, by Sir Hugh Rose's splendid campaign in central India, came as proof upon proof that the power which had won India was resolved to maintain it. In the latter half of the year 1858 one or two disturbances occurred which, by their exception to the general rule and by their easy suppression, served to prove the real tranquillity of the province.

Thenceforth, order throughout the Panjáb is disturbed but slightly.

In July 1858 a portion of the 18th Panjáb infantry, stationed at Déra Ishmáil Khán on the Indus, planned a mutiny. The portion referred to was composed of Sikhs, known as the Malwái Sikhs, and numbered about a hundred. For

First at Déra Ishmáil Khán.

Book V. Chapter III. 1868. July.

some cause unknown, they proposed, it was said, to murder their officers, to seize the magazine and the fort, and to re-arm the 39th regiment native infantry, which had been disarmed some time previously. Fortunately, on the 20th of July, the plot was discovered. Major Gardiner of the 10th Panjáb native infantry, and Captain Smith of the artillery, proceeded, at 10 o'clock in the evening of that day, to the lines of the regiment and summoned two of the Malwáis. One, a sepoy, came out at once, when Major Gardiner ordered him to be confined. On hearing the order he ran off, at once pursued by the guard. Just as the foremost men of the guard had reached him a Malwái jemadar rushed out, cut down one man and wounded another, and fled with the sepoy. A few days later they were captured, and the revolt, of which they had been the ringleaders, was suppressed.

Suppressed by Major Gardiner.

Múltán.

At Múltán an attempt made, the following month, to dispose quietly and peaceably of some of the disbanded regiments, terminated in bloodshed. At that station there were the 62nd and 69th native infantry and a native troop of horse artillery. These men were a source of great embarrassment to the authorities, for it was considered unsafe to re-arm them; whilst, disarmed, they required European troops to guard them. It was resolved, as a middle course, to disband them by fractions, and allow them to depart quietly to their homes. The sepoys acquiesced in the decision when the decision was made known to them. Subsequently, however, they conceived

Embarrassment caused to the authorities there by the disarmed regiments.

the impression that it was intended to attack and destroy them piecemeal on their way home. Imbued with this idea, they rose in revolt. When the mid-day gun fired on the 31st of August, they seized clubs and whatever else they could find in the shape of weapons, and rushed to attack the European and Sikh troops. Those troops consisted of one hundred and seventy artillerymen, a wing of the 1st Bombay fusiliers, the 11th Panjáb infantry, and the 1st irregular cavalry. These men were taken by surprise, and five of their number were beaten to death with clubs. Lieutenant Miles, Adjutant of the Bombay fusiliers, was dragged from his horse and killed in the same manner. As soon, however, as the Europeans and Panjábis realised the state of affairs, they came up in strength, and showed no mercy to the assailants. The 11th Panjábis were especially furious at the unprovoked attack. Of the thirteen hundred men who made it, few lived to return to their native land.

Book XV. Chapter II.

1858. August. The men of which, under the impression that they are about to be massacred, rise in revolt.

Suppression of the revolt.

Passing downwards through the territories of the loyal chieftains of the Cis-Satlaj states—of the rájá of Patiálá, who, at the very outset, cast in his lot with the British, protected the stations of Ambála and Karnál when the British army marched on Dehlí, guarded the grand trunk road from Karnál to Philor, co-operated with Van Cortlandt in Hissar, and maintained a contingent of five thousand troops for service with the British; of the rájá of Jhínd, who, emulating his brother rájá in loyalty, left his own country undefended to march against Dehlí, and in many

The reader traverses the loyal Cis-Satlaj states

and the Dehlí districts.

other ways rendered assistance to the good cause; and of the rájá of Nabhá, who aided in holding Lodiáná, supplied an escort for the siege-train, gallantly opposed the Jalandhar mutineers, and performed various other excellent services—the reader will traverse the pacified Dehlí territory till he reaches the district of Itáwah. Here he will make a short sojourn before proceeding to Ágra.

The position in Itáwah.

The Itáwah district had, in common with other districts in the Jamná Doáb, been included in the brigade command assigned to Sir Thomas Seaton.* The attention of that gallant soldier was, however, more constantly directed to the side of Rohilkhand than to the more peaceful districts to the south of him. In those districts order had been restored, and the civil administration generally re-introduced. The only chance of a renewal of disturbance in them arose from the possibility of some fugitive rebel from the country west of the Jamná endeavouring to restore the fortunes of his followers by a raid into a settled but little-guarded country. It was this possibility which occurred in the Itáwah district.

Inundated the rebels from across the Jamná.

The defeat of Sindia's rebellious troops at Gwáliár by Sir Hugh Rose had let loose on the country a number of turbulent partisans, who, escaping from the battle, had sought refuge in the ravines of the Jamná. Prominent among these was an adventurer named Rúp Singh. This man, followed by a few soldiers of the regular Gwá-

* Vol. ii. page 310.

Bár contingent, a certain number of the fugitives of Sindia's army, and other rabble, crossed the Jamná and made his appearance at A'jitmal, twenty-five miles from Itáwah, in the month of July. Though he was routed by a force sent from Itáwah and forced to flee, he did not abandon the district. And, what was of more consequence, other adventurers, animated by similar aims, sprang up about the same time, and rivalled him in his endeavours to harass and plunder the newly pacified districts. Amongst all these marauders, however, Rúp Singh maintained the pre-eminence. Often beaten, he always managed to elude his pursuers. During long periods he was not heard of in the districts. But whenever that occurred, daily accounts of robberies and stoppage of traffic on the Jamná reached the authorities. It was then discovered that Rúp Singh had taken possession of a fort at Barhi, near the junction of the Chambal with the Jamná, and that from this place he levied contributions on travellers by land and water.

Rúp Singh.

and his river piracy.

The exactions of this adventurer and of others like him reached at last so great a height that, in the month of August, a small force was despatched from Itáwah to destroy or disperse them. This force, commanded by Captain Gordon and accompanied by Mr. Lance, the able and energetic magistrate of the district, embarked in boats, and proceeded down the river towards Barhi. It had reached Garhá Kúdúr, a fortified village three miles from that place, and was still in the boats, when Rúp Singh attacked it.

A force proceeds against him from Itáwah.

Book XV. Chapter III. 1858

Gordon's men at once disembarked, in spite of opposition, drove away the rebels, re-embarked, dropped down to Barhi, and took the place. After destroying three of the bastions of the fort and rendering it generally indefensible, Lance pushed on to Chakarnaggar, the resort of another rebel chief, completely defeated the rebels there, and fixed that place as the head-quarters of a small detachment to control the country. This prompt action for a time pacified the districts. But in October Rúp Singh reappeared on the Kúári with a following of four hundred men, and attacked a British picket on the Itáwa side of that river. Mr. Allan, in command of a few levies—one hundred and forty infantry and twenty-five sowars—happened to be at the moment at Sahson, not very far from the point of Rúp Singh's action. He at once went in pursuit of him, caught him near the village of Kúári, completely defeated him, and captured all his camels and pack-cattle. The band of the rebel leader then dispersed, and from that time the Itáwah district was undisturbed.

Lance destroys Barhi.

and occupies Chakarnaggar.

Allan beats Rúp Singh on the Kúári.

when the band disperses.

In A'gra, since the relief of that place by Greathed, matters had remained fairly tranquil. In the early part of 1858 Brigadier Showers had been sent to command the district and to perform in its vicinity the work which he had so successfully accomplished in the Dehlí districts after the capture of the imperial city.* One of Showers's first acts was to work vengeance on some local

Showers at A'gra.

* Vol. ii. page 108.

rebels who had plundered the town of Báh and murdered the authorities. This was done on the 20th of March. Showers, making a long night-march, surprised the rebels at Kachrú and captured the ringleaders. But the task allotted to him and to the civil authorities in the fort was long and difficult. Not only were the districts swarming with small bands of insurgents, but the whole of the country west of the Jamná was in a state of complete insurrection. Gwáliár lies but sixty-five miles from A'gra, and it is no exaggeration to state that until the capture of Gwáliár by Sir Hugh Rose in June 1858, the influence of Mahárájá Sindia over his own people was not to be counted upon, and that A'gra was at any moment liable to an attack in force from any number of rebels.

Disturbed state of the districts.

This situation was entirely appreciated in A'gra. The guns of the fort remained pointed at the native town—the *focus* of a rebellion which might at any moment break out. Every precaution was, indeed, taken to prevent, or rather to ward off, such an event; but the fact that no European living beyond the range of the guns of the fort felt his life secure for a moment, shows how deep was the impression that a revolt was a mere question of opportunity. The slightest event might bring it on. The news of a disaster in the Doáb or in central India, the appearance on the Jamná of any one of the mutinied contingents or of Tántia Topi—any one of these eventualities would most certainly precipitate a catastrophe.

Apprehensions at A'gra.

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Throughout this crisis the civil authorities at A'gra—Colonel Fraser, Mr. E. A. Reade, and their colleagues—displayed a coolness of judgment and a readiness of resource which left nothing to be desired. The self-denying energy with which they devoted themselves to the task of reorganising where reorganisation was possible, of meeting great and pressing wants from exhausted resources, of providing all the military and civil requirements day by day, and of infusing their own brave spirit into those whose fortunes were at the lowest, deserve a far longer and a fuller notice than I am able to give them in these pages. The history of the occupants of A'gra is the history of men who, deprived of the stimulus of action, of the excitement of the camp, of the joyous sound of the clash of arms, devoted all their energies to their country, and deserved fully the credit and the glory always assigned to deeds more showy but not more meritorious.

Colonel Fraser and Mr. E. A. Reade.

Their great deserts.

Amongst the useful measures carried out during the period of which I am writing was the raising of a corps of cavalry, subsequently known as Meade's horse. At the end of the year 1857 the want of native troopers and mounted orderlies at A'gra had been greatly felt, and as there were in the fort officers whom the mutiny had deprived of their employment, it was considered advisable to raise a regiment on a military footing. The task of raising it was, in December 1857, committed to Captain R. J. Meade.

Meade's horse.

This officer, who will occupy a conspicuous

Captain R. J. Meade.

figure towards the close of the next chapter, had been for some years brigade-major of the Gwáliár contingent, and in that office had won the confidence of the officers under whom he had served. He possessed a thorough acquaintance with the language of the people, and he invariably gave all his energies to the duties confided to him. It would have been impossible for a general in command to have had under his orders an officer who would more resolutely carry into execution the orders he received.

Book VI. Chapter III. 1858 January.

A body of a hundred Sikhs and Panjábi Muhammadans formed the nucleus of this new regiment. To them Meade added some forty odd Eurasians and native Christians, chiefly drummers and bandsmen, taken from the disbanded native regiments. These were ultimately increased to eighty-five, and were formed into a Christian troop. As none of these men had ever previously crossed a horse, some of Meade's difficulties may be imagined.

Process of formation of Meade's horse.

At the end of January 1858 Meade obtained an accession of forty-five mounted Játs, sent from Rohtak under a jemadar of good family by Mr. J. Campbell, collector of that district; and a little later the new commandant induced Baldéo Singh Thákur of Jhárra to raise, from men of his class in the neighbourhood of the Chambal, a troop of seventy horsemen. In this manner the regiment was formed, and Meade was, in a short time, able to form it into six class troops.* The labour

* 1. Sikhs; 2. Panjábi Muhammadans; 3. Christians; 4. Thákurs; 5. Gwáliár Játs; 6. Mixed.

of drilling the men and teaching many of them to ride may be imagined when it is considered that none of the men had served in the cavalry or as soldiers at all. Working incessantly himself, and aided by such men as Sergeant Hartigan, V.C., of the 9th Lancers, and who subsequently gained a commission in the 16th, by Cockburn, whose gallantry has been referred to in a previous volume, and by others, Meade was able, by the beginning of March, to show a fair proportion of his regiment fit for service. Brigadier Showers, who inspected them during that month, expressed himself well satisfied alike with men and horses.

The regiment is formed,

From this time up to the beginning of June Meade's horse were constantly employed in maintaining order in the neighbourhood of Ágra, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the services they rendered in this respect to the administrative and military authorities in the place.

and renders good service in the vicinity of Ágra.

But in June the aspect of Ágra suddenly changed. How on the 1st of that month Mahárájá Sindia was attacked and driven to flight by the rebels under Tántia Topi, I have recorded in a previous chapter. The maharájá, abandoned by all but a few faithful men, fled to Dholpúr, intending to push on to Ágra. The news of his misfortune had, however, preceded him. Showers instantly despatched a squadron of Meade's horse to escort the fleeing sovereign with all honour into the capital of the north-west provinces. The maharájá, who reached Ágra on the 2nd of June, remained there till the 14th and left it that day,

Sindia, after his defeat, is escorted to Ágra.

escorted by two squadrons of Meade's horse to Dholpúr, thence to proceed to join Sir Hugh Rose, expected to reach Morár on the 16th. News of Sir Hugh's arrival on that day having reached the maharájá, he set out on the morning of the 17th, still escorted by the two squadrons and made the march, fully sixty-five miles, within twenty-four hours. The events which followed have been recorded in the preceding book.

Returning to Ágra, I have only to record the fact that on the defeat of Tántia Topi on the 17th and 19th of June at Morár and at Gwáliár Brigadier Showers sent out a detachment consisting of the 3rd Europeans and a battery of guns, to cover Bharatpúr, upon which place he believed the rebels to be marching. The demonstration was successful, inasmuch as the presence of the detachment induced Tántia Topi to bend his steps southwards. As soon as his march in that direction was definitively known, the detachment returned by way of Fathpúr Sikri to Ágra. Thenceforward that city and the districts east of the Jamná experienced the full relief caused by the crushing defeat, at a point so close to the British districts, of the one chieftain whose name up to that time had been a beacon of hope to the marauder.

Tántia Topi had fled from Gwáliár; had fled from Napier at Jáorá Alipúr; but whither? All that was known was that when he had fled from the battle field he had taken a southerly direction. Who could say how long he would

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maintain that direction? It is time now that we should follow him, and recount in some detail the measures adopted by his pursuers to overtake him.

BOOK XVI.

CHAPTER I.

TÁNTIA TOPI, accompanied by Ráo Sáhib and the nawáb of Bandá, had fled from the field of Jáora Alipúr on the 22nd of June. The information which had induced Brigadier Showers to send a detachment to cover Bharatpúr was perfectly correct, for Tántia, as soon as he had ascertained he was no longer pursued, had turned his steps north-westwards. On reaching Sarmathurá, however, he learned the dispositions made by Showers. Foiled on one side, he pushed on directly westwards, hoping to gain Jaipúr, in which place he believed a strong party was prepared to rise in his favour. Tántia Topi baffled by Showers. pushes towards Jaipúr

On this route I propose to leave him, whilst I trace the positions taken up by the several British columns upon whom his pursuit was to devolve.

I have already shown how on the 29th of June Sir Hugh Rose made over the command of his

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1858. June.

force to Brigadier-General Robert Napier, and proceeded to Bombay to assume command of the army of that presidency. The season for active military operations on the black and spongy soil of central India had now passed away, and Napier hoped before the country should harden he would be able to afford some rest to his overworked soldiers. With this object he made arrangements for comfortably housing a portion of them at Gwáliár itself. Here he quartered three squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, Meade's horse, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, the 86th foot, the 25th Bombay native infantry, a company of Bombay artillery, a company of Royal Engineers, and a light field battery. To rest at and to hold Jhánsi he detached a squadron of the 14th light dragoons, a wing of the 3rd Bombay cavalry, the 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay native infantry, a company of Bombay sappers, and three guns of the late Bhopál contingent. Brigadier Smith's brigade—which, it will be remembered, took an active part in the operations against Gwáliár—consisting of two squadrons of the 8th hussars, two of the 1st Bombay lancers, the 95th foot, the 10th Bombay native infantry, and a troop of Bombay horse artillery, marched to occupy Sipri, whilst Mayne's irregular cavalry took up their position at Gúnah.

Napier cantons his force at Gwáliár

and at Jhánsi.

Smith's brigade marches to Sipri and Gúnah.

But these were not the only troops which, in the month of July 1858, occupied positions overlooking the area on which only it was likely Tántia Topi would act. In a previous page I have recorded how General Roberts, commanding

Roberts' Rajpútáná field force

the Rajpútáná field force, had detached a column under Brigadier Smith to cover and to aid in the operations of Sir Hugh Rose. Roberts's force, diminished by the departure of that column, consisted of the 83rd foot, a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, wings of the 12th and 13th Bombay native infantry, two squadrons 8th hussars, two of the 1st Bombay lancers, three hundred Bilúchi horse, a light field battery, and a siege-train of six pieces. At the end of June Roberts lay with this force at Nasirábád. at Nasirábád.

Upon him it fell to strike the first blow against the fugitive leader. On the 27th of June Roberts learned from Captain Eden, the political agent, that Tántia Topi had sent emissaries to the disaffected party in Jaipúr assuring them that he was marching on that place, and begging them to be in readiness to join him. Roberts took his measures accordingly. On the 28th of June he set out from Nasirábád, and marching rapidly, reached Jaipúr before Tántia. Roberts marches to cover Jaipúr.

Tántia, again foiled, turned southwards, and made a raid on Tonk, followed by a light column under Colonel Holmes.* The nawáb of this place, Vizir Muhammad Khán, was by no means disposed to submit to the dictation of a Maráthá fugitive with an English army at his heels. He, therefore, shut himself in his citadel with the men he could depend upon. The remainder of his force, with four guns, he left outside with orders to face the rebels. Instead of facing them Tántia moves on Tonk followed by Holmes's light column.

* Consisting of the cavalry and horse artillery, some native infantry, and two hundred 72nd Highlanders.

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Tántia takes four guns at Tonk and moves off.

this force received them as brethren, and made over to them the four guns. With this addition to his army Tántia started off southwards to Madhopúr and Indragarh, still pursued by Holmes, and at a longer interval by Roberts.

Tántia baffled by the rise of the Chambal, moves towards Búndi.

The flight and the pursuit were alike retarded by the rains, which fell during this month with remarkable force, so much so that the river Chambal, swollen to a torrent, barred Tántia's passage from Indragarh to the eastward. Changing his course, then, he took a south-westerly course to Búndi, capital of the native state of the same name. The maháráo of Búndi, Rám Singh, had more than once displayed a disposition to strike for independence, but even he was not prepared to link his fortunes with those of Tántia Topi. He shut, therefore, the gates of Búndi in the face of the fugitive. Tántia, pursued, as he thought, by Holmes, had no time to stop to use force, but marched a few miles southward, then making a sudden tour westward, crossed the Búndi hills by the Kína pass, and made for the fertile country between Nasirábád and Nimach, a country which had already been the scene of warlike operations, and the larger towns in which had more than once shewn a disposition to favour the rebellion. Tántia was able to change his course without fear of being disturbed by Holmes, for on leaving Búndi he had loudly asserted his intention to continue his course due south, and he counted that information thus disseminated would deceive his pursuers.

Tántia turns to the country between Nimach and Nasirábád.

Tántia, pushing on, took up a position between

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the towns of Sánganír and Bhilwárá on the Nasirabád and Nímach road. Roberts, meanwhile, had been obliged, in consequence of the continuance of the heavy rain, to halt at Sarwár, an elevated plateau about thirty miles from Ájmir. On the 5th of August, however, the roads having been reported passable, Roberts broke up and marched towards Nímach. On the 7th, when at Dábla, ten miles from Sánganír, he received information regarding the position taken up by Tántia close to that place.

Roberts follows on his track.

The town of Sánganír is on the left bank of the little river Kotáriá. On the other side, and more than a mile up the stream, is the town of Bhilwára, in the front of which Tántia lay encamped.* Roberts was well aware that all his cavalry and a portion of his infantry under Holmes were following on the track of the rebels. He himself was in front of them. The opportunity was too good to be thrown away. He resolved, though he had no cavalry, to attack.

reaches, and determines to attack him.

The rebel infantry and guns had taken up a position in front of Bhilwára. Their horse, however, were thrown forward on the left, across the Kotáriá up to Sánganír, and on the right to the other side of that town, the whole forming a horse-shoe figure of about a mile and a half, connected by skirmishers. Their elephants and

Position occupied by Tántia.

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860. This number contains an admirably written account of the operations of Generals Roberts and Michel against Tántia Topi. It is difficult to exaggerate the obligations under which the author lies to the writer of this article, himself an actor in the scene.

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baggage were in the rear on the line by which they would retire if beaten.

Roberts attacks,

Roberts advanced his infantry, covered by skirmishers a short distance in front, cleared Sánganir of the few rebels who had penetrated within it, forced the rebel horse across the river, and bringing his guns to the river-bank, opened on the enemy's right. Under this fire his infantry, played upon by the rebel batteries, crossed the river, and took up a position on a rising ground, their right on a village, their left on a small tank. The guns then also crossed the river. Seeing this, Tántia attempted no further resistance; he withdrew his guns and infantry, massing his cavalry on the intervening plain to cover the retreat. He retired unscathed, except by the guns, for Roberts had no cavalry to send after him,* and proceeded to a village called Kotra in the Údaipúr country.

and forces him to retreat.

Roberts is joined by his cavalry, and pursues

The next day Roberts was joined by his much required cavalry, who had made a march of thirty miles. He then set out in pursuit of the rebels, doing twenty miles daily till, on the afternoon of the 13th, he came up with their advanced guard at Kankráolí,† a town situated on a lake not far

and overtakes Tántia.

* Tantia merely records of this action: "We were there" (Bhilwára) "attacked by the English force, and I fled during the night accompanied by my army and guns."

† The excellent information obtained by General Roberts enabled him, in more than one instance, to traverse the chord of a circle whilst the rebels had gone round by the arc. The method employed by Roberts to obtain this accurate information is thus succinctly described by the author of the article in *Blackwood*, already referred to. "The method which General Roberts adopted for

from the Arávalli hills. On driving in the rebel outposts, Roberts learned from prisoners and villagers that their main force was occupying a position on the Banás river, seven miles distant.

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Tántia Topi, who was, according to his lights, a religious man, had devoted that 13th of August to a visit to the shrine of Náthdwára, reputed one of the most sacred in India. On his return at midnight he heard for the first time of the close vicinity of the English. Dreading an attack, he determined to decamp at once. But his infantry refused to move. They said that they were worn out by the long marches, and must rest; that they would march in the morning, and the guns should march with them; that the cavalry might act as they pleased. Under these circumstances, Tántia had no other alternative but that of fighting.

Tantia loses an important day in religious exercises.

His infantry refuse to move.

At daybreak, then, he ranged his men as skilfully as the nature of the ground would allow. His position was strong. In front of him flowed the Banás, which, covering his centre, then made a bend which protected his right; his left rested on some steep hills. The ground he occupied

He takes up a strong position.

obtaining information was to have about twenty cavalry in advance, close to the rebels. They left connecting links of two or three men every few miles, so as to keep up the chain of communication. The advance party was composed, half of Bilúch horse, who had no sympathy with the rebels, but could not communicate very well with the villagers, and half of horsemen belonging to the rájá of Jaipúr, who were supposed, as Rájpúts, to be on good terms and able easily to communicate with the villagers, but not to be very warm partisans of the British. By this mixed party, correct and immediate intelligence was constantly supplied."

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was a low, steep ridge, which formed the bank of the river. Before him, on the opposite bank, was an open plain, eight hundred yards wide, across which his enemy must march.

Roberts attacks,

At 7 o'clock on the morning of the 14th Roberts marched across it. In vain did Tántia's four guns, well protected by a natural parapet, sweep that plain. In spite of the effect they produced—and it was considerable—the British and native infantry reached the left bank, forded the river, and scaled the heights on the enemy's left and centre. The right, where the guns were posted, being thus left unsupported, abandoned the pieces under a volley from the 13th Bombay native infantry. The cavalry, led by Colonel Naylor, then dashed across the stream, and came upon the rebels scattered over the plain. Naylor pursued them for two miles, his men dealing and receiving death. He then collected his men, and, under orders from the general, kept up a steady pursuit for fifteen miles, killing numbers of stragglers, and capturing three elephants and a quantity of baggage. Two miles further on the rebels, having reached a village surrounded by jungle, determined to make a stand. Naylor, finding that the number of men whom he could then muster amounted only to a hundred and fifty, and that the country was quite unfit for cavalry, upon this abandoned the pursuit.*

defeats,

and pursues him for seventeen miles.

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860. Tántia Topi writes thus of this action: "The next morning we moved towards Patun, and after proceeding about one mile, the English army arrived and an action took place. We left our four guns and fled."

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Tántia Topi, having shaken off his pursuers, pressed, now without guns, eastward, hoping to find the Chambal fordable, and to place that river between himself and the English. Roberts, divining his intention, followed in that direction, and the fourth day after the action reached Púnah, a town north of Chitor, not far from the high road between Nímach and Nasirábád. Here he met Brigadier Parke, commandant of the Nímach brigade, who, some days before, had started from that place in anticipation of orders to cut off Tántia from the south. Roberts now made over to him the 8th hussars and the Bilúchis, and begged him to continue the pursuit.

Tántia flees towards the Chambal.

pursued by Parke.

Parke set out at once, but some of the horses of the 8th hussars being knocked up, he deviated from the exact course followed by Tántia to proceed to Nímach, where he knew he could obtain about fifty fresh horses. Here he was met by conflicting news regarding the fugitives. On the one side he was assured by experts that it was absolutely impossible that Tántia could cross the Chambal at that season of the year, and that he was bent on pushing southwards; on the other, Captain Showers, the political agent at Údaipúr, who was then at Nímach, had received information from the spot that Tántia was determined to cross the river. Unfortunately, Parke believed the experts. Proceeding to Morássa, fifteen miles from Nímach and thirty from the Chambal, he halted there a few hours to obtain more exact information. When it came it told him that the informant of Captain Showers was right, and

Parke makes a divergence to Nímach for fresh horses,

and is deceived by false information.

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that Tántia was attempting the Chambal. Parke hurried after him, reached the river after a hard march, only to find it just fordable, but rising rapidly; to see "a few disabled ponies standing on the left bank, and the rebels disappearing among some mango-trees in the west horizon." Tántia had escaped. Parke returned to Nímach to refit.*

Tántia crosses the Chambal.

Tántia, meanwhile, having crossed the Chambal, pushed for Jhálra Patan, thirty miles distant. Jhálra Patan is a handsome town in the Jhálá-war state built on the model of Jaipúr. The ráná of that state, Príthi Singh, great grandson of the famous Zálim Singh, the founder of the principality, was loyal to his British overlord. He had no idea of yielding without a struggle. But his troops, when drawn up to repel the Maráthá invader, behaved precisely as Sindia's troops had behaved at Gwáliár on a similar occasion. They at once fraternised with the rebels. Tántia at once took possession of the ráná's guns, more than thirty in number, his ammunition, bullocks, and horses, and surrounded the palace. The next morning he visited the ráná, and demanded a contribution in money. The ránás offered five lakhs; but this sum not being deemed sufficient, Ráo Sáhib, acting as representative of the Péshwá, sent for him and demanded twenty-five. Ultimately the ráná agreed to give fifteen. Of these he actually paid five, but having been insulted and ill-treated, he escaped that same night and

Tántia crosses the Chambal.

The ráná, loyal to the British.

Is deserted by his troops.

Tántia takes possession of Jhálra Patan and levies a heavy contribution.

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860.

fled to Máu, leaving some barrels of powder handy for his wife and family to blow themselves up if threatened with insult.*

Book IV. Chapter I.

1858. August.

Tántia conceives the idea of marching on Indúr,

Tántia, freed by the rising of the Chambal from all chance of pursuit, halted five days at Jhálra Patan. He states that he employed the money taken to issue three months' pay to his troops, at the monthly rate of thirty rupees to each trooper, and twelve rupees to each foot soldier. Whilst so halting, he and his comrades, Ráo Sáhib and the nawáb of Bandá, conceived a very bold idea. This was no less than to march on Indúr, and summon Holkar's troops to join the representative of the liege lord of the Maráthás. Could he succeed in reaching the capital of Holkar before the small body of troops which the news of his approach would probably bring to the same spot from Máu, the fraternisation would be certain, and the result would spread to all Holkar's subjects. Impressed with this idea, he marched with his army, now reinforced by the Jháláwar levies and all the ráná's guns,† nearly direct south to Rájgarh.

and tries to carry it out.

But, whilst Tántia had been resting at Jhálra Patan, the officer commanding in Málwá, Major-General Michel, had, as if reading his thoughts,

* This account is taken mainly from Tántia's memoirs. The writer in *Blackwood* states that the war contribution amounted to sixty thousand pounds, whilst forty thousand pounds more was collected from Government property. As Jhálra Patan was a very rich town, this was very likely the case.

† Tántia says eighteen, but as three were abandoned and twenty-seven captured a few days later at Rájgarh, he must have taken all.

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despatched from that place a force,* under Colonel Lockhart, to cover Újjén, due north of Indúr. Lockhart proceeding further northwards, reached Súsnér, a place about seventeen miles to the west of Rájgarh. Not believing himself strong enough to attack Tántia, he intrenched himself, to await the arrival of a small reinforcement under Colonel Hope coming from Mán. He met this reinforcement at Nálkéra, about three miles to the south of Súsnér. At the very time of this junction Tántia was marching on Rájgarh, within a few miles of him.

Lockhart moves on the line on which Tántia is advancing.

At this period, the end of August 1858, a change took place in the *personnel* of the British command. Major-General Roberts, who had up to that time commanded in Rajpútáná, was transferred to the military and political control of the Gújrát division. His place was taken by Major-General Michel of the Royal army, commanding in Málwa, a command which he was now to hold in conjunction with that in Rajpútáná. Michel was a zealous, active, resolute, and capable officer, thoroughly impressed with the necessity of pursuing the fugitive chieftain without cessation.

Michel succeeds Roberts.

Michel joined the united columns of Lockhart and Hope at Nálkéra. He had no information regarding Tántia Topi, but a vague rumour prevailed that he was moving in a north-easterly direction. Marching was, in every sense of the

Takes command at Nálkéra.

* Three hundred and fifty 92nd Highlanders, four hundred and fifty 19th Bombay native infantry, one squadron Bombay 3rd light cavalry, and two guns Le Marchand's battery Bengal artillery.

word, difficult. Although the month of September had arrived, heavy rain, the precursor of the break-up of the monsoon, was falling, and the saturated cotton soil of Málwa resembled a sea of black mud. Still it was necessary to move, and Michel moved in the right direction. With great difficulty he transported his little army to Chápérá, about midway to Rájgarh. The following day, the rain having ceased, Michel pursued his march towards that place. The heat was so great and the sun's rays were so terrible, that some of the artillery-horses dropped dead in the traces. Still Michel pushed on, and about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, halting on a rising ground, he had the gratification of beholding Tántia Topi's army encamped near the walled town of Rájgarh.

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and, pursuing,

finds Tántia at Rájgarh.

To traverse three miles of black soil and then, at the approach of night, to attack with a tired army a fresh body of men in the position they had chosen, was not for a moment to be thought of. Michel, then, waited for the morning. But when morning dawned, Tántia and his men had disappeared. Michel at once sent his cavalry on their track. This track was distinguished, first, by the marks of the gunwheels and the elephants, then, more decidedly, by three guns lying abandoned on the road. A little further on the rebel force was descried, drawn up in two lines, the second on higher ground than the first, and the guns on ground above both. The cavalry then halted to await the approach of the infantry and guns.

Tántia flees in the night.

Michel tracks him, finds him again,

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and completely defeats him.

The infantry and guns did not let them wait long. As soon as they came up the action began with an artillery fire from both sides. Then the English infantry, deploying, went at the rebels. The latter did not wait the conflict, but gave way and fled. Getting entangled in intersecting roads, they fell into inextricable confusion. The British horse artillery, galloping forward in alternate divisions of two guns, kept up a fire on the retreating masses, whilst the cavalry, threatening their left flank, forced them to incline towards the north.* In the pursuit, twenty-seven guns were taken.

The pursuers gather round Tántia.

Tántia, driven towards the north, wandered about for some time in the jungly country on both sides of the Bétwah, and eventually made for Sironj—in an easterly direction. But whilst thus seeking a place of security, new enemies were gathering round him. To Brigadier Parke, who had left Nímach on the 5th of September, was entrusted the duty of covering Indúr and Bhopal, thus leaving Michel's force to follow Tántia from the west, whilst Smith's brigade should advance

* Of this action, Tántia writes: "On reaching Rájgarh the English army came up and attacked us. We left our guns and fled." It would be incredible, were it not true, that a force so large, numbering at least eight thousand, with thirty guns, should allow itself to be defeated by less than one-sixth of its number in men and guns, without drawing a drop of blood. Yet, so it was. It is the more strange, as about half the rebels had been trained and disciplined by Europeans; their guns were effective pieces of larger calibre than the English 9-pounders, their muskets bore the Tower mark, and their swords were excellent, yet not one man of the British force was killed or wounded!

from the north, and the Jhánsi column under Colonel Liddell from the north-east.

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The story reverts to Napier and Smith.

With this disposition opens a new phase of the pursuit. The defeat of Tántia Topi at Rájgarh almost coincided in time with the conclusion of the rainy season; for, although rain continued for some days to fall, further operations had become impossible. We are now entering upon the cold-weather campaign. In this new actors appear upon the scene. The Central India field force once more invites the attention of the public. It seems fitting, then, that before describing the events of that cold-weather campaign, I should trace the operations of General Napier and of Brigadier Smith from the period when we left them up to the middle of September. Meanwhile we must suppose Tántia Topi making the best of his way, by circuitous paths, from Rájgarh to Sironj.

The situation at Gwáliár apparently peaceful.

We left General Napier's division at Gwáliár and Jhánsi at the beginning of July, Brigadier Smith's brigade at Sipri, and Mayne's irregulars at Gúnah, all resting after the extraordinary fatigues and exposure of the central India campaign. To the superficial glance, order had been restored in Sindia's dominions. The mahárájá, grateful to the English, more fervent than at any previous period in his desire for their success, was doing his utmost to forward the views of the army administrators for the success of the troops. Sir Robert Hamilton, located in Gwáliár, was engaged in re-establishing political relations with the petty states

Book XVI. Chapter I.

1860. August. Revolt of Mán Singh, rájá of Narwár.

around. The situation was full of promise; and yet, all the time, it was hollow and unsound.

During the whole of July the European troops had rest. The comparatively trifling matters which required attention in the districts were easily disposed of by the employment on detached duty of the men of Meade's horse, a regiment daily rising in estimation. But on the 3rd of August an incident occurred which led to very serious complications. A chief of Sindia's territory, named Mán Singh, rájá of Narwár, had quarrelled with his liege lord. To avenge the wrong which, he conceived, had been inflicted upon him by Sindia, and which will presently be related, and encouraged possibly by Tántia's action in the south, this chieftain, summoning his followers, twelve thousand strong, surprised on the 2nd of August the strong fort of Páori, eighty-three miles by the Sipri road south-west of Gwáliár, and eighteen to the north-west of Sipri, but recently supplied with six months' provisions and ammunition. Now, Smith's brigade was at Sipri. On the 4th he learned of the act of rebellion perpetrated by Mán Singh. On the 5th he started from Sipri with a force composed of two squadrons of the 8th hussars, two of the 1st Bombay lancers, a wing of the 95th, and three field-guns, and, marching as rapidly as the roads would permit, reached the vicinity of Páori early on the morning of the 7th. On approaching the place, Mán Singh sent a messenger with a flag of truce to the brigadier, to assure him that he had no quarrel with the English;

He seizes Páori.

Smith starts from Sipri to recover the place.

that his contention was with the mahárájá alone, and to supplicate earnestly for an interview. Smith granted the request and saw the chief that day. In an earnest manner, totally devoid of pretension, Mán Singh told his story to the brigadier. He and his family, he said, had ever been loyal servants to the mahárájá. During the lifetime of his father, nothing had occurred to mar the good feeling which had previously existed. But on his father's death, the mahárájá had insulted and robbed him by refusing to recognise his right to succeed to the principality of Narwár,* and the estates adjacent. It was to recover these, or, at all events, to avenge himself on the mahárájá, that he had drawn the sword and seized Páori, which formed a part of his ancestral possessions, but, he added earnestly, "I have no connection with the rebels and no quarrel with the English." The plea, though true, and convincing the listener of its truth, was not of a nature which, in those times, could be accepted by an English commander. Smith was responsible for the peace of the country near Sipri; that peace had been violated by Mán Singh, and Smith had but one plain duty, to see that the violaters were punished and that peace was maintained. He informed Mán Singh of this necessity.

Prior Chapters.

1858. August.

Interview between Smith and Mán Singh.

Grievances of the latter.

Smith rejects his plea,

and prepares to besiege Páori.

* Narwár is a very important place, with an interesting history. It lies forty-four miles south of Gwáliár. In 1844 Narwár, with the lands pertaining to it, was assessed by the Gwáliár Government at 2,25,000 rupees annually. Little wonder, then, that the despotic ruler of the native state in which it lay should covet it.

CHAP. XVI. Section I.

1858. August.

Strength and garrison of Páori.

Smith sends to Gwáliár for reinforcements.

Napier sets out from Gwáliár to reinforce him.

Mán Singh prepared, then, to take the consequences.

Páori was strong, well supplied with provisions and ammunition, and its garrison, originally only two thousand, had been increased during the few days since the capture to nearly double that number. Amongst the new-comers was a chief, A'jhit Singh by name, uncle of Mán Singh. Smith's force amounted only to eleven hundred men of all arms, and his three pieces were field-pieces. He was thus far too weak to undertake a siege; and the place was too strong to be carried by a *coup-de-main*. Under these circumstances he deemed it prudent to maintain his position near the place, while he sent to Gwáliár an earnest request for reinforcements. On receiving this requisition Napier felt the enormous importance of settling the matter with as little delay as possible. Examples of that sort in a country long under Maráthá rule are apt to be contagious, and there was every probability that if Mán Singh were allowed for any length of time to parade his defiance of the British, chieftains more powerful than he might follow his example. Napier, then, determined to take the matter into his own hands. He started accordingly on the 11th with five guns and four mortars, escorted by six hundred horse and foot, reached Sipri on the 17th, and joined Smith on the 19th of August. He began operations the next day. For twenty-four hours he poured a vertical fire into the fort from his mortars, and then began to use his breaching batteries. This demonstra-

tion quite satisfied Mán Singh. On the night of the 23rd he, Ajhit Singh, and their followers evacuated Páori, and made their way southwards through the jungles. Napier entered Páori the following morning, then equipped a light column under Robertson, 25th Bombay native infantry—an officer whose gallantry and soldier-like conduct have often been mentioned in these pages—and sent him in pursuit of the rebels. Napier himself having destroyed the fortifications of Páori and burst the guns, retired to Sipri to make arrangements for the further pursuit of Mán Singh should Robertson fail to capture him.

Book XV. Chapter I. 1858. Aug. 23rd. Mán Singh evacuates the place. Robertson pursues.

That zealous officer left Páori on the 26th of August, on the track of Mán Singh. He had with him a squadron 8th hussars, a squadron Meade's horse, two 9-pounders, one 6-pounder, one 5½-inch howitzer, one hundred men of the 86th, one hundred and twenty of the 95th, two hundred 10th Bombay native infantry, and two hundred 25th Bombay native infantry. Pushing on by forced marches through the jungles, crossing difficult rivers, and conquering every obstacle, Robertson on the 3rd of September ascertained that the rebels were at Bijápúr, near Gúnah, twenty-three miles distant. His determination was instantly taken. Leaving the remainder to guard the camp and baggage, he mounted on elephants and camels seventy-five men of the 86th, ninety of the 95th, and one hundred each of the 10th and 25th native infantry, and with these and fifty men of the 8th hussars and one hundred and fifty of Meade's horse, he set out

Robertson overtakes Ajhit Singh's force at Bijápúr.

Sect. XVI. Chapter I.

1858. September.

surprises them,

and cuts them up.

that night. At daybreak the following morning he came in sight of the rebels occupying a rising ground on the opposite bank of the Párbatí river. They had no scouts, and, the light being still grey, Robertson was able to cross the river unperceived and to send his cavalry round to take up a position in rear of the rebel camp. These movements were executed with so much care and precision, that, when the cavalry were taking up the position indicated, the rebels were actually preparing to bathe in the river, preparatory to their morning meal. The surprise was complete. Of organised resistance there was none; but the casualty list showed that the rebels, though taken unawares, defended themselves bravely. Lieutenant Fawcett, 95th, was killed; Captain Poore and Lieutenant Hanbury, 18th hussars, and Lieutenants Stewart and Page, of Meade's horse, were wounded. The remaining casualties in killed and wounded amounted to eighteen.

Composition of the routed force.

It was discovered after the action that it was not Mán Singh's but A'jhit Singh's band which had been routed. The astute Mán Singh, on learning that he was pursued, had divided his partisans into three divisions, with instructions to traverse a separate road and to combine at an appointed place. It was one of these divisions, six hundred strong, and composed, as was ascertained after the action, of men from the maharájá's bodyguard, from the Gwáliár contingent, and from the 3rd, 40th, 47th, and 50th regiments native infantry. They were all dressed in red, and had percussion firelocks. About

three-fourths of them were killed,* but Ajhit Singh escaped.

Book XV. Chapter I.

1858. September.

Robertson marched from the scene of action to Gúnah, where he arrived the middle of September. With this march may be said to terminate the campaign of the rainy season in the districts to the west and south-west of Gwáliár bordering on Rajpútáná. It is now fit that we should follow the various columns in the cold-weather campaign against Tántia Topi and his allies. Of these, that against Tántia Topi demands precedence.

Close of the rainy season campaign.

The story reverts to Tántia Topi.

I left that chieftain making his way about the jungly country on both sides of the Bétwa towards Sironj. He duly reached that place about the middle of September, he and his men utterly exhausted. A rest of eight days, made sweeter by the absence of all fear—for the heavy rain that was falling would, they well knew, make the roads impassable to their enemy—set them on their legs again, and even restored to them their former audacity. On the conclusion of that period, the rains having ceased, Tántia led his men, with the four guns he had taken at Sironj, against Iságogarh, a town with a fort, belonging to Sindia, in the hilly and difficult country south of Sipri. Here he demanded supplies; but the townspeople refusing them, Tántia stormed and plundered the place, and took seven guns. He and his associates halted there for a day to con-

who rests at Sironj.

Takes guns and supplies from Iságogarh.

* The number of killed is often exaggerated, but on this occasion between four and five hundred dead bodies were actually counted on both sides of the river.

Book XVI. Chapter I. 1858. September.

sider their further plans. Their deliberations then culminated in a determination to divide their forces, Tántia proceeding with the bulk of them and five guns to Chandairi, the Ráo Sáhib with six guns and fewer followers making his way to Tál Bihat by Lalatpúr: this plan was carried out.

Tántia is repulsed at Chandairi.

What Chandairi was, the reader will recollect who has followed the history of Sir Hugh Rose's central Indian campaign.* It was now held for Sindia by a loyal soldier, a man who had no sympathy with rebels. He repulsed, then, Tántia Topi's appeals, and when the Maráthá chief attempted to storm the place he repulsed his attacks. Tántia wasted three days in an attempt to gain a place the possession of which would have been of incalculable use to him, and then, baffled though not dispirited, made for Mangráoli, about twenty miles south of Chandairi. He was marching, though he knew it not, on defeat, for the English were to meet him there!

and moves on Mangraoli.

I must now return to his pursuers. I have already stated the position of the several English columns; how Brigadier Parke was covering Indúr and Bhopál; how Colonel Liddell with the Jhánsi force was covering the country to the north-east. I have now only to add that Brigadier Smith, released by the capture of Páori, had taken up a position north of Sironj. In the inner part of the circle, the outer rim of which was occupied by these columns, General Michel was acting.

Positions of his pursuers.

* Page 151.

Enabled at last, towards the end of September, by the cessation of the heavy rains, to act freely, Michel, believing he should find Tántia in the Betwah valley, went in pursuit of him in a north-easterly direction. As he marched, he heard of the various depredations committed by the fugitives, and he felt sure he should find him. On the 7th of October, marching towards Mangráoli, information reached him that Tántia had occupied the high ground near the place, and was waiting for him.

Tántia had arrived there that very morning. He had not sought a battle, but as the ground was favourable he resolved to risk one. His position was strong, and the five guns he had placed in front of his line commanded the ground along which the English must advance. When, then, Michel sent his men forward, Tántia's guns opened a destructive fire. Grown bolder by despair, Tántia at the same time sent his cavalry to menace both flanks of the few assailants. For a moment the position of these seemed critical, the more so as some of the outflanking horsemen penetrated between the main body and the rear-guard. But whilst they still hesitated to come on, to risk a hand-to-hand encounter, the British troops advanced steadily, and gaining the crest, charged the guns. Then all was over. Tántia and his men abandoned their guns and fled. The want of sufficient cavalry did not allow Michel to pursue them.*

Date 1858. October.

Michel marches on Mangráoli.

Tántia resolves to risk an action.

Position before Tántia.

who, however, is beaten, and flees.

* Of this action Tántia writes: "On our march to Mangráoli we met the English army. Shots were fired for a short time, when we left all our guns and fled."

Book XVI. Chapter I. 1858. October.

Tántia and Ráo Sáhib separate.

Tántia crossed the Bétwah and fled first to Jáklóm, and then, next day, to Lalatpúr, where he rejoined Ráo Sáhib, who, it will be remembered, had six guns. Tántia remained here, but Ráo Sáhib, with the bulk of the troops and the guns, set off the following day, and marched in a south-easterly direction. Michel, meanwhile, ordering Smith to watch the left bank of the Bétwah, followed Ráo Sáhib, and making his way with great difficulty through the dense Jáklón jungle, came suddenly upon him at Sindwáho, about thirty miles east of the Bétwah. Warned by the inopportune sound of a bugle in the British camp, Ráo Sáhib had time to draw up his men on a rising ground, with the guns in front. Then followed a scene almost similar to that at Mangráoli. The English, threatened on both flanks, advance and capture the guns, when the rebels flee. In their flight, however, they were, on this occasion, less fortunate than at Mangráoli. Michel had his cavalry handy; the ground, too, was unfavourable for rapid flight. In a pursuit which covered twelve miles, the rebels then suffered severely. Ráo Sáhib, however, escaped. The English lost five officers and twenty men in killed and wounded.

Michel finally defeats Ráo Sáhib.

Ráo Sáhib, however, escapes.

The rebel chiefs unite and resolve to cross the Narbadá.

Ráo Sáhib rejoined Tántia at Lalatpúr, and again the two held counsel as to the future. The country north of the Narbadá seemed about to close on them. The circle was gradually lessening, and in a few days they would be in the folds of the destroyer. They saw this clearly, saw that their only chance was to break through the

circle and march to the south, putting the enemy, if possible, on a false scent. This was the difficult part of the programme, but they laid their plans to attempt it.

Retreat of Tántia towards the Narbada.

It is impossible to withhold admiration from the pertinacity with which this scheme was carried out. Leaving Lalatpúr, Tántia and the ráo, whose design was to escape southwards, marched to Kajúria, with the intention of recrossing the Bétwah near that place and turning thence southward. But the ford being guarded by Colonel Liddell, Tántia turned north-eastward, and made for Lál Bahat. There he halted to rest his men. The following day, moving direct southwards, he penetrated into the Jáklón jungles, still to the east of the Bétwah. He halted one day at Jáklón, and the next at Itaia. There he heard that the English army was on his track, so he at once broke up and pushed on towards Khorai.

Michel learns that Tántia is marching southwards and follows in pursuit.

Whilst he is making that march I must return to General Michel. From the field of Sindwáho that general had marched to Lalatpúr, keeping always to the westward of Tántia with the view of baulking the intention he believed he might entertain of breaking through to the south. On reaching Lalatpúr, however, a messenger from Brigadier Smith reached him with the information that Tántia had been met marching southwards, and had probably gained the west side of the general. No time was to be lost. Michel, sending off an express to warn Parke, and pressing southwards by forced marches

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1858. October.

Tántia comes him at Khorai.

Whilst he annihilates Tántia's left wing, the right wing escapes.

came upon Tántia by a cross road just as that chief was approaching the village of Khorai. Instantly the battle joined. The British cavalry separated one wing of the rebels' force from the other. Whilst the British forces were engaged in annihilating the left wing, the right, with which were Tántia and Ráo Sáhib, favoured by the jungle, managed to escape westward. Not that the left wing fought to save their comrades; they had fled in the direction from which they had advanced, and the whole of Michel's force had pounced upon them, leaving the other wing to escape. Tántia and Ráo Sáhib, in fact, purchased their retreat with the sacrifice of one-half of their followers.*

Tántia, molested on the way by Becher.

This happened on the 25th of October. Tántia pushed on to Rájgarh, molested on his way, four miles from Bagrod, by Colonel Charles Becher, one of the most gallant officers of the Indian army, who, at the head of a newly-raised regiment,† did not hesitate to attack his whole force. Becher inflicted considerable loss (upwards of forty men killed), but Tántia pressed on, and proceeding *viâ* Rájgarh, crossed the Narbadá into the Nágpúr territory at a point about forty miles above Hoshangábád.

Crosses the Narbadá.

Effect which could have been pro-

Thus in the dying agony of the mutiny was accomplished a movement which, carried out

* Tántia writes of this action: "The English force came up in the morning and our army became separated, I accompanied the Ráo Sáhib," &c. Not a word about the sacrifice of the wing.

† Now one of the regiments Central Indian horse.

twelve months earlier, would have produced an effect fatal for the time to British supremacy; a movement which would have roused the whole of the western presidency, have kindled revolt in the dominions of the Nizám, and have, in its working, penetrated to southern India. It was the movement to prevent which Lord Elphinstone had adopted the policy of aggressive defence till then so successful, which Durand had exerted all his energies, had used entreaties of the most urgent character with the Government of India, had stretched to the utmost the powers entrusted to him, to hinder. And now it was accomplished! The nephew of the man recognised by the Maráthás as the lawful heir of the last reigning Péshwá was on Maráthá soil with an army!

Caused by the act twelve months earlier.

I have said that had that event occurred but fifteen months previously, British authority in western India would, for the time, have succumbed. As it was, the event happening in October 1858, when the sparks of the mutiny in every other part of India, Oudh excepted, had been extinguished, and when, even in Oudh, they were being surely trampled out; as it was, the event caused alarm of no ordinary character to the Governments of Bombay and Madras. Although Lord Elphinstone had shown, to a remarkable degree, a true appreciation of the character of the rebellion and of the manner in which it should be met, even he could not view without grave concern the arrival of Tántia Topi and Ráo Sáhib in the country of the Bhonslás, that

Alarm which it caused even in October 1858,

in Bombay.

Book XVI. Chapter I. 1858. October.

country the annexation of which but a few years previously had moved the Maráthá heart to its core. He could not but remember that a large proportion of the population of the Bombay presidency was Maráthá, and he could not foresee — who, indeed, could foresee? — the effect which might be produced on the easily kindled minds of a susceptible people by the presence amongst them of the representative of the man whom many amongst them regarded as their rightful ruler.

Madras.

Nor could Lord Harris, who, throughout the trying times of 1857–58, had shown himself prompt to meet every difficulty, listen with an indifferent ear to the tidings that the Maráthá leader had crossed the Narbadá. True it was that the Madras Presidency was separated from the country now chosen by Tántia as his campaigning ground by the vast territories of the Nizám. True it was that the Nizám, guided by his able and far-seeing minister Sálar Jang, had displayed to the British a loyalty not to be exceeded. But the times were peculiar. The population of the Nizám's territories was to a very considerable extent Hindú. Instances had occurred before, as in the case of Sindia, of a people revolting against their sovereign when that sovereign acted in the teeth of the national feeling. It was impossible not to fear lest the army of Tántia should rouse to arms the entire Maráthá population, and that the spectacle of a people in arms against the foreigner might act with irresistible force on the people of the Dekhán.

The people of the central provinces manifest a marked antipathy to Tántia and his followers.

Fortunately, these fears were not realised. Six years' experience of British rule had produced a remarkable effect upon the people of the central provinces. Whatever might be the feelings of the landowners, of the courtiers, and of those Bráhmans who, by means of their influence in a court where Bráhmánical influence was supreme, were able to live a life of luxury, of intrigue, and of pleasure without having recourse to industry and toil, this at least is certain, that the peasantry had no desire to recur to their old masters. In this respect the central provinces presented a remarkable contrast to Oudh and Bandalkhand. With all its faults, the people of this part of India preferred the substantial justice of the rule of their alien lords. It is, indeed, a remarkable fact that whilst, in the dominions of Sindia and in the principalities governed by Rájpút princes, Tántia and his followers enjoyed the sympathy of the villagers, and always obtained from them, without pressure and without payment, supplies in abundance, in the Maráthá country beyond the Narbadá the peasantry regarded them as pests in whose face the door was to be closed and the gates were to be barred, who were to receive no supplies without payment, and, if it could be managed without injury to themselves, no supplies at all.

To return to the story. Tántia, crossing the Narbadá forty miles above Hoshangábád, proceeded *viâ* Fathpúr to Múltái in the direction of Núgpúr, but learning that a British force from that place had anticipated him, he turned sharp

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1858. November.

Tántia finds the country to the south and west barred against him.

westward, hoping to penetrate to the country southward by an unguarded pass in the hills. He found this impossible, for Brigadier Hill of the Haidarábád contingent was watching at Máilghát and Asirgárh; further westward, Sir Hugh Rose had made preparations to prevent Tántia from crossing into Khándésh, and, further westward still, General Roberts was bringing up troops to bar Gujrát against him. Nothing could have been more tantalising, for south of the Tápti river, from the banks of which he was separated only by the narrow Sátpúra range lay the country to which Náná Sáhib laid claim as his rightful inheritance.* Across this, under the circumstances, Tántia dared not venture. Shut out, then, from further progress west or south, Tántia made a turn north-westwards into Holkar's possessions, south of the Narbadá, hoping to recross the Narbadá unperceived and to penetrate thence into the territory of the Gáikwár. On the 19th of November he reached Kargún, a decayed town in Nimár. Here was stationed a detachment of Holkar's troops, consisting of two troops of cavalry, a company of infantry, and two guns. These Tántia forced to joined him, and then pushed on westward. On the 23rd he crossed near Thán, the great high road from Bombay to Ágra, just as it was being traversed by carts laden with mercantile stores for the use of the English. Plundering these, taking with him the natives who had been escorting the carts, and

He turns to the north-west with the intention of recrossing the Narbadá and marching on Barodah.

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860.

destroying the telegraph wires, he pursued his course, feeling confident of success if only he could reach the Narbadá before the English, whom he believed he had outmanœuvred, should molest him.

Book XV. Chapter I. 1857. November.

But fortune did not favour him. Michel, indeed, after defeating Tántia at Khorai, had pushed on in pursuit, though not on the same track, and, with his cavalry, had reached Hoshangábád on the 7th of November. There he joined Parke, whom he had previously ordered to meet him. Leaving Parke at Hoshangábád, Michel crossed the Narbadá and found himself in the wild country about Baitúl, with no accurate maps, no information of his own regarding the movements of the rebels, and with no prospect of obtaining any from the local authorities. Left thus to the resources of his own intelligence, Michel came to the conclusion that the roads to the south and due west would certainly be barred to Tántia, and that although there was little prospect of his attempting to recross the Narbadá, yet that it would not be wise on his part to move too far from that river. Impressed with this idea, he ordered Parke to cross the Narbadá at Hoshangábád, to march in a direction south-west by west, and take up a position at Chárwah, a town forming the angle nearest the Narbadá of a triangle of which Máilghát and A'sirgárh, both occupied by British troops, formed the other angles. In that direction, though more slowly, he moved himself.

Michel.

left without information.

divines Tántia's intentions.

and takes steps to baffle them.

Whilst the general was making these preparations south of the Narbadá, the British authori-

CHAP. XVI. Chapter I. 1857. November.

The British authorities at Máu

ties at Máu, to the north of it, were receiving disquieting rumours regarding the continued and persistent movements of Tántia westward. Dreading lest that chief should get possession of the grand trunk road, intercept supplies, and destroy the telegraph wire, Sir Robert Hamilton and Brigadier Edwards, who commanded at Máu, deemed it advisable, before Tántia had pillaged the carts in the manner already related, to post two small infantry detachments to watch the fords above Ákbarpúr. A day or two later, when intelligence was received that the westerly movement was being prolonged, Major Sutherland, who commanded one of these detachments, consisting of a hundred men of the 92nd Highlanders and a hundred of the 4th Bombay rifles, received instructions to cross the river at Ákbarpúr and keep clear the grand trunk road. Sutherland obeyed his orders, and passing through Thán—the village already spoken of—seventeen miles from Ákbarpúr, proceeded to Jilwána, thirteen miles further on, nearer to Bombay. There he was when, on the afternoon of the 23rd of November, Tántia and his troops passed through Thán, plundered the carts and cut the telegraph wires, as already described.

Posts parties to watch the fords of the Narbadá.

Sutherland crosses the Narbadá to a point below that traversed by Tántia.

Tántia having taken the precaution to carry off with him all the men accompanying the carts, Sutherland remained for some hours ignorant of this occurrence. He had been reinforced on the morning of the 23rd by fifty Europeans, sent on camels from Máu. The evening of that day, the report regarding the plundering reached him.

1858. November.

Sutherland learns the vicinity of Tántia and pursues him.

The next morning Sutherland, taking with him one hundred and twenty Europeans and eighty natives, riding alternately on camels, proceeded to Thán, and inspected the damage done.* Learning there that the rebels had taken a westerly direction, he followed hastily and came in sight of them as they were passing through the town of Rájpúr, nearly midway between Thán and the Narbadá. Pushing on, his men in advance still riding camels, disregarding the enemy's stragglers and the quantities of abandoned baggage and baggage-animals, Sutherland, in half an hour, had approached near enough to force a battle. He ordered, then, his men to dismount; but the delay thus caused gave Tántia an opportunity, of which he availed himself, to retire. Before Sutherland could set out in pursuit, he had the satisfaction of being joined by his rear-guard—the men who had not been mounted, and who, in their desire for combat, had marched at a great pace. Keeping the whole of his force dismounted, Sutherland resumed the pursuit, and after marching two miles came up with the rebels, formed in order of battle on a rocky

Catches him only to see him retire.

Resumes the pursuit.

Comes upon them formed in order of battle.

* "The road for eight miles was strewed with articles taken by the rebels the previous day from some merchants' carts on the main road; several carts had been brought on and abandoned when the bullocks got tired. The soldiers filled their water-bottles with port or sherry, of which there was enough to have stocked a large cellar, but not a man got intoxicated. A cart-load of books had been opened by the rebels during a halt—the contents were torn up and strewed in a circle, with a Walker's Pronouncing Dictionary left intact in the middle."—*Blackwood*, August 1860.

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1858. November.

ridge, thickly wooded, with their two guns, the guns of Holkar found at Kargún, pointing down the road. Tántia had with him from three to four thousand men. Sutherland had just two hundred. After a little skirmishing, the smaller number charged the larger. Dashing up the road under a shower of grape, they captured the guns, Lieutenant Humfries, adjutant of the 92nd, receiving a sword-cut from their commandant, who was killed at his post. The rebel infantry then fled. The casualties on both sides were trifling.* Sutherland encamped on the ground he had gained.

Attacks and puts them to flight.

Tántia recovers his guns, resumes his flight,

The presence of the two guns with Tántia's force had necessitated that slow march over rough ground which had allowed Sutherland to overtake him. Now that the guns were lost his men were able to display that capacity for rapid marching in which the natives of India are unsurpassed, I might almost say unequalled, by any troops in the world. So quickly did they cover the ground that when at sunset the following day Sutherland reached the banks of the Narbadá, he beheld the rebel force comfortably encamped on the opposite bank. Between him and their camp flowed the waters of the Narbadá, at that point five hundred yards broad, its banks high and difficult. To cross it in the face of an enemy twenty times

and places the Narbadá between himself and his pursuers.

* Regarding this action, Tántia writes (after referring to the capture of the carts): "We then left the high road and proceeded westward. The next day we were surprised by the English force, and leaving our two guns, we fled and reached the Narbadá."

his strength would have been an impossibility even for the troops he commanded.

How it was that Tántia had been able to cross the Narbadá.

That Tántia had been able to cross the Narbadá can only be accounted for by the fact that he had marched the previous afternoon, and the whole of the night, and had thus had at least twelve hours' start of his pursuers. It was well for him that he had that start. When he reached the left bank of the Narbadá Tántia had beheld on the bank opposite a party of a hundred sowars under an officer.* Under other circumstances the sight of these men might have made him hesitate. But he knew that Sutherland was behind him. He, therefore, plunged boldly in. The sowars then took flight.

Tántia pushes towards Barodah.

At midnight Tántia, having plundered a village called Chickla, broke up his camp on the Narbadá, and marched in the direction of Barodah. It was his last chance, but it was a great one could he but arrive before the English. Barodah was the seat of a Maráthá dynasty, and it was known that a large party at the court sympathised deeply with Nánáa Sáhib. There were in the city only one company of Europeans and two native regiments, besides the troops of the Gáikwár, who were almost sure to join the rebels. Full of the hope raised by the prospects before him, Tántia pushed on rapidly, marching from the banks of the Narbadá thirty-four miles straight

full of hope:

* So states Tántia himself, and I have usually found his statements corroborated by other writers. But I have been unable to ascertain who were these troopers or who was the officer. Probably he was a native officer.

Book XVI. Chapter I.

1858. Nov.-Dec.

on end. He halted at Rájpúra, took three thousand nine hundred rupees and three horses from the chief of that place, and marched the next day for Chota Údaipúr, only fifty miles from Barodah and connected with it by a road. Could he arrive at and leave that unmolested his future, he thought, would be assured.

Arrives with the fifty miles of Barodah.

But his pursuers were too many. I left General Michel and Brigadier Parke, in the second week of November, at Chárwah, south of the Narbadá, confident that Tántia's progress to the south was barred, and that he would endeavour to seek some means of recrossing into Malwá. Some days elapsed before an accurate account of his movements reached Michel. There was not a moment's hesitation as to the course to be followed. Michel recrossed the Narbadá at the Barwáni ford, and marching himself on Máu, despatched Parke with a flying column of cavalry, mounted infantry, and two guns, with orders to conduct the pursuit with the utmost speed that was possible.

Michel discovers Tántia's intentions,

and despatches Parke in pursuit of him.

Parke carried out these instructions to the letter. Marching, in nine days, two hundred and forty-one miles, for the last twenty of which he was forced to thread his way through a dense jungle, he came up with the rebels on the morning of the 1st of December, at Chota Údaipúr, just an hour or two after they had reached that place. Considering the climate, the nature of the country, and the other difficulties of the route, this march must be considered as rivaling any of which history makes record.

Parke catches Tántia at Chota Údaipur.

1858. December.

Force under Parke.

The force commanded by Parke consisted of two 9-pounder guns Bombay artillery, fifty men 8th hussars, fifty of the 2nd Bombay cavalry, a party of the Maráthá horse under Kerr—which, after having disarmed the southern Maráthá country, had been sent from the west to join Michel—Moore's Aden horse, one hundred of the 72nd Highlanders, mounted on camels, and one hundred and twenty-five Gujráti irregular horse. For the last twenty miles before reaching Chóta Údaipúr, this force had, as I have stated, threaded its way through a dense jungle, skilfully piloted by Moore with his Aden horse. On emerging from the jungle Moore perceived the rebels. He instantly surprised their outlying picket. The ground beyond the jungle was covered with large trees, brushwood, and tents still standing,* and was so broken as to be very difficult for cavalry and artillery. As Parke's troops debouched on to it, he deployed his force, placing some of the 8th hussars, of the Maráthá horse, and the Aden horse on his right; the rest of the Maráthá horse, under Kerr, on his left, the 72nd Highlanders flanking the two guns in his centre; the remainder of the cavalry in the rear. His whole front scarcely covered two hundred yards. The rebels, meanwhile, roused to action, had formed up about six hundred yards distant. They numbered three thousand five hundred men and outflanked the British force on both sides. Tántia first endeavoured to turn

Discovery of Tántia's force.

Parke sets his force in battle array.

Tántia's aggressive.

* Tántia admits that he was surprised on this occasion.

Book XVI. Chapter I. 1858. December.

Sketch is checked.

the British left, but Kerr, changing his front, charged with great impetuosity, and driving the rebels from the field, pursued them for a considerable distance, laying sixty of them low. A similar attempt on the British right was met with equal success by the cavalry stationed there, Bannerman, of the southern Maráthá horse, greatly distinguishing himself and killing four men with his own hands. In the pursuit a standard of the 5th Bengal irregulars, borne by the rebels, was captured. Whilst the wings were thus engaged, the two British guns had kept up a heavy fire from the centre. But it was not long needed. With the repulse of the flanking attacks the action terminated. A pursuit along the whole line then followed.

Tántia doubled and cut off from Barodah.

Flies to the Bánswárá jungles.

This engagement was fatal to Tántia's hopes regarding Barodah. Leaving his route to the westward he fled northwards into the jungles of Bánswárá, the southernmost principality of Rajpútáná. These jungles, extremely dense in their character, are inhabited principally by Bhíls, a wild and uncivilised race, much given to plunder. Hemmed in on the south by the Narbadá, now for ever abandoned, on the west by Gujrát, now completely guarded by General Roberts, and on the north and east by difficult ranges which separate it from Udaipúr and Sirohi, and the passes across which are few and difficult, Tántia might have been excused if he had despaired of escape. But he did not despair. Ráo Sáhib was now his only companion, the nawáb of Bandá having in November taken advantage of the royal procla-

Desperate position of Tántia and Ráo Sáhib.

mation to surrender.* But these two men were, in this hour of supreme danger, as cool, as bold, as fertile in resource, as at any previous period of their careers.

Book XIV. Chapter I.

1858. December.

They remain undaunted.

And yet the British commanders had done their utmost to hem him in. They really believed that at last they had him. The troops of Roberts's division were echelonned along the roads and paths and passes leading from Bánswárá to the west. On that side escape was impossible. A force detached from Nímach under Major Rocke guarded the passes to the north and north-west. Another column sent from Máu, under Colonel Benson, commanded at the moment by Colonel Somerset, watched the passes leading eastward and south-eastward whilst Tántia was cut off from the south by his recent pursuers, greatly strengthened by flying detachments from Búrhánpúr and from Khándésh. To add to his difficulties the Bhíl inhabitants of the jungles of Bánswárá, far from aiding him, followed his track as the vulture follows the wounded hare, anxious for the moment when she shall lie down and succumb.

The cordon about them is apparently complete.

But, undaunted, Tántia pressed deeper into the jungles. On reaching Déogarh Bári he found that but a small portion of his force was with him. He halted there two days, to allow his men to reunite. This result having been obtained, he, on the 10th of December, entered Bánswárá. Here he halted a day, his men plundering sixteen or seventeen camel-loads of cloth from

Tántia, after many movements in the jungles.

* To be hereafter referred to.

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1858. December.

Ahmadábád. He probably would have halted here longer but that information reached him that Colonel Somerset's brigade was closing up from Ratlam. Disturbed by this information, he marched in a nearly north-westerly direction to Salúmbar, an isolated fort belonging to the ráná of Údaipúr, encircled by hills, in the heart of the A'rávalli range. It was a strong position, commanding the approaches to Údaipúr. Here Tántia obtained some supplies, of which he was greatly in need, and set off the following day in the hope of surprising Údaipúr. But the British had received information of his movements, and Major Rocke's column had taken up a position at Bhánsrá, whence it would be easy for him to cover Údaipúr or to fall on Tántia as he emerged from the northern passes. Discovering this obstacle before he had committed himself too far, Tántia turned sharply to the north-east and took up a position at the village of Bhilwára,* in the densest part of the jungle. Here, it is said, Tántia and his followers debated the advisability of surrendering. But the intelligence which reached them during their deliberations that Mán Singh was at hand, and that Prince Firoz Sháh was advancing to their assistance, induced them to persevere in their resistance, to give one more chance to Fortune.

marches to surprise Údaipúr,

but discovers Rocke at Bhánsrá,

moves back into the jungles, and deliberates regarding surrender.

Decides against it.

Tántia halted two days at Bhilwára and then made for Partábgarh, the capital of the rájá of the state of that name. His probable line of

The English movements somewhat disarranged by the news

* Not the town of the same name on the road between Nímach and Nasirábád.

route had been well divined by the English general. But he, too, had received information of Firóz Sháh's movements, and it was necessary to arrange to meet him also. For this purpose, Somerset had been despatched with a light column to Agar, Rocke had been moved to take his place at Partábgarh, whilst Parke, plunging into the jungles from the westward, was rapidly following on the track of the fugitives.

of the approach of Firóz Sháh.

It thus happened that when, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 25th of December, Tántia and his followers emerged from the jungles close to Partábgarh, he found himself face to face with Major Rocke. That officer, not having a sufficient number of men at his disposal to close the three passes, had taken up a position about two miles from the jungles, whence he could march to any point at which the rebels might threaten to debouch, provided he had any information of their movements. On this occasion he had no such information. His force, too, was, as I have said, small, consisting only of two hundred infantry, two guns, and a handful of native cavalry. He had no chance, however, of assuming the offensive. Tántia marched straight at him, and kept him engaged for two hours, a sufficient time to enable his elephants and baggage to clear the pass. Seeing this result gained, Tántia, who had thus, in spite of his many foes, escaped from the trap, marched in the direction of Mandisor, and halted for the night within six miles of that place. Thence he marched very rapidly—in three days—to Zirápúr, a hundred miles east-south-east of

Tántia emerges from the jungles,

baffles Major Rocke,

and marches towards Mandisor and Zirápúr.

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1858-9. Dec.-Jan.

Nímach, thus returning to the part of the country almost directly south of Gwáliár.

But the English were at his heels. Benson, who had resumed command of the Máu column, had received excellent information regarding Tántia's movements from Captain Hutchinson, one of the assistants to Sir Robert Hamilton. He pushed on after Tántia, then, marching thirty-five miles a day, caught him up at Zirápúr the very day he had arrived there. Tántia, completely surprised, fled without fighting, leaving six of his elephants behind him, and pushed northwards to Baród. Here another surprise followed him. Somerset had reached Zirápúr the morning after Tántia had left it. He had two horse-artillery guns with him. Taking fresh horses from the ammunition wagons, he attached them to Benson's two guns. With these four guns, and the ammunition contained in the limber, Somerset started at once, and marching seventy miles in forty-eight hours, came upon Tántia at Baród. After an action fought in the usual Tántia Topi style, the rebels fled to Náhargarh in the Kotá territory. Here Tántia was fired at by the Kiladár. Moving out of range, he halted for the night. Ráo Sáhib then sent a messenger to summon Mán Singh, who had appointed to meet him at this place. On Mán Singh's arrival the rebels moved to Parón, where they halted two days. They then pushed northwards towards Indragarh. On reaching the banks of the Chambal, Mán Singh, for some unexplained reason, left them. On the 13th of

Benson catches him at Zirápúr. Tántia flies to Baród:

is caught there by Somerset and beaten.

Tántia meets Mán Singh

January they reached Indragarh, where Firoz Sháh, with his bodyguard and the 12th irregulars, met them. To ascertain how this had been possible, I must return to the movements of General Napier and the Central Indian force.

Book XV. Chapter I. 1858. December and Firoz Sháh.

I left General Napier just after he and his lieutenants had, at the end of September, expelled Mán Singh from the Gwáliár territory. His detached parties still continued to operate in the districts to the west and south-west of Gwáliár, bordering on Rajpútáná, and the work which those parties accomplished was of a most useful character. In this manner passed the months of October and November, but in December Gwáliár was invaded by a new enemy.

The story reverts to General Napier.

The pseudo-prince, Firoz Sháh, already mentioned in these pages, had, after his expulsion from Mandisor by Durand in November 1857, proceeded with his followers to Rohilkhand to try conclusions with the British in that quarter. Expelled from Rohilkhand by Lord Clyde, he entered Oudh and cast in his lot with the irreconcilables who, to the last, refused submission to the paramount power. It was only when the native cause was absolutely lost in that province that Firoz Sháh, reading the glowing accounts of his achievements which Tántia Topi regularly transmitted from the Chambal and the Narbadá, determined to march to the assistance of one whom he could not but consider as a worthy ally. At the time that he arrived at this resolution he was at a place called Bisúah, not far from Sitápúr. Marching rapidly from that place, he crossed the

Firoz Sháh.

baffled in Oudh and Rohilkhand.

resolves to join Tántia Topi.

Ganges on the 7th of December, cut the telegraph along the grand trunk road, and spread the report that he was about to proceed north-westwards. Instead of that he took the road to Itáwa, baffled a gallant attempt made by Mr. Hume and Captain Doyle—who lost his life—to stop him, out-marched a column led by Brigadier Herbert from Kánhpúr to pursue him, crossed the Jamná on the 9th, and moved off in the direction of Jhánsi. He marched with such speed that on the 17th he had arrived in the vicinity of Ránód, a large town fifty miles north-east of Gúnah. It was here he encountered his first check.

General, now become Sir Robert, Napier had received timely intimation regarding the course pursued by Firoz Sháh, and he had sent out detachments to watch the roads which that chieftain would probably follow. On the morning of the 12th of December he received from the commander of one of these, Captain McMahon, 14th light dragoons, located near the confluence of the Jamná, Chambal, and Sindh rivers, information to the effect that the rebels had passed into the Lohar district of Kachwázár. Believing, from this, that their course would be up the jungles of the Sind river, Napier marched at 2 o'clock that day with a lightly-equipped force,* intending to

* Two Bombay light field-battery guns, Captain G. G. Brown; one hundred and fifty men 14th light dragoons, Major Prettijohn; one hundred men 2nd Gwáliár Maráthá horse, Captain Smith; one hundred and seventeen men 71st Highlanders, Major Rich; fifty men 25th Bombay native infantry, Lieutenant Farrell; forty camels, Gwáliár camel corps, Captain Tennant.

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1858. December.

proceed to Dabrá on the Jhánsi road, thence, according to the information he might receive, to intercept the enemy.

Napier's accurate conceptions regarding the enemy's movements.

Napier halted that evening at A'ntri. At 2 o'clock the following morning, however, he was roused by an express message from the political agent at Gwáliár, Charters Macpherson, to the effect that information he had received led him to believe that the rebels would pass by Gohad, north of Gwáliár. Instead, then, of pushing on to Dabrá, Napier halted till the post should arrive with letters containing the grounds for the belief expressed by Macpherson. He did well not to act upon it without due caution, for at half-past 10 o'clock the tahsildár of A'ntri came to him to state that he had just ridden in from Dabrá, and had seen there the smoke of the staging bungalow which the rebels were then burning, and that they were taking a south-westerly direction. The express from Gwáliár had just come in time to baffle the accurate conceptions of Napier's brain, for had it not arrived, he would have caught them at the very spot he had selected.

Are baffled for the moment by a despatch from the political agent.

There was nothing for it now but to march southwards. Leaving A'ntri, then, immediately, Napier proceeded with great rapidity in that direction. At Bitáor, which he reached on the 14th, he learned the rebels were only nine miles in front of him. Indeed, at this place the Gwáliár Maráthá horse, for the first time under fire, came in contact with the rear-guard of the enemy and greatly distinguished themselves.

Napier pursues, and approaches the rebels.

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1858. December.

Napier continued the pursuit through Narwár, and leaving there the greater portion of the infantry and all the artillery, who could not keep up with him, took with him only thirty-eight men of the 71st Highlanders on camels, all his cavalry, including twenty-five of the Balandshahr horse he found halted at Narwár, and proceeding with the utmost speed, reached Ránód on the morning of the 17th before the rebels had arrived there. His divination that they would make their way through the jungles of the Sindh river had proved to be perfectly accurate.

Reaches them at Ránód.

Firoz Shah, ignorant that Napier is at Ránód,

Firoz Sháh, indeed, had preferred the more circuitous and difficult road through the jungles to the easier but more open route followed by Napier. Naturally he wished to make his way unseen, and thus to effect, with an unbeaten force, the contemplated junction with Tántia Topi. As it was, he had marched on a line almost parallel to that followed by the English leader, and it was only the temptation to leave the jungle cover to sack Ránód which had saved him from an attack the previous day. But Napier had now reached Ránód before him, and the sacking of the place was likely to be more difficult than he had anticipated. Full, however, of confidence, and utterly ignorant of the arrival of the English, Firoz Sháh marched on that eventful morning against Ránód, guided by a zamindár of the locality, his army forming an irregular mass extended in a front of nearly a mile.

marches on that place.

Napier had scarcely time to form up the 14th light dragoons, when the rebels were within a

Napier's force.

few yards of him. The Gwáliár Maráthá horse had been impeded in crossing a deep ravine by the riding-camels, and were a little behind. The force actually engaged consisted of one hundred and thirty-three 14th light dragoons under Major Prettijohn, sixty of the Maráthá horse under Captain F. H. Smith, and thirty-eight of the 71st Highlanders under Captain Smith, mounted on camels, and guided by Captain Templer.

Prettijohn charges them, and

As soon as the rebels had arrived within charging distance, Prettijohn and his hundred and thirty-three light dragoons dashed into their midst. The blow completely doubled them up. Though individuals amongst them fought bravely, the mass made no stand whatever. Their one thought seemed to be to try and escape. They were in full flight before the Maráthá horse could come upon the scene, in time only to participate in the pursuit. That pursuit was continued for seven miles, the rebels losing six elephants, several horses and ponies, and many arms. They left one hundred and fifty dead bodies on the ground before Ránód, including those of some native officers of the 12th irregulars, the murderers of the gallant Holmes. Prettijohn having been severely wounded before the pursuit began, the command of the dragoons devolved on Captain Need, and that officer estimated the loss of the rebels in the pursuit at three hundred. On the British side the wounded amounted to sixteen; one of these died subsequently of his wounds.

completely defeats

and pursues them.

Firoz Shah led the fugitives in the direction of Chandairi. Learning, however, that one British

Firoz Shah makes for the Aránd jungles.

force* had moved towards Ránod from Jhánsi, and another† from Lallatpúr to Chandairi, he suddenly turned westward, passed Íságarh and Púchar, and made for the jungles of Aróni. Passing near Rámpúr, between Gúnah and Sironj, he came suddenly upon forty men of the 1st Bombay lancers, under Lieutenant Stack, escorting clothing and remounts to Brigadier Smith. The rebels had captured the clothing of the detachment and one trooper when Stack gallantly brought up the rest of his men, and, skirmishing with the rebels, carried the remainder of his charge to Gúnah. The rebels then pushed on to Aróni. Meanwhile, Captain W. Rice, 25th Bombay native infantry, a noted tiger-slayer, had been ordered with a small column‡ from Gúnah to intercept their retreat. At Baród, on the 22nd of December, he learned from a horse-dealer, who had been robbed by them, that the rebels were encamped near the village of Sarpúr, eleven miles distant. Leaving his camp standing under charge of forty-two men, Rice set off that night, and outmarching the guns with his infantry, surprised the enemy at 11 P.M. The surprise was so complete that the rebels made no resistance, but ran off at once, leaving a hundred horses, several camels, many arms, and much clothing. From this point Firoz Sháh made the best of his way, unmolested, to Rájgarh, hoping to meet there Tántia Topi. He

* Under Brigadier Ainslie. 86th foot, one hundred and fifty 25th native infantry.
† Under Colonel Liddell. One hundred and forty Royal Engineers, fifty-five Meade's horse.
‡ Two 9-pounders, ninety

lingered there for a few days waiting for his ally, but learning that Brigadier Smith was on his track, he made for Indragarh, where, on the 9th of January, he effected the junction in the manner already related.*

Disposition of the British columns.

I left Brigadier Somerset at Baród, having, after his march of seventy miles in forty-eight hours, driven Tántia from that place. Brigadier Smith, who had been posted at Sironj, had, after Napier had driven Firoz Shah southwards, moved in pursuit of him from that place and had been near Baród when Somerset beat Tántia there. He was now moving on Indragarh in pursuit of Firoz Shah. General Michel was, at this time—early in January 1859—at Chaprá, ten or twelve miles due north of Baród. Thence he directed Colonel Becher to join him with all the cavalry under his command. He had previously ordered Brigadier Honner, commanding the Nasirábád brigade, to march in a north-easterly direction towards Indragarh, watching whilst he did so the fords between that place and Kotah. To complete the investment of the rebels, Brigadier Showers, moving with a light column from Ágra, had taken up a position at Kúshalgarh, north-east of the Banás river.

Desperate position of the rebels.

Escape now seemed absolutely impossible. Hemmed in by Napier on the north and north-east, Showers on the north-west, Somerset on the east, Smith on the south-east, Michel and Benson on the south, and Honner on the south-west and

* Page 359.

west, how was it possible for the man who had so long defied pursuit to break through the net closing around him? It did, in very deed, seem impossible. It will be seen, nevertheless, that the resources of the rebel leader were not yet entirely exhausted.

Tántia had joined Firoz Sháh at Indragarh on the 13th of January. But Indragarh was no safe resting-place. He had sure information that two English columns were marching on it. Strange it was, however, that whilst he received the fullest details regarding the movements of the various columns which had so long pursued him, and of Napier's troops, he had heard not a word of Showers's movement. Believing, then, that a way of escape in a north-westerly direction lay before him, he made a forced march to Dewássa, a large fortified town about midway between Jaipúr and Bharatpúr.

Showers heard of Tántia's arrival at Dewássa as soon as the speed of his scouts could convey the news. A similar message was conveyed, over a longer distance, to Honner. Both brigadiers set out immediately. But Showers, starting from Kúshalgarh and having the shorter road to traverse, arrived first. Showers entered the town on the morning of the 16th, just as Tántia, Ráo Sáhib, and Firoz Sháh were holding a council of war. How they escaped was a miracle. They were completely surprised. "The English force surprised us there," writes Tántia in his journal. About three hundred of his followers were killed or disabled, the remainder fled.

1859. January.

Whither? Every pass seemed closed to them. But the English columns from the south-west closing too rapidly on Dewássa, had just left one opening—the opening which, turning as it were the Jaipúr territory, led into Márwár. Of this Tántia and his followers availed themselves, and marched with all the speed of which they were capable towards the city which gives its name to the principality. Passing by Alwar, they turned westwards, and reached Sikar on the 21st. They were encamped there that night when Holmes, who had been sent from Nasirábád with a small party of the 83rd and the 12th Bombay native infantry and four guns, fell upon him, after marching fifty-four miles through a sandy country in twenty-four hours. The surprise was complete. The rebels abandoned horses, camels, and even arms, and fled in the utmost confusion. A few days later six hundred of them surrendered to the rájá of Bikanír.

Tántia avoids himself of one loop-hole to escape

to Sikar.

where Holmes catches and defeats him.

This defeat inaugurated the break-up of Tántia's army. On that very day Firoz Shah and the 12th irregulars separated from him. Since his wanderings in the Báuswárá jungles, Tántia had been on very bad terms with Ráo Sáhib, and the day after the defeat their quarrel came to an issue. "I told him," writes Tántia, "that I could flee no longer, and that whenever I saw an opportunity for leaving him, I would do so." Some Thákurs related to Mán Singh had joined Tántia that morning, and with them Tántia left the force to proceed in the direction of Parón, having as followers only "two pandits to cook

his food, and one sais* (groom), two horses, and a pony." In the Parón jungle Tántia met rájá Mán Singh. "Why did you leave your force?" asked the rájá, "you have not acted right in so doing." Tántia replied, "I was tired of running away, and I will remain with you whether I have done right or wrong." In fact, after the long chase, he was beaten.

Meanwhile, Ráo Sáhib, still with some three or four thousand followers, pushed first westwards, then to the south, and reached Kóshání, west of Ajmir, and about eighty miles east of Jodhpur, on the 10th of February. But the avenger was on his track. Honner, who had arrived too late for the rebels at Dewássa, had, after some inevitable delay, discovered their track. He set out in pursuit on the 6th, and, marching very rapidly, reached Koshání on the morning of the 10th, having accomplished one hundred and forty-five miles in four days. Finding Ráo Sáhib there, he attacked and defeated him, killing about two hundred of his followers. Ráo Sáhib fled southwards to the Chatterbúj pass and reached it on the 15th. Somerset, coming from the east, arrived within a few miles of it the same day. Unfortunately, no one with him knew the country, and many precious hours were spent in reconnoitring, hours which the ráo utilised in threading the pass. Finding, however, that the British were still close to him, the ráo turned

* "The grooms," adds Tántia, "left me and ran off after coming two stages."



down to the Búnswárá jungles, closely pursued. Finding the passes leading to the south and east closed, the ráo turned to the north-east and passed by Partábgarh, where Tántia had encountered Major Rocke only a few weeks before. As he fled before Somerset, who followed closely on his track, there occurred a great diminution of his followers. Like Tántia, these were "tired of running away." The majority of them fell out of the line during the retreat, threw away their arms, and quietly took the road to their homes. Some of them, Muhammadans from Kánhpúr and Baréli, about two hundred in number, gave themselves up. The chiefs and the other irreconcileables made their way to the Sironj jungles, where, sometimes disguised as mendicants, sometimes acting as marauders, they tried to obtain food from the villagers. Their organised opposition to the British Government had disappeared.

Doc. X. Chapt. 18[illegible] February. The rebels break up and disperse.

Of the chiefs of this long campaign, five still remained in whose fate the reader is naturally interested. These five were Ráo Sáhib, Firoz Sháh, Mán Singh, and Ájhit Singh, and last and greatest of all, the leading spirit of the drama, the Maráthá Tántia Topi. Of Ráo Sáhib I can relate nothing. He disappeared and was never heard of after. Firoz Sháh was equally successful in eluding the vigilance of his pursuers, and was never heard of afterwards. But it was not so with the others. Their case constitutes in itself an episode.

Ráo Sáhib.

Firoz Sháh.

The Párón jungles, in which Tántia Topi and Mán Singh were hiding, constituted a portion of

Mán Singh.

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the large family estates of Narwár, of which Sindia had unjustly deprived the latter. Here they were safe, safe absolutely, so long as each should remain true to the other, for no mere retainer of Mán Singh would betray his master or his his master's friend. The clear and acute intellect of Sir Robert Napier had recognised this fact the moment he received the report that the two chiefs in question had separated themselves from their army and taken refuge in the jungles. He had at once felt certain that to capture Tántia Topi the preliminary step was to gain Mán Singh. No star of lesser magnitude would suffice. Now, there were strong grounds for believing that it might be possible to gain Mán Singh. He was a chief of ancient lineage, of lofty birth, born to great possessions. To avenge himself on Sindia for confiscating a portion of those possessions, he had lost everything except the affection of his dependants, and the ground on which he slept; he had imperilled his head. Thenceforward, so long as he remained unreconciled to his liege lord, there was no prospect in the present, no hope in the future. On such a man, driven to desperation, become from a feudal lord an outcast, what might not be the effect of an offer of free and absolute pardon, with the prospect of intercession with Sindia for the restoration of some portion of his property?

Sir Robert Napier endeavours to gain Mán Singh.

Impressed with this idea Napier resolved to try the experiment. It happened that on the 27th of February Sir Robert had directed Meade, of Meade's horse, who then commanded a detach-

Napier sends Meade to Sir-

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1859. March.

ment* at Bijráon to proceed to Sirsimáo, to dislodge thence any party of rebels in the vicinity, to keep open his communications with Gúnah, and, in conjunction with Major Little's force at Párawant, to clear the roads to Amroa, Agár, Thánnah, Rájgarh, and Sipri. Napier further instructed him to attack Mán Singh and Tántia Topi, then wandering in the jungles, whenever opportunity should offer.

to open the jungles.

Meade reached Sirsimáo on the 3rd of March, found the place deserted, opened a communication that evening with Little, and, in co-operation with him, was engaged from the 5th to the 8th of March in clearing a roadway up the rugged and densely-wooded pass. But, before leaving Sirsimáo, Meade had ascertained that the old thákur who held that village, Niraiyan Singh by name, was connected with Mán Singh and possessed much influence in the neighbourhood. On the morning of the 8th this man and his followers came to a village some four or five miles distant from the pass up which the English troops were working, and showed an evident desire to communicate with Meade. Meade, feeling the great importance of obtaining the submission of so influential a personage, proceeded to the village, reassured the old man, who was at first nervous and alarmed, by his tact and kind manner, and induced him to return to Sirsimáo with his followers. He saw the thákur again that evening

Meade gains the confidence of an influential friend of Mán Singh.

* One hundred men 3rd Bombay Europeans, one hundred men 9th Bombay native infantry, one hundred men 24th Bombay native infantry, fifty men Meade's horse.

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at the village, and drew from him a promise to bring the dewán or confidential agent of Mán Singh to him within two or three days, and to do all in his power to induce Mán Singh himself to surrender.

Meade offers terms to Mán Singh.

The old man kept his word. On the 11th Meade had a long interview with the dewán. Through him he offered to Mán Singh the conditions he was empowered to offer—a guarantee of life and subsistence. He further requested the dewán to find out the rájá's family and household, to invite them to come to his camp, to promise them, should they comply, to do everything in his power for their comfort, to assure them that they should not be molested by the officials of the Gwáliár's darbár or by anyone else. With the dewán he likewise sent one letter addressed to the family, reiterating his invitation and his promise, and another addressed to Rájá Mán Singh himself, inviting him to surrender. He impressed, moreover, upon the dewán the primary necessity of bringing in the ladies first, feeling sure that the rájá would follow.

and assures him of safety and honour for his family.

Sir Robert Napier.

It is at this point of the story that the action of Sir Robert Napier comes in. That officer, acquainted with Meade's proceedings in the matter just described, and fully approving of them, had become naturally impatient when day followed day and no result issued from a beginning so promising. He waited a week after the interview with the dewán, and when, at the expiration of that time, no tidings had been received regarding the ránís or the rájá, he determined to

put greater pressure upon the latter. He wrote, then, on the 18th of March to Meade, directing him to leave his road-work, as "it is of great importance that the pressure upon Mán Singh should not be relaxed, till he comes in. Your letter of the 11th inst. gave hopes of certain parts of Mán Singh's family coming in, but as your letter of the 13th makes no allusion to the subject the brigadier-general concludes that the proposals have not been renewed." *

Book XV. Chapter I. 1859. March. urges upon Meade

Sir Robert added that, notwithstanding that Meade had no information on the subject, he had grounds for believing that Mán Singh had frequently been in the vicinity of the British force; that he had frequented places called Gárla, Hátri, Bhírwán, and Mahúdra; that he had been supplied with provisions from the last-named place. He accordingly directed Meade to move on Ágar, and to make a road up the Múshairi pass through the jungles from that place by Gárla and Hátri to Mahudra; and at the same time to exercise pressure upon the dewán at Sirsimáo by threatening to quarter his force there.

to put pressure on Mán Singh's dewán.

In conformity with these instructions Meade marched to the Múshairi pass. He found the people in that part of the country extremely hostile to the British. Not a man would give him information. His surprise was great, then, when, on the 25th of March, the rájá's dewán and his own confidential servant conducted into camp the ladies of the rájá's household and their at-

Mán Singh's family surrender to Meade.

* From Assistant Adjutant-General to Captain Meade, dated 18th March 1859.

Book XVI. Chapter I. 1859. March-April.

tendants, some seventy persons. Meade received them kindly, and sent them on to one of the rájá's villages near Sipri. His servant likewise informed him that he had seen Mán Singh four times, and that he had expressed his intention to give himself up in two or three days—a statement which was confirmed by the dewán.

Mán Singh agrees to Meade's conditions.

Meade continued his march to Mahúdra, sending a party of horse in front of him with the rájá's dewán and a múnshi, whom he instructed to open at once a communication with Mán Singh. On the 31st he received, at Mahúdra, the rájá's final offer to surrender on certain conditions. To some of these Meade declined to agree. Finally he induced him to come in on the following conditions:—1st, that he should be met at some distance from the camp by a native of position—a ceremony the omission of which is an insult; 2nd, that he should not be made over to the Gwáliár darbár, but should remain in the English camp; 3rdly, that after staying two or three days in camp he should be allowed to proceed to his home at Máori near Sipri, whither the females of his family had gone, to re-equip himself in a manner befitting his rank. On the 2nd of April Mán Singh entered the British camp.

and surrenders.

Feelings which coursed through the mind of Mán Singh.

Tántia Topi was still at large. But Tántia without Mán Singh, Mán Singh reconciled to his enemies, was assailable. Now had arrived the time to play upon the more selfish instincts of the rájá. He had life, and security for his life. But what was life to a born feudal chieftain

without consideration, without esteem, without position? What was life to a vassal lord of Sindia, disowned and hated by his sovereign? The first feeling of satisfaction at escape from death passed, and life to such a man in such a position would become a burden. But could not the position be ameliorated? Yes—a signal service—a deed for which men would be grateful—that would remove the still remaining obstacles to a return to his position among the nobles of his country.

Meade works upon those feelings.

On feelings such as these Meade worked with tact and skill. In many conversations which he had with the rájá during the 2nd and 3rd of April he urged him to perform some service which should entitle him to the consideration. His reasoning had so much effect that when, at 11 o'clock on the night of the second day, the 3rd, information reached Meade that the uncle of Mán Singh, A'jhit Singh, already mentioned in these pages, lay, with a band of men, fifteen miles distant, in the jungle, Mán Singh volunteered to accompany the force of one hundred and fifty men at the head of which Meade immediately started. The little force reached, at daybreak, the place where A'jhit Singh had been marked down, only to discover that he and his band had moved off during the night. Meade pushed on in search of him some seven miles further, to a place where the jungle was so dense that cavalry were useless. A'jhit Singh and his men were actually in this jungle, but before Meade could surround them they became aware

Mán Singh volunteers to accompany Meade in an attempt to capture his uncle.

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The news arrives to Mán Singh's mortification.

of the presence of enemies, and succeeded in getting away.* No one was more mortified than Mán Singh. A'jhit Singh was his uncle; A'jhit Singh had been his comrade on the battle-field, his abettor in his revolt against Sindia, and although, in his fury at Mán Singh's apostasy, as he regarded it, in surrendering to the English, he had threatened to take his life, yet he stood to Mán Singh in a relation than which there can scarcely be a closer between man and man—friend, comrade, uncle, and yet Mán Singh grieved bitterly that this man had not been captured by his enemies. It was a first step in moral debasement, a prelude to one still lower!

His first step in moral debasement.

During the three days which followed, close observation satisfied Meade that Tántia Topi was in the Parón jungles, and working daily on Mán Singh's longing desire for restoration to his former position† he persuaded him to acknowledge that he knew where Tántia was. From this moment he had made up his mind to betray him. His only anxiety now was lest Tántia should slip through his fingers. At that very time, to his

The second step.

* Ajhit Singh and his band were so terrified by their narrow escape, that they marched seventy or eighty miles on end, not halting till they joined the other rebels near Sironj.

† "I have done all I could by kind and encouraging counsel to urge him to establish, by so signal an act of service" (the betrayal of Tántia Topi), "his claim to the consideration of Government, promised him by Sir E. Hamilton in his telegram of the 27th ultimo."—Major Meade to Sir R. Napier, the 8th of April 1859. Sir E. Hamilton's telegram was to the effect that if Mán Singh surrendered his life would be spared, and his claims would receive consideration.

knowledge. Tántia was debating whether or not he should rejoin Firoz Sháh. Tántia had even sent his emissaries to Meade's camp to consult him on the subject. Were Tántia to go, the chance would be lost. No thought of old comradeship, of the ties of honour, weighed with him for a moment. He would at once betray him, if——

He resolves to betray Tántia Topi

Yes,—if he could himself recover his position. That was his one thought. "In the course of this forenoon" (the 7th of April), wrote Meade, "I learnt from Pribhú Lál that he thought Mán Singh would do as I wished, but that he was desirous of having Sir R. Hamilton's general assurance of 'consideration' for such a service reduced to some specific promise, and that his ambition was to have Sháhábád, Páori, or some other portion of the ancient ráj of Narwár, guaranteed to him in the event of his efforts to apprehend Tántia Topi being successful."

for a consideration;

It was quite out of Meade's power to make any such promise; he could only assure him that he "might rely on any claim he might establish being faithfully considered by Government." Unable to extract more, Mán Singh clutched at the prospect which this vague promise offered, and consented to betray his friend.

even for the chance of a consideration.

Then came Meade's difficulty. To seize such a man as Tántia Topi, great caution was required. Tántia had many spies in the British camp, and to have sent a European on such a duty would have been sufficient to warn the victim. Eventually Meade decided to send a party of the 9th

Meade sends a party of sepoys accompanied by Mán Singh.

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Bombay native infantry on the service, under an intelligent native officer. The orders he gave them were simply to obey the directions of Mán Singh, and to apprehend any suspicious characters he might point out. The name of Tántia Topi was not mentioned, and the men had no idea of the actual duty on which they were proceeding.

Tántia Topi, all the time, exposes absolute faith in Mán Singh.

Whilst Meade was thus negotiating with Mán Singh, Tántia Topi had lain quiet in the Parón jungles. Shortly after his arrival there, and some days before Mán Singh had surrendered, Tántia had, with the approval of that rájá, sent to obtain information regarding the position of his old comrades. The reply brought to him was that to the number of eight or nine thousand men they were in the Sironj jungles; that Ráo Sáhib had left them, but that Firoz Sháh, the Ámbapáni nawáb, and Imám Álí, Wúrdi major of the 5th irregulars, were there. The last-named also sent him a letter begging Tántia to join them. It was on the receipt of this letter that, on the 5th of April, Tántia sent to consult Mán Singh as to the course he should adopt. Tántia was well aware that Mán Singh had surrendered, yet he trusted him implicitly. He had placed himself quite in his power, and had chosen his actual hiding-place on the recommendation of the retainer to whose care Mán Singh had consigned him with these words: "Stop wherever this man takes you!"

Mán Singh surprises Tántia asleep,

To Tántia's message Mán Singh replied that he would come in three days to see him, and that

then they would decide on the action to be taken. Man Singh more than kept his word. At midnight on the third day, the 7th of April, he came to the hiding-place—followed at a distance by the Bombay sepoys. Tántia was asleep. Asleep he was seized, roughly awakened, and conveyed to Meade's camp. He arrived there by sunrise on the morning of the 8th.

and conveys him to Meade's camp.

Meade marched him into Sipri and tried him by court-martial. He was charged with having been in rebellion and having waged war against the British Government between June 1857 and December 1858, in certain specified instances. No other charge was brought against him.

Tántia is brought to a court-martial.

His defence was simple and straightforward; it ran thus: "I only obeyed, in all things that I did, my master's orders, *i.e.* the Náná's orders, up to the capture of Kálpi; and afterwards, those of Ráo Sáhib. I have nothing to state except that I have had nothing to do with the murder of any European men, women, or children; neither had I, at any time, given orders for anyone to be hanged."

Tántia's defence.

The defence displayed the existence of a feeling very common among the Maráthás. To many of these men the descendant of the Péshwá was their real lord, they knew no other. Tántia Topi was born and bred in the household of Báji Ráo, who had been Péshwá of the Maráthás. From his earliest childhood he had been taught to regard the adopted son of Báji Ráo, Náná Sáhib, as his master, his liege lord, whose every order he was bound to obey. Of the English he

Position, in his own eyes and in the eyes of the natives of India, of Tántia Topi, with respect to the English.

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1850. April.

knew nothing, except they were foreigners who had robbed his earliest master of the country he had inherited, and his son of the pension guaranteed to his first master in lieu of his ancestral dominions. To them he was bound by no ties. The English Government, by leaving the heir of the Péshwás on the world, had forced that heir to be a conspirator and had compelled all his dependants to be free-lances.

Tántia is sentenced to be hanged, and is hanged.

Notwithstanding this reasoning, which was not put before the court, and which probably did not present itself to the minds of any of its members, Tántia Topi was sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was carried into effect at Sipri on the 18th of April.

Reflections on the sentence.

Public opinion at the time ratified the justice of the sentence, but it may, I think, be doubted whether posterity will confirm that verdict. Tántia Topi was no born servant of the English rule. At the time of his birth—about the year 1812—his master was the independent ruler of a large portion of western India. He was under no obligation to serve faithfully and truly the race which had robbed his master. When that master, unbound equally by any tie to the English, saw the opportunity of recovering the territories of the Péshwá, Tántia Topi, who was his musáhib, his companion, obeyed his orders and followed his fortunes. He declared that he committed no murder. He was not charged with committing any. He, a retainer of the ex-Péshwá's family, was charged with fighting against the English. On that charge alone he was con-

shot and hanged. Surely, under the circumstances of the case, the punishment was greater than the offence. The clansman had obeyed his lord, and had fought with fair weapons.

Doubts whether a reflecting posterity will confirm it. Tántia Topi and Hofer.

Posterity has condemned Napoleon for causing Hofer to be shot. There is considerable analogy between the cases of Hofer and Tántia Topi. Neither was born under the rule of the nation against which he fought. In both cases the race to which each belonged was subjugated by a foreign race. In both cases the insurrection of the subdued race was produced by causes exterior to its own immediate interests. In both cases the two men cited rose to be the representatives of the nationality to which each belonged. In both—Hofer in the one, Tántia Topi in the other—they resisted the dominant race in a manner which necessitated the calling forth extraordinary exertions. In both cases the leader was a hero to his own countrymen. The one, the European, is still a hero to the world. The other, the Maráthá—well—who knows that in the nooks and corners of the valleys of the Chambal, the Narbadá and the Párbati, his name, too, is not often mentioned with respect and affection?

Tántia Topi as a general.

One word, before we dismiss him, regarding his character as a general. For nearly nine months, from his defeat at Jáora Alipúr by Sir Robert Napier, to his capture by an officer serving under that general, Tántia Topi had baffled all the efforts of the British. During that period he had more than once or twice made the tour of Rájpútáná and Málwá, two countries pos-

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sessing jointly an area of one hundred and sixty-one thousand seven hundred square miles, had crossed the Narbadá, and had threatened the more vulnerable parts of western India. The qualities he had displayed would have been admirable, had he combined with them the capacity of the general and the daring of the aggressive soldier. His marches were wonderful; he had a good eye for selecting a position, and he had a marvellous faculty for localities. But when that has been said, everything has been said. Unable to detect the weak points of his adversaries, he never took advantage of their mistakes or their too great daring; he never exposed himself in action, and he was the first to leave the field. On many occasions a judicious use of his cavalry, always superior in numbers, would have so crippled the English that further pursuit by them would have been impossible. With a little more insight and a little more daring he could, whilst retreating before them, have harassed the flanks and the rear of his pursuers, have captured their baggage, and cut up their camp-followers. But he never attempted anything of the sort. Provided he could escape from one place to harass them in another, with the chance of striking at Indúr, at Barodah, at Jodhpúr, or at Jaipúr, a blow similar to that which he had struck successfully at Gwáliár, he was satisfied.

his merits;

his demerits.

The fact that his enemies were English scared him.

Then, again, the fact that the enemy marching against him were English sufficed, no matter how small their numbers, to scare him. A striking

proof of this occurred when Major Sutherland attacked him with two hundred men, three-fifths of whom were Highlanders. Tántia had a strong position, two guns, and three to four thousand men. Had the natives been well led, their numbers must have prevailed. But fighting was repugnant to Tántia. He did not understand it. He was a guerilla leader, content to fire at his enemy and then to run away. For the lives of his followers he cared nothing.

The English leaders.

Too much praise, on the other hand, can scarcely be awarded to the English generals and officers who conducted the pursuit. Sir Robert Napier, first defeating Tántia, drove him into Rájpútáná, and then shut him out from the north. Roberts, then in Rájpútáná, and later, Michel, in Rájpútáná and Málwa, pursued him in a circle, bounded on the south by the Nizám's territory or by Khándésh, and on the west by Gujrát. His attempts to break the rim of that circle were baffled by General [illegible], by Sir Hugh Rose, and by General Robe[illegible]. Finally, all but surrounded as the circle became smaller, he broke away to the north and penetrated once more into the territories guarded by Sir Robert Napier. The English officers who pursued him showed, on more than one occasion, that they could march as quickly as he could. Witness the remarkable performances of Brigadier Parke, two hundred and forty miles in nine days; of Brigadier Somerset, two hundred and thirty miles in nine days, and, again, seventy miles in forty-eight hours; of Holmes, fifty-four

Napier.

Roberts.

Michel.

Rose.

Parke.

Somerset.

Holmes.

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1859. April.

Daring of Honner.

Daring of Becher and Sutherland.

miles through a sandy desert in little more than twenty-four hours; and of Honner, a hundred and forty-five miles in four days. Becher's daring, too, in assailing Tántia's whole army with a newly-raised regiment of troopers, and driving it before him, was a glorious act, vying with Sutherland's attack above referred to.

But these acts, daring as they were, do not stand out markedly from the achievements of other officers engaged in this pursuit. Where all did nobly it is impossible to draw a contrast. The historian, however, is bound to call attention to the skilful strategy which gave to the pursued no rest, which cut them off from the great towns, and which forced them to seek the jungles as their hiding-place. This result General Michel accomplished in Rajpútaná and Málwá, by distributing his forces in lightly equipped columns at salient points in those two divisions, with orders to pursue the rebels without intermission.* It has been calculated that the whole distance they were pursued between the 20th of June 1858 and the 1st of March 1859 exceeded three thousand miles; that Michel himself marched one thousand seven hundred and Parke two thousand.† There can be no doubt that this system, thoroughly well carried out, was the cause of the break-up of the rebel army. When Honner beat it at Koshám on the 10th of February, and the pursuit was

Use of Michel's light columns.

* *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860.

† Captain Flower's troop 8th hussars was with Parke the whole time.

taken up at once by a fresh force under Somerset, the campaign was virtually over. The rebels lost heart, abandoned their standards, and crept to their homes. It will be understood that these rapid pursuits were made without tents. These followed in the rear under charge of a small guard. They did not often come up for days, during which time the troops had to bivouac under trees.

With the surrender of Mán Singh tranquillity returns to the country.

To return. Tranquillity was restored. With the surrender of Mán Singh the rebellion collapsed in central India. So long as he was at large and hostile, the entire population held aloof from the British. The rebels could always find security in jungles in which they could not be tracked. The sense they had of security was so great, that at one time Tántia Topi and Mán Singh remained for days within five miles of the English army, then searching for them, their position known to the natives, not one of whom would betray them. But with the surrender of Mán Singh an entire change was inaugurated. The people of central India surrendered with him.

BOOK XVI.

CHAPTER II.

The capture of Mán Singh and Tántia Topi produced all over western and southern India an effect similar to that realised by the pacification of Oudh in the North-Western Provinces. The mutiny was now stamped out. The daring of the soldier had to give place to the sagacity and breadth of view of the statesman.

The Queen's proclamation.

Some months before the final blow had been struck, when the rebels had lost every stronghold and been driven to take refuge in the wooded hills and the dense jangles which abound alike on the northern frontier of Oudh and in central India, Her Majesty the Queen had deemed it advisable to issue a proclamation to her Indian subjects, a message of mercy to those who still continued to resist, of promise to all. Before referring more particularly to this proclamation, it will be advisable to refer to some of the events which rendered its issue at the end of 1858 particularly advisable.

1858. January.

Trial and sentence of the King of Dehli.

The titular sovereign of India, the King of Dehlí, had been brought to trial in the Privy Council Chamber of the palace, the Diwán-i-Khass, on the 27th of January 1858. Four charges were brought against him. The first accused him, when a pensioner of the British Government, of encouraging, aiding, and abetting the sepoys in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion against the State; the second, encouraging, aiding, and abetting his own son and other inhabitants of Dehlí and the North-West Provinces of India, to rebel and wage war against the State; the third, of having proclaimed himself reigning king and sovereign of India, and of assembling forces at Dehlí, and of encouraging others to wage war against the British Government; the fourth, of having, on the 16th of May, feloniously caused, or of having been accessory to, the death of forty-nine people of European and mixed European descent, and of having subsequently abetted others in murdering European officers and other English subjects. After a trial conducted with great patience, and which extended over forty days, the king was found guilty of the main points in the charges, and sentenced to be transported for life. Eventually he was taken to Pegu, where he ended his days in peace.

A scape-goat required.

Meanwhile it had been necessary in England to find a scape-goat for all the blood which had been shed in crushing the mutiny—an event, which, though it seemed at first to give a shock to the prestige of England, had been the means of displaying a power greater and more concen-

trated than that with which the world had credited her. If India had at that time been under the rule of the Crown, the natural scape-goat would have been the Ministry of the day. As it was, the blow fell upon the grand old Company which had nursed the early conquests on the eastern coast of Hindustan until they had developed into the most magnificent empire subject to an alien race which the world has ever seen. The East India Company had not deserved its fate. Its rule had been better and purer, more adapted to the circumstances of the great dependency than would have been possible had its acts and orders been subject to the fluctuations of party feeling. True, it had committed some faults; but it is a remarkable fact, especially in later years, that it had been driven into the commission of those faults by the Ministry of the day. This remark especially applies to the "crime," so to speak, of the mutiny. I call it a crime, because the Court of Directors were summoned before the bar of public opinion to answer for it, and were condemned upon it. Now, if, as I believe, the mutiny was due in a great measure to the acts of the Government of Lord Dalhousie, to the denial of the right to adopt, to the shock to public morality caused by the annexation of Oudh and especially by the manner in which that annexation was carried out, then, the Government of England was equally guilty with the Court of Directors, for it was that Government which more than sanctioned the annexation and the antecedent acts to which I have referred. But

The East India Company.

Though the faults she had were more than atoned for by the Ministry of the day.

in times of excitement justice almost always sleeps. The scape-goat was of the very kind which suited the public humour. He was old-fashioned, pursy, and defenceless. Against him every interest was arrayed. The Ministry, which wanted his patronage; the outsider, who saw an opening to the 'covenanted' services; the doctrinaire, on whose mind the idea of a double government grated harshly; these and other classes combined to cast stones at the scape-goat. The great Company was unable to withstand the pressure. It fell, but it fell not without regret and an honoured name. On the 2nd of August 1858 the Queen signed the act which transferred its functions to the Crown.

is made the scape-goat,

and doomed to death.

No sooner had this act been accomplished than it devolved upon the First Minister of the Crown, the late Earl of Derby, to draw up for submission to the Queen a proclamation, forthwith to be issued by Her Majesty in Council, in which should be set forth the principles on which the government of India should, for the future, be conducted. The circumstances which followed the preparation of the first draft of the proclamation by Lord Derby have been given to the world on the highest authority, in a work which has brought home to every Englishman and every Englishwoman the enormous loss sustained by the country in the premature death of the illustrious prince whose noble life it so touchingly and so gracefully records.* There were

Lord Derby draws up a proclamation for submission to the Queen.

* *Life of the Prince Consort*, vol. iv. page 284.

Book XV. Chapter II.

1859. August.

Objections taken to the second draft by the Queen and Prince Albert.

expressions in that draft which seemed to Her Majesty and to Prince Albert, in one case to invert, in another to express feebly, the meaning they were anxious to convey. In the memorandum with which the objections to these points were conveyed to Lord Derby, Her Majesty expressed in noble language the sentiments by which she was animated towards the great people of whom she was about to become the Empress, Empress in reality, though not then actually in name. "The Queen would be glad," continued the memorandum, after referring to the objections taken to the original draft of the proclamation, "if Lord Derby would write it himself in his excellent language, bearing in mind that it is a female sovereign who speaks to more than a hundred millions of Eastern people on assuming the direct government over them, and, after a bloody war, giving them pledges which her future reign is to redeem, and explaining the principles of her government. Such a document should breathe feelings of generosity, benevolence, and religious toleration, and point out the privileges which the Indians will receive in being placed on an equality with the subjects of the British Crown, and the prosperity following in the train of civilisation."

These objections anticipated by Lord Derby.

Before the memorandum containing these noble words had reached Lord Derby, that minister, warned by a telegram from Lord Malmesbury, then in attendance on the Queen, that Her Majesty was not satisfied with the proclamation, had turned his attention to the draft, and discover-

ing in it instinctively the faults which had been noticed by the Queen and Prince Albert, had recast it. In its amended form it met every objection, and corresponded entirely to the wishes of the august Lady in whose name it was to be issued to the people of India.

The Queen's Proclamation.

The proclamation, as finally approved by Her Majesty, ran as follows:—

"Victoria, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australasia, Queen, Defender of the Faith.

"Whereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in Parliament assembled, to take upon ourselves the government of the territories in India, heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India Company:

"Now, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare that, by the advice and consent aforesaid, we have taken upon ourselves the said government, and we hereby call upon all our subjects within the said territories to be faithful and to bear true allegiance to us, our heirs and successors, and to submit themselves to the authority of those whom we may hereafter from time to time see fit to appoint to administer the government of our said territories, in our name and on our behalf.

"And we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty, ability, and judgment of our

right trusty and well-beloved cousin and councillor, Charles John Viscount Canning, do hereby constitute and appoint him, the said Viscount Canning, to be our First Viceroy and Governor-General in and over our said territories, and to administer the government thereof in our name, and generally to act in our name and on our behalf, subject to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to time, receive from us through one of our principal Secretaries of State.

"And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and military, all persons now employed in the service of the Honourable East India Company, subject to our future pleasure, and to such laws and regulations as may hereafter be enacted.

"We hereby announce to the native Princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained; and we look for the like observance on their part.

"We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own, and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.

"We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects; and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfil.

"Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure.

"And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge.

"We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and we will that, generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard

Book XVI. Chapter II. 1858. September.

be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India.

"We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty.

"Already in one province, with a view to stop the further effusion of blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian dominions, our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the expectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of those who, in the late unhappy disturbances, have been guilty of offences against our Government, and has declared the punishment which will be inflicted on those whose crimes place them beyond the reach of forgiveness. We approve and confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-General, and do further announce and proclaim as follows:—

"Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects.

"With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy.

"To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or instigators in revolt,

their lives alone can be guaranteed; but in appointing the penalty due to such persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance, and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in a too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men.

"To all others in arms against the Government we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of all offences against ourselves, our crown and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits.

"It is our Royal pleasure that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with their conditions before the first day of January next.

"When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its Government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant unto us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people."

The proclamation published throughout India.

On the 1st of November 1858 this noble proclamation was published to the princes and people of India. At Calcutta, at Madras, at Bombáy, at Lahor, at Agra, at Allahábád, at Dehlí, at Rán-

gún, at Lakhnao, at Maisúr, at Karáchi, at Nágpúr, and at every civil and military station in India it was publicly read on that day with every accompaniment of ceremonial splendour which could give importance to the occasion in the eyes of the natives. Translated into all the languages and many of the dialects of India, it was, at the same time, transmitted to all the native princes, and was distributed by thousands for the edification of those of lower rank and position. The first Viceroy of India used all the means in his power to acquaint the native princes and people that, transferred to the suzerainty and rule of the Queen, they might rely upon the strict observance of all engagements entered into with them by the Company; that her Majesty desired no extension of her dominions, but would respect the rights, the honour, and the dignity of the princes of her empire; that, while their religion would not be interfered with, the ancient rights, customs, and usages of India would be maintained; that neither caste nor creed should be a bar to employment in her service. Lord Canning took every care, at the same time, that the rebels still in arms should have cognisance of the full and gracious terms offered them, terms which practically restored life and security to all those who had not taken part in the murder of British subjects.

and distributed.

Communications made to the native princes.

and to the rebels still in arms.

The proclamation was received by all classes throughout India with the deepest enthusiasm. The princes and landowners especially regarded it as a charter which would render their pos-

Its reception in India by princes and landowners.

sessions secure, and their rights—more especially the right, so precious to them, of adoption—absolutely inviolate. The people in general welcomed it as the document which closed up the wounds of the mutiny, which declared, in effect, that bygones were to be bygones, and that thenceforward there should be one Queen and one people. Many of the rebels still in arms—all, in fact, except those absolutely irreconcileable—took advantage of its provisions to lay down their arms and to submit to its easy conditions. In the great towns of India, natives of every religion and creed, the Hindús, the Muhammadans, the Párs̀is, met in numbers to draw up loyal addresses expressive of their deep sense of the beneficent feelings which had prompted the proclamation, of their gratitude for its contents, and of their loyalty to the person of the illustrious Lady to whose rule they had been transferred.

by rebels.

The natives draw up loyal addresses expressive of their gratitude.

With the issue of the proclamation the story of the mutiny should fitly close. But those who have accompanied me so far will have seen that in Oudh and in central India the work of warfare was prolonged for six months after its promulgation. In this there is, however, only a seeming misplacement. In the jungles on the Oudh frontier and of central India there survived for that period men who were more marauders than soldiers—men whose continued rebellion was but remotely connected with the original cause of the mutiny, who had offended too deeply to hope for forgiveness. In one notable instance, indeed, that of Mán Singh, the quarrel was in no sense a conse-

The mutiny had really terminated when the proclamation appeared.

Book XV. Chapter II.

1859. November.

quence of the mutiny. It was a quarrel between a noble and his feudal lord. Yet it was that quarrel, not the mutiny, nor any fact connected with the mutiny, which kept the dominions of Sindia in continual disturbance for more than six months. When Mán Singh surrendered, those disturbances ceased.

The proclamation the beginning of a new era.

As far as related, then, to the actual mutineers, with but a few exceptions to the sepoys, and to all the landowners in British territories, the proclamation of the Queen was, in very deed, the end and the beginning—the end of a conflict which had deluged the country with blood, the beginning of an era full of hope, alike for the loyal and the misguided, for the prince and the peasant, for the owner and for the cultivator, for every class and for every creed.

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BOOK XVII.

CHAPTER I.

The civil districts

THE record of military events has necessarily almost monopolised the pages of a work the object of which was to deal with the rise, the progress, and the suppression of a mutiny. I use the word mutiny advisedly, for although, as I shall show in a subsequent chapter, the disturbances of 1857 were primarily excited by men who were not soldiers; yet, had the native army remained faithful, these men would have been powerless for much evil. When, however, they succeeded in inducing the native army to revolt, the mutiny became the great factor in the disturbance. It was mainly the mutiny of the sepoys which demanded all the attention of the English. And as mutiny, both as regards the acts of its fomentors and in those who strive to subdue it, is the form of contest which of all others provokes the worst passions of mankind, the story of the rise, progress, and suppression of this par-

have necessarily attracted less attention than was their due.

ticular uprising has necessarily dealt almost entirely with marches and battles, with deeds of treachery and the punishment they call forth, with the clang of arms and the bustle of the camp. I am well aware that even in this particular subject many details of great interest, but not affecting the main issue at stake, have been omitted. Still more am I conscious that the civil districts and the heroic exertions of the officers who administered, have not in many cases received the attention which those exertions demanded. It is not easy to provide a perfect remedy for this perhaps unavoidable omission. To illustrate, however, the difficulties the civil officers encountered and the heroic way in which they met them, I propose to devote this chapter to a brief consideration of the events which occurred in five important civil districts, each with a character of its own, and to ask the reader to form his own opinion regarding the manner in which the members of the Civil Service of India, placed in circumstances of exceptional difficulty and danger, performed their duty to their country.

The omission to be partly remedied.

Bijnor.

The first district I take is that of Bijnor. Bijnor is a district in Rohilkhand, containing an area of one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two square miles, and a population of nearly seven hundred thousand souls. It is bounded on the north-east by the hill district of Gahrwál; on the east and south-east by Morádábád; on the west by Mírath, by Mozaffarnagar, and by Saháraupúr. In 1857 the magistrate and collector of this district was Mr. A. Shakespear; but at the station of

Bijnór, which gave its name to the district, were likewise Mrs. Shakespear; the joint magistrate, Mr. C. Palmer; the civil surgeon, Dr. Knight, and Mrs. Knight; Mr. Robert Currie, C.S., on his way to the hills; Mr. Lemaistre, the head clerk; Mrs. Lemaistre and three children; Mr. Johnson, a clerk; Mr. Murphy, a clerk; Mrs. Murphy and four children; and Mr. Cawood.

Book XVII. Chapter I. 1857 May. Mr. Shakespear and the European residents of Bijnór.

Though Bijnor was but forty miles distant from Mirath, the news of the terrible events there of the 10th of May did not reach Mr. Shakespear till the 13th, and then only through natives. That officer at once endeavoured to ascertain the real facts of the case by communicating with Mirath. But the whole country was up. The hereditary instincts of a marauding section of the population, extremely prolific in those parts, known as the Gújars, had been thoroughly roused, and their appetite for plunder had been whetted by the rivalry of the convicts escaped from the Mirath jail, who, spreading over the country, stopped and plundered everyone, not excepting the meanest traveller. It seems probable, also, that they stopped the communications near Mirath, for it is a curious fact that the horsemen sent by Shakespear to that station on the 13th of May, took the first intelligence of the mutiny of the 10th to the police station of Baisuna, which was on the high road between Mirath and Bijnor.

The mutiny of the 10th of May.

roused the districts to plunder.

The indiscriminate plunder of which I have spoken attained in a few days so alarming a proportion, that Shakespear found it was necessary

Shakespear invites the aid of the chiefs, landowners,

Book XVII. Chapter I.

1857. May.

for the retention of British authority to take stringent measures to repress it. He accordingly called on the principal landowners of the district to afford him all the aid in their power, at the same time that he sent a notice to all native soldiers on leave at their homes to come to the station and give their services to the State. Both these appeals were responded to fairly well. The chaodris* of Haldaor and Tajpur responded on the 23rd, and a few non-commissioned officers and men, chiefly belonging to the irregular cavalry, came on a few days later. At the same time the police was considerably strengthened. But events were marching too fast even for these precautionary measures. On the 10th of May the jail at Moradabad was broken open, and the worst prisoners connected with the Bijnor district were released. The freedom of these men added enormously to the insecurity of life and property in the neighbourhood. To add to the general danger, three hundred of the sappers and miners who had mutinied at Rurki entered the Bijnor district and entered into negotiations with Mahmud Khan, nawab of Najibabad, with the view, as it was then suspected, and subsequently transpired, to making an attack on the chief station. Eventually, however, these mutineers preferred to proceed to Moradabad, plundering on their road the town of Naghina.† On the very day, however, the 21st, on

* A chaodri is the headman of a village.

† Being short of ammunition, they hoped at Moradabad to obtain the co-operation of the 29th native infantry, but, instead of co-operation, that regiment robbed them of their spoil.

which they entered that town, the prisoners broke out of the jail in Bijnor itself. Mr. Shakespear hurried to the spot followed by some horsemen, and succeeded in stopping further egress, some of the prisoners falling under the fire of his followers. Whilst thus engaged, he despatched the joint magistrate, Mr. G. Palmer, to pursue the fugitives. The result would in all probability have been satisfactory but for the accidental refuge afforded to the malefactors by a sand-bank in the river, on which they had collected. To secure them here foot-soldiers were necessary, and before these could arrive night had set in. Under cover of darkness, two hundred and fifteen of them managed to escape.*

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1857. May.

The prisoners at Bijnor break out.

But they are pursued and partially recaptured.

It was evident to Mr. Shakespear that the love of liberty had far less prompted this outbreak than a lust for plunder, for the news of the disordered state of the districts had penetrated even within the jail. Under his charge, in the treasury, within a short distance of the jail, were the moneys belonging to Government, the collections of the district, amounting to a considerable sum. In a station, the capital of a surging district, where the number of the Europeans could be counted on the fingers, this treasury could no longer be considered safe from the greed of the disorganised rabble. It certainly could not be defended against a determined attack. Under these circumstances the happy thought occurred to Shakespear to throw all

Shakespear secures the moneys of the State.

* Seven had been killed, six, of whom twelve were wounded, were recaptured, and one hundred and twenty-

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1857. May.

the coin, except the small amount necessary for current expenses, into a well, the mouth of which could be defended from the roof of the treasury building. He carried out this measure. The result showed his prescience. Even the most covetous felt that the abstraction of the rupees had become a service fraught with certain death to those who should be foremost in the attempt.

in a well.

Mahmúd Khán

The precaution had not been taken one hour too soon. That very evening Mahmúd Khán, the nawáb of whom I have already spoken, arrived with a number of empty carts, and announced his intention to carry off the money to Najíbábád. Even he quailed before the prospect of extracting it from the well. Yet the station seemed at the mercy of this man and his Pathán followers, evidently unsettled and dangerous, disappointed, too, in their hopes regarding the rupees. The two days that followed were very critical. On the third day, fortunately, the retainers of the Hindú zamindárs arrived, and having in the interval raised some horse and taken measures for the protection of the station, Shakespear felt able to think of offensive measures. He was further confirmed in this view by the arrival, on the 28th, of fourteen sowars, nearly all leave men, under the command of a rassaldár of the Gwáliár contingent, followed by twenty-five sowars of the new Moradábád levy, and forty sepoys of the 29th native infantry—a regiment which, though mistrusted, had not then mutinied.

arrives to give trouble.

The station is relieved by the arrival of loyal Hindú landowners and others.

Shakespear's first act was to send Mr. Palmer,

Palmer quiets the district.

with the 29th sepoys and thirty sowars to coerce a large body of marauders near Mandáwar, a large and wealthy town which they were threatening. Palmer struck the rebels most successfully, and quieted the district. The next person to deal with was the nawáb. This man, baffled in his hopes regarding the rupees, had returned, on the 23rd, with his carts still empty, to Najibábád. A week later, however, he returned, uninvited, accompanied by upwards of two hundred stalwart Patháns, armed with matchlocks. His demeanour showed that he meant mischief, but that he was prepared to wait for the opportune moment. To get rid of him was difficult yet most necessary. Shakespear attempted the task, and after some trouble, persuaded the nawáb to move to a little distance to settle some Mewáti marauders, hoping, during his absence, to be able to do much to restore confidence.

The nawáb returns to Bijnor.

but is persuaded to retire.

These hopes were doomed to be disappointed. The mutiny at Baréli on the 31st of May* produced effects which were felt all over Rohilkhand. Shakespear had heard rumours of the event on the 1st, but rumours in those days were common. He received authentic information only on the 3rd. The danger was indeed imminent. The Nawáb's Patháns were close at hand, and it was but too clear that the forty men of the 29th native infantry would follow the example set them by their brethren at Baréli. But in this conjuncture Shakespear displayed both judgment

The mutiny at Baréli changes the situation for the worse.

* Vol. i. page 310.

Book VII. Chapter I.

1857. May.

Shakespear faces the difficulty.

and decision. He at once recalled Palmer, under whose orders the men of the 29th native infantry were serving, and on their arrival despatched them instantly, before they could communicate with anyone, to rejoin their head-quarters.

By the exercise of judgment Shakespear saves some of the state moneys.

At this time a party of the 4th irregulars, commanded by Lieutenant Gough, arrived from Mirath with a string of camels to carry off a portion of the Government money at Shakespear's disposal. The roads were unsafe; a long string of camels carrying coin could not be guarded efficiently by nineteen men, and everyone in the district was aware of the purpose for which the camels had arrived. Again did Shakespear display his judgment. For camels he substituted elephants. He loaded these animals with fifty thousand rupees, and Gough was thus enabled, by making a forced march, to accomplish his journey in safety at the same time that he relieved Bijnor of that which most tempted the miscreants of the period.

Communication with the outer world ceases.

But darker times were approaching. The revolt at Barélí had, as I have said, produced a ferment all over Rohilkhand. From the 2nd of June communications between English authorities elsewhere and Bijnor ceased. That place was cut off from the outer world.

The nawáb returns to Bijnor.

Affairs were in this darkened condition when Mahmúd Khán, nawáb of Najibábád, suddenly returned from the district. That return was occasioned solely by a report which had reached him that Shakespear was about to make over the remainder of the money under his charge to the

1857. June.

loyal Hindú chaudris. Mahmúd Khán arrived evidently resolved to take strong measures. To men of his class and country, placed in the extraordinary position in which they found themselves in 1857, the proverb, *ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte*, is specially applicable. Accustomed from their earliest childhood to respect British authority, habit had become a second nature, and it was not without a very extraordinary effort that they were able to break through the iron bar by which it bound them. But that bar once broken, there remained no extreme of villainy of which they would not be capable. The memory of the old bond, indeed, incited them to extreme measures. They felt, when they had committed themselves, that a return to the former condition was impossible; that thenceforth their safety required the death of those against whom they had lifted their hands. Shákespear was thoroughly cognisant of this feeling. He deemed it, therefore, of the utmost importance to soothe the nawáb, to persuade him not to take a step which would be irrevocable, which would commit him to murder. Fortunately he had at his hand an instrument for the purpose—a Muhammadan official of proved loyalty and trust named Saiyid Ahmad Khán. This man, sent by Shakespear to the nawáb, succeeded, by dint of smooth words and assurances, in inducing him to remain still on the further bank of the Rubicon. He continued, however, in a dogged and perverse humour, and declined to go and see Mr. Shakespear.

Feelings which animated men like the nawáb.

Shakespear manages him.

Book XVII. Chapter I. 1857. June. Bad news from Bareli.

That evening, the 7th of June, news reached the station of the assumption of authority by the rebel Khán Bahádur Khán, and of the murders committed at Baréli and Morádábád. It was now clear that a sentence of death had been pronounced against every European, every Christian in Rohilkhand.

Shakespear makes over charge of the district to the nawáb.

Under these circumstances, the pressing character of which was increased by the rumour that the detachment of the 29th native infantry was on its way to Bijnor, there remained no hope of saving the station. Mr. Shakespear determined, then, as a first measure of precaution, to place the ladies in safety by escorting them to a point beyond the province. But such an operation could not be undertaken without the consent of the nawáb. With the nawáb, then, Shakespear entered into an accommodation, by virtue of which that nobleman agreed to take charge of the district during the ten days for which Shakespear and his companions proposed to absent themselves. The nawáb was not authorised to collect revenue, but as he would have to meet heavy charges, the money in the treasury was placed at his disposal, and he was required to keep a regular account of its expenditure. In common with almost every other Englishman in India, Shakespear believed that Dehlí would fall as soon as the English force appeared before it, and that, within the ten days he had covenanted for, he would be able to return with a sufficient force to put down all disturbance.

Marches with the

He and his companions—those whose names

have been already given,* had intended to start early on the morning of the 8th for Rúrki, forty-three miles distant, and, marching all night, to reach it the same evening. The party, was, however, so much delayed in crossing the Ganges, that they were obliged to make for Mozaffarnagar instead. Here doubts arose regarding the fidelity of the escort. The travellers, then, after resting one day, pushed on for Rúrki, escorted by twelve troopers of the 4th irregulars, a detachment of which regiment was stationed at Mozaffarnagar.† Here they arrived on the night of the 11th of June.

Ladies and Europeans to Rúrki.

It now became Shakespear's great object to return to his district. He made numberless efforts to organise a small party of Gúrkhas or Europeans or other men who could be depended upon to effect this object. But Dehlí had not fallen, and every soldier was required to aid to contribute to its fall. Not a man, then, could be procured.

He finds it impossible to return.

Meanwhile Mahmúd Khán was carrying all before him at Bijnor. His first act was to proclaim himself ruler of the district under the king of Dehlí. He next fished up the remainder of the money from the well, and sent it to his own house at Najíbábád. Then, having stopped the posts, placed guards at the ferries, and increased his forces as much as possible, he despatched a confidential servant to Dehlí to endeavour to

The nawáb at Bijnor.

* Page 401.

† This detachment rose a few days later and murdered the adjutant, Lieutenant Smith.

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1857. July.

obtain authority from the king to hold the district in his name. He proceeded at the same time to alter the weights and measures, substituting for those of the Company others of a different character, bearing the imperial stamp of Dehlí.

Accepts the king of Dehlí as his lord.

Character of his rule in Bijnor.

The cause which, perhaps, more than any other contributed to the downfall of the Moghol dynasty was the system of persecution for religion, inaugurated by Aurangzib. It is remarkable that, whenever and wherever the Muhammadans in India obtained supremacy during the period of the mutiny they showed the same inclination. The nawáb was no exception. He had scarcely consolidated, as he thought, his usurped authority than he began to use it against the Hindús, leaguing himself with that object with co-religionists without birth and without character, and whose co-operation under other circumstances he would have spurned. His first operations were successful. Umráo Singh, chaudri of Shérkot, was compelled to flee the country with the loss of a great part of his property. This success was, however, fatal. It impelled the Hindú village chiefs, who had hitherto stood aloof from each other, to combine. An opportunity soon offered which enabled them to make their combination felt.

The Hindús rise and repel him,

To carry on his plans against the Hindús the nawáb had weakened his own forces at Bijnor, where he himself remained. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the younger of the chaudris of Haldúr, combining with the chaudris of

Bijnor, suddenly attacked the nawáb on the morning of the 6th of August and drove him in precipitous flight to Najibábád. The immediate result was not altogether satisfactory. It is true that the town was saved; but the public and private property outside it fell into the hands of the rabble, who had joined the chaodris simply with the hope of plunder, and who were altogether beyond control.*

but the place is plundered.

Before the events of the 6th of August could be made known to Mr. Shakespear, that gentleman, satisfied that the nawáb was not to be trusted, had resolved to cancel the written authority he had given him to administer the district. He wrote a letter to that effect on the 7th, and by the same opportunity directed the chaodris to consider themselves responsible for their respective properties and the quiet of the district. But when, a little later, information of the events of the 6th reached him, he saw that more decisive measures were required. It happened that there were on the spot two Muhammadan gentlemen of conspicuous loyalty—Muhammad Rahmat Khán the deputy collector, and Saiyid Ahmad Khán, already referred to. Shakespear then directed these gentlemen to assume charge of the district. They obeyed his orders, assumed the office on the 16th of August, and devoted to it the loyal zeal and true-hearted decision by which their conduct had been always characterised.

Shakespear transfers the charge of the district to loyal Muhammadans.

* A type of the proceedings which would certainly take place all over India if the protecting hand of England were to be withdrawn.

Book XVII. Chapter I. 1857. Aug., Sept. Fresh complications arise.

But every day now saw a fresh complication. The quarrel between the Muhammadans and the Hindús became so embittered, that the nawáb sounded the religious war-cry of the former, and, at the head of an infuriated band, marched to the vicinity of Bijnor on the 23rd. He first burned and plundered a Ját village, and then marched on Bijnor. There there were no defenders. The Hindús had gone to Naghína to oppose there an anticipated attack from another party of Muhammadans. Under these circumstances the two loyal officials above cited deemed it advisable to retire to Haldúr. Meanwhile the Muhammadans had taken and sacked Naghína. They then advanced on Haldúr, defeated the Hindús who moved from that place to meet them, and were only prevented from destroying it by the outbreak of fires in all directions, which hindered their advance. Bijnor, however, fell into their hands. The two loyal Government officials fled across the river, and one or two of the Hindú chaudris quitted the district which no longer offered them a safe habitation.

and the loyal Muhammadans are forced to flee.

From this time the district was a prey to civil war between the members of the opposite faiths, each alternately gaining some advantage. Some attempts were made at reconciliation, but neither party had sufficiently felt its inferiority to the other. At length, on the 18th of September, the Hindús experienced a decisive defeat, and another attempt was made to induce them to submit to Máhmúd Khán and his followers. Nothing, however, could tempt the younger chaudris to place

The Hindús are finally defeated.

and flee.

themselves in the power of the Muhammadans, and towards the end of the month they escaped across the Ganges to Mírath.

Disputes arise amongst the victors.

Just about this time a wanton massacre of unoffending Hindús confirmed the supremacy of the Muhammadans. But as always has happened in such cases—as, till the race greatly changes, always will happen—no sooner was their supremacy uncontested than disputes broke out amongst themselves. Finally, these disputes were arranged by the conferring on the nawáb the chief authority, with an allowance of twelve thousand rupees a month, having under him Márah Khán, a noted bad character, his own eldest son, and his nephew. The two first were to contribute two-thirds, the last one-third, of his salary. This arrangement lasted till the 22nd of February 1858.

The Muhammadans carry their raids across the river.

The Muhammadans now became so strong that notorious freebooters from neighbouring districts gathered to their party; they even attracted three princes of the imperial family of Dehlí! They then began to make successful raids across the border, and to burn and plunder at their will. They did this on several occasions in December 1857 and January 1858. On the 5th of the latter month they crossed the Ganges with a large force and two guns, burned the station of Miránpúr, proclaimed the nawáb, and retreated before the British troops could intercept them. Two days later they carried out the same programme at Kankhal and Hardwár. On the 9th, emboldened by their success, they again crossed

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the Ganges—this time only to repent their audacity, for they had the misfortune to fall in with a party sent from Rúrki under Captain H. Boisragon. This affair, which redounded greatly to that officer's credit, merits special notice.

As soon as the news regarding the three raids into British territory, just referred to, reached Rúrki, the officer commanding at that place, Captain Read, directed Lieutenant T. Boisragon, commanding at Maughúr, to proceed at once with his detachment* towards Maiapúr. Lieutenant Boisragon received this order at 8 o'clock on the evening of the 8th of January. He set out at once, and marching across a country, very indifferent for guns, reached Maiapúr at 9 o'clock the next morning. There he was joined by his brother Captain H. Boisragon, the district staff officer, accompanied by Captain H. Drummond, B.E., Lieutenant Thomason, B.E., Mr. Melville, B.C.S., and a few sowars. Captain Boisragon at once took command.

Boisragon marches to check the rebels.

Accompanied by the gentlemen named and three or four sowars, Captain Boisragon proceeded down the bank of the river in search of the enemy. After a ride of between two and three miles he came suddenly upon their camp, pitched within a few feet of the water, opposite to the ford of Anjon, a distance of about three miles in a direct line from Khankal. Owing to inequalities in the ground, Boisragon could not

He ascertains their position.

* Consisting of fifty Gúrkahs, fifty Sikhs, and two 6-pounder guns under Lieut. St. George, B.A.

gain a clear view of the position, but he ascertained that they numbered certainly five hundred, and that they had at least one gun. Boisragon and his party then fell back leisurely on their camp, to wait till the movement of the rebels should be more pronounced.

His patience was not long tried. The following afternoon, about 2 o'clock, Boisragon received information that the rebels were crossing the river in force, and that a great number had established themselves to the south of Khankal, which they were about to enter. Leaving a small party to protect his camp and watch the ford, Boisragon marched with the rest of the detachment to Khankal, entered it from the north side, traversed the main street, and went out from the south gate, just in time to prevent the entrance of the rebels. Detaching his few mounted men (sixteen men 1st Panjáb cavalry) to cover his flanks, Boisragon, with his small force,* advanced to cut off the rebels from the town of Jowálápúr, in which he had reason to believe they had many sympathisers. Posting the guns between that town and a large building, he sent the Gúrkahs on the extreme right, under Lieutenant Boisragon, to attack their left flank, whilst the Sikhs, who were next the guns, should charge their front. The attack was irresistible. One of the rebel leaders fell by the hand of Lieutenant Boisragon; their rank and file were thrown back on the river, and sought refuge either in the stream or by

Marches to Khankal.

attacks.

* Eight Europeans, thirty Gúrkahs, thirty Sikhs, and two guns.

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and completely defeats them.

flight along its banks. In their flight they were followed by the cavalry and considerably cut up. Captain Boisragon ascertained that they numbered about a thousand and that they had two guns. This little affair was the more important as it was the first decisive blow struck at the rebellion so long rampant in Rohilkhand.

Terror of the nawáb.

To return to Bijnor. The effect of Boisragon's victory was immediately felt in that district. No people traverse more quickly than the natives of India the space between exalted elation and bitter despondency. To conciliate the small landowners, the nawáb's nephew at once announced that all rent-free holdings resumed under British rule would be released; but this helped him but little, and the declension of the fortunes of the usurpers was followed by a renewal of their quarrels. Some bitter disputes terminated in a new agreement, in virtue of which the nawáb's monthly salary was reduced to eight thousand rupees; his eldest son was declared his heir-apparent; his nephew was nominated as his representative; two other Muhammadans were promoted to be generals, and assignments of lands were made to provide for their salaries; a third was appointed to be commander-in-chief; stipends were set apart for all the members of the nawáb's family, and an engagement was taken from the nephew that he would not aspire to the succession, or interfere in any way with the claims of the eldest son on his father's death.

The disputes between him and his coadjutors are readjusted.

Jones's force enters Rohilkhand.

This tinsel fabric was shattered at the very first push. Even whilst it had been building

there was being prepared at Rúrki a British force whose very appearance in Rohilkhand would be sufficient to shake it to its very foundations. On the 17th of April that force, accompanied by Mr. Shakespear and others crossed the Ganges near the head of the Ganges canal, and in five days effectually cleared the Bijnor district in the manner described in the second volume of this history.*

Shakespear resumes his duties.

From the date of the crossing of the avenging force into the Bijnor district, Mr. Shakespear resumed his duties as the representative of the Government. His responsibilities were extremely onerous. He was the only officer of the column who had any acquaintance with the country, so that matters connected with the department of the Quartermaster-General were mainly dependent upon his opinion and advice, and, added to this, it devolved upon him to decide the measures which should be taken for the punishment of offenders and for the restoration of order. In a sketch such as this is, it is impossible to render full justice to all that Mr. Shakespear in a very brief period was able to accomplish. The principle upon which he acted was to mark in an effective manner the displeasure of the Government, whilst opening to all, except to actual murderers, a way of reconciliation and pardon. Thus —even before the fight at Naghína—to leave a lasting symbol of the sentiments entertained by the British Government regarding the nawáb, the

Services rendered by him to Jones's force.

He reorganises the district.

* Vol. ii. pages 513 to 519.

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hall of audience at Najíbábád was destroyed; the district was at the same time dominated by the occupation of the fort of Pattargarh in the vicinity. These acts accomplished, Mr. Shakespear fixed his headquarters at Najíbábád, re-established the collectorships and police posts in the districts, and endeavoured, by conciliatory measures, to induce the rebel Muhammadans, who had not been engaged in any distinct crime in connection with the rebellion, to return to their peaceful avocations. His measures were so far successful that his police were able, even at that early period, to enter the jungles and capture without opposition some relatives of the nawáb. When, after Naghína, he returned, escorted only by the loyal Hindús and accompanying the guns captured at that fight, to Bijnor, he ascertained that the population were returning to their normal avocations; that traffic was being reopened, and that the collection of rebels in the jungles was rapidly diminishing. Mr. Shakespear subsequently visited every part of his district, and by his firm, conciliatory, and judicious measures, speedily removed the very last remnant of discontent. As he, at the beginning of the disturbances, had clung to his district longer than any other officer in Rohilkhand, so on their subsidence he was able to bring back the normal routine earlier than was found practicable in the other districts of the same province.*

His tact and conciliatory measures

speedily restores order and confidence.

* The nawáb Mahmúd Khán was sentenced to be transported for life. His property was forfeited to the State.

The "energy and sound judgment" displayed by Mr. Shakespear were noticed by the cordial approval of Lord Canning. With other civil officers, likewise, he was thanked for his services as a volunteer with the Rúrki force; but there the public acknowledgments ended. In the circumstances in which he was placed, no-one could have accomplished more than Mr. Shakespear. It must have been trying for him to notice, when the honours were apportioned, that others who had done less were substantially rewarded.

Dehrá Dún.

Dehrá Dún is another typical district which seems to deserve special mention.

In the beginning of May 1857, this district consisted of a valley measuring about sixty miles by fifteen, partly forest and partly tea-plantations, a hill-tract of less extent, and a sanitarium and convalescent depôt, containing invalids, women, and children, to the number of about two thousand. It was bounded on the north by native states, on the west by native states, on the south by the district of Saháranpúr, on the east by the district of Bijnor. The chief civil authority was the superintendent, Mr. H. G. Keene, his assistant being Mr. J. C. Robertson. The garrison consisted of the Sirmúr regiment of Gúrkahs under the command of Major Charles Reid. The Trigonometrical Survey had its head-quarters there under Colonel Scott Waugh of the Bengal Engineers. There was a small establishment under the American Presbyterian Board of Missions. There were also some old

Mr. Keene and the European population of the district.

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officers of the retired list resident at Dehrá, and a very few rich natives, the most prominent of whom was a political *détenu*, the rájá Lál Sinh, formerly regent of the Panjáb.

Mr. Keene is in the heart of the hills when the mutiny breaks out.

When the news of the Mírath outbreak reached Mr. Keene—which was on the 16th of May—he was in the heart of the hill subdivision, engaged in a survey preliminary to the settlement of the land revenue. The tracts were being swept by epidemic cholera, and there was considerable difficulty in moving the camp. He came in, however, as quickly as he could, met on the way with further alarms. On arriving at Dehrá he found that Reid's Gúrkahs had marched to join the main body of troops about to move from Mírath upon Dehlí. A depôt of eighty men constituted the total force left with him to maintain order. He accordingly lost no time in raising recruits to guard the passes by which his district could be entered from the plains. Rájá Lál Sinh also placed some of his armed retainers at Mr. Keene's disposal. In a few days news arrived of the fall of Bijnor, brought in by the civil officer of that district. Saháranpúr still held out under Mr. R. Spankie. The tract to the westward, under the Sirmúr rájá, was fairly peaceful. The hill tracts to the north were quiescent, except in the British subdivisions already mentioned, where petty outrages occurred which could not just then be punished.

He returns and organises exterior defensive measures,

Having made such provisions as appeared proper for his outward defences, the superintendent turned his attention to the maintenance of internal order. For this purpose he appointed

also for the maintenance of internal order.

the mess-house of the absent Gúrkah officers as a rendezvous in case of alarm, and enrolled a number of European volunteers whose names he placed upon a roster, and with whose aid the town of Dehrá and its environs were patrolled every night at unfixed hours. By this device it was calculated that the native police would be kept on the alert by their ignorance of the exact hour when they might be visited. The success was complete, no post having been found deserted, no beat unkept, during the whole time of trouble.

Bad news from the exterior.

Matters were in a state of tension, but all remained quiet—with the exception of one or two fires, probably accidental—till the middle of June. Then, one evening, a runner came in from the Sirmúr territory, bringing news that four hundred infantry and two hundred cavalry from the Jalandhar brigade were in full march upon the district. The messenger brought these tidings in a note from a British officer, and they were strictly true. The contents of the treasury were at once sent up to Masúrí (the hill sanitarium) with a note to the officer commanding the convalescent depôt, requesting his aid. The next day was occupied with preparing carriage and provisions, for the men of the Gúrkah depôt were to be marched out on elephants and the invalids on horseback. That evening the force started, about one hundred and fifty men in all,* and marched

Measures taken in consequence.

A force marches against the rebels.

* Mr. R. Forrest, of the Canal Department, the Rev. D. Herron, American Missionary, and some sick officers from Masúri, accompanied Mr. Keene, as also did his assistant.

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thirty-six miles during the sultry June night. In the morning they arrived at Bádsháh Bágh the outer end of the Timlí pass, and found that their prey had escaped them. Like snakes in the grass, the sepoys had slipped away during the hours necessarily given to preparation. The force could not go farther out of the district without draining it of its administrators and defenders; and the rebels had to be left to such obstacles as they might encounter in other districts.

The escape.

This was the most serious military occurrence that took place, with one exception, to be hereafter noticed. It had no important results. Still, it was well planned, showing spirit in all concerned. The enemy were well armed and equipped, and the cavalry superbly mounted on stud-bred horses. With a motley force, of which only a small portion was British, and that composed of convalescents, the task of bringing them to book, though a serious one, would probably have succeeded but for circumstances which no one could control or avoid.

The next trouble that arose was from the lawless state of the Saháranpúr district. Mr. Spankie kept such order as the times admitted. His coadjutor, Mr. H. D. Robertson, was actively engaged in scouring the district for the same purpose. But their efforts were much paralysed by the protracted defence and prolonged attack going on at Dehlí; and marauders of the old type who had given so much trouble in Shore's days, thirty years before, began to appear. One gang

The protracted siege of Dehlí favours disorder.

of these men came across the border and drove off a herd of cattle after killing the herdsman. They were pursued and arrested, brought to trial, condemned, and hanged within less than three weeks from the commission of their crime. The example proved sufficient; the forays ceased.

Difficulties regarding food and money.

The difficulty which next supervened was as to food and money, neither of which are sufficiently produced in the valley, even in common times. Now, when agriculture was almost suspended by war's alarms, when the roads were almost entirely closed for traffic by the disturbed state of the country, the difficulties may well have appeared almost insurmountable. And the population never was so large. The wives and families of officers in the field thronged to the hills, followed by flocks of servants; and the officers—unable to do anything else with their pay—drew it chiefly in the form of orders upon the treasuries of places where their wives were harbouring. Of these the most frequented was that of Dehrá, where a run consequently occurred to meet which the resources of the Panjáb were laid under requisition. John Lawrence and Donald Macleod, the strong rulers of that province, sent in several supplies, which were loyally escorted to Dehrá by the yeomanry of the Dún to whom Mr. Keene entrusted the duty. On one occasion, Mr. Spankie sent a small sum from Saháranpúr, to fetch which the Rev. J. Woodside, an American missionary, and Mr. R. Currie, a young civilian, went over and brought the cash

How partly surmounted.

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safely through one of the most disturbed parts of the Saháranpúr district.

These resources proving insufficient Mr. Keene—adopting a suggestion made to him by Captain Tennant, of the Engineers—determined to issue paper money on his own responsibility. He, therefore, prepared forms of acknowledgment for sums running from one rupee to fifty (which he marked with a crest press to prevent forgery). He then registered these in his treasury office, and issued them under his own signature in part payment of the drafts that were presented; so much paper and the balance in cash.*

These resources proving insufficient. Keene issues bank-notes.

Food was also procured through local merchants, and by these expedients the troubles of the time, though they could not be neutralised, were reduced to a minimum. The result was that of all those tender beings confided to the superintendent's care, not one hair of the head of any suffered wrong. The cattle-lifting above mentioned was the only damage that property sustained in the Dún up to the fall of Delhi. After that date, when a military officer had been sent to take charge, the Dún was once invaded at its extreme corner; but the invasion was repulsed with considerable loss by a party from Rúrki before the Dún force could come to the spot.

The Dún passes through the ordeal.

Of an entirely different character to the foregoing were the proceedings of Mr. R. H. W. Dun-

* *Vide* extract from Accountant to Government, quoted in *Letters on Indian Administration*, 1857 (p. 2).

lop, magistrate and collector of Mírath. Mr. Dunlop was travelling in the Himálaya mountains when the mutiny broke out.* He heard of that event at the village of Naggar near the source of the Bías river on the 31st of May. He at once pushed for the plains, passed through the Simla sanitarium, the inhabitants of which he found "either in the hot or cold fit of panic," and reached Ambála on the 9th and Karnál on the 10th of June. At the latter place he received a letter from his commissioner, Mr. Greathed, who was with the English army before Dehlí, in reply to one from himself asking for active employment, summoning him to the camp. It was just after the action of Badli-ki-sarái had been fought —an action considered by everyone as a precursor to the immediate storming of the imperial city. As Dunlop and Speke rode across that plain, still strewn with the bodies of the dead sepoys, the only anxiety they felt was the anxiety lest they might arrive too late for the great event, to attempt which, in fact, the army had still to undergo three months' toil, fighting, and privations.

Dunlop in the Himálayas when the mutiny breaks out.

Hastens to Dehlí.

On the very day of his arrival in camp, Dunlop was informed by the commissioner that the gentleman who had acted for him at Mírath was dead, and that as it was of great importance

He is ordered to Mírath.

* His companion was Speke of the 65th native infantry, brother of the African traveller. Speke was a few months later mortally wounded at the storming of Dehlí. He was a gallant soldier and a noble-hearted man. His dying words were: "Thy ways are not our ways, but they are just and true."

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and rides through the disturbed districts to Bhágpat.

Thence he rides for Mirath.

Peculiar position of Mirath.

that someone possessing local experience should take charge of that district, it was incumbent upon him to proceed thither at once, and that, owing to the scarcity of cavalry, he must find his way without an escort. Dunlop started that night on a hired horse, accompanied by one mounted orderly* belonging to his district who happened to be in camp, and rode straight for Bhágpat on the Jamná.

Having travelled three consecutive days and nights Dunlop was overcome with fatigue when he reached Bhágpat. Received with apparent cordiality by the two senior native officials of that place, he threw himself down and slept. When he awoke he found himself surrounded by natives; learned that the Muhammadans were ripe for rebellion, and that the country was becoming every day more dangerous. He devoted a portion of the night that followed to write a report of all that he had heard, accompanied by suggestions from himself to the commissioner, and the following afternoon rode for Mirath which he reached the same night.

Dunlop at once took charge of his duties. Under ordinary circumstances they would not have been very different from those devolving upon civilians in other large military stations held throughout the period of the mutiny by British troops. But the circumstances of Mirath were not ordinary. Only forty miles from

* There were four orderlies in camp, but one only could be spared.

Dehlí, and surrounded by districts in which mutiny was rampant, it constituted, in June 1857, the one spot on the grand trunk road running from Alláhábád to the north-west which might serve as an effective rallying-point for loyal natives. Dunlop had early experience of this truth. The morning of the day or the second day after he had taken charge nine Sikh horsemen, without arms, rode to his house to report their arrival to him as district officer. They represented themselves as belonging to the detachment of the 1st Oudh cavalry which had murdered Fletcher Hayes and two other Englishmen, and had then ridden for Dehlí. They had declined to accompany their mutinous comrades, had surrendered their arms to Mr. Watson, magistrate of Aligarh, and had then ridden to Mírath, there to proffer their services to the British authorities. Dunlop was only too glad to engage them.

Dunlop takes loyal Sikhs into his service.

Passing over an expedition into the neighbouring district, in which Dunlop served as a volunteer, I come to that part of his conduct which gives a special mark to his proceedings as district officer, and of which the incident regarding the enrolment of the nine Sikh horsemen may be considered as the foundation-stone.

Dunlop had not only found the civil treasury of Mírath almost empty, but that means of replenishing it were wanting. He had no men at his disposal to aid in collecting revenue in the district. Military aid could not be counted upon; whilst the native bankers and merchants of the

To meet the difficulties of the time,

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Dunlop resolves to raise volunteers.

city, under the circumstances of the time, positively refused to advance a loan to the Government. In this crisis Dunlop, availing himself of the ready co-operation offered by the brigade-major, Colonel Whish, resolved to organise a volunteer troop of European civil and other officers then refugees at Mírath.

Formation of the Khákí Risála.

The corps was speedily organised. Major Williams, superintendent of police, was nominated commanding officer, Captain Charles d'Oyly* as second in command, and Lieutenant Tyrwhitt† as adjutant. Volunteers flocked in, and so actively were the drilling, mounting, and arming proceeded with that, within three days one troop, composed of Englishmen, Eurasians, and a few Sikhs, was fit for duty. The uniform chosen was a suit of dust-coloured cloth called khákí, and this cloth gave the name of the Khákí Risála to the corps.

The Khákí Risála patrolles one district.

The Khákí Risála began its career as a regiment by proceeding, towards the end of June, to attack some villages only five miles from Mírath, which the Gújars had occupied. Accompanied by two guns and a few of the Carabineers, they drove out the Gújars, burned three of the villages, killed several Gújars, and took forty of them prisoners. From the date of this successful attack the revenue collections in the district began. At first the task was not easy, but other expeditions followed that just recorded, and it was found that every fresh ex-

* Now Major-General Sir D'Oyly, Bart.

† Now Major-General Tyrwhitt.

pedition increased the facility of realising the revenue.*

It may be interesting to record some of these expeditions.

Atrocities of the Gújars

On the 8th of July news of the burning of Bégamábád, an important village about twelve miles distant on the road to Dehlí, reached Mírath. The atrocity had been committed by a large body of Gújars, and had been accompanied by circumstances of singular atrocity, the victims being a number of loyal men of the Ját tribe who had bound themseves together to resist Gújar incursions. On this occasion, greatly outnumbered and despairing of success, the Játs had made a feeble resistance, and had succumbed. Within a few hours of the news reaching Mírath, Dunlop set off, accompanied by the Kháki Risála, fifteen of his armed retainers, twenty armed native Christians, and two mountain-guns, manned by native artillerymen. Pushing on with vigour, this column reached the ruins of Bégamábád by grey dawn of the morning of the day following the commission of the atrocity. The fires were still smouldering, the walls were blackened, the flooring in many places was dug up, and a few miserable fugitives were seen wandering here and

* "Every fresh expedition added to the facility of realising our revenue, and in a few months, amidst the wreck and disorganisation of surrounding districts, the entire government had been collected, with a rapidity and completeness hitherto unprecedented."—*Service and Adventure with the Khakee Ressalah*: a book upon which that portion of this chapter relating to that Risála is mainly based.

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are punished by the Risála.

there in the fields. The village of Síkri, two miles distant, was known to be the head-quarters of the Gújars. Thither the Kháki Risála proceeded, and before the alarm could be raised surrounded it. The Gújars defended themselves with great obstinacy, and five hours elapsed before the victory was gained. But when gained it was complete.

Devastations of Sáh Mall.

One of the most enterprising and daring of the Gújar leaders was Sáh Mall, zamindár of Bájrúl, a man who had conquered, and who had since maintained, a kind of semi-independence in the town of Baráuth, capital of the district of the same name in the Mírath division, but in close proximity to Dehlí. From this district and from Bájrúl, Sáh Mall had been for some time in the habit of sallying to carry fire and the sword into the neighbouring villages. The proximity of Baráuth to Dehlí seemed to promise him immunity from assault. Not so, however, thought Dunlop. This gentleman, angered at the ruthless destruction wrought by this brigand and his followers upon an unoffending people, sketched a plan for attacking the southern village of the Baráuth district by a rapid advance of the Kháki Risála and of such assistance as the general would afford him from Mírath. He laid his plan before the general, and obtained his assent to its execution. Dunlop knew well that considerable danger would attend the attempt, as forces would certainly be sent after him from Dehlí; but he trusted to the rapidity of his movements, to the increasing distance from Dehlí, as he should ap-

Dunlop resolves to check them.

His plans for that purpose.

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proach Sáh Mall's stronghold of Bájrúl, and to the prestige inseparable from audacity.

The expedition sets out.

Towards the end of July the expedition, composed of two mountain-guns, fifty men of the Risála, forty men 60th Rifles, two sergeants, and twenty armed bandsmen, and twenty-seven armed native retainers, marched to the village of Dalhaora, on the Hurdan, little more than twenty miles from Dehlí. There they heard heavy firing in the direction of Déolah, seven miles distant. The chaudri of Déolah, who was with the British force, was despatched at once to learn the cause of the firing. He returned during the night with information that Sáh Mall and his friends were lying at the Muhammadan village of Basáod, with the intention of attacking Déolah the next day. Early next morning the small British party marched on Basáod. Their approach was sufficient. Sáh Mall and his followers evacuated the place, leaving large supplies in it. Basáod, long used as a store-house for the rebels, was burned; the prisoners taken were shot. The force then marched for Baráuth. No revenue had been collected from this subdivision since the commencement of the mutiny. In fact, the civil establishments had been driven out in May, and the country had been more or less over-run by the rebels. Dunlop now devised and carried out a daring plan to remedy the evil. Whilst the force marched away along the course of the east Jamná canal he, taking with him a tahsildár*

and marches on Basáod.

and thence on Baráuth.

Dunlop's daring plan to restore order.

* A native collector of revenue. The party was three days later joined by a native officer.

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and two mounted orderlies, visited all the villages on the left bank, moving parallel with the force, collecting sheep and supplies for the force as he went along, and trusting to his prestige as district officer for immunity from attack.

The plan at first successful.

The experiment was at first most successful. From the first two villages, indeed, the inhabitants had fled, and Dunlop's care was to send out to reassure the zamindárs. The third village, Bichpúri, was a Gújar village, the inhabitants of which had taken a leading part in plunder and destruction. Dunlop, nevertheless, entered it; and here his prestige served him, for, he records, "numbers of armed men were leaving it as I arrived." In the four villages next visited his reception was not unfriendly; the inhabitants "appeared glad to see the tahsildár." From each he carried off one or two of the principal landowners as security for the Government revenue. The people of the next village, Barkái, were known to be friendly. To his surprise, then, on arriving before it, Dunlop found the gates closed and the people swarming from their houses. A whisper from one of them sufficed to give the information that they were expecting an attack from Sáh Mall.

but, on reaching Barkái, signs of disturbance are apparent.

Dunlop stayed for a few minutes, endeavouring to calm the fears of the villagers, when a tremendous noise of shouting and bellowing from a neighbouring village convinced him that they were well founded. In a few seconds Sáh Mall, at the head of two thousand men, came in sight. Very soon their matchlock-balls were flying

Sáh Mall

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amongst the small party, only one of whom was an Englishman. Dunlop would willingly have faced them—but *cui bono?* One or two hundred Englishmen might, as they did in the pursuit of Tántia Topi, face, and even successfully attack, four or five thousand. But one man against two thousand! The odds were too great. Dunlop and his five companions unwillingly fell back, leaving the fifteen landowners and twelve sheep he had collected, unguarded, as a prey to the rebels.

forces Dunlop to retire.

But the danger was not over. A horseman, armed with a matchlock and drawn sword—subsequently ascertained to be Bagdá, nephew to Sáh Mall—rode at Dunlop. Under ordinary circumstances the combat would probably have been short. But Dunlop was riding that morning, for the first time, a horse which had an insane dread of fire-arms. His position would have been ludicrous but for its danger. "The animal," he writes, "proceeded to the charge alternately tripping along sideways, or waltzing round on its hind legs, springing clear off the ground at every discharge of my revolver." Ultimately, however, Dunlop succeeded in depriving Bagdá of his thumb and in mortally wounding his charger. He then rode after his friends, leaving his pith helmet, which had fallen off in the fight, as a trophy on the field.

Dunlop engages in single combat the nephew of Sáh Mall;

danger of bestriding a timid horse.

Dunlop deprives his antagonist of his thumb and his horse;

but loses his own helmet.

Dunlop now made, with his small escort, for Baráuth. There he found that the column had had that morning an engagement with, and had put to flight, a body of rebels who were then being

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pursued. The cavalry had scarcely returned from the pursuit, when Sáh Mall led the men who had chased the small party in the morning to the attack. But it was Dunlop's turn now. The rebels, their flanks turned, soon broke and fled.

Defeat of Sáh Mall.

Sáh is slain.

This affair proved to be most important. In the pursuit Sáh Mall was overtaken and killed by a young volunteer, by name Tonnochy, assisted by a native trooper. His head, stuck on a pole, materially influenced the decision of a third attack, which the remainder of the rebels, unaware of Sáh Mall's death, ventured to deliver the same afternoon. It was repulsed with ease.* I should not omit to add that in the second fight of the day Dunlop's lost helmet was recovered.

and Dunlop's helmet is recovered.

Great results of Sáh Mall's death.

The effect of Sáh Mall's death was shown by the freedom with which the native dealers at once brought grain and other supplies into the British camp. That evening, too, the officers and men of the force enjoyed the gratification of encamping in and around a bungalow which Sáh Mall had set apart for himself as a hall of justice.

From Baráuth the little column marched for Sirdhána, famous as the residence of Bégam Samrú. Here Dunlop made arrangements for

* In this affair, and indeed throughout the campaign of the Khákí Risála, a young civilian made himself particularly distinguished for his coolness in danger and his courage in the field. This was Mr. A. C. Lyall, now Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, as remarkable for his ability now as he was for the sterner qualities in those troublous days.

the payment by the neighbouring villages of arrears of rent. But one village, Akálpúra, was refractory. This village belonged to one Narpat Singh, a notorious rebel. Under his auspices, then, the men of the place sent back Dunlop's messengers with the inquiry, "Who is the district officer and who is the tahsíldár that they should demand revenue from Akálpúra?" and threatened the messengers with death should they return on a similar errand. In consequence of this message, it was deemed advisable to pay the refractory villages a visit. The Khákis, then, started before daybreak, reached Akálpúra before the alarm had been sounded, surrounded and stormed it, Narpat Singh being among the slain. This prompt and successful action produced a marvellous effect on the turbulent spirits in the neighbourhood. The force then returned to Sirdhána.

Insolent message of Narpat Singh.

for which he atones with his life.

An act of justice such as the natives of India would thoroughly appreciate was performed about this time. There were two villages in the Rájpút portion of the Mírath division, known as Solána and Dháolána. The inhabitants of both were Rájpúts. The native official of the district was a Muhammadan, Toráb Áli, loyal to the British. As the district, however, was in close proximity to Muhammadan districts which had rebelled, the inhabitants of Dháolána, thinking to earn the praise of the court of Dehlí, declared against the English, attacked the police station, and took prisoner Toráb Áli. Upon this the people of Solána, loyal to the English, attacked Dháolána and released Toráb Áli. The Dháo-

Dunlop metes out justice which can be understood and appreciated.

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lána men, knowing they had sinned beyond forgiveness, incited other villages to revolt. Whereupon Dunlop visited the district with the little column, defeated the rebels, and gave their lands over to the loyal people of Solána.

Other successful expeditions.

Shortly after this, the 21st of July, the little column, somewhat strengthened, proceeded to Hauppar, thence to defeat the rebels at Gaháli —an achievement gallantly and successfully performed.

Of the Khaka Risála.

An expedition on the 18th of September to Morwána was so far successful, that the report of its approach was sufficient to scare the rebels. It was followed by one of greater importance—to drive some rebels from Bhowáni, eighteen miles beyond Mozaffarnagar—a place whence they had repulsed the district officer and a strong force. Dunlop's force, joined at Mozaffarnagar by that previously repulsed, was successful on this as it had been on every other occasion.

With the fall of Dehlí the necessity for the labours ceases.

With the fall of Dehlí the necessity for such detached expeditions in the Mírath division practically ceased. The army, released from the labours of the siege, proceeded, as we have seen, to free the country in all directions. It is impossible to exaggerate the services which in the interval had been rendered by the little band of volunteers, of whom Mr. Dunlop was the original organiser, the constant companion. Who were these volunteers? The best answer to that query is that given in the work in which their deeds are recorded, and which tells in eloquent language of the results they accomplished.

Who and what were the volunteers?

"Few of those," wrote Mr. Dunlop at the time, "who so gallantly volunteered for a life of peril and adventure in lieu of patient anticipation while awaiting the issue of the struggle at Dehlí, had any military experience to assist them, and their drill had to be commenced; but they possessed the hereditary courage of their race; they could all ride; many of them were sportsmen, some of them crack shots and admirable swordsmen. Made of such material, is it to be wondered at that they traversed the most distracted portions of the district in the height of the revolt; that they fearlessly faced, with the support of two little mountain-train guns, manned by native artillerymen of doubtful loyalty, forty native najibs, and forty of the rifle regiment, the assembled hordes of one of the most enterprising leaders this rebellion has produced, and, with little or no loss to themselves, routed and destroyed in hundreds the same class of men as those whose unbridled villainy produced such mischief in the station on the night following the outbreak; that, maddened by the insults and massacres inflicted on their own relations, on their own brothers and sisters, they executed, if let loose on a rebel village, a vengeance which made it a terror and a fear to the country around?" It is impossible to show more clearly how it was that, in the most critical times of the mutiny, the Mírath division was prevented from falling a prey to the rebels.

Allahábád.

I turn now to Allahábád—a name familiar to the readers of this history. The situation of

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1857 May—June.

Allahábád had many things common with that of Mirath. It was an important military station held throughout by the British, yet surrounded by districts and divisions in full revolt. Immediately to the north lay Oudh, to the north-east the districts of Ázamgarh and Gorákhpúr, to the west and south Bandalkhand. At the confluence of two great rivers, it was a most important strategical point, especially during the rainy season, when it formed the river terminus for the steamers from Calcutta. The military events occurring at Allahábád have been related in these volumes, but the heavy duties which devolved upon the members of the civil service have been but incidentally referred to. Yet those duties were of a nature to tax all the energies even of men accustomed, as are the members of the Indian Civil Service, to give themselves, heart and soul, to their country.

Importance of its position.

When the mutiny broke out, the Commissioner of the Allahábád division was Mr. C. Chester; the magistrate was Mr. M. H. Court, a glorious specimen of an Englishman, a good sportsman, a generous friend, and one whose hospitality was famous even in India. The news of the mutiny at Mirath reached Allahábád on the 12th of May; on the evening of the 5th of June the 6th regiment native infantry mutinied. That mutiny was the signal for a general revolt. That very night the rabble of the city, the whole of the native police, joined in the outbreak; the jail released its prisoners, two thousand in number, and the inhabitants of several adjoining villages,

Early days of the mutiny at Allahábád.

men renowned for lawlessness and plunder, sprang forth, and the work of incendiarism, riot, and plunder commenced.* The Europeans and Eurasians, men, women, and children, all who could escape the fury of the revolters, had, meanwhile, taken refuge in the fort, where they remained besieged till the 11th of June.

1857. June.

Now, on the afternoon of the 11th of June, the gallant Neill relieved the anxieties of the garrison, has formed a portion of the military history of the mutiny. It will suffice here to state that from the date of his arrival Allahábád formed the base of military operations undertaken against Kánhpúr, the most eastern part of Oudh, and the Azamgarh districts. My subject now relates solely to the civil officers and their duties.

The arrival of Neill gives the first check to the revolt.

No sooner had Neill restored the British power in the fortress and the city, than the European residents returned to the smoking ruin of their houses. In the city it was comparatively easy to restore matters to the condition antecedent to the mutiny. From the date of the 11th of June, Allahábád itself was never in danger. European troops were constantly arriving and passing through, and the inhabitants of the city were thoroughly aware that any other course but submission to the law would bring upon them sure and swift destruction. But in the districts the case was quite different.

Position of Allahabad after Neill's arrival.

* "A District during the Rebellion."—*Calcutta Review.* This article forms one of many about to be published in a separate volume by its accomplished author, Mr. R. N. Cust, C.S.

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The three natural divisions of Allahábád.

The effect of the junction of the streams of the Ganges and Jamná just below Allahábád has been to form three great natural divisions of land. These divisions contain more than one thousand villages and towns, and a population of nearly a million. Now in the centre division, that between the left bank of the Jamná and the right bank of the Ganges, no vestige of police remained. The villagers had everywhere commenced the career of plunder, and led on probably by some notorious criminal escaped from jail, had "commenced reprisals on their neighbours, paid out old scores, removed old boundary-marks, and ejected purchasers of land." * In this division disorder was rampant; Europeans were hunted down, the telegraph posts were torn up, the iron sockets converted into rude cannon, and the wire into slugs.

The centre division nearly lawless.

In the division on the right bank of the Jamná a far different order prevailed. There one or two large proprietors exercised great influence, and they were wise enough to see that their interests were bound up in the maintenance of the dominant power which had ever afforded them protection. They therefore at once offered to undertake the protection of their own villages if the Government would give them a subsidy. The Government complied, and the result was that in this division order was maintained. In due course, when the back of the mutiny had been broken,

In the division on the right bank of the Jamná order is maintained by the land-owners.

* Cust, who enters into much fuller details than I have space for.

the magistrate was able to re-introduce his own police. But not the less was he thankful to those who, when he was powerless, had taken the initiative to maintain order.*

From the third division, again, on the left bank of the Ganges, British authority had disappeared. The vicinity to Oudh, now in full revolt, had proved fatal to that authority. The neighbouring districts of Jánpúr, of Azimgarh, and of Gorakhpúr, had fallen into the hands of rebels, to be recovered only by the sword.

From the third division British authority had disappeared.

To maintain order in the first and third of these divisions, very considerable powers of life and death were given by the Government to the commissioner, the judge, the magistrate, the deputy magistrate, and the assistant magistrate; and so great was the panic at Calcutta, that, as if this had not been sufficient, similar powers were conferred upon two private individuals and the civil surgeon. No doubt some examples were required. Most certainly they were given. "Zealously," writes Mr. Cust, "did the three volunteers use their new powers, and in the short time which elapsed before their recall, one of the private individuals had sentenced sixty, the second sixty-four, and the civil surgeon fifty-four, to the gallows. No record remains of the crime or the evidence, but we gather that one man was hung

Means taken to maintain order.

The lawlessness of amateur authority.

* Mr. Cust well says:—"This opens out another and a serious question whether our established policy of cutting off the heads of all the tallest poppies, and leaving nothing betwixt the Imperial Government and the cultivating owners of the soil, is a wise one."

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for having a bag of new copper coin in his possession, presumed to have been plundered from the treasury, or, most probably, abandoned by the mutinous sepoys, who were surfeited with silver. More than a month after our power had been restored in the city, we find fifteen sentenced one day and twenty-eight the next, for rebellion and robbing the treasury; but it does not appear that they were sepoys. Thirteen were hung another day for a similar offence. Six were hung for plying a ferry for the convenience of the rebels." It is a relief, after the perusal of this disgraceful record, to find Mr. Cust declaring that "the investigations of the officers of Government, men trained to the consideration of evidence, and conscious of the necessity of supporting the character, as well as vindicating the authority, of the Government, were more deliberate." They had, indeed, need to be so; but the question occurs, how it was that the same Government which refused to disarm the sepoys at Dánápúr, and thus imperilled the safety of Calcutta, delayed the advance of Havelock, and caused an enormous amount of slaughter, should have complacently invested the three untrained gentlemen referred to with the terrible powers of life and death!

The measured justice of trained generals.

Responsibility resting on the Government.

To return. In addition to power over life, the magistrate was entrusted with authority to confiscate property, real and personal. In the hands of Mr. Court this authority was used with judgment and discretion. Mercy was tempered by judgment. But, nevertheless, the amount of property which changed hands was considerable.

The measures enforced regarding property.

Some men had died, their relatives were not forthcoming; some had absconded; some had openly joined the rebels. But there is reason to believe that in every instance justice was meted out with a hand more inclined to leniency than to its opposite.

It devolved upon Mr. Court likewise, in his capacity of collector of revenue, to furnish money and collect it. I cannot do better than transcribe the graphic account given by Mr. Oust of the manner in which these duties were performed.

The monetary arrangements of the division.

"All this time the executive officer of the district was not idle in his duties of collector. Money poured in by every steamer from Calcutta and poured out like water, leaving the tale of unadjusted items to be told in tens of thousands of pounds. There was constant payment of sums for saving European life or distinguished bravery, for it was then no light service for a native to stand by an Englishman, as he was liable to attack by the rebels for so doing. The terrorism of the rebels is scarcely appreciated by us to its full extent. There were compensations for losses or for wounds, or advances made to starving Christians or faithful natives, driven with only the clothes on their backs from out-stations. There were rewards to be paid for the arrest of notorious rebels and criminals escaped from gaol; spies and messengers to be paid handsomely for their services generally, by dipping their hands into a bag of silver, and securing as much as they could grasp; advances to be made to officers

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engaged in raising regiments of low-caste men; and reward for the restoration of Government horses, cattle, and stores. State-prisoners had to be maintained. Supplies of cash had to be furnished to every advancing column, or placed at the disposal of the commissariat and the ordnance department. No wonder that in these hasty remittances the tale of rupees ran short, that boxes of treasure were found violated, and, in one instance, a box of five hundred pounds was found missing. In the general moral debasement, we cannot be surprised that the European sentry was not always trustworthy. In the treasure chamber also was stowed away the plunder belonging to the army, the spoil of captured cities, valued at hundreds of thousands of pounds, and fastened down in beer-barrels until the end of the war. Among these spoils were the crown jewels of sovereigns, the gold plate of princes, ear-rings, and nose-rings, and jewels of women, ornamented daggers and diamond necklaces, all the pomp and wealth of oriental monarchs, wrung from a plundered and oppressed people, and now captured by the English army.

Duties devolving on the collector.

"At the same time the collector had to look after the revenue of those parts of the district in which his orders were respected. He had to suspend collections from such villages as had been plundered, burned, or deserted. He had to determine where he should remit and where enforce the demand; as it is a grave moral question how far a government is justified in demanding the payment of taxes, when it has notoriously failed

in its duty of protection, owing to no fault of the people. No sooner was the danger past than red tape raised its head again, and a gentleman, sitting in comfort and ease at Calcutta, reminded the excited collector of unattended-to forms and discontinued returns. With hundreds of boxes of stationery and stamps in his charge, directed to districts in the hands of the rebels, the collector, without a pen or sheet of paper belonging to him, dared not use the consignment of his neighbour without special authority. As he returned to his half-ruined home from his morning-duty of hanging rebels, flogging rioters, and blowing up temples, he found letters from the Head of the Finance Department, reminding him that he was personally responsible for every rupee missing in a treasury guarded by European soldiers in a fort three miles off. On his table he found notes from an officer with the force of Jang Bahádur, requesting a daily supply of a hundred he-goats for the hungry Gúrkah; from the post master, requesting him to hunt for a missing mail-cart; from the commanding officer, requesting him to close the grog-shops; from a cavalry-commandant to know whose grass was to be cut, and where a farrier was to be found; from the pension-paymaster requesting him to attend a committee on the confiscation of pensions. Telegraphic messages up and down were tumbling in all day long, sometimes announcing a victory, sometimes heralding a traveller, for, in addition to his other duties, he had to keep a "Red Lion" tavern for strangers, examine the passport of

The red-tape of Calcutta.

Difficulties of the collector.

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every native traveller, and ascertain the contents of every native letter.

The collector's reward.

"Thus passed six months away, and, if some gray hairs had shown themselves in his beard (for since his razors were plundered, he had remained perforce unshorn), if his heart sometimes palpitated from over-excitement, and his liver sometimes troubled him, no wonder. If his temper was somewhat soured, if he hated the natives with a deep hate, if he talked too lightly of cutting the thread of human life, and scoring the backs of poor devils, no wonder. He had had much to bear, and the rebellion had fallen heavily on his estate, his family, and his health. He was mentioned in no despatches; the thanks of Government reached him not; and, when he saw that the tide had turned, and that the country was saved, he hurried to England, on the chance of quiet restoring tone to his body, and change of scene bringing back equanimity to his mind."

The picture somewhat overdrawn.

The concluding portion of the description appears to me to be somewhat overdrawn. No; though he had lost many friends, probably some relations, though he had worked hardly under difficulties, and had earned the thanks and the honours which he did not receive, the magistrate and collector harboured no hatred against the natives. I shall never forget the last exhortation of one of those noble servants of the East India Company, a man who had served many years at that very Allahábád, on my return to India in 1858; they were words of exhortation

to be kind, to be mindful of the many excellent qualities possessed by the natives of India. And that man was, I believe, a type of his class.

I pass on now to Gorákhpúr.

Position and extent of Gorákhpúr.

The district called, after the chief town within its borders, Gorákhpúr, is bounded on the north by Nipál; on the east and south-east by the district of Sáran; on the south by Ázamgarh; on the south-west and west by the kingdom of Oudh. It includes an area of seven thousand three hundred and forty-six square miles, and possessed in 1857 a population somewhat exceeding three millions.

Mr. Wynyard.

In 1857 the judge of Gorákhpúr was Mr. William Wynyard, already mentioned in these pages *; the magistrate and collector was Mr. Paterson; the joint magistrate was Mr. Bird. In such times as those of 1857 the lead taken was never dependent on the rank of the officer. Sometimes, as at Patná, the senior officer directed affairs; at others, as at Banáras, the second in rank came prominently to the front. At Gorákhpúr Mr. Wynyard at once took the reins in his hands.

Mr. Paterson.

Mr. Bird.

Wynyard seems to have taken the responsibility.

Mr. Wynyard joined to great activity of body and a love of field-sports, a cultivated mind and a thorough acquaintance with native character. The station of Gorákhpúr being off the main line of postal communication, Wynyard did not hear of the events of the 10th of May till a week later,

* Vol. ii. page 318.

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the 17th. It happened that Mr. Paterson, the magistrate, was just on the point of quitting the station on leave of absence, for which he had applied and which had been granted. In the presence of the crisis then impending, and which he saw could not fail to bear with particular severity upon a place so near the Oudh frontier as was Gorákhpúr, Wynyard took it upon himself to delay Paterson's departure. I mention this fact not because in itself it was of great importance, but because it produced from the commissioner of the division a reply which indicated a belief common to almost all the high officials in India. Mr. Tucker thanked Wynyard for his action in having delayed Mr. Paterson's departure "till he has heard of the annihilation of the rebels." It was evidently not thought that the delay would be long!

Wynyard retains Mr. Paterson.

Mr. Tucker's opinion regarding the duration of the mutiny.

The troops at Gorákhpúr.

The troops of Gorákhpúr consisted of two companies 17th regiment native infantry and a small detachment 12th irregular cavalry. The head-quarters of the former were at Azamgarh, of the latter at Sigáoli. Very few days after the news reached him of the mutiny, Wynyard received information that the 17th native infantry could not be depended upon. The 12th irregulars bore then a good character, and their commanding officer, Major Holmes, whose name was a household word in the army, was known to trust them implicitly. But, even granting that they were loyal, their numbers were few, and Wynyard felt that it would be necessary for him to look elsewhere for sure support.

Happily, at this conjuncture, the commissioner, Mr. Tucker, placed Wynyard in civil charge of the district, warning him that trouble might be on him at any moment, that Banáras was shaky, recommending him to act boldly and on his own judgment, and giving him authority to assume any amount of responsibility, civil or military. The way thus made plain to him, Wynyard proceeded to act. He enlisted recruits for the jail and other local guards; he caused similar enlistments to be made in the districts; he wrote to the well-affected native landowners and to the European planters, authorising them to enlist well-affected natives for the Government service; he appointed a place of rendezvous in case of attack; and he despatched one hundred and twenty-five of the 17th native infantry and a detachment, thirty-four men, of the 12th irregulars to Banáras in charge of treasure. This still left him burdened with one hundred and twenty sepoys and sixty sowars.

Book XVI. Chapter VI. 1857. Mar.–June. Wynyard receives from the commissioner powers which he uses judiciously.

From that day forth for a long time to follow every post brought bad tidings from outside. One day it was the mutiny at Firozpúr, the next the outbreak at Lakhnao, then those at Nimach and Nasirábád. But the news received on the 5th of June was still more ominous for Gorákhpúr. It told of the mutiny at Azamgarh of the 17th native infantry, a detachment of which regiment was, as we have seen, on duty at Gorákhpúr.

Continued arrival of bad tidings.

That detachment was commanded by Captain Steel, an excellent officer. He at once paraded his men, Paterson having disposed the cavalry

Steel at once drills the men of the 17th native infantry.

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1857. June.

and local levies so as to attack them if they should mutiny. Steel then addressed them, apparently with effect. They displayed no outward sign of discontent. But this apparent loyalty lasted only for the day. The very next morning Steel endeavoured to march the sepoys to Azamgarh, but they refused to obey his orders, and one of them, whom the rest were evidently disposed to follow, was heard to declare that the money in the treasury should not leave the station without a fight.

The day following, the 7th of June, the prisoners attempted to break out from the jail, but they were baffled by the jail-guard, energetically led by Mr. Bird the joint magistrate and Mr. Desmazures an indigo-planter. Eight of the prisoners were killed in the attempt, and ten or twelve were wounded. That night the sepoys, apparently, resolved to join their comrades. They seized empty carts, and with these marched, armed, the following morning, towards the treasury. Their purpose was evident. They had determined to go, but not without the money. In this crisis Steel and Wynyard, who, from the verandah of the former's bungalow, saw them approaching, came to meet and harangued them. Their arguments were effective, for the sepoys returned to their lines. Still business was at a standstill. Everyone felt that one day, sooner or later, the trial would come. There seemed no means of averting it.

Next morning, however, Wynyard received from Major, now Major-General the Honourable

Sir Henry, Ramsay, the British resident at the court of Khátmándu, a letter, in which he promised to send him two hundred Gúrkahs from Pálpa, just across the border. This was cheering news. With the aid of that number of trustworthy troops, it seemed possible still to maintain the district.

Book XVII. Chapter I. 1857. June. Forcement of Gúrkahs.

But the following day showed that events were marching too fast for the Gúrkahs. I have already told how, towards the end of May, Wynyard had sent money to A'zamgarh escorted by one hundred and twenty-five of the 17th native infantry and thirty-four men of the 12th irregulars. On the morning of the 11th the irregulars returned, telling how, after leaving A'zamgarh, the sepoys had mutinied and had seized the money; how the Gházipúr district was in revolt, and how the loyalty of Bahár depended upon the power of the commissioner of Patná to maintain order in that turbulent city.

The sepoys in the district mutiny.

Nevertheless Wynyard did not lose heart. Trusting to the 12th irregulars, whose loyalty had, up to that time, been proof against seduction, he sent detachments to A'zamgarh, to Basti, and to other parts of the district, under his own officers or European residents, to restore order. And he succeeded. He proclaimed martial law in the district, suspended the ordinary forms of trial, and showed a zeal, an energy, and a resolution which had an extremely deterring effect upon the disaffected. They argued that no man would act with such boldness unless he had resources of which they knew nothing.

Great and successful measures adopted by Wynyard.

Book VIII. Chapter I. 1857. June.

The commissioner attempts to prevent the coming of the Gúrkahs.

And yet, all this time, Wynyard had not only no resources, but his superior officer was doing his best to deprive him of those whose timely arrival would still have saved the district. Mr. Tucker, the commissioner of Banáras, wrote at this crisis to tell him that no troops could be spared from that city. This was true, and was probably anticipated. But what was not anticipated, what in its result was fatal to many European lives, was the fact that at the same time Mr. Tucker was exerting all his efforts to prevent the arrival of the Gúrkahs, whose number was now swollen to three thousand, in British territory. To accept the aid of Jang Bahádur was, in Mr. Tucker's opinion, an evil; but surely it was a lesser evil than that involved in the occupation of British territory by rebels! Yet that was, as the result proved, the only alternative.

Fugitives from Oudh arrive.

On the 17th and on the 19th fugitives from Oudh arrived in Gorákhpúr. On the 20th Wynyard sent off all the ladies in the station—the wives of the clerks, who at the last moment refused to leave, excepted—to Banáras under an escort of twenty-five men of the 12th irregulars, seventy men belonging to the rájá of Bánáres, and accompanied by six officers and a sergeant who had escaped from Oudh. This party reached Jánpúr in safety; but the districts were swarming with rebels; all the landowners were up. Some of these stopped the party near Jánpúr and diverted their course to Gházipúr.

Two hundred Gúrkahs reach Gorákhpúr.

On the 28th the two hundred Gúrkahs originally promised by Ramsay arrived from Pálpa. It

must have been a satisfaction to Wynyard thus to have saved for seven weeks a district on the borders of revolted Oudh, contiguous to other districts in which the torch of mutiny had been lighted, and whose landowners had followed with light hearts the example set them by the sepoys. If, in the presence of adverse circumstances which he saw rising around him, Wynyard could not feel very sanguine as to the immediate future, at least he had grounds for hope. It needed but a decisive blow struck at some rebel centre to pacify the district, and it always seemed possible that any day might bring the good news.

It was encouraging to Wynyard at such a crisis that he should feel that his conduct had been approved not only by his local superior, but by the Governor-General. Mr. Tucker, just at this time, wrote him a letter fully approving of his arrangements and of the manner in which he had carried them out, and on the 28th of June Lord Canning sent him an autograph letter expressive of his gratitude for the excellent service which, in conjunction with Mr. Paterson, Mr. Wynyard had rendered at Gorákhpúr, and concluding with a hope that he might be still able to hold his ground; "if not," wrote Lord Canning, "have no scruple as to retiring in time. You have long ago saved your honour."

It was known on the 25th of July that more Gúrkahs were approaching. The districts, however, were greatly disturbed. During the preceding three weeks many untoward events had

happened. The slaughter of Kánhpúr had become known; the mutinies at Gwáliár and Baréli; the Ázamgarh district had been the scene of warfare, marked by the splendid gallantry of the daring Venables. The only counterbalancing news was that of the victories obtained by Havelock over the rebels and of his arrival at Kánhpúr. But Wynyard still kept his hold on the district; the Nipál army was near, and having accomplished so much Wynyard was still hopeful that he might accomplish more.

But on the 28th of July the fatal news of the mutiny of the 12th irregulars at Sigáuli, of the murder of Holmes and his noble wife, and of the doctor, and the intelligence that the regiment was marching on Gorákhpúr reached him. Instantly he sent off an express to the first division of Gúrkahs to push on. They pushed on and arrived that evening.

The arrival of the Gúrkahs produced a double effect. It saved the lives of the Europeans, but it necessitated the evacuation of Gorákhpúr. How this was so is capable of easy explanation. The Gúrkahs were under orders to march, by way of Ázamgarh, for Allahábád. At that time Ázamgarh had again fallen into the hands of the rebels. The officer commanding the Gúrkahs, Colonel Pahlwán Singh, declined to leave a detachment at Gorákhpúr, or in any way to divide his forces. Information had been received from English sources that the 12th irregulars, red with the blood of their own officers, were marching on Gorákhpúr. For the few English officials to re-

main there after the Gúrkahs should have left it, and to meet alone the 12th irregulars, accompanied by all the rabble of the districts, seemed indeed to be madness utterly wanting in method.

Book XVII. Chap. [illegible]

1st August.

Two or three days were left for Wynyard and his colleagues to consider the course to be adopted. These days were well employed. On the 1st of August the men of the detachment 17th native infantry were peaceably disarmed. The few men of the 12th irregulars were less successfully dealt with. These men gave up their arms, it is true, to their own commandant, Risáldár Muhammad Bakhsh; but they had scarcely done so when some of them made a rush at the arms, recovered them, mounted their horses, and galloped off. They were pursued by their own comrades under Captain Warren; six of them were killed, one was wounded and died of his wounds. The eighty-three loyal men remained staunch to the end.*

Troops at Gorákhpúr are disarmed.

The news which arrived two days later of the defeat of Captain Dunbar's detachment near Árah, and the receipt the following day of a letter containing Mr. Tucker's approval of a retirement upon Ázamgarh and Jánpúr, decided Mr. Wynyard and the other gentlemen of the district to accompany the Gúrkáhs. The district was no longer tenable. "Have no scruple," Lord Canning had written, "in retiring in time—you have

Mr. Wynyard and all the officials [illegible] one [illegible] Gorákhpúr.

* These men did good service in the mutiny, and marched with Havelock and Outram to the relief of Lakhnáo. The Risáldár, Muhammad Bakhsh, was made extra Aide-de-camp to the Governor-General.

long ago saved your honour." Mr. Wynyard and his companions then, on the 31st of August, made over charge of the district to the loyal landowners and rode that evening into the Gúrkha camp.

One, and one only, remained behind. This was the assistant magistrate, Mr. Bird. Mr. Bird was a great sportsman, affected the society of natives, and believed he could trust them. He, therefore, declined to accompany his countrymen. He soon had reason to repent it. Gorákhpúr, after the departure of the Gúrkhás, was contested for by the zamindárs of the neighbourhood, and Muhammad Husén, calling himself the Nazim, from Oudh. Eventually the latter took possession of the place. But before this happened one of the zamindárs, the rájá of Gopálpúr, entered the town and released the prisoners. One of these, a man whom Bird himself had committed for forgery, forced his way into the presence of his old committing officer, and seated himself on the table. The native guards declined to remove him. Bird then wrote to his European comrades for assistance, but it could not be given. The Gúrkah commandant declined to send a man. After four or five days of stirring adventure, going about with his life in his hand, he eventually escaped into the jungle. Muhammad Husén, who had by that time occupied Gorákhpúr, offered a reward of five thousand rupees for his head, and whilst he despatched two hundred men to cut him off, sent as many more on his track. But Bird, a sportsman who knew thoroughly the bye-ways

of the jungle, succeeded in baffling both and in reaching Bétiah in the Champáran district, eighty-two miles from Gorákhpúr, in safety.

Book XVII. Chapter V.

1857. August.

Meanwhile the Gúrkah force, accompanied by Wynyard and his comrades, marched towards Ázamgarh. On the 20th of August they repulsed a spirited attack made upon their camp by the rebels at Gagha. On the 21st the force crossed the Ghaghrá river and marched without further interruption on Ázamgarh, which was reached on the 27th. Mr. Wynyard was then nominated chief civil officer of the Ázamgarh district. How that district was fought for and maintained has been told in a previous volume.*

The Gúrkah force, meanwhile, proceeds to Ázamgarh.

The state of Gorákhpúr immediately upon the departure of the English officials fully justified that departure. In few parts of India did the districts become more infested with men thirsting for European blood than in the districts bordering on Oudh. To have maintained Gorákhpúr for three months without assistance, in the presence of disaffected sepoys, and surrounded by turbulent landowners, was a feat worthy of the highest praise—a feat which testified to the courage, the tact, the judgment of those by whom it was accomplished, and which redounded greatly to their honour. But, notwithstanding Lord Canning's emphatic declaration in this respect, notwithstanding the services subsequently rendered, Mr. Wynyard and his companions were not admitted within the favoured circle of official

The maintenance of Gorákhpúr for three months redounds to the credit of Wynyard and the other officials,

who are, nevertheless, left unrewarded.

* Vol. II. pages 317 and following.

Book XVII. Chapter I. 1857-8.

approbation. The more necessary is it, then, that admiration should be accorded to them by their countrymen.

The civil servants of India.

Here I must pause. The history of the other civil districts of India during the crisis of 1857–58 would present the same tale of gallantry, of devotion, of energy, of zeal, as has the history of those I have recorded. The circumstances, it is true, were not precisely similar in all. Not only did the incidents vary, but the localities, the distances from one important central point, the temper of the people, the amount of aid to be counted upon, varied also. But in one respect there was a striking similarity. In every case the English officials, members of the Indian Civil Service, untrained to arms as they were, displayed the characteristics of the island home of their birth—the cool courage, the firm resolution, the devotion to duty, well becoming the descendants of the men who had made an empire on which the sun never sets, and which their children now found themselves called upon, under the most dangerous and difficult circumstances, to maintain. How well they performed that duty these pages have shown. Not in this chapter only; for the names of John Lawrence of the Panjáb, of William Tayler who saved Patná, and, conjointly with Vincent Eyre, Calcutta; of Frederic Gubbins, who saved Banáras; of Seton-Karr, who saved the southern Maráthá country; of Montgomery, of Barnes, of George Ricketts, of Ross Mangles, and of many others—stand out in a

manner which will cause them to live for ever in the memory of those who love cool and calm heroism, who value true and noble action more than the tinsel decoration which so often rewards subservience and self-seeking.

BOOK XVII.

CHAPTER II.

The officers of the Indian navy.

In another part of this history* I have recorded the gallantry of a young midshipman of the Indian navy, Arthur Mayo—a gallantry which was rewarded by the bestowal of the Victoria Cross. This display of courage and conduct was emulated by very many of the profession to which Mayo belonged, and I feel it is only due to the members of a service which no longer exists, but whose bright and brilliant deeds form an important part of the story of English adventure and English rule in India, to devote a short chapter to the more prominent of those services.

Lewis and Mayo at Dhaka.

The gallant service of Lieutenant Lewis, Mr. Mayo, and their comrades at Dhaka, has been already related. It has been truly remarked† that "if the Indian naval detachment had been repulsed in their attack on the mutineers' posi-

* Vol. ii. second edition, page 420.

† Low's *History of the Indian Navy*.

tion, and had been obliged to retreat, a general massacre would probably have ensued, for in their rear lay the city of Dháká with a large fanatical Muhammadan population in a very excited state." The gallantry of the sailors was thus mainly instrumental in saving eastern Bengal from pillage and slaughter.

The officers and men who saved Dháká distinguish themselves again in 1859.

The same officers, accompanied by others, took a very leading part in an expedition against the Abor hillmen in February 1859. This operation, though occurring before the mutiny had been finally crushed in central India and in Oudh, cannot properly be brought within the range of its events. I refer to it here only to mention that the officers who were prominent at the Dháká affair in 1857 were again well to the front on this occasion, and, with Lieutenant Davies, I.N., were most favourably mentioned by the military officer commanding.

Lieutenant Carew.

In the Jagdispúr jungles, Lieutenant Carew, I.N., rendered excellent service. I have related* how, on the 23rd of April 1858, Captain Le Grand of the 35th foot had been defeated in those jungles by Kúnwar Singh with the loss of two guns; how this disaster had thrown the district once more into disorder; how the safety of Árah was threatened, and how a panic had reigned at Chapra. I have recorded, also, how for the time the arrangements made assured the safety of these stations, and that a few days later Sir E. Lugard and Colonel Corfield had beaten the rebels con-

* Vol. ii. pages 477 to 480.

Sect. XVII. Chapter II.

1858. May.

his services under Corfield in the Jaunpúr jungles.

tinuously. In these contests Lieutenant Carew, serving under Corfield, took a prominent part. Carew, after making several most earnest requests, had been allowed to serve in that part of the country in command of a battery which he had formed himself. His battery was supplied with two 9-pounders and two 5½-inch mortars, and was manned by one hundred and ten sailors. Serving under him were two midshipmen, Brownlow and Cotgrave. In Corfield's action with the rebels on the 11th of May at Hétanpúr, Carew's battery took a very prominent part. They "worked their guns admirably." * And yet that very day they had marched fourteen miles, and before they had time to take a meal had to march against the rebels under a sun which struck dead seven men of the 6th regiment marching with them. Though the Indian navy sailors were more acclimatised than their brethren of the royal army, yet even they lost three of their comrades that very day from the effect of exposure. The same cause compelled, a little later, Carew to resign his command to Mr. Midshipman Cotgrave.

Lieutenant Batt.

Lieutenant, afterwards Commander, Batt did splendid service in the same district. Batt had distinguished himself by his activity in the Ganges between Allahábád and Káuhpúr, in July and August 1857, by shelling the rebels out of their position in the fort of Káli Kánki. Subsequently he commanded at Baksar where he

* Corfield's despatch.

Book XVIII. Chapter II.

repaired the fort, made gun-carriages, and trained his men. Later on, in the autumn of 1858, he assisted in the measures taken to drive the followers of Kúnwar Singh from the jungles of Jagdispúr, being always to the front. On one of the many occasions in which he was in action, an officer serving under him, Acting-Master George Chicken, gained the Victoria Cross. The force to which Chicken was attached was engaged with and had driven back the rebels near Pirú on the 4th of September 1858. In the pursuit Chicken suddenly came alone upon a group of twenty preparing to rally and open fire on their scattered pursuers. He at once charged them. Surrounded on all sides, Chicken fought most desperately and killed five of the rebels. He would, however, have succumbed had not four native troopers arrived in the nick of time to his rescue. He escaped with a severe wound.

1858. July–Sept. his gallant and useful services.

Mr. Chicken gains the Victoria Cross.

In the western Bihár division, Lieutenant Duval, Midshipmen Wray and Scamp, and later Lieutenant Barron, rendered good service after the mutiny of the sepoys at Dánápúr had introduced disorder there. In the repression of the mutinies in Chutiá Nágpúr,* Captain Burbank of the Bengal Marine and Lieutenant Windus, I.N., and the seamen under them, were most efficient and useful. The latter received the special thanks of the Government, and it is clear that he was a man who was equally at home when at work in the field and when engaged in organising arrange-

Duval, Wray, Scamp, and Barron.

Burbank of the Bengal Marine, Windus.

* Vol. ii. pages 436 to 441.

Book XVII. Chapter II.

1858. July-Aug.

ments for that work. There was nothing he could not turn his hand to. Captain Burbank's services with Mr. Yule in pursuit of the Dháká rebels have been already recorded.*

The Indian navy on the western coast.

On the western coast the services of the Indian navy in the suppression of the mutiny were invaluable. "In the months of July and August," writes Mr. Low, "though in the height of the south-west monsoon, the *Berenice*, Lieutenant Chitty, and the *Victoria*, Lieutenant Sweny, were engaged carrying troops from Bombay to Karáchi, and landing them on that open and storm-beaten coast, sixteen miles below Jargarh near Ratnaghari, and at Goa. . . . These officers made several voyages with troops, including portions of the 33rd and 86th regiments and the 2nd Bombay Europeans.† The services of Griffith Jenkins have been previously referred to in connection with the despatch by Lord Elphinstone to the Cape and to the Mauritius for reinforcements, but it is due to that gallant sailor to add that he possessed all the qualifications necessary to ensure the success of a delicate negotiation, and that Sir George Grey and Governor Higginson alike expressed their sense of the admirable man-

Chitty. Sweny.

* Vol. ii. pages 426 to 435.

† These were the troops landed on the coast referred to in pages 40 and 41 of this volume, whose opportune arrival disconcerted the mutineers of Kohlapúr. Lord Elphinstone specially thanked Lieutenants Chitty and Sweny for the "good services they rendered in carrying the different detachments of European troops down the coast at the height of the monsoon, by which movement, under Providence, the peace of the Southern Maráthá country and of the presidency was preserved."

ner in which he discharged his duties. Captain Jenkins had the gratification of receiving from the highest quarter an official acknowledgment of his services. "I have been commanded," wrote Sir C. Wood to him from the India Office, "to convey to you the gracious approbation of Her Majesty of your conduct during that critical period."

Captain Jenkins.

With regret I confine myself to this short notice of the services of the officers of the Indian navy. Those officers knew well, when in Bengal they gave their fullest energies to a service which was not properly their own, that they were serving under the cold shade of officialism, that though the brows of their brethren in the army might be crowned with laurels, their modest deeds would remain comparatively unnoticed. Knowing this, they yet vied with the bravest in daring, with the most zealous in energy and devotion, and when the mutiny came to an end they had the satisfaction of knowing that they had deserved well of their country. They had little more. Besides the war medal, which the detachments engaged with the rebels received in common with the army, and two Victoria Crosses gained by personal valour, not a decoration was bestowed upon any one of them. Shortly after the mutiny the noble service with which they had been connected was abolished, the survivors were pensioned, and nothing remained but the consolation of heroes—the conviction of duty performed, of honour unsullied, of great services rendered to their country!

"The cold shade of officialism."

Book XVII (Chapter II). 1857. May-June. The next episode.

With one episode, slight though it may be as compared with others recorded in this history, yet reflecting, in the story of one officer, the conduct of many placed in circumstances not altogether dissimilar, this chapter will fitly conclude.

Alexander and Tomkinson at Orai.

When the mutiny broke out at Mírath on the 10th of May 1857 two companies of the 53rd native infantry, then at Kánhpúr, were on detached command duty at Orai, on the right bank of the Jamná, about eighty miles from Kánhpúr. The officers commanding these companies were Captain Alexander and Lieutenant Tomkinson. The native regiments stationed at Kánhpúr surpassed all the other regiments of the native army in the cruelties and barbarities they perpetrated; but the men of the detachment at Orai, free from the contamination produced apparently by the close vicinity to the wronged province of Oudh, displayed a spirit far more amenable to reason. Everything remained quiet at Orai till the end of May. On the 3rd of June, however, the deputy commissioner of that station received orders to send to Gwáliár the money he had in the treasure-chest. The sepoys, on hearing of this order, evinced a great inclination to dispute it. However, they did not do so, and on the 4th Tomkinson started for Gwáliár with the treasure and a detachment of his men. Leaving him for a moment, I may mention that on the 6th of June the regiments at Kánhpúr mutinied. When this news reached the men stationed at Orai, they provided Captain and Mrs. Alexander with a

Tomkinson escorts treasure to Gwáliár.

camel, and recommended them to make the best of their way to Ágra, which they eventually succeeded in doing.

1858. June.

Meanwhile Tomkinson and his men arrived safely with the treasure, on the 12th of June, in the vicinity of Gwáliár. At that time the troops at Gwáliár were very shaky; it was known that Tomkinson's regiment had mutinied at Kánhpúr; fear and distrust were in every man's mind. Major C. Macpherson, then, the political agent at Gwáliár, on hearing of Tomkinson's approach, sent out a party to relieve him of the treasure, but at the same time forbade him to enter Gwáliár, and directed him to proceed to A'gra. Tomkinson would have obeyed had it been possible, but meanwhile Mr. Colvin had been communicated with at A'gra, and Mr. Colvin, as distrustful as Macpherson, had telegraphed that no native troops were to proceed thither.

Tomkinson's party is forbidden by the political agent to enter Gwáliár,

and A'gra is barred to them by Mr. Colvin.

Left to himself, Tomkinson stayed with his men until the state of the country forced them into action. They made no attempt on his life; on the contrary, they expressed on parting with him the greatest regret that they were forced to take the line they were about to follow.

Tomkinson is forced to separate from his men.

Left alone, it would seem that the villagers, intent on plunder, deprived him of his horse and his gun, and it would have gone hard with him but for the kindness of a native. Hungry and destitute, having nothing but the clothes on his back, he was seen by a Muhammadan villager wandering in the fields in apparent distress. The poor man took him to his home in the village of

His life is preserved by a Muhammadan.

Book XVII. Chapter II. 1857. October.

Amain, concealed him there till the month of October. A man of substance in the village supplied him with clothes and paid for his food. Tomkinson apparently chafed under this life, and longed for active work; but the country around him was in revolt. He persuaded his host on one occasion to take a letter into Kánhpúr, but the news that met the poor man on the way so frightened him that he destroyed the letter. At length, towards the end of October, an opportunity of rendering service to his country seemed to offer. Information reached the village that a body of rebels, with a large quantity of ammunition, was about to pass in its vicinity. If he could only explode the ammunition, Tomkinson thought, he would perform an act which would paralyse their movements. He resolved to attempt to explode it. Accordingly, on the 23rd of October, he crept out, reached the rebel camp, and made the effort. He was, however, discovered and killed.

I hope that a story which paints the devotion to duty of an Englishman, and the kindness and fidelity of a Muhammadan, may be considered a fitting close to this somewhat desultory chapter.

BOOK XVIII.

CONCLUDING CHAPTER.

What caused the mutiny?

EVEN before the last embers of the mutiny had been trampled out, the question which had from the first puzzled every man, from the Governor-General in Council to the subaltern in his modest bungalow, the question as to the original cause of the mutiny, became the burning question of the day. It was a question which required a complete and accurate reply, because prompt reorganisation was necessary, and to carry out a complete scheme of reorganisation a knowledge of the circumstances which had caused the collapse of the system to be reorganised was indispensable.

Anxiety to know the opinion of Sir John Lawrence.

On this question the opinion of no man was looked forward to with so much eagerness, so much anxiety, and, I may add, with so much curiosity, as the opinion of the great Indian official whose daring and unselfish policy had made possible the storming of Dehli. It was

Book XVIII. including Chapter.

Reasons why the opinion should be

and why it might not be

sound.

It attributes the mutiny to the greased cartridges only.

Reasons why the conclusion cannot be accepted.

very natural that this should be so. Few men had associated more with the natives than Sir John Lawrence; few men had more thoroughly pierced to the core the national character, and few men possessed a more complete power of mental analysis. People, for the most part, did not stop to remember that, with all his gifts, Sir John Lawrence had ever been the partisan of a school—a school opposed to the tenure of land by great families; that he had favoured Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation; and that although he was thoroughly acquainted with the feelings of the agricultural class, he contemned those of the large proprietors, and that he knew little of the sepoys. Furthermore, and especially, that he possessed no personal knowledge of Oudh and of its people.

It will readily be believed, then, that when the opinion of Sir John Lawrence was published it gave absolute satisfaction to the many, none at all to the thinking few. After an exhaustive argument, Sir John Lawrence arrived at the conclusion that the mutiny was due to the greased cartridges, and to the greased cartridges only. The public applauded a result so beautiful in its simplicity, so easy of comprehension. It chimed so entirely with the ideas of men who never take the trouble to think for themselves, that by the masses, which are mainly composed of such men, it was promptly and thankfully accepted. With them it remains still the unanswerable reason for the mutiny of the Indian army. They did not stop to consider that to declare that

the greased cartridges caused the mutiny was in all respects similar to the declaration of a man who if asked what causes a gun to discharge, should reply—the powder. True it is that the powder, when exploded, forces out the bullet: but who ignites the powder? That the greased cartridges were the lever used to excite the sepoys is incontestable; they were explosive substances. But, though explosive, they had been perfectly harmless had the minds of the sepoys not been prepared to act upon them in the same manner that the percussion-cap acts upon gunpowder. It should never be forgotten that the greased cartridges were not the only instrument employed to create discontent in 1856–7. Before a greased cartridge had been issued the chapatties had been circulated by thousands in many rural districts. The chapatty was, it is true, a weapon far less perfect than the greased cartridge. It was, nevertheless, sufficiently adapted to the comprehensions of the class to whom it was addressed—the class given to agriculture. To minds, simple, impressionable, suspicious, prompt to receive ideas, the chapatty acted as a warning of an impending calamity. A Hindú can conceive nothing more dreadful than a violation of his caste and his religion. The conclusion was a foregone one. The receipt of the chapatties foreshadowed a great attempt to be made to upset the national religion.

The greased cartridges not the only instrument employed to create discontent.

The chapatties.

Though we might even grant, then, for the sake of argument, that the greased cartridges were not in themselves harmless, yet the chapatties cer-

The cartridges and the chapatties alike means to an end.

tainly were so. But it was these harmless chapatties which stirred up the rural populations, especially those in Oudh and in Bandalkhand, to participate in the rebellion. What becomes, then, of Sir John Lawrence's conclusion? It simply vanishes. The greased cartridges became dangerous only when used by others as a means to an end. Before the plans of the leaders of the revolt were ripe the cartridges and the chapatties were nothing more than gunpowder stored in a magazine. When the opportune moment arrived, when the minds of the sepoys and the agricultural classes had been instructed to receive any ideas, however absurd, then the cartridges and the chapatties were rammed into them, and were exploded.

The real cause of the mutiny.

But what was it that made the minds of the sepoys, what was it that made the minds of the agricultural classes prone to conceive suspicions alike regarding the greased cartridges and the chapatties? The answers to these two questions will bring us to the real cause of the mutiny. Sir John Lawrence's conclusions were not pushed to their legitimate issue. He named only one of the means. I must go back to the cause.

Bad faith, and the attempt to force European ideas on an eastern people.

The real cause of the mutiny may be expressed in a condensed form in two words:—bad faith. It was bad faith to our sepoys which made their minds prone to suspicion; it was our policy of annexation, of refusing to Hindú chiefs the permission to adopt—with them a necessary religious rite—of suddenly bringing a whole people under the operation of complex rules to which

they were unaccustomed, as in Oudh, in the Sagar and Narbadá territory, and in Bandalkhand, and our breaches of customs more sacred to the natives than laws, which roused the large landowners and the rural population against the British rule.

Book VIII. Concluding Chapter.

Bad faith towards the sepoys;

The bad faith towards the sepoys goes back so far as the period immediately succeeding the first Afghán war. In that war the sepoys had behaved splendidly; they had fought well, they had suffered privations without a murmur, they had borne with cheerfulness absence from their country and their families, in a cause which was only theirs because it was the cause of their foreign masters. I recollect well meeting in 1844 at Allahábád a political officer whose conduct during his mission at Herát can never be mentioned without admiration—the late d'Arcy Todd. Speaking to me of the difficulties of his position at Herát, d'Arcy Todd stated that but for the zeal, the energy, and the fidelity of the few sepoys who were with him he could not have stayed at Herát, he added, "When properly treated the Bengal sepoy will go anywhere and do anything." Well, these men returned from Afghánistán. Immediately afterwards we annexed Sindh. The Bengal sepoys were sent to garrison a country then notoriously unhealthy. How were they treated? The time-honoured rule which provided that they should receive a fixed extra food allowance on proceeding to certain localities was rescinded, in one instance after the men had reached one of the

their devotion when properly managed.

Breach of faith towards them in the double batta question.

Sect. XVIII. Continuing Chapter.

indicated localities, in another instance when the regiment was in full march to it. Is it to be wondered at that the men grumbled and then actually refused to march? They committed no violence. They simply said, "You are guilty of bad faith; we contracted to enter your service and to perform all the duties entrusted to us on certain conditions, of which the payment to us of food allowance under certain circumstances was one. We have fulfilled our share of the contract, and now you refuse to fulfil your share. We decline to work until you fulfil it." In equity the sepoys were right; but the Government, instead of soothing them, acted in a high-handed manner: disbanded one regiment and severely punished the men of another.

The Government punish the sepoys for declining to fulfil a contract which the Government had broken.

Bad effect produced on the Indian army.

This conduct produced a very bad effect throughout the Indian army. It was felt in every regiment that the word of the Government could no longer be depended upon. Nevertheless no open indignation was manifested. The Satlaj campaign ensued, and again the sepoys fought well. The annexation of the Panjáb followed. Then succeeded a long period of quiescence—a period during which seeds, sown some time before, took root, sprang up, and blossomed into regulations fraught with danger to the discipline of the Indian army.

Gradual progress of the weakening influence of commanding officers.

The natives of India serve a master well when once he has shown himself capable of wielding authority. But should that authority slacken, or, worse still, should they find out that the Government they serve has placed at their disposal

the means not only of shaking but even of upsetting it, then the nominal master wielding it ceases to be their real master; the substance of his power vanishes; the shadow only remains. The occurrences in the Indian army during the several years immediately preceding 1857 completely illustrate this assertion. In former days, in the time of Lake, in the time of Hastings, and even later, the commanding officer of a native regiment was supreme in all matters of discipline. Responsible immediately to his divisional commander, he could promote, he could reduce, he could punish. But as time passed on, men were appointed to the general staff of the Indian army whose visions became clouded and whose brains became turned by the air of the new regions to which they had been transferred. Forgetting their own regimental experience, not caring to know that the routine system which suits a British regiment formed of men taught to obey the law, no matter by whom administered, is not applicable to a regiment composed of Asiatics bred to obey the man in whose hands they see authority centred and him only, these men began, step by step, to introduce the British system into the native army. It would take too long to tell how gradually the real power of the commanding officer was undermined; how the sepoy was, by degrees, taught to look upon him, not as a superior who must be obeyed, but as a very fallible mortal, peculiarly liable to err, and against whose lightest exercise of authority he had the right to appeal to the one central power, the

Book XVIII. Concluding Chapter.

Disastrous result of this policy.

Commander-in-Chief. Suffice it to say that this process of sapping the powers of the commanding officer was carried to so great an extent that immediately prior to the mutiny the sepoys had lost all respect for the authority he only nominally wielded. Nor had the sepoy imbibed for the Commander-in-Chief the feeling which he had ceased to entertain towards his commanding officer. To him the Commander-in-Chief was but a name; he was a lay figure, living in the clouds of the Himálayas, rarely, often never, seen, but whose interposition enabled him to defy his own colonel and to set discipline at nought! The extent to which this interposition was exercised before the mutiny was dangerous in the extreme. It succeeded before 1857 in weakening the influence of all the regimental officers, and in undermining the discipline of the army.

It undermines the discipline of the army.

The progress of demoralisation between 1843 and 1852.

I have said that the refusal of the Government of India in 1843 to act up to their contract with regard to the sepoys sent to occupy Sindh, had been felt throughout the Indian army. Immediately subsequent to that event, the process of undermining the powers of commanding officers had made swift progress. When, then, in 1852, the Government most unadvisedly again attempted another breach of contract, the sepoys, demoralised by the process I have alluded to, were even more inclined to resent it.

A proportion of the regiments of the Bengal army have enlisted for service

The breach of contract referred to occurred in this manner. With the exception of six or seven regiments, the sepoys of the Bengal army are enlisted for service in India only; they were

never to be required to cross the sea. But with the view of supplying the necessities of the state in Arakán and the Tenasserim provinces, six or seven regiments had been specially raised for general service, and these regiments were invariably sent across the sea whenever their services were there required. Lord Dalhousie, however, who had ridden roughshod over so many native customs, considered that he might set aside this one also. Accordingly, when, during the Burmese war, he wanted to send an additional regiment to Burma, instead of despatching a general service regiment or of inviting a regiment to volunteer, he ordered a regiment stationed at Barrákpúr to proceed thither. The men of the regiment refused to go. "You ask us," they said, "to embark upon a service for which we have not enlisted, and which many of us regard as imperilling our caste. We will not do it." Lord Dalhousie was forced to submit. He was very angry, but there was no help for it.

across the sea.

Lord Dalhousie attempts to break contract with the sepoys.

But the result on the minds of the sepoys was most disastrous. For the first time in the history of India the orders of the Governor-General had been successfully resisted. It was little to the purpose to argue that the Governor-General had exceeded his powers: the blow to the discipline of the native army was not the less deadly.

The result most disastrous to discipline.

The minds of the sepoys were under the influence of this blow, and by the insane action of the head-quarter staff they were becoming more and more released from the bands of dis-

The annexation of Oudh.

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cipline towards their own officers, when the annexation of Oudh took place. How this affected them I shall state as briefly as possible.

Reason why service in the Company's army was popular with the men of Oudh, when Oudh had its own king.

A very large proportion of the army of the Bengal presidency, and a smaller proportion of the army of the Bombay presidency were recruited from the kingdom of Oudh. It is scarcely too much to affirm that there was not a single agricultural family in that country which was not represented by at least one of its members in the Indian army. Service in that army, in fact, offered no inconsiderable advantages to the subjects of the king of Oudh. It made them clients of the paramount power. Every sepoy was, so to speak, represented at the court of Lakhnao by the British resident. His commanding officer was authorised to frank any petition he might present addressed to the resident, and the fact that the resident had received such petition ensured substantial justice to the claims of the petitioner at the hands of the court of Lakhnao. Everyone familiar with the workings of a native court will at once recognise the value at which service in the Indian army was rated by the natives of Oudh. By accepting such service they obtained an all-powerful advocate at their sovereign's court.

Persistent loyalty to the paramount power of the [illegible] and [illegible] of Oudh.

The nawábs and kings of Oudh had from the time of Warren Hastings shown a loyalty to the British Government not to be surpassed. During the Afghán disasters, the Gwáliár campaign, the battles on the Satlaj and in the Panjáb, Oudh had been the milch-cow of the suzerain power.

She had lent that power money, she had given her her best sons as soldiers, she had done all that she could do to maintain unimpaired the relations between the prince independent only in his own country and the paramount overlord.

The plea of misgovernment, one ought to be sustained

"But," exclaimed the advocates for annexation, "she had misgoverned." Misgovernment is a relative term. There can be no question but that in the English sense of the term there had been no good government in Oudh. But a kind of administrative system had, nevertheless, prevailed which induced the sepoys, after the term of their service under the British flag had expired, to settle in their native country. More than that, after the natives of Oudh had had one year's experience of British government as administered by Mr. Coverley Jackson and Mr. Martin Gubbins, they, one and all, evinced a strong preference for the native government which had been superseded.

as a justification for annexation

It is necessary to take all these circumstances into consideration when one analyses the effect which the annexation of Oudh produced upon the sepoys of the Bengal army. In my belief that annexation gave them the greatest shock they had felt since the occurrences, already adverted to, of 1843. It was the last and the most fatal blow to their belief in British honesty. It made them ready to become the tools of any adventurer.

Disastrous effect produced on the minds of the sepoys by that annexation.

It was not only that they beheld in that annexation a lowering of their own position as men represented at their sovereign's court by a British

There is good reason for another breach of faith

Book XVIII. Concluding Chapter.

resident, though that was a blow under which the Indian army yet reels. They beheld in that act, and in the manner in which it was carried out, a deliberate infringement of promises they had ever looked upon as sacred, a repayment for the good services of nearly a century such as even the most abandoned amongst their own princes would have hesitated to enforce.

Sure of the sepoys stationed at Kánhpúr when Outram crossed into Oudh to Inner it.

These are not statements made at random. It devolved upon the officer of the Commissariat Department of the Kánhpúr division to supply carriage and provisions for the force which, under Outram, crossed the Ganges into Oudh at the end of 1855. Over that officer's house and office, which were in the same compound, was a sepoy guard—a sergeant's party. Contrary to custom and to departmental instructions, no written orders were given to that officer for the requisitions. The expedition was to be a secret, he was told, and he must obey verbal orders. But, in spite of this mystery, the destination of the force became known before it set out to every sepoy in the cantonment, to every native in the town. The effect was alarming. The natives had no doubt whatever as to the real meaning of the demonstration. For the first time in the memory of man an English regiment was about to march on Lakhnao, and an English regiment would march on Lakhnao with but one object.

The authorities do warned.

The agitation of the sepoys of the guard was a circumstance never to be forgotten. They were with great difficulty controlled, and the subordinates of the Commissariat Department assured

their officer that a similar feeling was manifesting itself in every regiment in the place. The officer made no secret of these manifestations. He reported them in the proper quarter. He communicated them even to one of the officials, a man of remarkable gifts, who had accepted a high post in Oudh; but his warnings found no more credence than did the warnings of Cassandra. They were remembered afterwards.

but in vain.

The annexation of Oudh, keeping in view the way in which it was carried out, was, in very deed, the act which finally broke the trust of the sepoys in their English masters. The perpetration of that deed prepared their minds to receive and to believe any matter, however absurd in itself, which might betoken English perfidy. How their minds were played upon I shall show presently. Meanwhile it is necessary that I should indicate how it was that the landowners and agricultural classes of India became impressed with the 'bad faith' of their rulers.

The annexation of Oudh removes the last remnant of confidence in the British.

The internal annexation policy inaugurated by Lord Dalhousie was, in many instances, based upon his refusal to recognise a right which the Hindús hold as an essential part of their religion—the right to adopt an heir on the failure of children lawfully begotten. In the early part of this volume I have spoken of the disaffection, the terror, the hatred of the English which this policy produced in the southern Maratha country. Carrying out this principle Lord Dalhousie had annexed the territory of the Bhonslás, he had annexed the state of Jhánsi, he had endeavoured

The mode in which the princes, chiefs, and landowners of India lost faith in the British.

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to annex the state of Karáuli, and had only b
prevented by the interference of the Home
vernment on a threatened motion in the H
of Commons. Still he continued to hold
principle *in terrorem* over the heads of the pa
and chiefs of India, and the fact that suc
principle was held in esteem by the paramo
power, and might, on the occurrence of de
without natural heirs, be applied, produced,
not too much to say, "a terror" in the minds
the Hindú princes throughout India.

The principle of granting a life annuity in exchange for a kingdom.

But in another and a far more guiltless man
the Government had sown the seeds of hatre
the minds of the representatives of great fami
whose ancestors they had deprived of their
minions. Two instances of the action of
policy will occur at once to the reader—N
Sáhib and the ráo of Kirwi. Nána Sáhib
indubitably the lawful representative, accord
to Hindú law, of the last of the Péshwás. Wh
in June 1818 Báji Ráo surrendered to Sir J
Malcolm, the Court of Directors considered t
a life annuity of eighty thousand pounds
more than an adequate compensation for the
of an empire. Báji Ráo lived in the enjoym
of this pension nearly thirty-five years. W
he died, in January 1853, Lord Dalhousie refu
either to recognise his adopted son or to conti
the pension.

Totally repugnant to Hindú ideas.

According to European ideas this ruling
perfectly just. It strictly carried out the ag
ment made by Sir John Malcolm in 1818.
it was, nevertheless, totally repugnant to

ideas and opposed to the customs of the races of Hindústán. With them it was a point of honour to recognise in the son, whether begotten or adopted, the successor to the titles of his father. Whether the English recognised him or not, Náná Sáhib was still Péshwá in the eyes of every true Maráthá.* The refusal to recognise him and the stoppage of the pension forced the heir of the Péshwá to conspire. It can easily be conceived how readily such a man, occupying a fortified palace close to the Oudh frontier, would hail and encourage the discontent which the—in the minds of the natives—nefarious annexation of Oudh could not fail to produce.

That refusal made Náná Sáhib a conspirator.

The story of the ráo of Kirwí† is similar in character and in application.

* I recollect well when I was at Banáras in 1851-52, the Governor-General's agent, Major Stewart, a man of great culture and information, told me that there was living then, in extreme poverty, in the Mirzápúr jungles, near Banáras, a man recognised by the natives as the lineal descendant of Chéit Singh, rájá of Banáras, expelled by Warren Hastings in 1781, and that to that day the natives salaamed to him and treated him with the respect due to the rájá.

† *Vide* page 199. I may be permitted to note here another instance in which the British Government has applied the same unjust principle. When in 1845 and 1848-49 England waged war with the Sikhs, the King of Láhor was a minor, under the tutelage of his mother, and in no respects responsible for the occurrences which in either instance led to the war. Yet in 1849, although his irresponsibility was officially admitted, he was treated as though he was in all respects the guilty party. The British annexed his kingdom and gave him in exchange a life pension. The matter has only to be seriously examined for the injustice to become apparent. Most of the nobles of the Panjáb, who secretly fomented the wars of 1845 and 1848, were secured in the possession of their estates, and their posi-

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The Western principle applied to its logical extreme illustrates an Eastern race.

We see, then, how many of the princes and the chiefs of India in possession, and all the chiefs not in possession, were predisposed to view with at least indifference any troubles which might assail their British over-lord. Incidents like that of the rájá of Dilhéri* came at uncertain intervals to add to the general mistrust. Such incidents affected alike chieftain and retainer, noble and peasant, for in many parts of the country the latter considered their interests as bound up with those of the former.

The annexation of Oudh peculiarly odious.

It was when the minds of all were thus distrustful that the annexation of Oudh—of Oudh which had ever been faithful, always true and loyal—came to startle them still more. It is just within the bounds of possibility that if the system introduced by the English into Oudh had been administered in a conciliatory manner the result might have been similar to that which was produced in a few years in the central provinces. But the Englishmen to whom the administration of the newly annexed province was intrusted were men with fixed ideas, which they rode to death; the slaves of a system which they carried out without regard to the feelings and previous habits of those with whose lands and property they were

The principle of Western not one on an Eastern people.

tion, under English rule, has become trebly secure. But Mahárája Dhulíp Singh, who was a mere child, innocent of intrigue, was awarded in exchange for his kingdom and its princely revenues a life annuity only—an annuity which will expire with his life. Yet his children are the children of one who was once King of Lahor! Can we wonder that treatment of this sort sinks deep into the hearts of the natives?

* Page 38.

dealing. In less than twelve months the result was disaffection and dismay. The new settlement made the men of Oudh rebels at heart.

At the close of 1856 all classes are ready for the machinations of conspirators.

With Oudh thus disaffected, the chiefs and the territorial interest doubting and trembling, with the sepoys alienated and mistrustful, there needed but one other element to produce insurrection. The country, the army, the newly-annexed province were alike ready for the machinations of conspirators.

The authors of the mutiny.

The conspirators, too, were ready. Who all those conspirators were may never certainly be known. Most of them died and made no sign. It is, however, a fact beyond question that the Moulvi of Faizábád—the man who was killed at Powain—was one of them. I have already given a sketch of the previous career of this man.* I have shown how, after the annexation of Oudh, he travelled all over the north-west provinces on a mission which was a mystery to the Europeans; how he was suspected even then of conspiring. Abundant proofs were subsequently obtained that a conspiracy had been formed by some influential people in Oudh in the interval between the annexation and the outbreak of the mutiny. Of this conspiracy the Moulvi was undoubtedly a leader. It had its ramifications all over India—certainly at A'gra, where the Moulvi stayed some time, and almost certainly at Dehlí, at Mirath, at Patná, and at Calcutta, where the ex-king of Oudh and a large following were residing.

The Moulvi of Oudh.

* Vol. ii. page 541.

For some time there was one thing wanting to the conspirators—the means, the instrument—with which to kindle to action the great body of their countrymen. Especially were they at a loss how to devise a scheme by which the minds of the sepoys serving throughout the Bengal Presidency should be simultaneously affected. They were in this perplexity when they heard of the new cartridge—a cartridge smeared with animal fat and which they were told was to be bitten.

It was easy for them to make this discovery. Their spies were everywhere. The cartridges were openly manufactured at Damdam. Eagerly looking out for a novelty to be introduced from Europe into the native army, they were the most likely men of all to hit upon the greased cartridge. They had no sooner found it than they felt they had the weapon required. Instantly the chapatties were distributed by thousands to the rural population, whilst means were employed to disseminate in every military station in Bengal the information regarding the cartridge.

To tell a body of Hindús already suspicious of their foreign master that they would be required to bite a cartridge smeared with the fat of their sacred animal, and to tell Muhammadans that they would be required to bite a cartridge smeared with the fat of an animal whose flesh was forbidden to them, was tantamount to tell them that their foreign master intended to make them break with their religion. Certainly that result was produced. When the new cartridges were issued suspicion and calumny had done their

work. The sepoys even believed that cartridges made of paper had been feloniously tampered with; and, when they were issued to them, they broke into revolt.

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In this lesser sense, then, and in this only, did the cartridges produce the mutiny. They were the instrument used by conspirators; and those conspirators were successful in their use of the instrument only because, in the manner I have endeavoured to point out, the minds of the sepoys and of certain sections of the population had been prepared to believe every act testifying to bad faith on the part of their foreign masters.

The cartridge only the instrument.

I have said that the mistrust of the British faith had, towards the year 1857, become as great in the minds of the princes and chiefs and landowners of India as in the minds of the sepoys. There were, however, a few exceptions, and, when the country rose, those exceptions saved us. I will briefly refer to the most prominent amongst them.

The exceptions who proved the rule.

In four great provinces of our empire—in Oudh, in Rohilkhand, in Bandalkhand, and in the Ságar and Narbadá territory—the great bulk of the people rose against British rule. In western Bihár, using that geographical expression as inclusive of the districts subordinate to the Commissioner of Patná, in many districts of the Allahábád division, in the A'gra division, and in many parts of the Mírath division, the risings of the people and the sepoys were almost simultaneous in point of time. Had the revolt been universal, had the chiefs, the people, and the sepoys

The provinces which rose against us.

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The loyalty of Sindia.

risen at one and the same moment, India could not have been held. Fortunately for British interests, the great prince who occupied the most important position in India, and whose action, had he risen, would have been felt to the extremities of western India, was, throughout the crisis, loyal to his suzerain. Throughout the period between the 12th of May and the 1st of September 1857 Sindia held the fate of India in his hands.

His loyalty was not based upon affection for the British as a people.

In another volume* I have described very briefly how it was that in an unexampled crisis in the fortunes of the people with whom his ancestors had contended for empire, Sindia did remain loyal. I have shown that the loyalty did not proceed from affection towards the English. His minister and confidant, Dinkar Ráo, had no love for our nation. Sindia's people were, almost to a man, against us. Yet Dinkar Ráo used all his great influence in favour of a loyal policy, and his representations, backed by the solid arguments of the able representative of the British power at the court of Sindia, Major Charters Macpherson, prevailed over national sentiment, the solicitations of other courtiers, and the boisterous demonstrations of the people. The importance of the result to English interests cannot be over-estimated. Sindia's loyalty alone made possible Havelock's march on, and the retention of, Kánhpúr. It acted at the same time on the rebels like a wedge which pierces the centre of

Yet it saved us.

* Vol. i. pp. 151, 152

an army, dividing the wings, and preventing concentrated action. Nor, when, after the back of rebellion had been broken, Sindia's army revolted against himself, was the effect much lessened. Sindia's great influence was still used for the English.

The loyalty really based on the fact that we had dealt fairly and generously with him.

In considering Sindia's loyalty in connection with the risings of others—of all, or almost all, the rájás and tálúkdárs of Oudh, of the chiefs in Bandalkhand, in the Ságar and Narbadá territory, in the southern Maráthá country, and in western Bihár—it is impossible to shut our eyes to the fact that there had been a marked difference in the behaviour of the British Government towards Sindia on the one side, and towards the rájás and landowners of the countries mentioned on the other. Under circumstances of a peculiarly tempting character, Lord Ellenborough had behaved with the greatest generosity and forbearance towards Sindia in 1844. The Government had kept faith with him ever since. The reader of this volume will see that towards the rájás and landowners of the other provinces mentioned the British Government had shown neither generosity nor forbearance. In some instances they had not even kept faith. It is scarcely necessary to point the moral.

The remarkable instances in which the behaviour of the people of Indian states responded to the faith we had kept with them.

It is, indeed, a very remarkable fact, and one which the rulers of India at the present moment would do well to bear in mind that in the several provinces and districts traversed by our troops in 1857–8–9, the behaviour of the people corresponded to the character of our rule. Thus, in

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the Central Provinces, to which the regulation system had never penetrated, the people were loyal and contented, and refused all aid to Tántia Topi. In the Ságar and Narbadá territories, in Oudh and in the districts bordering on that province, in the A'gra division—in all of which the British hand had been heavy, and the British acts opposed to the national sentiment—the people showed a spirit of opposition, a resolution to fight to the last, and in many cases a detestation of their masters, such as no one would before have credited. Cases similar to that of the rájá of Dilhéri referred to in the earlier part* of this volume, had sown far and wide the seed of disaffection and revolt.

The mutiny the result of a false system.

If these facts are, as I believe them to be, correct, we have not to go far to seek the conclusion. The mutiny of the army and the insurrection in the provinces I have named were the natural consequences of an attempt to govern a great Eastern empire according to pure Western ideas.

To govern an Eastern people according to pure Western ideas.

The civilisation, over-refined though it might be, of thousands of years was ridiculed by the rougher race which, scorning sentiment, regarded utilitarianism as its foundation-stone. The governing members of that race failed to recognise the great truth upon which their forefathers had built their Indian empire, that the Western race can gain the confidence of the Eastern only when it scrupulously respects the long-cherished cus-

* Page 93.

tions of the latter, and impresses upon it the conviction that its word is better than its bond. This is just the conviction which, during the thirty years immediately antecedent to 1856, the majority of the Hindús and Muhammadans of India had been gradually losing, and which in 1857 they had lost.

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If Lord Canning had had any idea in the early part of 1857 that the isolated outbreaks which then disturbed the general serenity were part of an organised plot, he would, I believe, have at once taken measures to meet the difficulty. Not that, at any time in 1857, he could have prevented a mutiny, but he could easily have made better arrangements to meet one. I am far, however, from imputing any blame to Lord Canning in this respect. He had but recently arrived in India. His predecessor, when making over to him charge of the empire, had expressed his conviction that never had the country been in so satisfactory condition. All the time the ground was undermined, the train was being laid, the miners were at work. But how was Lord Canning to know this? He inherited Lord Dalhousie's councillors. They were as satisfied, and as ignorant of the real state of the country, as was Lord Dalhousie. Lord Dalhousie had quitted India in a blaze of glory; and the new Governor-General, unused to the currents of Indian thought, could for some months only steer the vessel by the advice of the officers who had helped to bring to Lord Dalhousie a renown far-reaching and seemingly well-deserved.

Lord Canning.

new to India.

inherits Lord Dalhousie's councillors.

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The councillors of Lord Canning.

But, in fact, upon no men did the news of the mutiny descend with so startling a surprise as upon the councillors of Lord Canning. They could not comprehend it. Weeks and weeks elapsed before they could bring themselves to believe that it was anything more than a fortuitous explosion at various points, each having no concert and no connection with the other. The Home Secretary's assurances that the apprehensions expressed regarding its nature were "a passing and groundless panic," that "there is every hope that in a few days tranquillity will be restored throughout the presidency," testify to the ideas that filled the minds of these men. The admission at least is due to them that they were honest—they believed what they said. But those sayings betrayed a complete ignorance of the country and of the situation. This ignorance, this blindness to the fact that it was more even than a mutiny of the Bengal army, and not merely a series of isolated revolts, with which they had to cope, was illustrated in a thousand ways, but in none more strongly than in the refusal to disarm regiments which were known to be mutinous. The consequences of this refusal were most serious. In the case of the regiments at Dánápúr, the reader will have seen that it brought revolt into western Bihár, added enormously to the dangers of Havelock, and even imperilled Calcutta.

Their utter ignorance of the reality of the Calcutta.

How great Lord Canning really was, how small were his councillors, was shown when, having completely shaken off their influence, he stood alone and unshackled at Allahábád in the early party of

Lord Canning's real greatness evident when he stood unshackled at Allahábád.

1858. A different man was he then from the Lord Canning of April and May 1857. His nature then displayed itself in its real nobility. His grasp of affairs, at Calcutta apparently so small, excited at Allahábád the admiration of all who came in contact with him. He showed a truer insight into the military position than the Commander-in-Chief himself. It was entirely owing to Lord Canning's insistance that the campaign in Rohilkhand followed close upon the capture of Lakhnao. Sir Colin Campbell would have postponed it. But Lord Canning was too convinced of the danger of allowing a province to continue to flaunt rebellion, unchecked, in the face of the Government to permit the delay. He insisted with all the determination of a man whose resolution, based on the logic of facts, was not to be shaken. It was Lord Canning at Allahábád who gave his fullest support to Sir Hugh Rose, and to the generals engaged against Tántia Topi; and if, in one respect, to which I have adverted, his judgment was faulty, his companion in error was the Commander-in-Chief, and the error was a solitary one.

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His military movements.

Nor is lesser praise due to him for the measures inaugurated at Allahábád to heal the wounds caused—he must have seen—in a great measure by the mistakes of his predecessors. His Oudh proclamation, despite of the apparently harsh terms which it contained, was intended as a message of mercy, and, in its application, was a message of mercy. It gave every landowner in Oudh a title better, safer, more valid than the

His legislation in regard to Oudh.

Book XVIII. Concluding Chapter.

title he had lost. It ensured mercy to all except those who by their crimes had forfeited all right to it. Interpreted, as Lord Canning meant it to be interpreted, by one of the ablest administrators in India, it became the charter upon which the position now occupied by the people of Oudh has been built up and secured.

The reception of Lord Ellenborough's strictures.

Never was the real greatness of Lord Canning's character more completely displayed than when the galling strictures of Lord Ellenborough's despatch were published to the world. At the moment the insult, the breach of etiquette, were lost sight of in the fear lest the condemnation of his policy proceeding from so high a quarter should afford encouragement to the rebels or weaken the attachment of the native tributaries. As soon as he ascertained that the despatch had not produced that result he was calm. He could not help seeing that it was designedly impertinent, that it was intended to provoke him to resign. Conscious of the rectitude of his motives and of the soundness of his views, he laughed at the pettiness of the display. In his calm and statesmanlike answer, he sought neither revenge nor triumph. But both soon came to him. The news that Lord Ellenborough had been hoisted with his own petard, the receipt of Lord Derby's almost imploring letter not to resign, followed the insulting missive with a rapidity almost startling.

His conduct towards his colleagues and subordinates.

Towards the men who served under him, Lord Canning displayed generosity, kindness, and forbearance. He knew that in many departments he had been badly served, yet he would rather

bear the burden himself than dismiss the incapable minister. But so low did he rate the abilities of the men about him, that when he had resolved to appoint Mr. Edmonstone Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, he cast his eyes far from the men surrounding him to select a successor to that official. He had actually resolved to offer the post to Herbert Edwardes when the publication by that officer of a letter, violently polemical, caused him to reconsider his resolve. For the moment he was cast back upon the clique about him, but finally he made an admirable choice in Durand.

The lofty-minded English gentleman, the trained statesman.

Judging Lord Canning's conduct after his arrival at Alláhábád, it is difficult to find a fault in it. He was then the lofty-minded English gentleman, the trained and skilful statesman. Every day made it more clear that the mistakes of the Calcutta period, mistakes which have been fully recorded in these volumes, were due to the inexperience of a generous nature guided by men whom he had been told to look upon as masters of the situation, but who were in fact hopelessly ignorant and incapable. That Lord Canning came to know this himself was evidenced by the generosity he displayed, after the mutiny had been quelled, to those who had ventured to express very boldly their disagreement with his policy of 1857.

Lord Elphinstone.

But if Lord Canning was to be admired from the time of his arrival at Allahábád, Lord Elphinstone deserves the fullest meed of praise that can be accorded to him from the very first.

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Comprehended the full extent of the mutiny from the very outset.

Lord Elphinstone possessed this advantage over Lord Canning—his previous experience in India had given him a thorough knowledge of the country and the people. When the mutiny broke out at Mírath he saw it as it really was; he saw that it was no isolated outbreak, no local discontent, but part and parcel of an organised rebellion which had its main roots, indeed, in the North-West Provinces, but the development of which, especially in the direction of Bombay, was certain, unless it could be promptly stopped. The Bombay Presidency, in fact, with an army partly recruited from Oudh, and composed mainly of a conglomeration of Maráthá states, was in a peculiar degree, susceptible. Lord Elphinstone understood the situation at once. He dealt with it in a manner possible only to a statesman of high and lofty courage, of a clear intellect and of far-seeing views. The idea of waiting for the mutiny within his own borders, if, indeed, it ever occurred to him, came only to be promptly rejected. To mass the greatest number of men on the decisive point of the scene of action—that Napoleonic motto became at once his principle.

His policy of [illegible] defence.

For that purpose he denuded his own presidency, highly sensitive as it was, of European troops, and despatched them as fast as he could force them to move to the threatened points outside of it. He, too, like Lord Canning, had colleagues in his government, but here again his previous experience saved him from the mistakes which marred Lord Canning's administration during the first seven months of the mutiny.

Knowing his counsellors thoroughly, he listened to them with courtesy—but he acted on his own convictions. To the men who were the instruments of his policy he gave the most complete and generous confidence. How large was his trust when he once gave it Mr. Forjett is a living evidence. Mr. Frere in Siudh, Mr. Seton-Karr and afterwards Colonel Le G. Jacob in the southern Maráthá country, Mr. John Rose in Satárah, and Colonél Malcolm, are instances of a similar import. When, in spite of all his measures to keep the mutiny from Bombay by a policy of offensive defence, the poison crept in and infected the regiments of the regular army in the southern Maráthá country, how vigorous, how decided is his policy! We see here none of the hesitation, of the half-heartedness, the halting between two extremes, which enabled the mutinous regiments of Dánápúr to disturb all the plans of the Government and to imperil the safety of the empire. Promptly, without an hour's delay, Lord Elphinstone sent for the fittest man at his disposal and told him to go to Kolhapúr and at all costs quell the mutiny. Le Grand Jacob went and disarmed the rebellious sepoys. How Lord Elphinstone was occasionally thwarted by men not immediately under his orders has been shown in the case of Woodburn. But his firmness was proof even against opposition of this description, and, after some vexatious delay, he carried out his policy.

Only those who have enjoyed the privilege of reading his voluminous correspondence during 1857-58 can form an idea of the remarkable per-

Book XVIII. Concluding Chapter.

The generous confidence he placed in his subordinates.

His quick decision.

His correspondence evidences his foresight.

Book XVIII. Concluding Chapter.

sagacity which characterised Lord Elphinstone's views on every point connected with the stirring events of those years. The strong and the weak points of a case, the true policy to be pursued, the proper time for putting it in action, when to withhold the blow, when to strike, the reasons for withholding or for striking, are laid down in clear and vigorous language in his letters. Reading them after the event, it seems marvellous how a man standing alone should have judged so clearly, so truly. Many of the military movements which tended to the pacification of the country had their first inspiration from Lord Elphinstone; and the smallest of the tardy tributes that can be paid him is this—that no man in India contributed so much as he contributed to check the mutiny at its outset; no man contributed more to dominate it after it had risen to its greatest height.

Lord Elphinstone is appointed by three successive secretaries of state to succeed Lord Canning.

In the glory of the victory, amid the bestowal of well-merited rewards for military services, the great deserts of Lord Elphinstone received but small notice from the public. But it is a remarkable fact that after the death of Sir Henry Lawrence he was nominated by three successive secretaries of state—by Mr. Vernon Smith, by Lord Ellenborough, and by Lord Stanley—to be successor to Lord Canning in the event of a vacancy occurring in the office of Governor-General. It now becomes the duty of the historian to place him on the lofty pedestal to which his great services and his pure and noble character entitle him.

Book XVIII Concluding Chapter.

Lord Harris.

The southern presidency was never invaded by the mutinous spirit. But not the less is a large share of credit due to its governor, Lord Harris. The responsibility which weighed upon this nobleman was very great indeed. The immunity of Madras depended upon the loyalty of the Nizám, and, at the outset, the Nizám had much to apprehend from his own people. It was in the height of the crisis that Lord Harris denuded his own presidency to send troops to Haidarábád, and it cannot be doubted but that their opportune arrival tended greatly to the pacification of the Nizám's dominions. The formation of the Kámpti column, of Whitlock's force, of the brigade which fought under Carthew at Kánhpúr, the despatch to Bengal of the regiments which kept open the grand trunk road in western Bihár and who afterwards co-operated against Kúnwar Singh, of the troops who rendered good service in Chútia Nágpúr, testify to the energy, the foresight, the devotion of the Governor of Madras. He used all the resources of his presidency to crush outside the rebellion which never penetrated within his own borders.

displays foresight, energy, and devotion.

Of other actors in the rise, progress, and suppression of the rebellion I have written in the body of this history, not always, perhaps, in as full detail as their splendid services demanded, but, I hope, in full proportion to the scope and requirements of the work entrusted to me. It may be that some incidents have escaped me. I shall regret much should such prove to be so, for my chief anxiety has been to render full justice

The devotion of English heroism in the crisis of 1857-8-9.

Book XVIII. Concluding Chapter.

to every man. This, at least, I may say, that, however ineffectively the history of the Indian mutiny may at any time be told, the character of our countrymen must be seen to emerge from the terrible ordeal of 1857-58 in a form that would gratify the most exacting people. We are, fortunately, as a nation, accustomed to success in the field, but on no occasion in our history has the nerve and fibre of our troops, or the fortitude and manliness of our countrymen of all ranks, been more conspicuous—often in the face of death itself, or under circumstances which would have seemed to justify despair. But with life they never despaired. They endured all that had to be endured, with a patience and cheerfulness never to be surpassed, and sought victory when it was possible with a determination before which the strongest opposition had to yield. And in all this they were sustained and animated by our countrywomen, who, in positions and under trials to which few gentle-nurtured women have been subjected, showed all the noblest and most loveable aspects of a woman's character. The history of the Indian mutiny is, in fact, a record of the display of all the qualities for which Englishmen have been famous—of the qualities which enabled the inhabitants of a small island in the Atlantic to accumulate the noblest and largest empire in the world, and which, so long as they remain unimpaired in their descendants, will maintain it.

APPENDIX A.

Reference to pages 38 to 67, Volume II.

The Services of the Artillery during the Street-fighting at Dehlí.

When the third column entered the city through the Káshmír gate, it was followed by Major Scott's light field battery (No. 14). Heavy fighting was going on in the streets. Two guns, under Lieutenant M. M. FitzGerald, were at once sent to Ahmad Alí Khán's house on the right of the College gardens, to support the 60th regiment, which was soon after joined by the 52nd. Two guns, under Lieutenant Minto Elliot, joined the Bilúchis and 61st regiment in the College gardens, where Lieutenant Elliot was soon dangerously wounded. The remaining two guns, under Lieutenant Aislabie, joined Nicholson's column just as it had been compelled to retire to the Kábul gate, and assisted in all the subsequent fighting of that column until the capture of the Lahor gate. FitzGerald's and Elliot's guns were more or less actively engaged in all the street-fighting that took place on the left and centre, including the capture of the magazine and bank. The losses of the battery in men and horses were considerable, but not greater than were to be expected when manœuvring in narrow streets under con-

steady musketry-fire from the houses. They remained in the city, horses in harness, without relief until late on the 17th of September, when they were sent back to Ludlow Castle very used up. A detachment of the gunners, under Lieutenant Aislabie, was retained in the College gardens until the 20th of September. They manned some heavy mortars and howitzers there, and shelled the palace and the bridge of boats.

The 5th troop 1st brigade (native) Bengal horse artillery was the only battery of native artillery which remained faithful to us when it had the chance of mutinying. It was quartered at Jalandhar when the mutiny occurred there. Lieutenant Renny then marched it to Delhi. On the 9th of July, after the fanatic attack by the rebel cavalry on the right rear of our camp, it was thought advisable to take away its guns and horses as a precautionary measure. The native officers and men begged to be allowed to prove their loyalty, and were placed in charge of the mortar battery on the ridge, which they manned and worked without relief until the end of the siege.

On the 14th of September Lieutenant Renny took some of these native gunners into the city with him. They carried by hand a couple of 12-pounder mortars, and were usefully employed in shelling the houses and streets in front of our attack. Lieutenant Renny himself earned the Victoria Cross for gallant conduct at the attack on the magazine, and the loyalty of his troop was a striking proof of his personal influence. When the city had fallen, guns and horses were restored to him, and the 5th troop 1st brigade did gallant service in the Rohilkhand campaign.

APPENDIX B.

Reference to page 122 of Volume II.

I REGRET that, in describing somewhat in detail the stimulating effect on the provision of means for the equipment and progress of the army produced by the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell in Calcutta in August 1857, I should have seemed to undervalue the services of a most distinguished officer, Major, now General, Orfeur Cavenagh. I take the earliest opportunity of endeavouring to supply the omission. The Government of India had not under its orders in Calcutta an officer more deserving, or who rendered in that city such excellent service as did Major Cavenagh. In the early stages of the mutiny, and before the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, it was Major Orfeur Cavenagh who, as town and fort-major of Fort William, had officially represented to the Government the necessity for being prepared to receive the expected reinforcements. He had suggested that he should be allowed an assistant who should superintend all disembarkations, render any assistance to commanding officers on their arrival, and have under his charge a staff of servants to be kept complete and allotted to troops on their arrival. As usual, Cavenagh's suggestions were negatived, though permission was given him to entertain

the servants should he consider it necessary to do so. On this permission he acted, and, throughout the mutiny, under his own superintendence, he kept up a body of native servants. Eventually a disembarkation officer was appointed, not, however, as assistant to the town-major. To enable this officer to carry out his duties successfully, Cavenagh directed his own subordinates to recognise him and afford him every aid as though he were his assistant.

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC

APPENDIX C.

Reference to pages 201, 202, 203, Vol. II.

From the sixth line from the bottom, page 201, beginning at the words "He ordered" to the word "Moti Mahal," in the second line from the top on page 203, the text in subsequent editions will, in lieu of the present text, which is cancelled, run as follows:

"He ordered on this duty a company of the 90th foot, under Captain Wolseley, and a picket of the 58rd, sixty strong, under Captain Hopkins, Major Barnston's battalion of detachments, under Captain Guise of the 90th, and some of the 4th Panjáb rifles, under Lieutenant Powlett.

"The feat of arms devolving upon these men to attempt was no light one. The Mess-house, a building of considerable size, was surrounded by a loop-holed mud wall, covering a ditch about twelve feet broad, scarped with masonry. The ditch was traversed by drawbridges, but whether these were up or not was unknown to the storming party.

"I must deal first with Hopkins. Leading his men at the double across the intervening space, exposed to a hot fire from the neighbouring buildings, that most daring officer reached the mud wall of which I have spoken, dashed over it, crossed the drawbridge, fortunately left down, and entered

the Mess-house. Shortly after Hopkins had thus gained the place, Roberts of the Artillery—now Sir Frederic Roberts of Afghan celebrity—galloped up, handed him a Union Jack and requested him to hoist it on one of the turrets. Followed by one of his men, Hopkins ran to the top of the roof, and giving three cheers, planted the Union Jack on the summit. The cheers were responded to by a shout from the men, but the flag had not been up ten minutes before a round shot cut it and sent it down into the garden. Again did Hopkins plant it and again was it knocked down. He wished to hoist it again, but an order from the Commander-in-Chief arrived forbidding its further display. Whilst searching for the flagstaff in the garden Hopkins met Sir Colin and, after a brief colloquy, was at once placed in command of the Mess-house by the Chief of the Staff. He never left it till relieved the following afternoon by Captain Rolleston, 84th regiment. Wolseley, on his side, assaulting the place from a different point, had attacked the houses on the right of the building, whilst Irby, with a company of the supports, attempted to clear those on the left. Both attacks were successful, and the rebels, driven out, fled in panic to the Moti Mahal."*

* "About 5 P.M., when it was considered that men might be sent to storm it" (the Mess-house), "it was taken by a company of the 90th, under Captain Wolseley and a picket of H.M.'s 52nd under Captain Hopkins, supported by Major Barnston's battalion of detachments under Captain Guise H.M.'s 90th, and some of the Panjáb infantry under Lieutenant Powlett. The Mess-house was carried with a rush."—*Sir Colin Campbell's Despatch.*

APPENDIX D.

Reference to page 364 of Volume II.

The statement made by me in the first edition of the second volume regarding the part taken by Brigadier Napier in the plan for the attack on Lákhnao having been taken objection to, I drew attention in the second edition to the official papers on the subject extracted from Volume X. of *Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers*. I now attach extract from a letter, dated the 4th of February 1858, addressed by Brigadier Napier to Sir Colin Campbell containing his proposals for the attack—all of which were accepted and carried out.

"My dear Sir Colin,—

"I am afraid you will be disappointed at not receiving the projects, but our people have been bringing a considerable amount of intelligence to fill up our plans, which have tempted me to enter into details. I may, however, briefly state that, notwithstanding the enemy has made a good many defences and thrown up a ditch and rampart round the north side of the Kaisár Bágh, and has endeavoured to cut away all the passages across the canal, I do not apprehend any great difficulty.

"I would propose to encamp the force sufficiently far behind the Dilkusha to be out of fire; to establish a bridge

on the Gúmti to pass over artillery and cavalry, to cut off the enemy's supplies, and to deter them from bringing out guns on the north side of the river to annoy us.

"To cross the canal in the first instance at Banks's house, under cover of our artillery, and to place guns in position to bear on the mass of buildings which flank the European infantry barracks, the hospital, the Bégam's house, and the Hazratgauj—the places which rendered the European barracks so barely tenable—and to take that mass of buildings with the barracks.

"This position takes in flank all the defences of the north side of the Kaisar Bágh, and from them we may penetrate gradually to the Kaisar Bágh with the aid of the sapper and gunpowder, at the same time that we will occupy your old ground between the Kaisar Bágh and the Gúmti, to have positions for our artillery of all kinds to play on the Kaisar Bágh and its surrounding buildings. We shall, during this time, be steadily penetrating through the buildings on the left of the European barracks, making irresistible progress until we reach the Kaisar Bágh.

"Until we take that place we shall have as little street-fighting as is possible, and I hardly expect they will await an assault. But if they should do so, and defend the remainder of the city, we must advance, under cover of our mortars, until we occupy the bridges, which will certainly clear off the remainder, or they will starve.

"Jallálábád will be our depôt, and when we have got the enemy's guns driven off, we may bring our park up to the Dilkusha.

"I should have chosen your old passage across the canal but the enemy have cut a new one across the neck of a loop, and have put guns behind it, so that, as far as the intelligence guides us, Banks's house will be easiest."

APPENDIX E.

Reference to page 407 of Volume II.

For the sentence beginning "Hagart ordered the 7th to charge," the following will be substituted in subsequent editions:—"Hagart ordered the 7th to charge. Before they could get well in motion, Slade, who commanded the party, was severely wounded, and Bankes and his charger were cut down. Wilkin charged to his side, but in warding off the attack from his wounded comrade, his horse reared. This caused him to miss his aim, and at the same time he received a severe wound in the foot. Wheeling again to the rescue, he cut down the rebel who was on the point of killing Bankes. The loss of their officers had taken the men by surprise, but Wilkin, though wounded, rallied them, and, joined by Hagart, who came up opportunely, once again charged the rebels, and cut down nearly all those who remained. These two officers particularly distinguished themselves."

To be added in a note: "For his gallant conduct Wilkin was twice recommended for the Victoria Cross, but he received neither recognition nor reward."

APPENDIX F.

Reference to page 418 of Volume II.

On the subject of the panic in Calcutta of the 3rd of March 1858, the following particulars have been furnished me by General Orfeur Cavenagh:—"On the 2nd of March, about 6 P.M., I received a note from General Ramsay stating that he had received information that arms had been collected in the suburbs of Calcutta for the purpose of being distributed amongst the men of the Reserve guard, on their march down to the fort, to enable them to make an attack on the European residents. The general begged me to be on the alert, and to cause a search to be made for the arms. Mr. Dorin was then President of the Council, and I rode over to his house and showed him the note. He requested me to instruct the civil authorities to make the requisite search for the arms, and to quietly intimate to commanding officers, including Turnbull, who commanded the volunteers, that it was possible that the services of the troops might be required, so that they might be ready to turn out if necessary. No orders were given for any pickets to be posted, nor was the garrison guard under arms. It was late before I returned to the fort, as I had to ride over to Alipúr to see F., who was the magistrate by whom orders for the search had to be made. Only a few muskets were discovered. This was the real cause of the alarm to which you refer. I was rather surprised at hearing of the excitement that had taken place in Calcutta."

APPENDIX G.

Reference to page 472 of Volume II.

For the sentence, "Hamilton of the 3rd Sikhs, a very gallant officer, was killed charging the squares," the following will be substituted in subsequent editions:—"Hamilton of the 3rd Sikhs, a very gallant officer, was wounded and unhorsed when charging the squares. As he lay on the ground, the rebels cutting at him, Middleton of the 29th Foot and Farrier Murphy rushed to his assistance, and succeeded in rescuing his body from being cut to pieces. The wounds Hamilton received were, however, mortal. A little later, when a body of rebels, who had re-formed, left their ranks with drawn talwárs in their hands to cut down a dismounted wounded trooper of the Military Train, Middleton dashed at them, drove them back, dismounted, and placed the wounded trooper on his horse. The rebels fell back, leaving only three guns on the field. The British found it impossible to pursue. They therefore halted," &c. &c.

APPENDIX H.

Reference to pages 507 and 508 of Vol. II.

Since the second edition of the second volume of this history was published I have ascertained that the account of the death of Adrian Hope given in that volume was not quite accurate in some of its details. It will be seen from the amended account, which I subjoin, and which in future editions will occupy its proper place on pages 507 and 508 of the second volume, that, notwithstanding the rumours of the camp, Adrian Hope never had the smallest intention of taking the command from Walpole. The amended account will immediately follow the paragraph in page 507 concluding with the words "his gallant exploit," and will displace the now cancelled paragraphs in page 507 beginning "Before these gallant deeds," and in page 508, beginning with the words "All this time Adrian Hope" and "What was Adrian Hope going to say to Walpole?"

"Before these gallant deeds had been performed, Walpole, alarmed at the consequences of his own rashness, had caused the heavy guns to open on the wall from the side opposite to that occupied by the skirmishers. Soon after they had opened fire, a report was made to Adrian Hope that the shots from the heavy guns were going over the fort and

dropping amongst his men. Adrian Hope at once rode to Walpole. What passed between them cannot with any certainty be known, but it seems probable that Walpole doubted the truth of the report, for on his return from the conversation Adrian Hope declared to his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Butler, that he would go and see for himself. Dismounting from his horse, and closely followed by the brigade-major and Butler, Hope walked to the advanced line of skirmishers and crept up the glacis to look over. He had scarcely shown himself before he fell back, shot dead. Before, during, and for a short time subsequently to this event occurred those deeds of daring on the part of Willoughby, Douglas, Bramley, and their men which I have spoken of. At last Walpole, unable to make any impression on the fort, and seeing that every minute added to the slaughter of his infantry, ordered a retreat. This retreat was the signal for the display of the splendid devotion recorded in the preceding paragraph."

The next paragraph will begin, "Adrian Hope had fallen. Then, the retreat having been ordered, Brigadier Hagart," &c. &c.

APPENDIX I.

Translation of Tántia Topi's Voluntary Deposition or Statement taken in Camp Máshári on the 10th of April 1858, in presence of Major Meade, commanding Field Force.

My name is Tántia Topi; my father's name is Pándurang, inhabitant of Jolá-Pargannáh, Patoda-Zillah, Nagar. I am a resident of Bithúr. I am about forty-five years of age, in the service of Náná Sáhib in the grade of companion or aide-de-camp.

In the month of May 1857 the collector of Kánhpúr sent a note of the following purport to the Náná Sáhib at Bithúr, viz. that he begged him (the Náná) to forward his wife and children to England. The Náná consented to do so, and four days afterwards the collector wrote to him to bring his troops and guns with him from Bithúr (to Kánhpúr). I went with the Náná and about one hundred sepoys and three hundred matchlockmen and two guns to the collector's house at Kánhpúr. The collector was then in the intrenchment, and not in his house. He sent us word to remain, and we stopped at his house during the night. The collector came in the morning and told the Náná to occupy his own house, which was in Kánhpúr. We accordingly did so; we remained there four days, and the gentleman said it was fortunate we had come to his aid, as the sepoys had become disobedient, and that he would apply to the general in our behalf. He did so, and the

general wrote to Agra, whence a reply came that arrangements would be made for the pay of our men. Two days afterwards the three regiments of infantry and the 2nd light cavalry surrounded us and imprisoned the Náná and myself in the Treasury, and plundered the magazine and Treasury of everything they contained, leaving nothing in either. Of the treasure the sepoys made over two lakhs and eleven thousand rupees to the Náná, keeping their own sentries over it. The Náná was also under charge of these sentries, and the sepoys who were with us also joined the rebels. After this the whole army marched from that place and the rebels took the Náná Sáhib and myself and all our attendants along with them, and said, "Come along to Dehlí." Having gone three coss from Kánhpúr, the Náná Sáhib said that, as the day was far spent, it was better to halt there then, and to march on the following day. They agreed to this and halted. In the morning the whole army told him (the Náná) to go with them towards Dehlí. The Náná refused, and the army then said, "Come with us to Kánhpúr, and fight there." The Náná objected to this; but they would not attend to him, and so, taking him with them as a prisoner, they went towards Kánhpúr, and fighting commenced there. The fighting continued for twenty-four days, and on the twenty-fourth day the general raised the flag of peace, and the fighting ceased. The Náná got a female who had been captured before to write a note to General Wheeler to this effect, that the sepoys would not obey his orders, and that, if he wished, he (the Náná) would get boats and convey him and those with him in the intrenchment as far as Alláhábád. An answer came from the general that he approved of this arrangement, and the same evening the general sent the Náná something over one lakh of rupees, and authorised him to keep the amount. The following day I went and got ready forty boats, and having caused all the gentlemen, ladies, and children to get into the boats, I started them off to Alláhábád. In the

meanwhile the whole army, artillery included, having got ready, arrived at the river Ganges. The sepoys jumped into the water and commenced a massacre of all the men, women, and children, and set the boats on fire. They destroyed thirty-nine boats. One, however, escaped as far as Kolá Kankar, but was there caught and brought back to Kánhpúr, and all on board of it destroyed. Four days after this the Náná said he was going to Bíthúr to keep the anniversary of his mother's death; they (the sepoys) allowed him to go, and some of them also accompanied him. Having kept the anniversary, they brought him back to Kánhpúr, and they took for their pay the money they had first made over to the Náná's charge, and made arrangements to fight against Hussan Fathpúr, where they heard some Europeans had arrived from Allahábád, and they told the Náná to accompany them there. The Náná refused. I and the Náná remained at Kánhpúr, and sent Joala Parsad, his (the Náná's) agent, along with them to Fathpúr. Having arrived there and been defeated, they retreated to Kánhpúr, and the aforesaid European force pressed them the whole way to Kánhpúr, when there was a battle for about two hours, and the rebel army was again defeated, and ran away from Kánhpúr. Under these circumstances the Náná and I fled to Bíthúr, arriving there at midnight, and the rebel army followed us. The next morning the Náná, taking some cash, &c. with him, went to Fathpúr. The rebel army followed, and looted the place. The Náná, Bálá Sáhib, Teka Sáhib, and myself, with all our wives, crossed the Ganges in boats, and arrived at Fathpúr in the Lakhnau territory, and put up with the chaudri Bhopal Singh. Some days passed, when the 42nd native infantry arrived at Sheorajpúr, and wrote to the Náná to send them someone to take them to him. I went and told them that the Náná had sent for them. In the meanwhile the English army arrived, and the said 42nd regiment native infantry went to Bíthúr, and fought there. I accompanied the said regiment, and having

been defeated, we fled from Bithúr and crossed the Ganges, and came to the Nána. Some days after, I received orders from the Nána to go to Gwáliár, and to bring back with me to Kálpi the English such of the contingent as were at Morár. According to his order, I went to Morár, and brought back the contingent with me to Kálpi. The Nána had sent his brother, the Bálá Sáhib, to Kálpi, and according to his order, I went with the army to fight against Kánhpur, leaving a small force and magazine at Kálpi. Having arrived at Kánhpár, there was a battle which lasted eleven days. After eleven days the rebel army was defeated, and we all ran away. The next day after this we fought at Shoorajpúr, and there also having been defeated, we ran away, having with us fifteen guns (including one horse-artillery gun). I and the Bálá Sáhib and the Ráo Sáhib, who had been sent by the Nána to Kánhpár, all crossed the Ganges at Nana Máu-ki-Ghát. We remained at a place called Kheyra for the night. I got orders from the Ráo Sáhib to go and take charge of the small force and magazine left at Kálpi, in obedience to which I went there. After my arrival at Kálpi, I received orders from the Nána to go and attack Chirkári, and that the Ráo Sáhib should be sent after me. Accordingly I, with nine hundred sepoys, two hundred cavalry, and four guns, went to Chirkári, and fighting commenced. Four days afterwards the Ráo Sáhib came to Kálpi. I fought at Chirkari for eleven days, and took it. I took twenty-four guns and three lakhs of rupees from the rája. The rájás of Bánpár and Shahgarh, and Dewan Despat and Daulat Singh, the Kuchwaya Kharwára, and a great gathering of people joined me there at this time. I received a note from the queen of Jhánsi to the effect that she was waging war with the Europeans, and begging me to come to her aid. I reported the news to the Ráo Sáhib at Kálpi. The Ráo came to Jaipúr, and gave me permission to go to the assistance of the queen of Jhánsi. Accordingly I went to Jhánsi, and halted at

Burrua Ságar. There rájá Mán Singh came and joined me. The next day, about a mile from Jhánsi, the whole of our army had a fight with the English army. At this time we had twenty-two thousand men and twenty-eight guns. In this battle we were defeated. A part of the rebel army, with four or five guns, fled to Kálpi, and I went to the same place, *viâ* Bhánderi and Kúnch, with two hundred sepoys. The queen of Jhánsi arrived there the same evening as myself, and begged the Ráo Sáhib to give her an army that she might go and fight. The following morning the Ráo Sáhib ordered a parade of all the troops, and told me to accompany the queen to battle. Accordingly I, with a force, accompanied the queen, and there was a battle at Kúnch which lasted till noon. We were again defeated, and fled, and I fled to "Chirki," which is about four miles from Jalaur, and where my parents were. The queen of Jhánsi and the force which fled with her arrived at Kálpi. The Ráo had a battle afterwards at Kálpi and was defeated, and he and his whole army arrived at Gopálpúr. I also left Chirkee, and joined him at Gopálpúr; we all marched thence towards Gwáliár. We had one day's fight with Mahárájá Sindia, and defeated him. Three days afterwards all Sindia's army joined the Ráo Sáhib, and having procured from the Gwáliár treasury, through Amarchand Batia (the mahárájá's treasurer), the requisite funds, pay was distributed to the army. Rám Ráo Govind was also with us. Some days afterwards the English army arrived at Gwáliár from Kálpi, and a force also came from Sirpúr. Fighting again took place, and continued for four or five days, during which the Jhánsi rání was killed. Rám Ráo Govind had her corpse burnt, and we were all defeated and fled, taking twenty-five guns with us. We reached Jaora Álipúr and remained there during the night. The next morning we were attacked, and fought for an hour and a half. We fired five shots, and the English army fired four shots, and we then ran off, leaving all our guns. We crossed

the Chambal and reached Tánk *viâ* Sirmuthia. The nawáb of Tánk fought with us, and we took four guns from him. With these guns we proceeded to Bhilwára *viâ* Mándalgarh and Indragarh. We were there attacked by the English force, and I fled during the night, accompanied by my army and guns. At that time I had eight or nine thousand men and four guns with me. We all proceeded to a village called Kotra (about four miles from Natheduwarra) and halted there for one night. The next morning we moved towards Patan, and after proceeding about one mile the English army arrived, and an action took place. We left our four guns and fled, reaching Patan as fugitives. (The nawáb of Bándá, who had come with us from Kálpi, and the nawáb of Kumoona, who had joined us at Indárki, were both with us.) On our arrival at Patan fighting commenced between us and the rájá of that place; we conquered, and got possession of all the rájá's guns and magazines, and surrounded his palace, in which he was. The next day I went and told the rájá to give some money to pay the expenses of my army. He said he could give five lakhs of rupees, but not more. I returned and told the Ráo Sáhib this. The next day the Ráo Sáhib sent for the rájá and demanded twenty-five lakhs from him. The rájá declared he could not give more than five lakhs; but, after some discussion, it was settled that he should pay fifteen lakhs. The rájá said he would go to his palace and send this sum. He went accordingly, and sent two and a quarter lakhs in cash, and promised that the rest should follow. By the next day he had paid up five lakhs.

Imám Alí, Wárd major 5th irregular cavalry, ill-treated the rájá very much, and the latter fled during the night. We remained there five days, and issued three months' pay to our troops at the rate of thirty rupees each sowar, and twelve rupees to each foot-soldier per mensem.

We then marched for Sironj, taking eighteen guns with us. On reaching Rájgarh the English army came up and

attacked us. We left our guns and fled, and reached Sironj via Nija Killa. We halted at Sironj eight days, and having taken four guns from the Tank nawáb's agent at Sironj, we proceeded thence to Ishoghur. On arrival there we demanded supplies, but the Ishogarh people would not give them. We therefore attacked Ishogarh, and plundered it. The following day we halted, and the Ráo Sáhib told me to go to Chandairi and that he would come round by Tál Bahat. I accordingly went to Chandairi, and the Ráo Sáhib came to Lallatpúr from (or by) Tál Bahat. On my reaching Chandairi, four shots were first fired on us from the fort, which we attacked and fought with Sindia's agent. After three days we marched from Chandairi towards Mangroli, taking with us eleven guns, viz. seven which we had brought from Ishogarh and the four we had got from Sironj. On our march to Mangróli, we met the English army. Shots were fired for a short time, when we left all our guns and fled. (Of the eleven guns five were with me and six with the Ráo Sáhib. I lost my five in this fight, but the Ráo kept his six.)

(Note.—It would appear that the Ráo was not in this action.)

I reached Jaklon, and the next day went to Sulantpúr, where the Ráo Sáhib also arrived. After three days the English force arrived, and the Ráo Sáhib took his army to Jaklon (about five miles from Lallatpúr), and some firing took place there. I was not present in this fight. The Ráo Sáhib returned to Lallatpúr, and the following day proceeded to Rajúriá (ten miles from Sulantpúr) and halted there. The next day the English army came up just as we were going to march, and an action commenced which lasted an hour and a half. We then left all our guns and fled, and reached Tál Bahat. We halted there, and the following day went to Jaklon, and thence to a village called Itara, twelve miles distant, where we stopped. We there heard that the English army was coming to surprise us, and marched at

night. The English force came up in the morning, and our army became separated. I accompanied the Ráo Sáhib, and we proceeded, *viâ* Rájghur, and crossed the Narbadá, and got to Kaogáon Battis *viâ* Kandula. The troops who were with us burned the Government thánna and bungalow at Kandula. The Ráo Sáhib forbad their doing so, but they would not obey him. This was about four months ago. At Kaogáon Battis there were some of Holkár's troops—one hundred and forty sowars, one company of infantry, and two guns. These we forced to join us, and took them with us when we marched the following day towards Gujrát, crossing the high road where the telegraph-wire ran. The sepoys broke the wire and plundered seven hackeries which were on the road proceeding with Government property towards Gwálior, and seized the chuprassis and chaukidárs who were with the hackeries, and took them with them. Some of the chaukidárs belonging to the chauki were hanged by them. We there left the high road and proceeded westward. The next day we were surprised by the English force, and leaving our two guns, we fled, and reached the Narbadá. An officer, with one hundred men, was on the opposite bank. Our force commenced to cross, and this officer and party of sowars ran off. We plundered a village there called Chikda, and marched thence at midnight. After proceeding thirty-six miles, we halted at Rajpúra. The next day we took three thousand nine hundred rupees and three horses from the rasd of that place, and from it went on to Chota Udaipúr. The following day the English force surprised us; some of them were killed, and some of ours. From Chota Udaipúr we went on to Deogarh Bári, and our army became separated. There was jungle at that place, and I halted there two days. Our troops having been collected again, we started, and went to Bánswára. Our men plundered there sixteen or seventeen camel-loads of cloth (some of Ahmadábád) belonging to a mahájan which they found there. We thence went to Salomar, and I called on

Kaisar Singh, agent for the Udaipúr rájá, to furnish us with supplies. He sent us some, and the following day we again started with the intention of going to Udaipúr. However, *en route* we received tidings of the English force, and retraced our steps to Bhílwárá. We remained there two days and then proceeded to Partábgarh, where we fought for two hours with a body of English troops which had come from Nímach. About 8 o'clock P.M. we ran off, and proceeded about six miles to the east of Mandisor and halted there. We then went on to Zirápúr, making three stages *en route*. An English force surprised us there, and we were again surprised by another force at Chápra Baród. We fled thence to Nahargarh, the agent of the Kotah rájá, at which place nine shots were fired at us from guns. We moved out of range, and halted there during the night; and the Ráo Sáhib sent Risáldár Nannú Khán to call rájá Mán Singh. The rájá came and accompanied us—*i.e.*, the Ráo Sáhib, myself, and our force—to a place about two miles from Parón, where we halted. We remained there two days, and on the third went on to a place about eight miles beyond Kilwarrí, whose name I do not remember. Rájá Mán Singh accompanied us as far as a river which we crossed *en route*, and then left us. We made two stages thence to Indragarh; and Firoz Shah with the Khás Risálá (body-guard) and 12th irregulars met us there. The next day we went on, making two stages, to Dawás, which is fourteen miles from Jaipúr. The English force surprised us there; some men on both sides were killed, and flying thence towards Márwár, we reached a village about thirty koss from Márwár, whose name I do not remember. At 4 o'clock that night we were surprised by the English force, and the 12th irregular cavalry separated from the Ráo Sáhib's army. The next day Thákur Naráyan Singh, Ajhít Singh, uncle of rájá Mán Singh, and Thákur Gangá Singh joined us at that place (i.e. to which the Ráo's army had fled). They were coming in this (the Parón) direction. I had been quarrel-

ling with the Ráo Sáhib all the way from Deogarh Bárí, and told him I could flee no longer, and that whenever I saw an opportunity for doing so, I should leave him. The opportunity for doing so here offered, and I left him and accompanied the (three) above-named parties in this (the Paron) direction. When I left the Ráo Sáhib he had about six thousand men with him. But three men (two Pandits to cook my food and one sais) and three horses and one tattú accompanied me. The names of the two pandits were Rám Ráo and Naráyan. The sais's name was Gobind, but he left me and ran off after coming two stages. We reached the Paron jungle and met rájá Mán Singh. Ajhit Singh took leave of rájá Mán Singh, and went to his home. Naráyan Singh and I remained with rájá Mán Singh. The rája said, "Why did you leave your force? You have not acted right in so doing." I replied that I was tired of running away, and that I would remain with him whether I had done right or wrong. I heard after this that the Ráo Sáhib's army had gone to Patan, and thence towards Sironj. I told rájá Mán Singh I would send a man to get intelligence of them, and he approved of my doing so. I sent accordingly, and got information that the Ráo Sáhib was not there; but Imám Alí, Wúrdí-major, Firoz Sháh, and the Ambapání-wala Nawáb, Adil Muhammad, were there with eight or nine thousand men. Imám Alí, Wúrdí-major of the 5th irregular cavalry, wrote to me to come and join them. I had lost my master's (the Nána's) seal, and had another made up at Paron.

When I heard, as above, from the Wúrdí-major, I sent a man to rája Mán Singh, who was at Mahidia in Major Meade's camp (he had then been there three days), to inform him that I had received a note of this purport, and to ask him if I should go or remain. Rája Mán Singh had consulted me before giving himself up to Major Meade, and had left one of his men with me, saying, "Stop wherever this man takes you." Rája Mán Sing replied to my message

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